Easy Access Rules for Air Operations

Regulation (EU) 2015/2338

(a)By 16 December 2018 at the latest, the operator shall establish and maintain, as part of the system for exercising operational control over the flights, an aircraft tracking system, which includes the flights eligible to (b) when performed with the following aeroplanes:

(1)aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 27 000 kg, with an MOPSC of more than 19, and first issued with an individual CofA before 16 December 2018, which are equipped with a capability to provide a position additional to the secondary surveillance radar transponder;

(2)all aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 27 000 kg, with an MOPSC of more than 19, and first issued with an individual CofA on or after 16 December 2018; and

(3)all aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 45 500 kg and first issued with an individual CofA on or after 16 December 2018.

(b)Flights shall be tracked by the operator from take-off to landing, except when the planned route and the planned diversion routes are fully included in airspace blocks where:

(1)ATS surveillance service is normally provided which is supported by ATC surveillance systems locating the aircraft at time intervals with adequate duration; and

(2)the operator has provided to competent air navigation service providers necessary contact information.

ED Decision 2021/008/R

EQUIPMENT, PERFORMANCE AND PROCEDURES WHEN AIRCRAFT TRACKING IS REQUIRED

(a)Automatic tracking of aeroplane position

The aircraft tracking system should rely on equipment capable of automatically detecting and transmitting a position report to the aircraft operator, except if (d)(2) applies.

(b)Position reporting period

The tracking of an individual flight should provide a position report at time intervals which do not exceed 15 minutes.

(c)Content of position reports

Each position report should contain at least the latitude, the longitude and the time of position determination and whenever available, an indication of the aeroplane altitude, except that for each flight:

(1)One of the position reports may contain only time-stamped data indicating that the aeroplane has left the gate;

(2)One of the position reports may contain only time-stamped data indicating that the aeroplane has become airborne;

(3)One of the position reports may contain only time-stamped data indicating that the aeroplane has landed; and

(4)One of the position reports may contain only time-stamped data indicating that the aeroplane has reached the gate.

(d)Source of position data

The data contained in a position report may come from:

(1)ATC surveillance systems, if the ATC surveillance data source is capable of providing this data with a delay equal to or less than 10 minutes;

(2)the flight crew, if the planned flight duration is less than two position reporting periods;

(3)aeroplane systems. In that case:

(i)the source of time, latitude and longitude data should be the navigation system of the aeroplane or an approved GNSS receiver;

(ii)the source of altitude data should be:

(A)the same source as for time, latitude and longitude data, or

(B)an approved source of pressure altitude; and

(iii)the delivery time of position reports from the aeroplane to the operational control over the flight should, to the extent possible, not exceed 10 minutes; or

(4)any data source when the position report is of a type designated by (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3) or (c)(4). In that case, the delivery time of position reports from the data source to the operational control over the flight should, to the extent possible, not exceed 10 minutes.

(e)Temporary lack of aircraft tracking data

Aircraft tracking data may be incomplete due to a temporary or unexpected issue prior to or during the flight. However, the operator should:

(1)identify any loss of aircraft tracking data which is not due to a temporary issue, and

(2)address any systematic lack of aircraft tracking data affecting a given aeroplane or a given route in a timely manner.

(f)Operational control over the flights

When abnormal flight behaviour is suspected, this should be checked and acted upon without delay.

(g)Recording of aircraft tracking data during normal operation

When the tracking of a flight is required, all related aircraft tracking data should be recorded on the ground, including position data from ATC surveillance systems when they are used. The aircraft tracking data of a given flight should be retained until confirmation that the flight is completed and no accident or serious incident occurred.

(h)Preserving aircraft tracking data after an accident or a serious incident

Following an accident or a serious incident, the operator should retain the aircraft tracking data of the involved flight for at least 30 days. In addition, the operator should be capable of providing a copy of this data without delay and in an electronic format that is human-readable using a common text file editor.

(i)Procedures

The operator should establish procedures describing its aircraft tracking system, including the identification of abnormal flight behaviour and the notification of the competent ATS unit (ATS unit responsible for providing the alerting service in the airspace where the aircraft is believed to be), when appropriate. These procedures should be integrated with the emergency response plan of the operator.

ED Decision 2017/023/R

ROUTES INCLUDED IN AIRSPACE COVERED BY ATS SURVEILLANCE

(a)Trajectory points located at a distance of less than 50 NM from the departure airfield and trajectory points located at a distance of less than 50 NM from the destination airfield may be considered as not part of the ‘planned route’.

(b)Trajectory points located at a distance of less than 50 NM from any diversion airfield may be considered as not part of the ‘planned diversion routes’.

