ANNEX III (Part-ORO)

Regulation (EU) 2024/1111

This Annex establishes the requirements to be met by an air operator that conducts:

(a)commercial air transport (CAT) operations;

(b)commercial specialised operations;

(c)non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft;

(d)non-commercial specialised operations with complex motor-powered aircraft;

(e)innovative air mobility (IAM) operations.

SUBPART GEN: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

SECTION 1 – General

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

For the purpose of this Annex, the competent authority exercising oversight over operators subject to a certification or declaration obligation or specialised operation authorisation shall be for operators having their principal place of business in a Member State, the authority designated by that Member State.

Regulation (EU) 2019/1384

(a)The operator is responsible for the operation of the aircraft in accordance with Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, as applicable, the relevant requirements of this Annex and its air operator certificate (AOC) or specialised operation authorisation (SPO authorisation) or declaration.

(b)Every flight shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the operations manual.

(c)The operator shall establish and maintain a system for exercising operational control over any flight operated under the terms of its certificate, SPO authorisation or declaration.

(d)The operator shall ensure that its aircraft are equipped and its crews are qualified as required for the area and type of operation.

(e)The operator shall ensure that all personnel assigned to, or directly involved in, ground and flight operations are properly instructed, have demonstrated their abilities in their particular duties and are aware of their responsibilities and the relationship of such duties to the operation as a whole.

(f)The operator shall establish procedures and instructions for the safe operation of each aircraft type, containing ground staff and crew member duties and responsibilities, for all types of operation on the ground and in flight. Those procedures and instructions shall not require crew members to perform any activities during critical phases of flight other than those required for the safe operation of the aircraft. Procedures and instructions for a sterile flight crew compartment shall also be included.

(g)The operator shall ensure that all personnel are made aware that they shall comply with the laws, regulations and procedures of those States in which operations are conducted and that are pertinent to the performance of their duties.

(h)The operator shall establish a checklist for each aircraft type to be used by crew members in all phases of flight under normal, abnormal and emergency conditions in order to ensure that the operating procedures in the operations manual are followed. The design and the usage of checklists shall observe human factors principles and take into account the latest relevant documentation from the design approval holder.

(i)The operator shall specify flight planning procedures to provide for the safe conduct of the flight based on considerations of aircraft performance, other operating limitations and relevant expected conditions on the route to be followed and at the aerodromes or operating sites concerned. These procedures shall be included in the operations manual.

(j)The operator shall establish and maintain dangerous goods training programmes for personnel as required by the technical instructions. Such training programmes shall be commensurate with the responsibilities of personnel. Training programmes of operators performing CAT, whether they transport dangerous goods or not, and of operators conducting operations other than CAT referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of point ORO.GEN.005 that transport dangerous goods shall be subject to review and approval by the competent authority.

(k)Notwithstanding point (j), operators conducting commercial operations with either of the following aircraft shall ensure that the flight crew has received an appropriate dangerous goods training or briefing, to enable them to recognise undeclared dangerous goods brought on board by passengers or as cargo:

(1)a single-engined propeller-driven aeroplane having an MCTOM of 5 700 kg or less and a MOPSC of 5 or less, operated in a flight taking off and landing at the same aerodrome or operating site, under VFR by day;

(2)an other-than-complex motor-powered helicopter, single-engined, with an MOPSC of 5 or less, operated in a flight taking off and landing at the same aerodrome or operating site, under VFR by day.

ED Decision 2015/005/R

SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR CREW MEMBERS — CAT OPERATIONS

Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, the CAT operator should establish and maintain a security training programme for crew members, including theoretical and practical elements. This training should be provided at the time of operator conversion training and thereafter at intervals not exceeding three years. The content and duration of the training should be adapted to the security threats of the individual operator and should ensure that crew members act in the most appropriate manner to minimise the consequences of acts of unlawful interference. This programme should include the following elements:

(a)determination of the seriousness of the occurrence;

(b)crew communication and coordination;

(c)appropriate self-defence responses;

(d)use of non-lethal protective devices assigned to crew members whose use is authorised by the Member State;

(e)understanding of behaviour of terrorists so as to facilitate the ability of crew members to cope with hijacker behaviour and passenger responses;

(f)in case where cabin crew are required, live situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions;

(g)flight crew compartment procedures to protect the aircraft;

(h)aircraft search procedures, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, including identification of prohibited articles; and

(i)guidance on the least risk bomb locations.

ED Decision 2015/005/R

SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR GROUND PERSONNEL — CAT OPERATIONS

In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, the CAT operator should establish and maintain a security training programme for ground personnel to acquaint appropriate employees with preventive measures and techniques in relation to passengers, baggage, cargo, mail, equipment, stores and supplies intended for carriage so that they contribute to the prevention of acts of sabotage or other forms of unlawful interference.

