Easy Access Rules for Air Operations

ED Decision 2013/021/R

GUIDANCE MATERIAL FOR TERRAIN AWARENESS WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES

(a)Introduction

(1)This GM contains performance-based training objectives for TAWS flight crew training.

(2)The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAWS cautions; response to TAWS warnings.

(3)The term ‘TAWS’ in this GM means a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) enhanced by a forward-looking terrain avoidance function. Alerts include both cautions and warnings.

(4)The content of this GM is intended to assist operators who are producing training programmes. The information it contains has not been tailored to any specific aircraft or TAWS equipment, but highlights features that are typically available where such systems are installed. It is the responsibility of the individual operator to determine the applicability of the content of this Guidance Material to each aircraft and TAWS equipment installed and their operation. Operators should refer to the AFM and/or aircraft/flight crew operating manual (A/FCOM), or similar documents, for information applicable to specific configurations. If there should be any conflict between the content of this Guidance Material and that published in the other documents described above, then the information contained in the AFM or A/FCOM will take precedence.

(b)Scope

(1)The scope of this GM is designed to identify training objectives in the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation; recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items that are considered essential training items and those that are considered to be desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined.

(2)No attempt is made to define how the training programme should be implemented. Instead, objectives are established to define the knowledge that a pilot operating a TAWS is expected to possess and the performance expected from a pilot who has completed TAWS training. However, the guidelines do indicate those areas in which the pilot receiving the training should demonstrate his/her understanding, or performance, using a real time interactive training device, i.e. a flight simulator. Where appropriate, notes are included within the performance criteria that amplify or clarify the material addressed by the training objective.

(c)Performance-based training objectives

(1)TAWS academic training

(i)This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or by providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions.

(ii)Theory of operation. The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of TAWS operation and the criteria used for issuing cautions and warnings. This training should address system operation. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how a TAWS functions. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions:

(A)Surveillance

(a)The GPWS computer processes data supplied from an air data computer, a radio altimeter, an instrument landing system (ILS)/microwave landing system (MLS)/multi-mode (MM) receiver, a roll attitude sensor, and actual position of the surfaces and of the landing gear.

(b)The forward-looking terrain avoidance function utilises an accurate source of known aircraft position, such as that which may be provided by a flight management system (FMS) or global positioning system (GPS), or an electronic terrain database. The source and scope of the terrain, obstacle and airport data, and features such as the terrain clearance floor, the runway picker, and geometric altitude (where provided), should all be described.

(c)Displays required to deliver TAWS outputs include a loudspeaker for voice announcements, visual alerts (typically amber and red lights) and a terrain awareness display (that may be combined with other displays). In addition, means should be provided for indicating the status of the TAWS and any partial or total failures that may occur.

(B)Terrain avoidance. Outputs from the TAWS computer provide visual and audio synthetic voice cautions and warnings to alert the flight crew about potential conflicts with terrain and obstacles.

(C)Alert thresholds. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings. Criteria: the pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and alerts and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including:

(a)basic GPWS alerting modes specified in the ICAO standard:

Mode 1: excessive sink rate;

Mode 2: excessive terrain closure rate;

Mode 3: descent after take-off or missed approach;

Mode 4: unsafe proximity to terrain; and

Mode 5: descent below ILS glide slope (caution only);

(b)an additional, optional alert mode:

Mode 6: radio altitude call-out (information only); and

(c)TAWS cautions and warnings that alert the flight crew to obstacles and terrain ahead of the aircraft in line with or adjacent to its projected flight path (forward-looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) and premature descent alert (PDA) functions).

(D)TAWS limitations. Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the limitations of TAWS. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of TAWS limitations identified by the manufacturer for the equipment model installed, such as:

(a)navigation should not be predicated on the use of the terrain display;

(b)unless geometric altitude data is provided, use of predictive TAWS functions is prohibited when altimeter subscale settings display ‘QFE’ (atmospheric pressure at aerodrome elevation/runway threshold);

(c)nuisance alerts can be issued if the aerodrome of intended landing is not included in the TAWS airport database;

(d)in cold weather operations, corrective procedures should be implemented by the pilot unless the TAWS has in-built compensation, such as geometric altitude data;

(e)loss of input data to the TAWS computer could result in partial or total loss of functionality. Where means exist to inform the flight crew that functionality has been degraded, this should be known and the consequences understood;

(f)radio signals not associated with the intended flight profile (e.g. ILS glide path transmissions from an adjacent runway) may cause false alerts;

(g)inaccurate or low accuracy aircraft position data could lead to false or non-annunciation of terrain or obstacles ahead of the aircraft; and

(h)minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions should be applied in the event of the TAWS becoming partially or completely unserviceable. (It should be noted that basic GPWS has no forward-looking capability.)

(E)TAWS inhibits. Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of a TAWS are inhibited. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of the various TAWS inhibits, including the following means of:

(a)silencing voice alerts;

(b)inhibiting ILS glide path signals (as may be required when executing an ILS back beam approach);

(c)inhibiting flap position sensors (as may be required when executing an approach with the flaps not in a normal position for landing);

(d)inhibiting the FLTA and PDA functions; and

(e)selecting or deselecting the display of terrain information, together with appropriate annunciation of the status of each selection.

(2)Operating procedures. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate TAWS avionics and to interpret the information presented by a TAWS. This training should address the following topics:

(i)Use of controls. Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all TAWS controls and inhibits. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following means by which:

(A)before flight, any equipment self-test functions can be initiated;

(B)TAWS information can be selected for display; and

(C)all TAWS inhibits can be operated and what the consequent annunciations mean with regard to loss of functionality.

(ii)Display interpretation. Objective: to verify that the pilot understands the meaning of all information that can be annunciated or displayed by a TAWS. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information annunciated or displayed by a TAWS, including the following:

(A)knowledge of all visual and aural indications that may be seen or heard;

(B)response required on receipt of a caution;

(C)response required on receipt of a warning; and

(D)response required on receipt of a notification that partial or total failure of the TAWS has occurred (including annunciation that the present aircraft position is of low accuracy).

(iii)Use of basic GPWS or use of the FLTA function only. Objective: to verify that the pilot understands what functionality will remain following loss of the GPWS or of the FLTA function. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge of how to recognise the following:

(A)un-commanded loss of the GPWS function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) protection (essentially, this is the FLTA function); and

(B)un-commanded loss of the FLTA function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining CFIT protection (essentially, this is the basic GPWS).

(iv)Crew coordination. Objective: to verify that the pilot adequately briefs other flight crew members on how TAWS alerts will be handled. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate that the pre-flight briefing addresses procedures that will be used in preparation for responding to TAWS cautions and warnings, including the following:

(A)the action to be taken, and by whom, in the event that a TAWS caution and/or warning is issued; and

(B)how multi-function displays will be used to depict TAWS information at take-off, in the cruise and for the descent, approach, landing (and any missed approach). This will be in accordance with procedures specified by the operator, who will recognise that it may be more desirable that other data is displayed at certain phases of flight and that the terrain display has an automatic ‘pop-up’ mode in the event that an alert is issued.

(v)Reporting rules. Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the rules for reporting alerts to the controller and other authorities. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge of the following:

(A)when, following recovery from a TAWS alert or caution, a transmission of information should be made to the appropriate ATC unit; and

(B)the type of written report that is required, how it is to be compiled and whether any cross-reference should be made in the aircraft technical log and/or voyage report (in accordance with procedures specified by the operator), following a flight in which the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert, or if any part of the equipment appears not to have functioned correctly.

(vi)Alert thresholds. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings. Criteria: the pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and warnings and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including awareness of the following:

(A)modes associated with basic GPWS, including the input data associated with each; and

(B)visual and aural annunciations that can be issued by TAWS and how to identify which are cautions and which are warnings.

(3)TAWS manoeuvre training. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to respond correctly to TAWS cautions and warnings. This training should address the following topics:

(i)Response to cautions:

(A)Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to cautions. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the need, without delay:

(a)to initiate action required to correct the condition that has caused the TAWS to issue the caution and to be prepared to respond to a warning, if this should follow; and

(b)if a warning does not follow the caution, to notify the controller of the new position, heading and/or altitude/flight level of the aircraft, and what the pilot-in-command intends to do next.