(c)An ATS surveillance service may be considered ‘supported by ATC surveillance systems locating the aircraft at time intervals with adequate duration’ if those ATC surveillance systems are capable of locating aircraft at time intervals not exceeding 15 minutes when operated normally.

(d)When applicable, the operator should check that the conditions required for using the exception defined by CAT.GEN.MPA.205(b) are fulfilled before operating into new airspace blocks.

(e)When applicable, the operator should check at time intervals not exceeding 180 calendar days that the conditions required for using the exception defined by CAT.GEN.MPA.205(b) are maintained.

ED Decision 2017/023/R

EXPLANATION OF TERMS

For the understanding of the terms used in CAT.GEN.MPA.205:

(a)’capability to provide a position additional to the secondary surveillance radar transponder’ means airborne equipment other than the SSR transponder, which is operative and which can be used to automatically transmit time-stamped position data without change to the approved airborne systems; and

(b)‘abnormal flight behaviour’: see GM1 to Annex I (Definitions).

ED Decision 2017/023/R

DETERMINING WHETHER A FLIGHT NEEDS TO BE TRACKED

Table 1 provides a summary of the cases applicable to an aeroplane which is within the scope of CAT.GEN.MPA.205(a).

Table 1: Cases applicable to the flight of an aeroplane subject to the aircraft tracking requirement

ED Decision 2017/023/R

METHOD FOR ASSESSING WHETHER A FLIGHT NEEDS TO BE TRACKED

The following gives an example of a method to assess whether flights performed along a given route need to be tracked.

(a)Determine the planned route and the planned diversion routes and consider only points of these routes located at a distance of greater than or equal to 50 NM from the departure airfield, the destination airfield and the diversion airfields. If there is no such point, then the flight does not need to be tracked, otherwise go to (b).

(b)Identify all airspace blocks crossed by the result of (a) and go to (c).

(c)If every airspace block meets all of the following conditions, then the flight does not need to be tracked:

(1)ATS surveillance service is provided in the airspace block;

(2)This ATS surveillance service relies on ATC surveillance systems which are normally capable of detecting aircraft in the airspace block at time intervals not exceeding 15 minutes; and

(3)The air navigation service provider competent for the airspace block has information sufficient to contact the on-duty staff at the operator;

ED Decision 2017/023/R

POSSIBLE SOURCES AND MINIMUM CONTENT OF A POSITION REPORT

Table 1 presents a summary of the possible sources and the minimum content of a position report according to AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.205.

Table 1: Possible sources and minimum content of a position report

ED Decision 2017/023/R

AIRCRAFT TRACKING — CHOICE OF THE POSITION REPORTING PERIOD

(a)Unless the aircraft tracking system includes functionalities enhancing the detection of deviations from normal operation (e.g. airborne systems capable of automatically transmitting more information under some conditions, possibility for the operational control to adjust the position reporting period of an ongoing flight, etc.), the choice of the position reporting period has a significant influence on the effectiveness of the aircraft tracking system.

(1)Indeed, assuming that an operator has set itself the objective of detecting, within a given time T, deviations from normal operation, and that the operator relies for this purpose only on position reports, then the position reporting period needs to be less than T.

(2)Furthermore, when no other information than position reports is available to locate a missing aircraft, then the search zone is a circle with a radius corresponding to the distance likely to have been covered since the last detection. The corresponding search area grows as the square of the time, until the position of the aircraft is detected again or the fuel on board is exhausted. Taking the example of an aeroplane cruising at Mach 0.8 (i.e. covering a distance of about 8 NM per minute), after 15 minutes the search area is 155 000 square kilometres.

(3)In the publication of the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau titled ‘The Operational Search for MH370’ (dated October 2017), it is recommended that ‘Aircraft operators, aircraft manufacturers, and aircraft equipment manufacturers investigate ways to provide high-rate and/or automatically triggered global position tracking in existing and future fleets’.

(b)It is advised to take the above into account when setting up the aircraft tracking system.

ED Decision 2021/008/R

PROVIDING CONTACT INFORMATION TO COMPETENT AIR NAVIGATION SERVICE PROVIDERS

A solution for the operator to make the necessary contact information available to all competent air navigation service providers (ANSPs) could be to register to the global OPS Control Directory of ICAO. Another possible way is to provide in the ATS flight plan (item 18 ‘Other information’) information sufficient to contact the on-duty staff of the aircraft operator.

ED Decision 2017/023/R

GUIDANCE

Additional guidance for the establishment of an aircraft tracking system is found in ICAO Circular 347 – Aircraft Tracking Implementation Guidelines, dated 2017.