ED Decision 2015/005/R

SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR CREW MEMBERS

ICAO Security Manual Doc 9811 (restricted access) contains guidance on the development of training programmes.

ED Decision 2014/017/R

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

The organisation and methods established to exercise operational control should be included in the operations manual and should cover at least a description of responsibilities concerning the initiation, continuation and termination or diversion of each flight.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

(a)Point ORO.GEN.110(c) does not imply a requirement for licensed flight operations officers/flight dispatchers.

(b)If the operator uses flight operations officers (FOOs)/flight dispatchers (FDs) in conjunction with a method of operational control, training for that personnel should be based on the relevant parts of ICAO Annex 1 and ICAO Documents 10106 and 9868. This training should be described in the OM.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES — OPERATIONAL CONTROL PERSONNEL THAT PERFORM TASKS RELATED TO FLIGHT MONITORING AND FLIGHT WATCH — TRAINING PROGRAMME

(a)When a CAT operator uses flight monitoring or flight watch as functions of a system for exercising operational control, FOOs/FDs should perform those functions.

(b)The CAT operator should develop a training programme, based on the relevant parts of ICAO Annex 1, ICAO Documents 10106 and 9868, for FOOs/FDs that perform those functions.

(c)The training programme specified above should be detailed in the OM of the CAT operator and should be delivered by an instructor for operational control personnel.

INITIAL TRAINING

(d)The initial training should include, where relevant to the intended operation, the following elements that should be tailored to the specific duties assigned to each person:

(1)air law:

rules and regulations relevant to the task assignment, appropriate ATS practices and procedures;

(2)aircraft general knowledge:

(i)principles of operation of aeroplane engines/systems/instruments;

(ii)operating limitations of aeroplanes and engines; and

(iii)MEL and configuration deviation list (CDL);

(3)flight performance calculation, planning procedures, and loading:

(i)effects of loading and mass distribution on aircraft performance and flight characteristics; mass and balance calculations;

(ii)operational flight planning; fuel consumption and endurance calculations; alternate aerodrome selection procedures; en-route cruising control; extended range operation;

(iii)preparation and filing of ATS flight plans; and

(iv)basic principles of computer-assisted planning systems;

(4)human performance:

human performance related to operational control duties, including principles of threat and error management (TEM); guidance material on how to design training programmes on human performance, including on TEM, is provided in ICAO Doc 9683 Human Factors Training Manual;

(5)meteorology:

(A)aeronautical meteorology; movement of pressure systems; structure of fronts; origin and characteristics of significant weather phenomena that affect take-off, en-route, and landing conditions;

(B)interpretation and application of aeronautical meteorological reports, charts, and forecasts; codes and abbreviations; use of, and procedures for, obtaining meteorological information;

(C)effects of meteorological conditions on aircraft operation and on radio reception in the aircraft that is used by the operator; and

(D)all-weather operations;

(6)navigation:

(A)principles of air navigation with particular reference to IFR; and

(B)navigation and radio equipment in the aircraft that is used by the operator;

(7)operational procedures:

(A)use of aeronautical documentation and SOPs;

(B)procedures for operations beyond 60 minutes from an adequate aerodrome, including, if applicable, extended-diversion-time operations (EDTOs);

(C)operational procedures for the carriage of cargo and dangerous goods;

(D)de-icing/anti-icing;

(E)procedures related to aircraft accidents and incidents; emergency flight procedures; and

(F)security procedures related to unlawful interference and sabotage of aircraft;

(8)principles of flight:

principles of flight related to the appropriate category of aircraft;

(9)radio communications:

procedures for communicating with other aircraft and ground stations; and

(10)special aerodromes.

OPERATOR-SPECIFIC TRAINING

(e)In addition to the initial training, FOOs/FDs should receive training in the specific duties, responsibilities, and tools that are associated with the operational control system of the operator.

RECURRENT TRAINING

(f)When the recurrent training is conducted within the last 12 months of a 36-month validity period, the next 36-month validity period should be calculated from the original expiry date of the previous assessment.

(g)Notwithstanding the 36-month interval of point (f), recurrent training may also be performed at shorter intervals and adjusted to the needs identified after an assessment of the training needs conducted by the operator.

KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR INSTRUCTORS OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL PERSONNEL

(h)Unless otherwise required by the relevant national regulations, instructors for operational control personnel should:

(1)be able to prove that they are current in the subjects covered by the training programme for FOOs/FDs, including the operator-specific elements, or otherwise successfully complete an FOO/FD training programme;

(2)have adequate instructional skills or attend instructor training; if more than 24 months have passed since the delivery of the last FOO/FD course, they should attend recurrent instructor training before delivering the next course; and

(3)have relevant work experience in the areas of the training that they provide.