(B)The correct response to a caution might require the pilot to:

(a)reduce a rate of descent and/or to initiate a climb;

(b)regain an ILS glide path from below, or to inhibit a glide path signal if an ILS is not being flown;

(c)select more flap, or to inhibit a flap sensor if the landing is being conducted with the intent that the normal flap setting will not be used;

(d)select gear down; and/or

(e)initiate a turn away from the terrain or obstacle ahead and towards an area free of such obstructions if a forward-looking terrain display indicates that this would be a good solution and the entire manoeuvre can be carried out in clear visual conditions.

(ii)Response to warnings. Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to warnings. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following:

(A)The need, without delay, to initiate a climb in the manner specified by the operator.

(B)The need, without delay, to maintain the climb until visual verification can be made that the aircraft will clear the terrain or obstacle ahead or until above the appropriate sector safe altitude (if certain about the location of the aircraft with respect to terrain) even if the TAWS warning stops. If, subsequently, the aircraft climbs up through the sector safe altitude, but the visibility does not allow the flight crew to confirm that the terrain hazard has ended, checks should be made to verify the location of the aircraft and to confirm that the altimeter subscale settings are correct.

(C)When workload permits, that the flight crew should notify the air traffic controller of the new position and altitude/flight level and what the pilot-in-command intends to do next.

(D)That the manner in which the climb is made should reflect the type of aircraft and the method specified by the aircraft manufacturer (which should be reflected in the operations manual) for performing the escape manoeuvre. Essential aspects will include the need for an increase in pitch attitude, selection of maximum thrust, confirmation that external sources of drag (e.g. spoilers/speed brakes) are retracted and respect of the stick shaker or other indication of eroded stall margin.

(E)That TAWS warnings should never be ignored. However, the pilot’s response may be limited to that which is appropriate for a caution, only if:

(a)the aircraft is being operated by day in clear, visual conditions; and

(b)it is immediately clear to the pilot that the aircraft is in no danger in respect of its configuration, proximity to terrain or current flight path.

(4)TAWS initial evaluation:

(i)The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test.

(ii)The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a flight simulation training device (FSTD) equipped with TAWS visual and aural displays and inhibit selectors similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft that the pilot will fly. The results should be assessed by a flight simulation training instructor, synthetic flight examiner, type rating instructor or type rating examiner.

(iii)The range of scenarios should be designed to give confidence that proper and timely responses to TAWS cautions and warnings will result in the aircraft avoiding a CFIT accident. To achieve this objective, the pilot should demonstrate taking the correct action to prevent a caution developing into a warning and, separately, the escape manoeuvre needed in response to a warning. These demonstrations should take place when the external visibility is zero, though there is much to be learnt if, initially, the training is given in ‘mountainous’ or ‘hilly’ terrain with clear visibility. This training should comprise a sequence of scenarios, rather than be included in line orientated flight training (LOFT).

(iv)A record should be made, after the pilot has demonstrated competence, of the scenarios that were practised.

(5)TAWS recurrent training:

(i)TAWS recurrent training ensures that pilots maintain the appropriate TAWS knowledge and skills. In particular, it reminds pilots of the need to act promptly in response to cautions and warnings and of the unusual attitude associated with flying the escape manoeuvre.

(ii)An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to TAWS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique TAWS characteristics of which pilots should be aware.

(6)Reporting procedures:

(i)Verbal reports. Verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit:

(A)whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance;

(B)when, following a manoeuvre that has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aircraft has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or

(C)when an air traffic control unit issues instructions that, if followed, would cause the pilot to manoeuvre the aircraft towards terrain or obstacle or it would appear from the display that a potential CFIT occurrence is likely to result.

(ii)Written reports. Written reports should be submitted in accordance with the operator's occurrence reporting scheme and they also should be recorded in the aircraft technical log:

(A)whenever the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert (false, nuisance or genuine);

(B)whenever a TAWS alert has been issued and is believed to have been false; and/or

(C)if it is believed that a TAWS alert should have been issued, but was not.

(iii)Within this GM, and with regard to reports:

(A)the term 'false' means that the TAWS issued an alert that could not possibly be justified by the position of the aircraft in respect to terrain and it is probable that a fault or failure in the system (equipment and/or input data) was the cause;

(B)the term 'nuisance' means that the TAWS issued an alert that was appropriate, but was not needed because the flight crew could determine by independent means that the flight path was, at that time, safe;

(C)the term 'genuine' means that the TAWS issued an alert that was both appropriate and necessary;

(D)the report terms described in (c)(6)(iii) are only meant to be assessed after the occurrence is over, to facilitate subsequent analysis, the adequacy of the equipment and the programmes it contains. The intention is not for the flight crew to attempt to classify an alert into any of these three categories when visual and/or aural cautions or warnings are annunciated.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1199

The operator shall establish operational procedures and training programs when ACAS is installed and serviceable so that the flight crew is appropriately trained in the avoidance of collisions and competent in the use of ACAS II equipment.

ED Decision 2019/019/R

GENERAL

(a)The ACAS operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account this Guidance Material. It incorporates advice contained in:

(1)ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV;

(2)ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III; and

(3)ICAO PANS-ATM.

(b)Additional guidance material on ACAS may be referred to, including information available from such sources as EUROCONTROL.

ACAS FLIGHT CREW TRAINING

(c)During the implementation of ACAS, several operational issues were identified that had been attributed to deficiencies in flight crew training programmes. As a result, the issue of flight crew training has been discussed within the ICAO, which has developed guidelines for operators to use when designing training programmes.

(d)This Guidance Material contains performance-based training objectives for ACAS II flight crew training. Information contained here related to traffic advisories (TAs) is also applicable to ACAS I and ACAS II users. The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAs; and response to resolution advisories (RAs).

(e)The information provided is valid for version 7 and 7.1 (ACAS II). Where differences arise, these are identified.

(f)The performance-based training objectives are further divided into the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training items and those which are considered desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined.

(g)ACAS academic training

(1)This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or through providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions.

(2)Essential items

(i)Theory of operation. The flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of ACAS II operation and the criteria used for issuing TAs and RAs. This training should address the following topics:

(A)System operation

Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how ACAS functions.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions:

(a)Surveillance

(1)ACAS interrogates other transponder-equipped aircraft within a nominal range of 14 NM.

(2)ACAS surveillance range can be reduced in geographic areas with a large number of ground interrogators and/or ACAS II-equipped aircraft.

(3)If the operator's ACAS implementation provides for the use of the Mode S extended squitter, the normal surveillance range may be increased beyond the nominal 14 NM. However, this information is not used for collision avoidance purposes.

(b)Collision avoidance

(1)TAs can be issued against any transponder-equipped aircraft that responds to the ICAO Mode C interrogations, even if the aircraft does not have altitude reporting capability.

(2)RAs can be issued only against aircraft that are reporting altitude and in the vertical plane only.

(3)RAs issued against an ACAS-equipped intruder are co-ordinated to ensure complementary RAs are issued.

(4)Failure to respond to an RA deprives own aircraft of the collision protection provided by own ACAS.

(5)Additionally, in ACAS-ACAS encounters, failure to respond to an RA also restricts the choices available to the other aircraft's ACAS and thus renders the other aircraft's ACAS less effective than if own aircraft were not ACAS equipped.

(B)Advisory thresholds

Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following:

(a)ACAS advisories are based on time to closest point of approach (CPA) rather than distance. The time should be short and vertical separation should be small, or projected to be small, before an advisory can be issued. The separation standards provided by ATS are different from the miss distances against which ACAS issues alerts.

(b)Thresholds for issuing a TA or an RA vary with altitude. The thresholds are larger at higher altitudes.

(c)A TA occurs from 15 to 48 seconds and an RA from 15 to 35 seconds before the projected CPA.

