Airspace of Libya

This CZIB is issued based on information currently available to EASA, the European Commission and Member States in order to share information which is considered necessary to ensure the safety of flights over zones of interest and indicate areas of high risk.

The security situation in Libya remains volatile due to the presence of two competing governments and violent non-state actors, creating the potential for unpredictable developments affecting the Libyan airspace.

At lower and medium altitudes, main risks arise from the presence of multiple armed actors, localised armed clashes, military UAV activity and the availability of aviation-relevant weapons, including MANPADS and anti-aircraft artillery. These factors increase the risk of misidentification and unintended engagement of civil aircraft, particularly during periods of heightened tension. Consequently, the airspace below FL320 is assessed as presenting a high level of risk, except for operations to airports involving approaches from the sea, provided these are conducted in full coordination with local authorities and local ATC, and supported by a robust risk assessment.

In relation to the main risks affecting Libyan airspace at high altitudes, actors in Libya continue to retain all-altitude capable air-defence systems. However, there is currently no active armed conflict involving military air operations or surface-to-air missile activity affecting the upper airspace, nor any indication that Libyan actors intend to target civil aviation. There is also no information indicating an imminent resumption of full-scale armed conflict or widespread hostilities between the competing authorities. Consequently, the airspace above FL320 is assessed as presenting a medium level of risk under the current security conditions.

Should the security situation deteriorate, the risk to overflights could increase with little or no warning. In such circumstances, fragmented command and control of air-defence systems, together with heightened military activity, could increase the likelihood of misidentification of civil aircraft, particularly when operating across territories controlled by competing authorities.

In terms of airspace management, the fragmented security environment reduces the effectiveness of civil-military coordination, information sharing and deconfliction arrangements. In addition, the absence of timely or reliable advisories, including aeronautical information (e.g. NOTAMs), may limit operators' ability to identify and mitigate conflict-related risks. As a result, there are limited mitigating measures, on which air operators can rely at present.