(i)The CAT operator should include in the OM the required knowledge, skills, and qualifications of the instructors for operational control personnel.

ED Decision 2017/007/R

MEL TRAINING PROGRAMME

(a)The operator should develop a training programme for ground personnel dealing with the use of the MEL and detail such training in the continuing airworthiness maintenance exposition CAME and OM as appropriate. Such training programme should include:

(1)the scope, extent and use of the MEL;

(2)placarding of inoperative equipment;

(3)deferral procedures;

(4)dispatching; and

(5)any other operator’s MEL related procedures.

(b)The operator should develop a training programme for crew members and detail such training in the Operations Manual. Such training programme should include:

(1)the scope, extent and use of the MEL;

(2)the operator’s MEL procedures;

(3)elementary maintenance procedures in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014; and

(4)pilot-in-command/commander responsibilities.

ED Decision 2015/005/R

GROUND OPERATIONS WITH PASSENGERS ON BOARD IN THE ABSENCE OF FLIGHT CREW

For ground operations, whenever passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking in the absence of flight crew members, the operator should:

(a)establish procedures to alert the aerodrome services in the event of ground emergency or urgent need; and

(b)ensure that at least one person on board the aircraft is qualified to apply these procedures and ensure proper coordination between the aircraft and the aerodrome services.

ED Decision 2014/017/R

GROUND PERSONNEL

For the purpose of the MEL training programme referred to in AMC1 ORO.GEN.110(e) ground personnel include maintenance personnel, flight dispatchers and operations officers.

ED Decision 2015/005/R

AERODROME SERVICES

Aerodrome services refer to units available at an aerodrome that could be of assistance in responding to an urgent need or an emergency, such as rescue and firefighting services, medical and ambulance services, air traffic services, security services, police, aerodrome operations, air operators.

ED Decision 2015/005/R

STERILE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT

(a)Sterile flight crew compartment procedures should ensure that:

(1)flight crew activities are restricted to essential operational activities; and

(2)cabin crew and technical crew communications to flight crew or entry into the flight crew compartment are restricted to safety or security matters.

(b)The sterile flight crew compartment procedures should be applied:

(1)during critical phases of flight;

(2)during taxiing (aeroplanes);

(3)below 10 000 feet above the aerodrome of departure after take-off and the aerodrome of destination before landing, except for cruise flight; and

(4)during any other phases of flight as determined by the pilot-in-command or commander.

(c)All crew members should be trained on sterile flight crew compartment procedures established by the operator, as appropriate to their duties.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PERSONNEL — BRIEFING OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS OFFICERS/FLIGHT DISPATCHERS BEFORE ASSUMING DUTIES

In the context of an ongoing flight-following, flight-monitoring, or flight-watch activity, an FOO/FD, before assuming duties, should be briefed on the elements related to the safety of the operations the FOO/FD will be performing as part of the operational control.

ED Decision 2025/008/R

PROCEDURES FOR THE RELIEF OF FLIGHT CREW MEMBERS IN CAT OPERATIONS

If operating with augmented flight crew, the operator procedures should address all of the following:

(a)the responsibilities and command chain in the flight crew compartment during the absence of the commander;

(b)the assignment of flight crew member stations or seats to relieving crew members, accounting for different phases of flight, including any possible emergency scenarios and controlled rest periods. The operator should consider all possible crew compositions such as multiple captains operating together, instructors during line training, and possible consequences following an incapacitation. The operator should establish the minimum flight level or altitude below which crew members may not vacate their assigned station for the purpose of transferring duties to another crew member; and

(c)any handover and related briefing between flight crew members should cover essential information on command delegation and associated task sharing. The briefing should focus on continuity of the flight.

[applicable until 26 March 2028 — ED Decision 2025/002/R]

TURNAROUND COORDINATION

(a)Turnaround coordination refers to the coordination of one or more ground handling activities, which may be performed by one or more providers of ground handling services, during the aircraft turnaround. The goal is to complete the ground handling task(s) efficiently and within a set time frame to ensure the aircraft can depart on schedule.

(b)The operator should establish a turnaround plan for its aircraft and agree with the ground handling organisation on the organisation’s roles and responsibilities during the turnaround to ensure that the organisation coordinates the aircraft turnaround activities in accordance with that plan.

[applicable from 27 March 2028 — ED Decision 2025/008/R]

ED Decision 2015/005/R

STERILE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT

(a)Establishment of procedures

The operator should establish procedures for flight, cabin, and technical crew that emphasise the objectives and importance of the sterile flight crew compartment. These procedures should also emphasise that, during periods of time when the sterile flight deck compartment procedures are applied, cabin crew and technical crew members should call the flight crew or enter the flight crew compartment only in cases related to safety or security matters. In such cases, information should be timely and accurate.