(d)RAs are chosen to provide the desired vertical miss distance at CPA. As a result, RAs can instruct a climb or descent through the intruder aircraft's altitude.

(C)ACAS limitations

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the limitations of ACAS.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of ACAS limitations, including the following:

(a)ACAS will neither track nor display non-transponder-equipped aircraft, nor aircraft not responding to ACAS Mode C interrogations.

(b)ACAS will automatically fail if the input from the aircraft’s barometric altimeter, radio altimeter or transponder is lost.

(1)In some installations, the loss of information from other on board systems such as an inertial reference system (IRS) or attitude heading reference system (AHRS) may result in an ACAS failure. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crews are aware of the types of failure which will result in an ACAS failure.

(2)ACAS may react in an improper manner when false altitude information is provided to own ACAS or transmitted by another aircraft. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crew are aware of the types of unsafe conditions which can arise. Flight crew members should ensure that when they are advised, if their own aircraft is transmitting false altitude reports, an alternative altitude reporting source is selected, or altitude reporting is switched off.

(c)Some aeroplanes within 380 ft above ground level (AGL) (nominal value) are deemed to be ‘on ground’ and will not be displayed. If ACAS is able to determine an aircraft below this altitude is airborne, it will be displayed.

(d)ACAS may not display all proximate transponder-equipped aircraft in areas of high density traffic.

(e)The bearing displayed by ACAS is not sufficiently accurate to support the initiation of horizontal manoeuvres based solely on the traffic display.

(f)ACAS will neither track nor display intruders with a vertical speed in excess of 10 000 ft/min. In addition, the design implementation may result in some short-term errors in the tracked vertical speed of an intruder during periods of high vertical acceleration by the intruder.

(g)Ground proximity warning systems/ground collision avoidance systems (GPWSs/GCASs) warnings and wind shear warnings take precedence over ACAS advisories. When either a GPWS/GCAS or wind shear warning is active, ACAS aural annunciations will be inhibited and ACAS will automatically switch to the 'TA only' mode of operation.

(D)ACAS inhibits

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of ACAS are inhibited.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the various ACAS inhibits, including the following:

(a)‘Increase Descent’ RAs are inhibited below 1 450 ft AGL.

(b)‘Descend’ RAs are inhibited below 1 100 ft AGL.

(c)All RAs are inhibited below 1 000 ft AGL.

(d)All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL.

(e)Altitude and configuration under which ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are inhibited. ACAS can still issue ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs when operating at the aeroplane's certified ceiling. (In some aircraft types, ‘Climb’ or ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are never inhibited.)

(ii)Operating procedures

The flight crew member should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate the ACAS avionics and interpret the information presented by ACAS. This training should address the following:

(A)Use of controls

Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all ACAS and display controls.

Criteria: demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following:

(a)Aircraft configuration required to initiate a self-test.

(b)Steps required to initiate a self-test.

(c)Recognising when the self-test was successful and when it was unsuccessful. When the self-test is unsuccessful, recognising the reason for the failure and, if possible, correcting the problem.

(d)Recommended usage of range selection. Low ranges are used in the terminal area and the higher display ranges are used in the en-route environment and in the transition between the terminal and en-route environment.

(e)Recognising that the configuration of the display does not affect the ACAS surveillance volume.

(f)Selection of lower ranges when an advisory is issued, to increase display resolution.

(g)Proper configuration to display the appropriate ACAS information without eliminating the display of other needed information.

(h)If available, recommended usage of the above/below mode selector. The above mode should be used during climb and the below mode should be used during descent.

(i)If available, proper selection of the display of absolute or relative altitude and the limitations of using this display if a barometric correction is not provided to ACAS.

(B)Display interpretation

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands the meaning of all information that can be displayed by ACAS. The wide variety of display implementations require the tailoring of some criteria. When the training programme is developed, these criteria should be expanded to cover details for the operator's specific display implementation.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information displayed by ACAS, including the following:

(a)Other traffic, i.e. traffic within the selected display range that is not proximate traffic, or causing a TA or RA to be issued.

(b)Proximate traffic, i.e. traffic that is within 6 NM and ± 1 200 ft.

(c)Non-altitude reporting traffic.

(d)No bearing TAs and RAs.

(e)Off-scale TAs and RAs: the selected range should be changed to ensure that all available information on the intruder is displayed.

(f)TAs: the minimum available display range that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution.

(g)RAs (traffic display): the minimum available display range of the traffic display that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution.

(h)RAs (RA display): flight crew members should demonstrate knowledge of the meaning of the red and green areas or the meaning of pitch or flight path angle cues displayed on the RA display. Flight crew members should also demonstrate an understanding of the RA display limitations, i.e. if a vertical speed tape is used and the range of the tape is less than 2 500 ft/min, an increase rate RA cannot be properly displayed.

(i)If appropriate, awareness that navigation displays oriented on ‘Track-Up’ may require a flight crew member to make a mental adjustment for drift angle when assessing the bearing of proximate traffic.

(C)Use of the TA only mode

Objective: to verify that a flight crew member understands the appropriate times to select the TA only mode of operation and the limitations associated with using this mode.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following:

(a)Knowledge of the operator's guidance for the use of TA only.

(b)Reasons for using this mode. If TA only is not selected when an airport is conducting simultaneous operations from parallel runways separated by less than 1 200 ft, and to some intersecting runways, RAs can be expected. If, for any reason, TA only is not selected and an RA is received in these situations, the response should comply with the operator's approved procedures.

(c)All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. As a result, TAs issued below 500 ft AGL may not be noticed unless the TA display is included in the routine instrument scan.

(D)Crew coordination

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands how ACAS advisories will be handled.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of the crew procedures that should be used when responding to TAs and RAs, including the following:

(a)task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring;

(b)expected call-outs; and

(c)communications with ATC.

(E)Phraseology rules

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the controller.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following:

(a)the use of the phraseology contained in ICAO PANS-OPS;

(b)an understanding of the procedures contained in ICAO PANS-ATM and ICAO Annex 2; and

(c)the understanding that verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit:

(1)whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance;

(2)when, subsequent to a manoeuvre that has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aeroplane has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or

(3)when air traffic issue instructions that, if followed, would cause the crew to manoeuvre the aircraft contrary to an RA with which they are complying.

(F)Reporting rules

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the operator.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of where information can be obtained regarding the need for making written reports to various States when an RA is issued. Various States have different reporting rules and the material available to the flight crew member should be tailored to the operator’s operating environment. This responsibility is satisfied by the flight crew member reporting to the operator according to the applicable reporting rules.

(3)Non-essential items: advisory thresholds

Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following:

(i)The minimum and maximum altitudes below/above which TAs will not be issued.

(ii)When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be less than the ACAS-desired separation, a corrective RA that requires a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 300 ft at low altitude to a maximum of 700 ft at high altitude.

(iii)When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be just outside the ACAS-desired separation, a preventive RA that does not require a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 600 to 800 ft.

(iv)RA fixed range thresholds vary between 0.2 and 1.1 NM.

(h)ACAS manoeuvre training

(1)Demonstration of the flight crew member’s ability to use ACAS displayed information to properly respond to TAs and RAs should be carried out in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. If a full flight simulator is utilised, crew resource management (CRM) should be practised during this training.

(2)Alternatively, the required demonstrations can be carried out by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made. The flight crew member should be informed whether or not the responses made were correct. If the response was incorrect or inappropriate, the CBT should show what the correct response should be.

(3)The scenarios included in the manoeuvre training should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-aircraft encounters. The consequences of failure to respond correctly should be demonstrated by reference to actual incidents such as those publicised in EUROCONTROL ACAS II Bulletins (available on the EUROCONTROL website).

(i)TA responses

Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAs.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following:

(A)Proper division of responsibilities between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should fly the aircraft using any type-specific procedures and be prepared to respond to any RA that might follow. For aircraft without an RA pitch display, the pilot flying should consider the likely magnitude of an appropriate pitch change. The pilot monitoring should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the ACAS display, using this information to help visually acquire the intruder.