Regulation (EU) 2022/2203

As of 1 January 2025, the following aeroplanes shall be equipped with robust and automatic means to accurately determine, following an accident during which the aeroplane is severely damaged, the location of the point of end of flight:

(a)all aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 27 000 kg, with an MOPSC of more than 19, and first issued with an individual CofA on or after 1 January 2024; and

(b)all aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than 45 500 kg and first issued with an individual CofA on or after 1 January 2024.

ED Decision 2021/008/R

PERFORMANCE OF THE AIRBORNE SYSTEM, TRANSMISSION SERVICE, AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

(a)Performance of the airborne system

The airborne system used to comply with point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 (‘airborne system’) should:

(1)be approved in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements; and

(2)comply with the Certification Specifications for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CS-ACNS) issued by EASA, or equivalent.

(b)Transmission service

If the airborne system relies on other equipment than ELTs for transmitting the information needed to comply with point CAT.GEN.MPA.210, the provider of the transmission service should be a surveillance service provider that is certified in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/373 (the ‘ATM/ANS Regulation’).

(c)Flight crew procedures

The operator should establish flight crew procedures for using the airborne system, including manual activation and manual deactivation of that system. These procedures should ensure that the flight crew manually activate the airborne system only if a search and rescue (SAR) response is needed or anticipated, and that they inform the relevant ATS unit in a timely manner when they manually deactivate or disable the airborne system to stop data transmission.

(d)Operator’s procedures

The operator should establish procedures:

(1)for assessing whether an aircraft is likely to be in a state of emergency and

(2)for informing the competent ATS unit (ATS unit responsible for providing the alerting service in the airspace where the aircraft is believed to be):

(i)when a state of emergency is identified, and

(ii)when a state of emergency no longer exists.

(e)Limiting the effects of false alerts

To reduce the frequency and effects of false alerts that are caused by the airborne system, the operator should:

(1)establish procedures for disabling any of the required functions of the airborne system;

(2)consider the airborne system inoperative if, during a flight, there were several occurrences of undesirable automatic activation of the airborne system; and

(3)analyse occurrences of undesirable (manual and automatic) activation of the airborne system to determine their probable cause; the records of such analyses should be retained for at least 12 months and provided to the competent authority on request.

ED Decision 2021/008/R

OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION

(a)The purpose of point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 is to have a high probability of timely and accurately locating the accident site after an accident during which the aircraft is severely damaged, irrespective of the accident location and survivability (hence, the terms ‘automatic’, ‘robust’, and ‘accurately’ are used in CAT.GEN.MPA.210). The scope of point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 includes non-survivable accidents. Means compliant with point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 are expected to:

(1)quickly inform the SAR authority concerned that an accident occurred or is about to occur and provide them with information that can easily be used for locating the accident site; and

(2)help the safety investigation authority concerned to locate the accident site and the aircraft wreckage so that they can collect evidence in a reasonable time frame.

Therefore, if an aircraft in the scope of CAT.IDE.A.280 complies with CAT.GEN.MPA.210, this aircraft is not required to be equipped with an automatic emergency locator transmitter (ELT). Similarly, if an aircraft in the scope of CAT.IDE.A.285 complies with CAT.GEN.MPA.210, this aircraft is not required to be equipped with a 8.8-kHz underwater locating device (ULD).

(b)The airborne system used to comply with point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 could rely, for example, on an emergency locator transmitter of a distress tracking type (ELT(DT)), on an automatic deployable flight recorder (ADFR), or on the transmission of position reports at short time intervals (high-rate tracking (HRT)).

(c)Subpart A of the Certification Specifications for Airborne Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CS-ACNS) contains general conditions applicable to the airborne system. Subpart E of CS-ACNS contains specific conditions for meeting the purpose of point CAT.GEN.MPA.210.

(d)If other transmitting equipment than an ELT is used by the airborne system for complying with CAT.GEN.MPA.210, AMC1 CNS.OR.100 to Part-CNS of the ATM/ANS Regulation contains conditions applicable to the provider of the transmission service that is used by that equipment.

(e)While AMC1 CNS.OR.100 only addresses the transmission of information to the SAR authorities, the capability to also transmit that information to the operator is advisable.