(b)Flight crew activities

When sterile flight crew compartment procedures are applied, flight crew members are focused on their essential operational activities without being disturbed by non-safety related matters. Examples of activities that should not be performed are:

(1)radio calls concerning passenger connections, fuel loads, catering, etc.;

(2)non-critical paperwork; and

(3)mass and balance corrections and performance calculations, unless required for safety reasons.

(c)Communication to the flight crew

Cabin crew and technical crew use their own discretion to determine whether the situation is related to safety or security matters and whether to call the flight crew. Situations requiring information to the flight crew may include:

(1)any outbreak of fire inside the cabin or in an engine;

(2)a burning smell in the cabin or presence of smoke inside or outside;

(3)fuel or fluid leakage;

(4)exit door unable to be armed or disarmed;

(5)localised extreme cabin temperature changes;

(6)evidence of airframe icing;

(7)cabin/galley equipment or furniture malfunction/breakage posing a hazard to the occupants;

(8)suspicious object;

(9)disruptive passenger;

(10)security threat;

(11)abnormal vibration or noise;

(12)medical emergency;

(13)general drop-down of the oxygen masks in the cabin; and

(14)any other condition deemed relevant by a cabin crew or technical crew member.

ED Decision 2022/014/R

ELEMENTS OF THE BRIEFING GIVEN TO FLIGHT OPERATIONS OFFICERS/FLIGHT DISPATCHERS BEFORE ASSUMING DUTIES

Before commencing their shift, the FOO/FD should be briefed on relevant safety information such as:

(a)weather charts;

(b)weather reports;

(c)NOTAMs;

(d)operational restrictions in force;

(e)flights in the air and flights for which operational flight plans have been issued but which have not yet started and for which the FOO/FD will be responsible;

(f)the forecast flight schedule; and

(g)other relevant safety information as listed in GM28 Annex I ‘Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII’.

ED Decision 2025/002/R

BRIEFING BETWEEN RELIEVING FLIGHT CREW MEMBERS

A typical briefing between relieving crew members includes:

(a)the technical status of aeroplane, including fuel;

(b)the navigation and ATC status;

(c)the en route and destination weather;

(d)the alternate airport’s status;

(e)contingency scenarios; and

(f)the cabin status.

ED Decision 2019/019/R

ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES

(a)An operator should establish procedures to be followed by cabin crew covering at least:

(1)arming and disarming of slides;

(2)operation of cabin lights, including emergency lighting;

(3)prevention and detection of cabin, galley and toilet fires;

(4)actions to be taken when turbulence is encountered;

(5)actions to be taken in the event of an emergency and/or an evacuation; and

(6)safety aspects of the in-flight entertainment (IFE) system, if installed.

(b)When establishing procedures and a checklist system for cabin crew with respect to the aircraft cabin, the operator should take into account at least the following duties:

(c)The operator should specify the contents of safety briefings for all cabin crew members prior to the commencement of a flight or series of flights.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)The application for an air operator certificate or an amendment to an existing certificate shall be made in a form and manner established by the competent authority, taking into account the applicable requirements of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules.

(b)Applicants for an initial certificate shall provide the competent authority with documentation demonstrating how they will comply with the requirements established in Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules. Such documentation shall include a procedure describing how changes not requiring prior approval will be managed and notified to the competent authority.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)Alternative means of compliance to those adopted by the Agency may be used by an operator to establish compliance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules.

(b)When an operator subject to certification wishes to use an alternative means of compliance to the acceptable means of compliance (AMC) adopted by the Agency to establish compliance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules, it shall, prior to implementing it, provide the competent authority with a full description of the alternative means of compliance. The description shall include any revisions to manuals or procedures that may be relevant, as well as an assessment demonstrating that the Implementing Rules are met.

The operator may implement these alternative means of compliance subject to prior approval by the competent authority and upon receipt of the notification as prescribed in ARO.GEN.120(d).

(c)An operator required to declare its activity shall notify to the competent authority the list of alternative means of compliance it uses to establish compliance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules.

(d)When an operator subject to SPO authorisation wishes to use alternative means of compliance, it shall comply with (b) whenever such alternative means of compliance affects the standard operating procedures that are part of the authorisation and with (c) for the declared part of its organisation and operation.

ED Decision 2014/017/R

DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLIANCE

In order to demonstrate that the Implementing Rules are met, a risk assessment should be completed and documented. The result of this risk assessment should demonstrate that an equivalent level of safety to that established by the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) adopted by the Agency is reached.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

A certified operator shall comply with the scope and privileges defined in the operations specifications attached to the operator’s certificate.

ED Decision 2014/017/R

MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION

The management system documentation should contain the privileges and detailed scope of activities for which the operator is certified, as relevant to the applicable requirements. The scope of activities defined in the management system documentation should be consistent with the terms of approval.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)Any change affecting:

(1)the scope of the certificate or the operations specifications of an operator; or

(2)any of the elements of the operator’s management system as required in ORO.GEN.200(a)(1) and (a)(2),

shall require prior approval by the competent authority.