(B)Proper interpretation of the displayed information. Flight crew members should confirm that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued. Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data tag), and its vertical speed direction (trend arrow).

(C)Other available information should be used to assist in visual acquisition, including ATC ‘party-line’ information, traffic flow in use, etc.

(D)Because of the limitations described, the pilot flying should not manoeuvre the aircraft based solely on the information shown on the ACAS display. No attempt should be made to adjust the current flight path in anticipation of what an RA would advise, except that if own aircraft is approaching its cleared level at a high vertical rate with a TA present, vertical rate should be reduced to less than 1 500 ft/min.

(E)When visual acquisition is attained, and as long as no RA is received, normal right of way rules should be used to maintain or attain safe separation. No unnecessary manoeuvres should be initiated. The limitations of making manoeuvres based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or at night, or without a definite horizon should be demonstrated as being understood.

(ii)RA responses

Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to RAs.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following:

(A)Proper response to the RA, even if it is in conflict with an ATC instruction and even if the pilot believes that there is no threat present.

(B)Proper task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should respond to a corrective RA with appropriate control inputs. The pilot monitoring should monitor the response to the RA and should provide updates on the traffic location by checking the traffic display. Proper CRM should be used.

(C)Proper interpretation of the displayed information. The pilot should recognise the intruder causing the RA to be issued (red square on display). The pilot should respond appropriately.

(D)For corrective RAs, the response should be initiated in the proper direction within 5 seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ¼ g (gravitational acceleration of 9.81 m/sec²).

(E)Recognition of the initially displayed RA being modified. Response to the modified RA should be properly accomplished, as follows:

(a)For increase rate RAs, the vertical speed change should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g.

(b)For RA reversals, the vertical speed reversal should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g.

(c)For RA weakenings, the vertical speed should be modified to initiate a return towards the original clearance.

(d)An acceleration of approximately ¼ g will be achieved if the change in pitch attitude corresponding to a change in vertical speed of 1 500 ft/min is accomplished in approximately 5 seconds, and of ⅓ g if the change is accomplished in approximately 3 seconds. The change in pitch attitude required to establish a rate of climb or descent of 1 500 ft/min from level flight will be approximately 6° when the true airspeed (TAS) is 150 kt, 4° at 250 kt, and 2° at 500 kt. (These angles are derived from the formula: 1 000 divided by TAS.).

(F)Recognition of altitude crossing encounters and the proper response to these RAs.

(G)For preventive RAs, the vertical speed needle or pitch attitude indication should remain outside the red area on the RA display.

(H)For maintain rate RAs, the vertical speed should not be reduced. Pilots should recognise that a maintain rate RA may result in crossing through the intruder's altitude.

(I)When the RA weakens, or when the green 'fly to' indicator changes position, the pilot should initiate a return towards the original clearance, and when ‘clear of conflict’ is annunciated, the pilot should complete the return to the original clearance.

(J)The controller should be informed of the RA as soon as time and workload permit, using the standard phraseology.

(K)When possible, an ATC clearance should be complied with while responding to an RA. For example, if the aircraft can level at the assigned altitude while responding to RA (an ‘adjust vertical speed’ RA (version 7) or ‘level off’ (version 7.1)), it should be done; the horizontal (turn) element of an ATC instruction should be followed.

(L)Knowledge of the ACAS multi-aircraft logic and its limitations, and that ACAS can optimise separations from two aircraft by climbing or descending towards one of them. For example, ACAS only considers intruders that it considers to be a threat when selecting an RA. As such, it is possible for ACAS to issue an RA against one intruder that results in a manoeuvre towards another intruder that is not classified as a threat. If the second intruder becomes a threat, the RA will be modified to provide separation from that intruder.

(i)ACAS initial evaluation

(1)The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test or interactive CBT that records correct and incorrect responses to phrased questions.

(2)The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the flight crew member will fly, and the results assessed by a qualified instructor, inspector, or check airman. The range of scenarios should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-threat encounters. The scenarios should also include demonstrations of the consequences of not responding to RAs, slow or late responses, and manoeuvring opposite to the direction called for by the displayed RA.

(3)Alternatively, exposure to these scenarios can be conducted by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the pilot will fly. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made and a record made of whether or not each response was correct.

(j)ACAS recurrent training

(1)ACAS recurrent training ensures that flight crew members maintain the appropriate ACAS knowledge and skills. ACAS recurrent training should be integrated into and/or conducted in conjunction with other established recurrent training programmes. An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to ACAS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique ACAS characteristics which flight crew members should be made aware of.

(2)It is recommended that operator's recurrent training programmes using full flight simulators include encounters with conflicting traffic when these simulators are equipped with ACAS. The full range of likely scenarios may be spread over a 2 year period. If a full flight simulator, as described above, is not available, use should be made of an interactive CBT that is capable of presenting scenarios to which pilot responses should be made in real-time.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

Before commencing an approach operation, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied that:

(a)the meteorological conditions at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the runway/FATO intended to be used will not prevent a safe approach, landing or go-around, considering the performance information contained in the operations manual; and

(b)the selected aerodrome operating minima are consistent with all of the following:

(1)the operative ground equipment;

(2)the operative aircraft systems;

(3)the aircraft performance; and

(4)flight crew qualifications.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT

(a)The in-flight landing distance assessment should be based on the latest available weather report and runway condition report (RCR).

(b)The assessment should be initially carried out when the weather report and the RCR are obtained, usually around top of descent. If the planned duration of the flight does not allow to carry out the assessment in non-critical phases of flight, the assessment should be carried out before departure.

(c)When meteorological conditions may lead to a degradation of the runway surface condition, the assessment should include consideration of how much deterioration in runway surface friction characteristics may be tolerated, so that a quick decision can be made prior to landing.

(d)The flight crew should monitor the evolution of the actual conditions during the approach, to ensure that they do not degrade below the condition that was previously determined to be the minimum acceptable.

(e)The in-flight determination of the landing distance should be done is such way that either:

(1)the landing distance available (LDA) on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA); or

(2)if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is not available, the LDA on the intended runway at the estimated time of landing is at least the landing distance determined at the time of dispatch.

(f)If performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is available, it should be based on approved data contained in the AFM, or on other data that is either determined in accordance with the applicable certification standards for aeroplanes or determined by the Agency.

(g)Whenever the runway braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as good as reported by the aerodrome operator in the RCR, the pilot-in-command should notify the air traffic services (ATS) by means of a special air-report (AIREP) as soon as practicable.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

LANDING DISTANCE

The assessment of the LDTA begins with the acquisition of the latest available weather information and the RCR. The information provided in the RCR is divided in two sections:

(a)The ‘aircraft performance’ section which contains information that is directly relevant in a performance computation.

(b)The ‘situational awareness’ section which contains information that the flight crew should be aware of for a safe operation, but which does not have a direct impact on the performance assessment.

The ‘aircraft performance’ section of the RCR includes a runway condition code (RWYCC), the contaminant type, depth and coverage for each third of the runway.

The determination of the RWYCC is based on the use of the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM); however, the presentation of the information in the RCAM is appropriate for use by aerodrome personnel trained and competent in assessing the runway condition in a way that is relevant to aircraft performance. While full implementation of the RCAM standard would eventually no longer require the flight crew to derive from various information available to them the appropriate runway condition to be used for the landing performance assessment at the time of arrival, it is desirable that pilots maintain an understanding of the performance effect of various components considered in the assessment.

It is the task of the aerodrome personnel to assess the appropriate RWYCC in order to allow the flight crew to assess any potential change of the runway in use. When no RWYCC is available in winter conditions, the RCAM provides the flight crew with a combination of the relevant information (runway surface conditions: state and/or contaminant or pilot report of braking action (AIREP)) in order to determine the RWYCC.

Table 1 below is an excerpt of the RCAM and permits to carry out the primary assessment based on the reported contaminant type and depth, as well as on the OAT.

Table 1: Association between the runway surface condition and the RWYCC based on the reported contaminant type and depth and OAT

Note 1: Under certain conditions, frost may cause the surface to become very slippery.