ED Decision 2021/008/R

EXPLANATION OF TERMS

The terms used in point CAT.GEN.MPA.210 and AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.210 are explained below for better understanding:

—‘accident during which the aeroplane is severely damaged’ refers to an accident during which the aeroplane sustains damage or structural failure that adversely affects its structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics, and would normally require a major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for:

—an engine failure or damage to the engine, when the damage is limited to a single engine (including its cowlings or accessories);

—damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, probes, vanes, tyres, brakes, wheels, fairings, panels, landing gear doors, windscreens, the aeroplane skin (such as small dents or puncture holes);

—minor damage to the landing gear; and

—damage resulting from hail or bird strike (including holes in the radome);

—‘accurately determine the location of the point of end of flight’ means locating the point of end of flight with a position accuracy that is sufficient for safety investigation purposes, and when the accident conditions are survivable, also for SAR purposes;

—‘activation of the airborne system’ means the transition of the airborne system from another state to the activated state;

—‘airborne system’ means the organised set of airborne applications and airborne equipment that comply with CAT.GEN.MPA.210;

—‘ATM/ANS Regulation’ refers to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/373 of 1 March 2017 or any later EU regulation laying down common requirements for providers of air traffic management/air navigation services.

—‘automatic means’ refers to means that do not require any human action to perform their intended function;

—‘automatic activation of the airborne system’ means activation of the airborne system that is automatically triggered by airborne equipment;

—‘deactivation of the airborne system’ means the transition of that system from the activated state to another state;

—‘point of end of flight’ means, depending on the nature of the accident, the point where the aircraft crashed into land or water, or landed on land or water, or was destroyed;

—‘required functions of the airborne system’ refers to the ‘functions of the system’, which are defined in the CS-ACNS that are applicable to locating an aircraft in distress;

—‘robust means’ refers to means designed to work properly under the circumstances of survivable accidents, and under the circumstances of most non-survivable accidents;

—‘the airborne system is activated’ means that the airborne system transmits signals to enable the determination of the location of the point of end of flight without sending mobile SAR facilities to the area of the transmitter; and

—‘transmission service’ refers to the service that makes the information sent by the airborne system available to the relevant stakeholders.

Regulation (EU) 2018/1042

(a)The operator shall enable, facilitate and ensure access to a proactive and non-punitive support programme that will assist and support flight crew in recognising, coping with, and overcoming any problem which might negatively affect their ability to safely exercise the privileges of their licence. Such access shall be made available to all flight crew.

(b)Without prejudice to applicable national legislation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, the protection of the confidentiality of data shall be a precondition for an effective support programme as it encourages the use of such a programme and ensures its integrity.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING A SUPPORT PROGRAMME

The access to a support programme should:

(a)enable self-declaration or referral in case of a decrease in a flight crew’s medical fitness with an emphasis on prevention and early support; and

(b)if appropriate, allow the flight crew to receive temporary relief from flight duties and be referred to professional advice.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

CONFIDENTIALITY AND PROTECTION OF DATA

(a)The personal data of flight crew who have been referred to a support programme should be handled in a confidential, non-stigmatising, and safe environment.

(b)A culture of mutual trust and cooperation should be maintained so that the flight crew is less likely to hide a condition and more likely to report and seek help.

(c)Disclosure of data to the operator may only be granted in an anonymised manner such as in the form of aggregated statistical data and only for purposes of safety management so as not to compromise the voluntary participation in a support programme, thereby compromising flight safety.

(d)Notwithstanding the above, an agreement with related procedures should be in place between the operator and the support programme on how to proceed in case of a serious safety concern.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

ELEMENTS OF A SUPPORT PROGRAMME

(a)A support programme should contain as a minimum the following elements:

(1)procedures including education of flight crew regarding self-awareness and facilitation of self-referral;

(2)assistance provided by professionals, including mental and psychological health professionals with relevant knowledge of the aviation environment;

(3)involvement of trained peers, where trained peers are available;

(4)monitoring of the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme;

(5)monitoring and support of the process of returning to work;

(6)management of risks resulting from fear of loss of licence; and

(7)a referral system to an aero-medical examiner in defined cases raising serious safety concerns.

(b)A support programme should be linked to the management system of the operator, provided that data is used for purposes of safety management and is anonymised and aggregated to ensure confidentiality.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

TRAINING AND AWARENESS

(a)The operator should promote access to the support programme for all flight crew.

(b)Professionals, including mental and psychological health professionals, as well as trained peers, where trained peers are available, that are involved in the support programme, should receive initial and recurrent training related to their role and function within the support programme.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

SUPPORT PROGRAMME

(a)A support programme is a proactive programme applying the principles of ‘just culture’ as defined in Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, whereby the senior management of the operator, mental health professionals, trained peers, and in many cases representative organisations of crew members work together to enable self-declaration, referral, advice, counselling and/or treatment, where necessary, in case of a decrease in medical fitness.