(b)For any changes requiring prior approval in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules, the operator shall apply for and obtain an approval issued by the competent authority. The application shall be submitted before any such change takes place, in order to enable the competent authority to determine continued compliance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules and to amend, if necessary, the operator certificate and related terms of approval attached to it.

The operator shall provide the competent authority with any relevant documentation.

The change shall only be implemented upon receipt of formal approval by the competent authority in accordance with ARO.GEN.330.

The operator shall operate under the conditions prescribed by the competent authority during such changes, as applicable.

(c)All changes not requiring prior approval shall be managed and notified to the competent authority as defined in the procedure approved by the competent authority in accordance with ARO.GEN.310(c).

ED Decision 2019/019/R

APPLICATION TIME FRAMES

(a)The application for the amendment of an air operator certificate (AOC) should be submitted at least 30 days before the date of the intended changes.

(b)In the case of a planned change of a nominated person in accordance with ORO.GEN.210(b) or of a safety manager as defined under AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(1), the operator should inform the competent authority at least 20 days before the date of the proposed change.

(c)Unforeseen changes should be notified at the earliest opportunity, in order to enable the competent authority to determine continued compliance with the applicable requirements and to amend, if necessary, the AOC and related terms of approval.

ED Decision 2017/007/R

GENERAL

(a)Typical examples of changes that may affect the AOC or the operations specifications or the operator’s management system, as required in ORO.GEN.200(a)(1) and (a)(2), are listed below:

(1)the name of the operator;

(2)a change of legal entity;

(3)the operator’s principal place of business;

(4)the operator’s scope of activities;

(5)additional locations of the operator;

(6)the accountable manager referred to in ORO.GEN.210(a);

(7)reporting lines between the accountable manager and the nominated person;

(8)the operator’s documentation, as required by this Annex, safety policy and procedures;

(9)the facilities.

(b)Prior approval by the competent authority is required for any changes to the operator’s procedure describing how changes not requiring prior approval will be managed and notified to the competent authority.

(c)Changes requiring prior approval may only be implemented upon receipt of formal approval by the competent authority.

ED Decision 2014/017/R

CHANGE OF NAME

A change of name requires the operator to submit a new application as a matter of urgency.

Where this is the only change to report, the new application can be accompanied by a copy of the documentation previously submitted to the competent authority under the previous name, as a means of demonstrating how the operator complies with the applicable requirements.

ED Decision 2017/007/R

MANAGEMENT OF CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL

For changes requiring prior approval, the operators should conduct a safety risk assessment and provide it to the competent authority upon request.

ED Decision 2023/007/R

CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL

The following GM is a non-exhaustive checklist of items that require prior approval by the competent authority as specified in the applicable Implementing Rules:

(a)alternative means of compliance;

(b)procedures regarding items to be notified to the competent authority;

(c)cabin crew:

(1)conduct of the training, examination and checking required by Annex V (Part-CC) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011⁵⁵ and issue of cabin crew attestations;

(2)procedures for cabin crew to operate on four aircraft types;

(3)training programmes, including syllabi;

(d)leasing agreements;

(e)procedure for the use of aircraft included in an AOC by other operators for NCC, NCO and specialised operations, as required by ORO.GEN.310;

(f)specific approvals in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA);

(g)dangerous goods training programmes;

(h)flight crew:

(1)alternative training and qualification programmes (ATQPs);

(2)procedures for flight crew to operate on more than one type or variant;

(3)training and checking programmes, including syllabi and use of flight simulation training devices (FSTDs);

(i)fuel schemes and special refuelling or defuelling of aeroplanes;

(j)helicopter operations:

(1)over a hostile environment located outside a congested area;

(2)to/from a public interest site located in a congested hostile environment where performance class 1 criteria cannot be met;

(3)under performance class 2 or 3 without an assured safe forced landing capability;

(4)that include short excursions above 13 000 ft without using supplemental oxygen within a HEMS mission; and

(5)during refuelling with rotors turning;

(k)mass and balance: standard masses for load items other than standard masses for passengers and checked baggage;

(l)minimum equipment list (MEL):

(1)MEL;

(2)operating other than in accordance with the MEL, but within the constraints of the master minimum equipment list (MMEL);

(3)rectification interval extension (RIE) procedures;

(m)minimum flight altitudes:

(1)the method for establishing minimum flight altitudes;

(2)descent procedures to fly below specified minimum altitudes;

(n)performance:

(1)increased bank angles at take-off (for performance class A aeroplanes);

(2)short landing operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes);

(3)steep approach operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes);

(4)reduced required landing distance operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes);