Note 2: Operations in conditions where less-than-poor braking action prevails are prohibited.

Note 3: The runway surface temperature should preferably be used where available.

A primary assessment may have to be downgraded by the aerodrome operator based on an AIREP of lower braking action than the one typically associated with the type and depth of contaminant on the runway.

Upgrading a RWYCC 5, 4, 3 or 2 determined by the aerodrome operator from the observed contaminant type is not allowed.

A RWYCC 1 or 0 maybe be upgraded by the aerodrome operator to a maximum of RWYCC 3. The reason for the upgrade will be specified in the ‘situational awareness’ section of the RCR.

When the aerodrome operator is approved for operations on specially prepared winter runways, in accordance with Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) No 139/2014, the RWYCC of a runway that is contaminated with compacted snow or ice, may be upgraded to RWYCC 4 depending upon a specific treatment of the runway. In such cases, the reason for the upgrade will be specified in the ‘situational awareness’ section of the RCR.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

RCR, RWYCC and RCAM

A detailed description of the RCR format and content, the RWYCC and the RCAM may be found in Annex V (Part-ADR.OPS) to Regulation (EU) No 139/2014. Further guidance may be found in the following documents:

(a)ICAO Doc 9981 ‘PANS Aerodromes’;

(b)ICAO Doc 4444 ‘PANS ATM’;

(c)ICAO Doc 10064 ‘Aeroplane Performance Manual’; and

(d)ICAO Circular 355 ‘Assessment, Measurement and Reporting of Runway Surface Conditions’.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF LDTA

Guidance on performance information for the assessment of the LDTA may be found in:

(a)AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(e) of the AMC & GM to Annex IV (Part CAT) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012; and

(b)ICAO Doc 10064 ‘Aeroplane Performance Manual’.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

REPORTING ON RUNWAY BRAKING ACTION

The role of the flight crew in the runway surface condition reporting process does not end once a safe landing has been achieved. While the aerodrome operator is responsible for generating the RCR, flight crew are responsible for providing accurate braking action reports.

The flight crew braking action reports provide feedback to the aerodrome operator regarding the accuracy of the RCR resulting from the observed runway surface conditions.

ATC passes these braking action reports to the aerodrome operator, which in turn uses them in conjunction with the RCAM to determine if it is necessary to downgrade or upgrade the Runway Condition Code (RWYCC).

During busy times, runway inspections and maintenance may be less frequent and need to be sequenced with arrivals. Therefore, aerodrome operators may depend on braking action reports to confirm that the runway surface condition is not deteriorating below the assigned RCR.

Since both the ATC and the aerodrome operator rely on accurate braking action reports, flight crew should use standardised terminology in accordance with ICAO Doc 4444 ‘PANS ATM’.

The following Table 1 shows the correlation between the terminology to be used in the AIREP to report the braking action and the RWYCC.

Table 1: Association between AIREP and RWYCC

An AIREP should be transmitted to the ATC, in accordance with one of the following specifications, as applicable:

(a)Good braking action is reported as ‘BRAKING ACTION GOOD’.

(b)Good to medium braking action is reported as ‘BRAKING ACTION GOOD TO MEDIUM’.

(c)Medium braking action is reported as ‘BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM’.

(d)Medium to poor braking action is reported as “BRAKING ACTION MEDIUM TO POOR”

(e)Poor braking action is reported as ‘BRAKING ACTION POOR’.

(f)Less than poor braking action is reported as ‘BRAKING ACTION LESS THAN POOR’.

In some cases, the differences between two consecutive levels of the six braking action categories between ‘Good’ and ‘Less than Poor’ may be too subtle for the flight crew to detect. It is therefore acceptable for the flight crew to report on a more coarse scale of ‘Good’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Poor’.

Whenever requested by ATC, or if the braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as previously reported by the aerodrome operator in the RCR, pilots should provide a braking action report. This is especially important and safety relevant where the experienced braking action is worse than the braking action associated with any RWYCC code currently in effect for that portion of the runway concerned.

When the experienced braking action is better than that reported by the aerodrome operator, it is important to report this information, which may trigger further actions for the aerodrome operator in order to upgrade the RCR.

If an aircraft-generated braking action report is available, it should be transmitted, identifying its origin accordingly. If the flight crew have a reason to modify the aircraft-generated braking action report based on their judgement, the commander should be able to amend such report.

A braking action AIREP of ‘Less Than Poor’ leads to a runway closure until the aerodrome operator can improve the runway condition.

An air safety report should be submitted whenever flight safety has been endangered due to low braking action.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

FLIGHT CREW TRAINING

Flight crew should be trained on the use of the RCR, on the use of performance data for the assessment of the LDTA, if available, and on reporting braking action using the AIREP format.

Guidance on the development of the content of the training may be found in:

(a)AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 & CAT.OP.MPA.311 of the AMC & GM to Annex IV (Part CAT) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, as applicable to the intended operations;

(b)ICAO Doc 10064 ‘Aeroplane Performance Manual’; and

(c)ICAO Circular 355 ‘Assessment, Measurement and Reporting of Runway Surface Conditions’.

Regulation (EU) 2019/1387

Before commencing an approach to land, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied that, according to the information available, the weather at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

FATO SUITABILITY

The in-flight determination of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) suitability should be based on the latest available meteorological report.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

(a)For aeroplanes, if the reported visibility (VIS) or controlling RVR for the runway to be used for landing is less than the applicable minimum, then an instrument approach operation shall not be continued:

(1)past a point at which the aeroplane is 1 000 ft above the aerodrome elevation; or

(2)into the final approach segment (FAS) if the DH or MDH is higher than 1 000 ft.

(b)For helicopters, if the reported RVR is less than 550 m and the controlling RVR for the runway to be used for landing is less than the applicable minimum, then an instrument approach operation shall not be continued:

(1)past a point at which the helicopter is 1 000 ft above the aerodrome elevation; or

(2)into the FAS if the DH or MDH is higher than 1 000 ft.

(c)If the required visual reference is not established, a missed approach shall be executed at or before the DA/H or the MDA/H.

(d)If the required visual reference is not maintained after DA/H or MDA/H, a go-around shall be executed promptly.

(e)Notwithstanding point (a), in the case where no RVR is reported, and the reported VIS is less than the applicable minimum, but the converted meteorological visibility (CMV) is equal or greater than the applicable minimum, then the instrument approach can be continued to the DA/H or MDA/H.

(f)Notwithstanding points (a) and (b), if there is no intention to land, the instrument approach may be continued to the DA/H or the MDA/H. A missed approach shall be executed at or before the DA/H or the MDA/H.

ED Decision 2023/007/R

APPLICATION OF RVR OR VIS REPORTS — AEROPLANES

(a)There is no prohibition on the commencement of an approach based on the reported RVR or VIS. The restriction in NCC.OP.230 applies only if the RVR or VIS is reported and applies to the continuation of the approach past a point where the aircraft is 1 000 ft above the aerodrome elevation or in the FAS, as applicable.

APPLICATION OF RVR OR VIS REPORTS — HELICOPTERS

(b)There is no prohibition on the commencement of an approach based on the reported RVR. The restriction in NCC.OP.230 applies to the continuation of the approach past a point where the aircraft is 1 000 ft above the aerodrome elevation or in the FAS, as applicable.

The prohibition to continue the approach applies only if the RVR is reported and is below 550 m and is below the operating minima. There is no prohibition based on VIS.

(c)If the reported RVR is 550 m or greater, but it is less than the RVR calculated in accordance with AMC5 CAT.OP.MPA.110, a go-around is likely to be necessary since visual reference may not be established at the DH or MDH. Similarly, in the absence of an RVR report, the reported visibility or a digital image may indicate that a go-around is likely. The pilot-in-command should consider available options, based on a thorough assessment of risk, such as diverting to an alternate aerodrome, before commencing the approach.

APPLICATION OF RVR OR VIS REPORTS — ALL AIRCRAFT

(d)If a deterioration in the RVR or VIS is reported once the aircraft is below 1 000 ft or in the FAS, as applicable, then there is no requirement for the approach to be discontinued. In this situation, the normal visual reference requirements would apply at the DA/H.