(b)The support programme should be easily accessible for flight crew, and should provide adequate means of support at the earliest stages.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

FACILITATION OF TRUST IN THE SUPPORT PROGRAMME

Essential trust between management and crew is the foundation for a successful support programme. This trust can be facilitated by:

(a)establishing a platform for multi-stakeholder participation and partnership in the governance process of the support programme by involving flight crew representatives from one or more operators and representatives of the relevant operator. In some cases, a multi-stakeholder platform may also include representatives of the competent authority;

(b)participation of the representatives of those personnel covered by the support programme in the design, implementation and operation of the support programme;

(c)a formal agreement between management and crew, identifying the procedures for the use of data, its protection and confidentiality;

(d)clear and unambiguous provisions on data protection;

(e)senior management’s demonstrated commitment to promote a proactive safety culture;

(f)a non-punitive operator policy that also covers the support programme;

(g)support programme management by staff either established within the operator or by a separate independent organisation;

(h)involvement of persons with appropriate expertise when advising crews (for example, pilot peers with similar cultural backgrounds and professional staff with appropriate training in e.g. psychology, etc.);

(i)a structured system to protect the confidentiality of personal data; and

(j)an efficient communication system that promotes the benefits of the support programme, such as its positive impacts, temporary relief from duties without fear of dismissal, management of risks resulting from fear of loss of licence.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

TRAINING AND AWARENESS

(a)When promoting the benefits of the support programme, the operator should stress at least the following elements of the programme:

(1)positive impacts of a support programme;

(2)awareness of job stressors and life stressors — mental fitness and mental health;

(3)coping strategies;

(4)potential effects of psychoactive substances and their use or misuse;

(5)medication use (prescribed and over-the-counter medication) to ensure the safe exercise of the privileges of the licence whilst taking medication;

(6)early recognition of mental unfitness;

(7)principles and availability of a support programme; and

(8)data protection and confidentiality principles.

(b)Mental health professionals involved in the support programme should be trained on:

(1)psychological first aid;

(2)applicable legal requirements regarding data protection; and

(3)cases where information should be disclosed due to an immediate and evident safety threat and in the interest of public safety.

(c)Peers involved in the support programme should receive practically orientated basic training in psychological first aid and regular refresher trainings.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO A SUPPORT PROGRAMME

When implementing a support programme, the operator should pay attention to the following:

(a)establishment and verification of operational and data protection procedures;

(b)selection and training of dedicated and experienced staff and peers;

(c)offer of motivating alternative positions to flight crew in case a return to in-flight duties is not possible; and

(d)limitation of the financial consequences of a loss of licence, for example through extending loss of licence coverage.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

POSSIBILITY TO CONTRACT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPPORT PROGRAMME TO A THIRD PARTY

The operator may contract the establishment of a support programme to a third party. For a smaller-sized operator, the synergies created by a third-party support programme can be beneficial and in some cases may provide the only feasible option to ensure access to a support programme or to ensure availability of trained peers.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

OBLIGATION TO SEEK AERO-MEDICAL ADVICE IN CASE OF A DECREASE IN MEDICAL FITNESS

Joining a support programme does not remove the flight crew’s obligation to seek aero-medical advice in case of a decrease in medical fitness in accordance with MED.A.020 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

SCOPE OF THE SUPPORT PROGRAMME

Nothing should prevent an operator from extending the scope of the support programme to include, apart from flight crew, other safety-sensitive categories personnel, e.g. cabin crew or maintenance, as well.

ED Decision 2018/012/R

MEANING OF THE TERM ‘PEER’

(a)In the context of a support programme, a ‘peer’ is a trained person who shares common professional qualifications and experience, and has encountered similar situations, problems or conditions with the person seeking assistance from a support programme. This may or may not be a person working in the same organisation as the person seeking assistance from the support programme.

(b)A peer’s involvement in a support programme can be beneficial due to similar professional backgrounds between the peer and the person seeking support. However, a mental health professional should support the peer when required, e.g. in cases where intervention is required to prevent endangering safety.

Regulation (EU) 2025/24

(a)The operator providing any of the ground handling activities listed in Article 2(2) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/20 to itself or within a single air carrier business grouping (self-handling) shall comply with the applicable requirements of Annex I and Annex II to that Regulation, except for the requirements applicable to the ground supervision function, which shall comply with point ORO.GEN.315.

(b)The operator shall submit the training programme for its ground handling personnel in accordance with point ORGH.GEN.145 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/20 to the competent authority responsible for the oversight of ground handling activities. The dangerous goods training programme is subject to approval in accordance with ORO.GEN.110(j).