(o)isolated aerodrome: using an isolated aerodrome as destination aerodrome for operations with aeroplanes;

(p)method used to establish aerodrome operating minima;

(q)approach flight technique:

(1)all approaches not flown as stabilised approaches for a particular approach to a particular runway;

(2)non-precision approaches not flown with the continuous descent final approach (CDFA) technique for each particular approach/runway combination;

(r)maximum distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an extended range operations with two-engined aeroplanes (ETOPS) approval:

(1)air operations with two-engined performance class A aeroplanes with a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19 or less and a maximum take-off mass less than 45 360 kg, over a route that contains a point further than 120 minutes from an adequate aerodrome, under standard conditions in still air;

(s)aircraft categories:

(1)Applying a lower landing mass than the maximum certified landing mass for determining the indicated airspeed at threshold (VAT).

(t)commercial air transport operations with single-engined turbine aeroplanes in instrument meteorological conditions or at night (CAT SET-IMC).

Regulation (EU) 2019/1384

(a)The operator’s certificate shall remain valid subject to all of the following:

(1)the operator remaining in compliance with the relevant requirements of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 and its delegated an implementing acts, taking into account the provisions related to the handling of findings as specified under ORO.GEN.150 of this Annex;

(2)the competent authority being granted access to the operator as defined in point ORO.GEN.140 of this Annex to determine continued compliance with the relevant requirements of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 and its delegated and implementing acts;

(3)the certificate not being surrendered or revoked.

(b)Upon revocation or surrender the certificate shall be returned to the competent authority without delay.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1111

(a)For the purpose of determining compliance with the relevant requirements of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 and its delegated and implementing acts, the operator shall grant access at any time to any facility, aircraft, document, records, data, procedures or any other material relevant to its activity subject to certification, SPO authorisation or declaration, whether it is contracted or not, to any person authorised by one of the following authorities:

(1)the competent authority defined in point ORO.GEN.105 of Annex III to this Regulation;

(2)the authority acting under the provisions of points ARO.GEN.300(d), ARO.GEN.300(e) or Subpart ARO.RAMP of Annex II to this Regulation.

(b)Access to the aircraft referred to in point (a) shall:

(i)for CAT operations with aeroplanes and helicopters, include the possibility to enter and remain in the aircraft during flight operations unless otherwise decided by the commander for the flight crew compartment in accordance with point CAT.GEN.MPA.135 in the interest of safety;

(ii)for IAM operations with VCA, include the possibility to enter and remain in the aircraft during flight operations unless otherwise decided by the pilot-in-command in accordance with point IAM.GEN.MVCA.135 in the interest of safety.

Regulation (EU) 2025/24

After receipt of notification of findings, the operator shall:

(a)identify the root cause of the non-compliance;

(b)define a corrective action plan; and

(c)demonstrate corrective action implementation to the satisfaction of the competent authority within a period agreed with that authority as defined in ARO.GEN.350(d).

(d)inform any contracted ground handling organisations of the actions taken to address the noncompliance if that non-compliance directly affects the safety risk within, or the responsibilities of, that ground handling organisation.

[applicable from 27 March 2028 — Regulation (EU) 2025/24]

ED Decision 2014/017/R

GENERAL

The corrective action plan defined by the operator should address the effects of the non-compliance, as well as its root cause.

ED Decision 2014/017/R

GENERAL

(a)Preventive action is the action to eliminate the cause of a potential non-compliance or other undesirable potential situation.

(b)Corrective action is the action to eliminate or mitigate the root cause(s) and prevent recurrence of an existing detected non-compliance or other undesirable condition or situation. Proper determination of the root cause is crucial for defining effective corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence.

(c)Correction is the action to eliminate a detected non-compliance.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

The operator shall implement:

(a)any safety measures mandated by the competent authority in accordance with ARO.GEN.135(c); and

(b)any relevant mandatory safety information issued by the Agency, including airworthiness directives.

Regulation (EU) 2019/1384

(a)The operator shall report to the competent authority, and to any other organisation required to be informed by the State of the operator, any accident, serious incident and occurrence as defined in Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council⁵⁶ and Regulation (EU) No 376/2014.

(b)Without prejudice to point (a) the operator shall report to the competent authority and to the organisation responsible for the design of the aircraft any incident, malfunction, technical defect, exceeding of technical limitations or occurrence that would highlight inaccurate, incomplete or ambiguous information contained in the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 or other irregular circumstance that has or may have endangered the safe operation of the aircraft and that has not resulted in an accident or serious incident.

(c)Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 and Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, the reports referred in points (a) and (b) shall be made in a form and manner established by the competent authority and shall contain all pertinent information about the conditions known to the operator.

(d)Reports shall be made as soon as practicable, but in any case within 72 hours of the operator identifying the condition to which the report relates, unless exceptional circumstances prevent this.