(e)Where additional RVR information is provided (e.g. midpoint and stop end), this is advisory; such information may be useful to the pilot in order to determine whether there will be sufficient visual reference to control the aircraft during roll-out and taxi. For operations where the aircraft will be controlled manually during roll-out, Table 1 in AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) provides an indication of the RVR that may be required to allow manual lateral control of the aircraft on the runway.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

MINIMUM RVR FOR CONTINUATION OF APPROACH — AEROPLANES

(a)The touchdown RVR should be the controlling RVR.

(b)If the touchdown RVR is not reported, then the midpoint RVR should be the controlling RVR.

(c)Where the RVR is not available, CMV should be used, except for the purpose of continuation of an approach in LVO in accordance with AMC8 NCC.OP.110.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

MINIMUM RVR FOR CONTINUATION OF APPROACH — HELICOPTERS

(a)The touchdown RVR should be the controlling RVR.

(b)If the touchdown RVR is not reported, then the midpoint RVR should be the controlling RVR.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

VISUAL REFERENCES FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS

For instrument approach operations Type A and CAT I instrument approach operations Type B, at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot at the MDA/H or the DA/H:

(a)elements of the approach lighting system;

(b)the threshold;

(c)the threshold markings;

(d)the threshold lights;

(e)the threshold identification lights;

(f)the visual glide path indicator;

(g)the TDZ or TDZ markings;

(h)the TDZ lights;

(i)the FATO/runway edge lights;

(j)for helicopter PinS approaches, the identification beacon light and visual ground reference;

(k)for helicopter PinS approaches, the identifiable elements of the environment defined on the instrument chart;

(l)for helicopter PinS approaches with instructions to ‘proceed VFR’, sufficient visual cues to determine that VFR criteria are met; or

(m)other visual references specified in the operations manual.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

APPROACHES WITH NO INTENTION TO LAND

The approach may be continued to the DA/H or the MDA/H regardless of the reported RVR or VIS. Such operations should be coordinated with air traffic services (ATS).

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

(a)An operator that intends to conduct EFVS 200 operations with operational credits and without a specific approval shall ensure that:

(1)the aircraft is certified for the intended operations;

(2)only runways, FATOs and IAPs suitable for EFVS operations are used;

(3)the flight crew members are competent to conduct the intended operation, and a training and checking programme for the flight crew members and relevant personnel involved in the flight preparation is established;

(4)operating procedures are established;

(5)any relevant information is documented in the minimum equipment list (MEL);

(6)any relevant information is documented in the maintenance programme;

(7)safety assessments are carried out and performance indicators are established to monitor the level of safety of the operation; and

(8)the aerodrome operating minima take into account the capability of the system used.

(b)The operator shall not conduct EFVS 200 operations when conducting LVOs.

(c)Notwithstanding point (a)(1), the operator may use EVSs meeting the minimum criteria to conduct EFVS 200 operations, provided that this is approved by the competent authority.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

GENERAL

(a)EFVS operations exploit the improved visibility provided by the EFVS to extend the visual segment of an instrument approach. EFVSs cannot be used to extend the instrument segment of an approach and thus the DH for EFVS 200 operations is always the same as for the same approach conducted without EFVS.

(b)Equipment for EFVS 200 operations

(1)In order to conduct EFVS 200 operations, a certified EFVS is used (EFVS-A or EFVS-L). An EFVS is an enhanced vision system (EVS) that also incorporates a flight guidance system and displays the image on a HUD or equivalent display. The flight guidance system will incorporate aircraft flight information and flight symbology.

(2)In multi-pilot operations, a suitable display of EFVS sensory imagery is provided to the pilot monitoring.

(c)Suitable approach procedures

(1)Types of approach operation are specified in AMC1 NCC.OP.235(a)(2).

EFVS 200 operations are used for 3D approach operations. This may include operations based on NPA procedures, approach procedures with vertical guidance and PA procedures including approach operations requiring specific approvals, provided that the operator holds the necessary approvals.

(2)Offset approaches

Refer to AMC1 NCC.OP.235(a)(2).

(3)Circling approaches

EFVSs incorporate a HUD or an equivalent system so that the EFVS image of the scene ahead of the aircraft is visible in the pilot’s forward external FOV. Circling operations require the pilot to maintain visual references that may not be directly ahead of the aircraft and may not be aligned with the current flight path. EFVSs cannot therefore be used in place of natural visual reference for circling approaches.

(d)The aerodrome operating minima for EFVS 200 operations are determined in accordance with AMC1 NCC.OP.235(a)(8).

The performance of EFVSs depends on the technology used and weather conditions encountered. Table 1 ‘Operations utilising EFVS: RVR reduction’ has been developed after an operational evaluation of two different EVSs, both using infrared sensors, along with data and support provided by the FAA. Approaches were flown in a variety of conditions including fog, rain and snow showers, as well as at night to aerodromes located in mountainous terrain. Table 1 contains conservative figures to cater for the expected performance of infrared sensors in the variety of conditions that might be encountered. Some systems may have better capability than those used for the evaluation, but credit cannot be taken for such performance in EFVS 200 operations.

(e)The conditions for commencement and continuation of the approach are in accordance with NCC.OP.230.

Pilots conducting EFVS 200 operations may commence an approach and continue that approach below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or into the FAS if the reported RVR or CMV is equal to or greater than the lowest RVR minima determined in accordance with AMC1 NCC.OP.235(a)(8) and if all the conditions for the conduct of EFVS 200 operations are met.

Should any equipment required for EFVS 200 operations be unserviceable or unavailable, the conditions to conduct EFVS 200 operations would not be satisfied, and the approach should not be commenced. In the event of failure of the equipment required for EFVS 200 operations after the aircraft descends below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or into the FAS, the conditions of NCC.OP.230 would no longer be satisfied unless the RVR reported prior to commencement of the approach was sufficient for the approach to be flown without the use of EFVS in lieu of natural vision.

(f)The EFVS image requirements at the DA/H are specified in AMC1 NCC.OP.235(a)(4).

The requirements for features to be identifiable on the EFVS image in order to continue approach below the DH are more stringent than the visual reference requirements for the same approach flown without EFVS. The more stringent standard is needed because the EFVS might not display the colour of lights used to identify specific portions of the runway and might not consistently display the runway markings. Any visual approach path indicator using colour-coded lights may be unusable.

(g)Obstacle clearance in the visual segment

The ‘visual segment’ is the portion of the approach between the DH or the MAPt and the runway threshold. In the case of EFVS 200 operations, this part of the approach may be flown using the EFVS image as the primary reference and obstacles may not always be identifiable on an EFVS image. The operational assessment specified in AMC1 NCC.OP.235(a)(2) is therefore required to ensure obstacle clearance during the visual segment.

(h)Visual reference requirements at 200 ft above the threshold

For EFVS 200 operations, natural visual reference is required by a height of 200 ft above the runway threshold. The objective of this requirement is to ensure that the pilot will have sufficient visual reference to land. The visual reference should be the same as the one required for the same approach flown without the use of EFVS.

Some EFVSs may have additional requirements that have to be fulfilled at this height to allow the approach to continue, such as a requirement to check that elements of the EFVS display remain correctly aligned and scaled to the external view. Any such requirements will be detailed in the AFM and included in the operator’s procedures.

(i)Specific approval for EFVS

In order to use an EFVS without natural visual reference below 200 ft above the threshold, the operator needs to hold a specific approval in accordance with Part-SPA.

(j)Go-around

A go-around will be promptly executed if the required visual references are not maintained on the EFVS image at any time after the aircraft has descended below the DA/H or if the required visual references are not distinctly visible and identifiable using natural vision after the aircraft is below 200 ft. It is considered more likely that an EFVS 200 operation could result in the initiation of a go-around below the DA/H than the equivalent approach flown without EFVS, and thus the operational assessment required by AMC1 NCC.OP.235(a)(2) takes into account the possibility of a balked landing.