[applicable from 27 March 2028 — Regulation (EU) 2025/24]

ED Decision 2025/008/R

SINGLE AIR CARRIER BUSINESS GROUPING

The term ‘single air carrier business grouping’ refers to two or more AOC holders whose principal place of business is in a territory to which the Treaties apply. Those AOC holders may or may not facilitate the harmonisation of their management systems and operations for the purpose of applying requirements for self-handling in a harmonised way. The management systems and operations include policies, processes and procedures for ground handling, training of personnel performing ground handling activities, ground operations procedures and the maintenance programme for ground support equipment.

[applicable from 27 March 2028 — ED Decision 2025/008/R]

ED Decision 2025/008/R

TRAINING PROGRAMME

The training programme for the operators’ ground handling personnel does not require the prior approval of the competent authority.

This approach is consistent with Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/20, which establishes the requirements for ground handling training applicable to a CAT operator of complex motorpowered aeroplanes performing self-handling. Regulation (EU) 2025/20 does not require any prior approval of any element of the operator’s management system, as organisations providing ground handling services operate under a declaration regime.

[applicable from 27 March 2028 — ED Decision 2025/008/R]

SUBPART B: OPERATING PROCEDURES

SECTION 1 – Motor-powered aircraft

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

(a)The operator shall ensure that:

(1)air traffic services (ATS) appropriate to the airspace and the applicable rules of the air are used for all flights whenever available;

(2)in-flight operational instructions involving a change to the ATS flight plan, when practicable, are coordinated with the appropriate ATS unit before transmission to an aircraft.

(b)Notwithstanding (a), the use of ATS is not required unless mandated by air space requirements for:

(1)operations under VFR by day of other-than complex motor-powered aeroplanes;

(2)helicopters with an MCTOM of 3 175 kg or less operated by day and over routes navigated by reference to visual landmarks; or

(3)local helicopter operations (LHOs),

provided that search and rescue service arrangements can be maintained.

ED Decision 2014/015/R

IN-FLIGHT OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

When coordination with an appropriate air traffic service (ATS) unit has not been possible, in-flight operational instructions do not relieve a commander of the responsibility for obtaining an appropriate clearance from an ATS unit, if applicable, before making a change in flight plan.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

(a)The operator shall establish procedures for altimeter checking before each departure.

(b)The operator shall establish procedures for altimeter settings for all phases of flight, which shall take into account the procedures established by the State of the aerodrome or the State of the airspace, if applicable.

ED Decision 2022/014/R

ALTIMETER SETTING PROCEDURES

The following paragraphs of ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III provide recommended guidance on how to develop the altimeter setting procedure:

(a)3.2 ‘Pre-flight operational test’;

(b)3.3 ‘Take-off and climb’;

(c)3.5 ‘Approach and landing’.

Regulation (EU) 2015/140

(a)The operator shall only use aerodromes and operating sites that are adequate for the type(s) of aircraft and operation(s) concerned.

(b)The use of operating sites shall only apply to:

(1)other-than complex motor-powered aeroplanes; and

(2)helicopters.

ED Decision 2023/007/R

DEFINING OPERATING SITES — HELICOPTERS

When defining operating sites (including infrequent or temporary sites) for the type(s) of helicopter(s) and operation(s) concerned, the operator should take account of the following:

(a)An adequate site is a site that the operator considers to be satisfactory, taking account of the applicable performance requirements and site characteristics (guidance on standards and criteria are contained in ICAO Annex 14 Volume 2 and in the ICAO Heliport Manual (Doc 9261-AN/903)).

(b)The operator should have in place a procedure for the survey of sites by a competent person. Such a procedure should take account of possible changes to the site characteristics which may have taken place since last surveyed.

(c)Sites that are pre-surveyed should be specifically specified in the operations manual. The operations manual should contain diagrams or/and ground and aerial photographs, and depiction (pictorial) and description of:

(1)the overall dimensions of the site;

(2)location and height of relevant obstacles to approach and take-off profiles, and in the manoeuvring area;

(3)approach and take-off flight paths;

(4)surface condition (blowing dust/snow/sand);

(5)helicopter types authorised with reference to performance requirements;

(6)provision of control of third parties on the ground (if applicable);

(7)procedure for activating site with land owner or controlling authority;

(8)other useful information, for example, appropriate ATS agency and frequency; and

(9)lighting (if applicable).

(d)For sites that are not pre-surveyed, the operator should have in place a procedure that enables the pilot to make, from the air, a judgment on the suitability of a site. (c)(1) to (c)(6) should be considered.

(e)Operations to non-pre-surveyed sites by night (except in accordance with SPA.HEMS.125(c)(4)) should not be permitted.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

The operator shall consider an aerodrome as adequate if, at the expected time of use, the aerodrome is available and equipped with necessary ancillary services such as air traffic services (ATS), sufficient lighting, communications, meteorological reports, navigation aids and emergency services.