(e)Where relevant, the operator shall produce a follow-up report to provide details of actions it intends to take to prevent similar occurrences in the future, as soon as these actions have been identified. This report shall be produced in a form and manner established by the competent authority.

ED Decision 2019/019/R

GENERAL

(a)The operator should report all occurrences defined in AMC 20-8, and as required by the applicable national rules implementing Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on occurrence reporting in civil aviation.

(b)In addition to the reports required by AMC 20-8 and Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, the operator should report volcanic ash clouds encountered during flight.

ED Decision 2016/019/R

REPORTABLE EVENTS OF PBN OPERATIONS

(a)A reportable event should be an event that adversely affects the safety of the operation and may be caused by actions or events external to the functioning of the aircraft navigation system.

(b)Technical defects and the exceedance of technical limitations, including:

(1)significant navigation errors attributed to incorrect data or a database coding error;

(2)unexpected deviations in lateral/vertical flight path not caused by flight crew input or erroneous operation of equipment;

(3)significant misleading information without a failure warning;

(4)total loss or multiple navigation equipment failure; and

(5)loss of integrity, e.g. RAIM function, whereas integrity was predicted to be available during preflight planning,

should be considered a reportable event.

(c)The operator should have in place a system for investigating a reportable event to determine if it is due to an improperly coded procedure or a navigation database error. The operator should initiate corrective actions for such an event.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

REPORTABLE EVENTS OF LVOs

(a)A reportable event should include:

(1)significant deviations from the flight path not caused by flight crew input;

(2)misleading information without flight deck alerts;

(3)loss of airborne navigation equipment functions necessary for the operation;

(4)loss of functions or facilities at the aerodrome necessary for the operation, including aerodrome operating procedures, ATC operation, navigation facilities, visual aids and electrical power supply;

(5)loss of other functions related to external infrastructure necessary for the operation; and

(6)any other event causing the approach or landing to be abandoned if occurring repeatedly.

(b)The reports should be submitted to the aerodrome involved when relevant and in addition to the recipients prescribed in ORO.GEN.160(b).

ED Decision 2023/007/R

REPORTABLE EVENTS OF LVOs — OTHER EVENTS OCCURRING REPEATEDLY

(a)The purpose of point (a)(6) of AMC3 ORO.GEN.160 is to share the information with aviation stakeholders other than the operator of the aircraft to identify yet unknown systemic safetyrelated issues. The main focus is thus on a series of similar events rather that an isolated single event.

(b)Other events causing the approach or landing to be abandoned may include but are not limited to:

(1)erroneous or inadequate flight crew action or aircraft handling; or

(2)meteorological phenomena or human-made disturbances (e.g. road crossing final approach in an EFVS approach, laser strikes, etc.) or emissions from infrastructures (e.g. 5G) which require flight crews to take corrective action to an extent to which the LVO cannot be terminated successfully or completed as planned, leading to a go-around, a balked landing or an unplanned manual intervention by the pilot during the landing manoeuvre.

(c)Possible causes may be human-factor-related issues when employing newly introduced LVO equipment technologies or procedures or when changes take place in the runway environment or aerodrome vicinity.

SECTION 2 – Management

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a)The operator shall establish, implement and maintain a management system that includes:

(1)clearly defined lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the operator, including a direct safety accountability of the accountable manager;

(2)a description of the overall philosophies and principles of the operator with regard to safety, referred to as the safety policy;

(3)the identification of aviation safety hazards entailed by the activities of the operator, their evaluation and the management of associated risks, including taking actions to mitigate the risk and verify their effectiveness;

(4)maintaining personnel trained and competent to perform their tasks;

(5)documentation of all management system key processes, including a process for making personnel aware of their responsibilities and the procedure for amending this documentation;

(6)a function to monitor compliance of the operator with the relevant requirements. Compliance monitoring shall include a feedback system of findings to the accountable manager to ensure effective implementation of corrective actions as necessary; and

(7)any additional requirements that are prescribed in the relevant Subparts of this Annex or other applicable Annexes.

(b)The management system shall correspond to the size of the operator and the nature and complexity of its activities, taking into account the hazards and associated risks inherent in these activities.

ED Decision 2017/007/R

NON-COMPLEX OPERATORS — GENERAL

(a)Safety risk management may be performed using hazard checklists or similar risk management tools or processes, which are integrated into the activities of the operator.

(b)The operator should manage safety risks related to a change. The management of change should be a documented process to identify external and internal change that may have an adverse effect on safety. It should make use of the operator’s existing hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation processes.

(c)The operator should identify a person who fulfils the role of safety manager and who is responsible for coordinating the safety-management-related processes and tasks. This person may be the accountable manager or a person with an operational role within the operator.

(d)Within the operator, responsibilities should be identified for hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation.