An obstacle free zone (OFZ) may also be provided for CAT I precision approach (PA) procedures. Where an OFZ is not provided for a CAT I precision approach, this may be indicated on the approach chart. NPA procedures and approach procedures with vertical guidance provide obstacle clearance for the missed approach based on the assumption that a go-around is executed at the MAPt and not below the MDH.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION

For EFVS 200 operations, the aircraft should be equipped with an approach system using EFVS-A or a landing system using EFVS-L.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

AERODROMES AND INSTRUMENT PROCEDURES SUITABLE FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

(a)For EFVS 200 operations, the operator should verify the suitability of a runway before authorising EFVS operations to that runway through an operational assessment taking into account the following elements:

(1)the obstacle situation;

(2)the type of aerodrome lighting;

(3)the available IAPs;

(4)the aerodrome operating minima; and

(5)any non-standard conditions that may affect the operations.

(b)EFVS 200 operations should only be conducted as 3D operations, using an IAP in which the final approach track is offset by a maximum of 3 degrees from the extended centre line of the runway.

(c)The IAP should be designed in accordance with PANS-OPS, Volume I (ICAO Doc 8168) or equivalent criteria.

ED Decision 2022/014/R

VERIFICATION OF THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

The operational assessment before authorising the use of a runway for EFVS 200 operations may be conducted as follows:

(a)Check whether the runway has been promulgated as suitable for EFVS 200 operations or is certified as a PA category II or III runway by the State of the aerodrome. If this is so, then check whether and where the approach and runway lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment used by the operator.

(b)If the check in point (a) above comes out negative (the runway is not promulgated as EFVS suitable or is not category II or III), then proceed as follows:

(1)For straight-in IAPs, US Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) may be considered to be acceptable as an equivalent to PANS-OPS. If other design criteria than PANS-OPS or US TERPS are used, the operations should not be conducted.

(2)If an OFZ is established, this will ensure adequate obstacle protection from 960 m before the threshold. If an OFZ is not established or if the DH for the approach is above 250 ft, then check whether there is a visual segment surface (VSS).

(3)VSSs are required for procedures published after 15 March 2007, but the existence of the VSS has to be verified through an aeronautical information publication (AIP), operations manual Part C, or direct contact with the aerodrome. Where the VSS is established, it may not be penetrated by obstacles. If the VSS is not established or is penetrated by obstacles and an OFZ is not established, then the operations should not be conducted. Note: obstacles of a height of less than 50 ft above the threshold may be disregarded when assessing the VSS.

(4)Runways with obstacles that require visual identification and avoidance should not be accepted.

(5)For the obstacle protection of a balked landing where an OFZ is not established, the operator may specify that pilots follow a departure procedure in the event of a balked landing, in which case it is necessary to verify that the aircraft will be able to comply with the climb gradients published for the instrument departure procedures for the expected landing conditions.

(6)Perform an assessment of the suitability of the runway which should include whether the approach and runway lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment used by the operator.

(c)If the AFM stipulates specific requirements for approach procedures, then the operational assessment should verify that these requirements can be met.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

INITIAL TRAINING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

Operators should ensure that flight crew members complete the following conversion training before being authorised to conduct EFVS operations unless credits related to training and checking for previous experience on similar aircraft types are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012:

(a)A course of ground training including at least the following:

(1)characteristics and limitations of head-up displays (HUDs) or equivalent display systems including information presentation and symbology;

(2)EFVS sensor performance in different weather conditions, sensor limitations, scene interpretation, visual anomalies and other visual effects;

(3)EFVS display, control, modes, features, symbology, annunciations and associated systems and components;

(4)the interpretation of EFVS imagery;

(5)the interpretation of approach and runway lighting systems and display characteristics when using EFVS;

(6)pre-flight planning and selection of suitable aerodromes and approach procedures;

(7)principles of obstacle clearance requirements;

(8)the use and limitations of RVR assessment systems;

(9)normal, abnormal and emergency procedures for EFVS 200 operations;

(10)the effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions;

(11)human factors aspects of EFVS 200 operations; and

(12)qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval for EFVS 200 operations.

(b)A course of FSTD training and/or flight training in two phases as follows:

(1)Phase one (EFVS 200 operations with aircraft and all equipment serviceable) — objectives:

(i)understand the operation of equipment required for EFVS 200 operations;

(ii)understand operating limitations of the installed EFVS;

(iii)practise the use of HUD or equivalent display systems;

(iv)practise the set-up and adjustment of EFVS equipment in different conditions (e.g. day and night);

(v)practise the monitoring of automatic flight control systems, EFVS information and status annunciators;

(vi)practise the interpretation of EFVS imagery;

(vii)become familiar with the features needed on the EFVS image to continue approach below the DH;

(viii)practise the identification of visual references using natural vision while using EFVS equipment;

(ix)master the manual aircraft handling relevant to EFVS 200 operations including, where appropriate, the use of the flare cue and guidance for landing;

(x)practise coordination with other crew members; and

(xi)become proficient at procedures for EFVS 200 operations.

(2)Phase one of the training should include the following exercises:

(i)the required checks for satisfactory functioning of equipment, both on the ground and in flight;

(ii)the use of HUD or equivalent display systems during all phases of flight;

(iii)approach using the EFVSs installed on the aircraft to the appropriate DH and transition to visual flight and landing;

(iv)approach with all engines operating using the EFVS, down to the appropriate DH followed by a missed approach, all without external visual reference, as appropriate.

(3)Phase two (EFVS 200 operations with aircraft and equipment failures and degradations) — objectives:

(i)understand the effect of known aircraft unserviceabilities including use of the MEL;

(ii)understand the effect of failed or downgraded equipment on aerodrome operating minima;

(iii)understand the actions required in response to failures and changes in the status of the EFVS including HUD or equivalent display systems;

(iv)understand the actions required in response to failures above and below the DH;

(v)practise abnormal operations and incapacitation procedures; and

(vi)become proficient at dealing with failures and abnormal situations during EFVS 200 operations.

(4)Phase two of the training should include the following exercises:

(i)approaches with engine failures at various stages of the approach;

(ii)approaches with failures of the EFVS at various stages of the approach, including failures between the DH and the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired, require either:

(A)reversion to head down displays to control missed approach; or

(B)reversion to flight with downgraded or no guidance to control missed approaches from the DH or below, including those which may result in a touchdown on the runway;

(iii)incapacitation procedures appropriate to EFVS 200 operations;

(iv)failures and procedures applicable to the specific EFVS installation and aircraft type; and

(v)FSTD training, which should include minimum eight approaches.

ED Decision 2023/007/R

RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

(a)The operator should ensure that the pilots are competent to perform EFVS 200 operations. To do so, pilots should be trained every 6 months by performing at least two approaches on each type of aircraft operated.

(b)The operator should ensure that the pilots’ competence to perform EFVS 200 operations is checked at each required demonstration of competence by performing at least two approaches on each type of aircraft operated, of which one should be flown without natural vision to 200 ft.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

RECENT EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

Pilots should complete a minimum of four approaches using the operator’s procedures for EFVS 200 operations during the validity period of the periodic demonstration of competence unless credits related to currency are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

DIFFERENCES TRAINING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

(a)The operator should ensure that the flight crew members authorised to conduct EFVS 200 operations are provided with differences training or familiarisation whenever there is a change to any of the following:

(1)the technology used in the flight guidance and flight control system;

(2)the HUD or equivalent display systems;

(3)the operating procedures.