ED Decision 2019/019/R

RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING SERVICES (RFFS)

When considering the adequacy of an aerodrome’s rescue and firefighting services (RFFS), the operator should:

(a) as part of its management system, assess the level of RFFS protection available at the aerodrome intended to be specified in the operational flight plan in order to ensure that an acceptable level of protection is available for the intended operation; and

(b)include relevant information related to the RFFS protection that is deemed acceptable by the operator in the operations manual.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

VERIFICATION OF WEATHER CONDITIONS

This GM clarifies the difference between ‘adequate aerodrome’ and ‘weather-permissible aerodrome’. The two concepts are complementary:

—‘adequate aerodrome’: see definition in Annex I (Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII) and point CAT.OP.MPA.107 of Annex IV (Part-CAT) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012; and

—‘weather-permissible aerodrome’ means an adequate aerodrome with additional requirements: see definition in Annex I (Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII).

Weather conditions are not required to be considered at an adequate aerodrome.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

(a)The operator shall establish aerodrome operating minima for each departure, destination or alternate aerodrome that is planned to be used in order to ensure separation of the aircraft from terrain and obstacles and to mitigate the risk of loss of visual references during the visual flight segment of instrument approach operations.

(b)The method used to establish aerodrome operating minima shall take all the following elements into account:

(1)the type, performance, and handling characteristics of the aircraft;

(2)the equipment available on the aircraft for the purpose of navigation, acquisition of visual references, and/or control of the flight path during take-off, approach, landing, and the missed approach;

(3)any conditions or limitations stated in the aircraft flight manual (AFM);

(4)the relevant operational experience of the operator;

(5)the dimensions and characteristics of the runways/final approach and take-off areas (FATOs) that may be selected for use;

(6)the adequacy and performance of the available visual and non-visual aids and infrastructure;

(7)the obstacle clearance altitude/height (OCA/H) for the instrument approach procedures (IAPs);

(8)the obstacles in the climb-out areas and necessary clearance margins;

(9)the composition of the flight crew, their competence and experience;

(10)the IAP;

(11)the aerodrome characteristics and the available air navigation services (ANS);

(12)any minima that may be promulgated by the State of the aerodrome;

(13)the conditions prescribed in the operations specifications including any specific approvals for low-visibility operations (LVOs) or operations with operational credits.

(14)any non-standard characteristics of the aerodrome, the IAP or the environment

(c)The operator shall specify a method of determining aerodrome operating minima in the operations manual.

(d)The method used by the operator to establish aerodrome operating minima and any change to that method shall be approved by the competent authority.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES

(a)Take-off minima

Take-off minima should be expressed as visibility (VIS) or runway visual range (RVR) limits, taking into account all relevant factors for each runway planned to be used and aircraft characteristics and equipment. Where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure and/or for a forced landing, additional conditions, e.g. ceiling, should be specified.

(b)Visual reference

(1)The take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical engine.

(2)For night operations, the prescribed runway lights should be in operation.

(c)Required RVR or VIS

(1)For multi-engined aeroplanes, with performance such that, in the event of a critical engine failure at any point during take-off, the aeroplane can either stop or continue the take-off to a height of 1 500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the required margins, the take-off minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR or VIS values not lower than those specified in Table 1.

(2)For multi-engined aeroplanes without the performance to comply with the conditions in (c)(1), in the event of a critical engine failure, there may be a need to re-land immediately and to see and avoid obstacles in the take-off area. Such aeroplanes may be operated to the following take-off minima provided that they are able to comply with the applicable obstacle clearance criteria, assuming engine failure at the height specified. The take-off minima specified by the operator should be based upon the height from which the one-engine-inoperative (OEI) net take-off flight path can be constructed. The RVR minima used should not be lower than either of the values specified in Table 1 or Table 2.

(3)For single-engined turbine aeroplane operations approved in accordance with Subpart L (SET-IMC) of Annex V (Part-SPA), the take-off minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR values not lower than those specified in Table 1.

Unless the operator is making use of a risk period, whenever the surface in front of the runway does not allow for a safe forced landing, the RVR values should not be lower than 800 m. In this case, the proportion of the flight to be considered starts at the lift-off position and ends when the aeroplane is able to turn back and land on the runway in the opposite direction or glide to the next landing site in case of power loss.

Table 1

Take-off — aeroplanes (without LVTO approval)

RVR or VIS

*The reported RVR or VIS value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment.