(b)The differences training should:

(1)meet the objectives of the appropriate initial training course;

(2)take into account the flight crew members’ previous experience; and

(3)take into account the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

TRAINING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

If a flight crew member is to be authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring during EFVS 200 operations, then the flight crew member should complete the required FSTD training for each operating capacity.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

RECURRENT CHECKING FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

In order to provide the opportunity to practise decision-making in the event of system failures and failure to acquire natural visual reference, the recurrent training and checking for EFVS 200 operations is recommended to periodically include different combinations of equipment failures, go-around due to loss of visual reference, and landings.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

(a)For EFVS 200 operations, the following should apply:

(1)the pilot flying should use the EFVS throughout the approach;

(2)in multi-pilot operations, a suitable display of EFVS sensory imagery should be provided to the pilot monitoring;

(3)the approach between the FAF and the DA/H should be flown using vertical flight path guidance;

(4)the approach may be continued below the DA/H provided that the pilot can identify on the EFVS image either:

(i)the approach light system; or

(ii)both of the following:

(A)the runway threshold identified by the beginning of the runway landing surface, the threshold lights or the runway end identifier lights; and

(B)the TDZ identified by the TDZ lights, the TDZ runway markings or the runway lights;

(5)a missed approach should be executed promptly if the required visual reference is not distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EFVS by 200 ft above the threshold.

(b)Operating procedures for EFVS 200 operations should:

(1)be consistent with the AFM;

(2)be appropriate to the technology and equipment to be used;

(3)specify the duties and responsibilities of each flight crew member in each relevant phase of flight;

(4)ensure that flight crew workload is managed to facilitate effective decision-making and monitoring of the aircraft; and

(5)deviate to the minimum extent practicable from normal procedures used for routine operations.

(c)Operating procedures should include:

(1)the required checks for the satisfactory functioning of the aircraft equipment, both before departure and in flight;

(2)the correct seating and eye position;

(3)determination of aerodrome operating minima;

(4)the required visual references at the DH;

(5)the action to be taken if natural visual reference is not acquired by 200 ft;

(6)the action to be taken in the event of loss of the required visual reference; and

(7)procedures for balked landing.

(d)Operating procedures for EFVS 200 operations should be included in the operations manual.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA — EFVS 200 OPERATIONS

When conducting EFVS 200 operations:

(a)the DA/H used should be the same as for operations without EFVS;

(b)the lowest RVR minima to be used should be determined by reducing the RVR presented in:

(1)Table 8 in AMC5 NCC.OP.110 in accordance with Table 1 below for aeroplanes;

(2)Table 12 of AMC6 NCC.OP.110 in accordance with Table 1 below for helicopters;

(c)in case of failed or downgraded equipment, Table 15 in AMC9 NCC.OP.110 should apply.

Table 1

Operations utilising EFVS: RVR reduction

ED Decision 2022/012/R

EVFS 200 with legacy systems under an approval

The EVS should be certified before 1 January 2022 as ‘EVS with an operational credit’.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

The competent authority referred to in NCC.OP.235 point (c) is the competent authority for the oversight of the operator, as established in ORO.GEN.105.

SUBPART C: AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND OPERATING LIMITATIONS

Regulation (EU) No 800/2013

(a)During any phase of operation, the loading, the mass and the centre of gravity (CG) position of the aircraft shall comply with any limitation specified in the AFM, or the operations manual, if more restrictive.

(b)Placards, listings, instrument markings, or combinations thereof, containing those operating limitations prescribed by the AFM for visual presentation, shall be displayed in the aircraft.

Regulation (EU) No 800/2013

(a)The operator shall establish the mass and the CG of any aircraft by actual weighing prior to initial entry into service. The accumulated effects of modifications and repairs on the mass and balance shall be accounted for and properly documented. Aircraft shall be reweighed if the effect of modifications on the mass and balance is not accurately known.

(b)The weighing shall be accomplished by the manufacturer of the aircraft or by an approved maintenance organisation.

(c)The operator shall determine the mass of all operating items and crew members included in the aircraft dry operating mass by actual weighing, including any crew baggage, or by using standard masses. The influence of their position on the aircraft’s CG shall be determined. When using standard masses the following mass values for crew members shall be used to determine the dry operating mass:

(1)85 kg, including hand baggage, for flight crew/technical crew members; and

(2)75 kg for cabin crew members.

(d)The operator shall establish procedures to enable the pilot-in-command to determine the mass of the traffic load, including any ballast, by:

(1)actual weighing;

(2)determining the mass of the traffic load in accordance with standard passenger and baggage masses; or

(3)calculating passenger mass on the basis of a statement by, or on behalf of, each passenger and adding to it a predetermined mass to account for hand baggage and clothing, when the number of passenger seats available on the aircraft is:

(i)less than 10 for aeroplanes; or

(ii)less than six for helicopters.

(e)When using standard masses the following mass values shall be used:

(1)for passengers, those in Tables 1 and 2, where hand baggage and the mass of any infant carried by an adult on one passenger seat are included:

Table 1

Standard masses for passengers — aircraft with a total number of passenger seats of 20 or more

Table 2

Standard masses for passengers — aircraft with a total number of passenger seats of 19 or less

(2)for baggage:

(i)for aeroplanes, when the total number of passenger seats available on the aeroplane is 20 or more, standard mass values for checked baggage in Table 3;

Table 3

Standard masses for baggage — aeroplanes with a total number of passenger seats of 20 or more

(ii)for helicopters, when the total number of passenger seats available on the helicopters is 20 or more, the standard mass value for checked baggage of 13 kg.

(f)For aircraft with 19 passenger seats or less, the actual mass of checked baggage shall be determined:

(1)by weighing; or

(2)by calculation on the basis of a statement by, or on behalf of, each passenger. Where this is impractical, a minimum standard mass of 13 kg shall be used.

(g)The operator shall establish procedures to enable the pilot-in-command to determine the mass of the fuel load by using the actual density or, if not known, the density calculated in accordance with a method specified in the operations manual.

(h)The pilot-in-command shall ensure that the loading of:

(1)the aircraft is performed under the supervision of qualified personnel; and

(2)traffic load is consistent with the data used for the calculation of the aircraft mass and balance.

(i)The operator shall establish procedures to enable the pilot-in-command to comply with additional structural limits such as the floor strength limitations, the maximum load per running metre, the maximum mass per cargo compartment and the maximum seating limit.

(j)The operator shall specify, in the operations manual, the principles and methods involved in the loading and in the mass and balance system that meet the requirements contained in (a) to (i). This system shall cover all types of intended operations.

ED Decision 2013/021/R

CENTRE OF GRAVITY LIMITS — OPERATIONAL CG ENVELOPE AND IN-FLIGHT CG

In the Certificate Limitations section of the AFM, forward and aft CG limits are specified. These limits ensure that the certification stability and control criteria are met throughout the whole flight and allow the proper trim setting for take-off. The operator should ensure that these limits are respected by:

(a)Defining and applying operational margins to the certified CG envelope in order to compensate for the following deviations and errors:

(1)Deviations of actual CG at empty or operating mass from published values due, for example, to weighing errors, unaccounted modifications and/or equipment variations.

(2)Deviations in fuel distribution in tanks from the applicable schedule.

(3)Deviations in the distribution of baggage and cargo in the various compartments as compared with the assumed load distribution as well as inaccuracies in the actual mass of baggage and cargo.

(4)Deviations in actual passenger seating from the seating distribution assumed when preparing the mass and balance documentation. Large CG errors may occur when ‘free seating’, i.e. freedom of passengers to select any seat when entering the aircraft, is permitted. Although in most cases reasonably even longitudinal passenger seating can be expected, there is a risk of an extreme forward or aft seat selection causing very large and unacceptable CG errors, assuming that the balance calculation is done on the basis of an assumed even distribution. The largest errors may occur at a load factor of approximately 50 % if all passengers are seated in either the forward or aft half of the cabin. Statistical analysis indicates that the risk of such extreme seating adversely affecting the CG is greatest on small aircraft.

(5)Deviations of the actual CG of cargo and passenger load within individual cargo compartments or cabin sections from the normally assumed mid position.

(6)Deviations of the CG caused by gear and flap positions and by application of the prescribed fuel usage procedure, unless already covered by the certified limits.

(7)Deviations caused by in-flight movement of cabin crew, galley equipment and passengers.

(b)Defining and applying operational procedures in order to:

(1)ensure an even distribution of passengers in the cabin;

(2)take into account any significant CG travel during flight caused by passenger/crew movement; and

(3)take into account any significant CG travel during flight caused by fuel consumption/transfer.