**The pilot is able to continuously identify the take-off surface and maintain directional control.

***Runway end lights may be substituted by colour-coded runway edge lights or colour-coded runway centre line lights.

Table 2

Take-off — aeroplanes (without LVTO approval)

Assumed engine failure height above the runway versus RVR or VIS

**The reported RVR or VIS value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

TAKE-OFF OPERATIONS — HELICOPTERS

(a)General

(1)Take-off minima should be expressed as VIS or RVR limits, taking into account all relevant factors for each aerodrome or operating site planned to be used and aircraft characteristics and equipment. Where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure, or for a forced landing, additional conditions, e.g. ceiling, should be specified.

(2)The commander should not commence take-off unless the meteorological conditions at the aerodrome or operating site of departure are equal to or better than the applicable minima for landing at that aerodrome or operating site unless a weather-permissible take-off alternate aerodrome is available.

(3)When the reported VIS is below that required for take-off and the RVR is not reported, a take-off should only be commenced if the commander can determine that the visibility or RVR along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum.

(4)When no reported VIS or RVR is available, a take-off should only be commenced if the commander can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum.

(b)Visual reference

(1)The take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical engine.

(2)For night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the take-off runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) and any obstacles.

(3)For point-in-space (PinS) departures to an initial departure fix (IDF), the take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to see and avoid obstacles and return to the heliport if the flight cannot be continued visually to the IDF. This should require a VIS of 800 m. The ceiling should be 250 ft.

(c)Required RVR or VIS

(1)For performance class 1 operations, the operator should specify an RVR or a VIS as takeoff minima in accordance with Table 3.

(2)For performance class 2 operations onshore, the commander should operate to take-off minima of 800 m RVR or VIS and remain clear of cloud during the take-off manoeuvre until reaching performance class 1 capabilities.

(3)For performance class 2 operations offshore, the commander should operate to minima not less than those for performance class 1 and remain clear of cloud during the take-off manoeuvre until reaching performance class 1 capabilities.

Table 3

Take-off — helicopters (without LVTO approval)

RVR or VIS

*The take-off flight path to be free of obstacles.

**On PinS departures to IDF, VIS should not be less than 800 m and the ceiling should not be less than 250 ft.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

DETERMINATION OF DH/MDH FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES

(a)The decision height (DH) to be used for a 3D approach operation or a 2D approach operation flown using the continuous descent final approach (CDFA) technique should not be lower than the highest of:

(1)the obstacle clearance height (OCH) for the category of aircraft;

(2)the published approach procedure DH or minimum descent height (MDH) where applicable;

(3)the system minima specified in Table 4;

(4)the minimum DH permitted for the runway specified in Table 5; or

(5)the minimum DH specified in the aircraft flight manual (AFM) or equivalent document, if stated.

(b)The MDH for a 2D approach operation flown not using the CDFA technique should not be lower than the highest of:

(1)the OCH for the category of aircraft;

(2)the published approach procedure MDH where applicable;

(3)the system minima specified in Table 4;

(4)the lowest MDH permitted for the runway specified in Table 5; or

(5)the lowest MDH specified in the AFM, if stated.

Table 4

System minima — aeroplanes

*For localiser performance with vertical guidance (LPV), a DH of 200 ft may be used only if the published FAS datablock sets a vertical alert limit not exceeding 35 m. Otherwise, the DH should not be lower than 250 ft.

Table 5

Runway type minima — aeroplanes

(c)Where a barometric DA/H or MDA/H is used, this should be adjusted where the ambient temperature is significantly below international standard atmosphere (ISA). GM8 CAT.OP.MPA.110 ‘Low temperature correction’ provides a cold temperature correction table for adjustment of minimum promulgated heights/altitudes.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

DETERMINATION OF DH/MDH FOR INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS — HELICOPTERS

(a)The DH or MDH to be used for a 3D or a 2D approach operation should not be lower than the highest of:

(1)the OCH for the category of aircraft;

(2)the published approach procedure DH or MDH where applicable;

(3)the system minima specified in Table 6;

(4)the minimum DH permitted for the runway/FATO specified in Table 7, if applicable; or

(5)the minimum DH specified in the AFM or equivalent document, if stated.

Table 6

System minima — helicopters

*For LPV, a DH of 200 ft may be used only if the published FAS datablock sets a vertical alert limit not exceeding 35 m. Otherwise, the DH should not be lower than 250 ft.

**For PinS approaches with instructions to ‘proceed VFR’ to an undefined or virtual destination, the DH or MDH should be with reference to the ground below the missed approach point (MAPt).

Table 7

Type of runway/FATO versus lowest DH/MDH — helicopters

Table 7 does not apply to helicopter PinS approaches with instructions to ‘proceed VFR’.