(e)The safety policy should include a commitment to improve towards the highest safety standards, comply with all applicable legal requirements, meet all applicable standards, consider best practices and provide appropriate resources.

(f)The operator should, in cooperation with other stakeholders, develop, coordinate and maintain an emergency response plan (ERP) that ensures orderly and safe transition from normal to emergency operations and return to normal operations. The ERP should provide the actions to be taken by the operator or specified individuals in an emergency and reflect the size, nature and complexity of the activities performed by the operator.

ED Decision 2025/020/R

COMPLEX OPERATORS — ORGANISATION AND ACCOUNTABILITIES

The management system of an operator should encompass safety by including a safety manager and a safety review board in the organisational structure.

(a)Safety manager

(1)The safety manager should act as the focal point and be responsible for the development, administration and maintenance of an effective safety management system.

(2)The functions of the safety manager should be to:

(i)facilitate hazard identification, risk analysis and management;

(ii)monitor the implementation of actions taken to mitigate risks, as listed in the safety action plan;

(iii)provide periodic reports on safety performance;

(iv)ensure maintenance of safety management documentation;

(v)ensure that there is safety management training available and that it meets acceptable standards;

(vi)provide advice on safety matters; and

(vii)ensure initiation and follow-up of internal occurrence/accident investigations.

[applicable until 31 December 2027 — ED Decision 2019/019/R]

(2)The functions of the safety manager should be to:

(i)facilitate hazard identification, risk analysis and management;

(ii)monitor the implementation of actions taken to mitigate risks, as listed in the safety action plan;

(iii)provide periodic reports on safety performance;

(iv)ensure maintenance of safety management documentation;

(v)ensure that there is safety management training available and that it meets acceptable standards;

(vi)provide advice on safety matters;

(vii)ensure initiation and follow-up of internal occurrence/accident investigations; and

(viii)ensure the effective use of the flight data monitoring (FDM) programme for safety risk management, if such an FDM programme is required.

[applicable from 1 January 2028 — ED Decision 2025/020/R]

(3)If more than one person is designated for the safety management function, the accountable manager should identify the person who acts as the unique focal point (i.e. the 'safety manager').

(b)Safety review board

(1)The safety review board should be a high level committee that considers matters of strategic safety in support of the accountable manager’s safety accountability.

(2)The board should be chaired by the accountable manager and be composed of heads of functional areas.

(3)The safety review board should monitor:

(i)safety performance against the safety policy and objectives;

(ii)that any safety action is taken in a timely manner; and

(iii)the effectiveness of the operator’s safety management processes.

[applicable until 31 December 2027 — ED Decision 2019/019/R]

(iii)the effectiveness of the operator’s safety management processes, including those related to the FDM programme, if such a programme is required.

[applicable from 1 January 2028 — ED Decision 2025/020/R]

(c)The safety review board should ensure that appropriate resources are allocated to achieve the established safety performance.

(d)The safety manager or any other relevant person may attend, as appropriate, safety review board meetings. He/she may communicate to the accountable manager all information, as necessary, to allow decision making based on safety data.

ED Decision 2019/019/R

SAFETY MANAGER

(a)Depending on the size of the operator and the nature and complexity of its activities, the safety manager may be assisted by additional safety personnel for the performance of all safety management related tasks.

(b)Regardless of the organisational set-up it is important that the safety manager remains the unique focal point as regards the development, administration and maintenance of the operator’s safety management system.

COMPETENCIES OF THE SAFETY MANAGER

(c)The safety manager as defined under AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(1) is expected to support, facilitate and lead the implementation and maintenance of the safety management system, fostering an organisational culture for an effective safety management, risk management and occurrence reporting. The competencies for a safety manager should thus include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1)Knowledge of:

(i)ICAO standards and European requirements and provisions on safety management;

(ii)basic safety investigation techniques; and

(iii)human factors in aviation.

(2)Relevant and documented work experience, preferably in a comparable position, in:

(i)management systems including compliance monitoring systems and safety management;

(ii)risk management; and

(iii)the operations of the organisation.

(3)Other suitable competencies

(i)the promotion of a positive safety culture;

(ii) interpersonal, influencing and leadership skills;

(iii)oral and written communication skills;

(iv)data management, analytical and problem-solving skills;

(v)professional integrity.

ED Decision 2017/007/R

COMPLEX OPERATORS — SAFETY ACTION GROUP

(a)A safety action group may be established as a standing group or as an ad-hoc group to assist or act on behalf of the safety review board.

(b)More than one safety action group may be established depending on the scope of the task and specific expertise required.

(c)The safety action group should report to and take strategic direction from the safety review board and should be comprised of managers, supervisors and personnel from operational areas.

(d)The safety action group should:

(1)monitor operational safety;

(2)define actions to mitigate the identified safety risks;

(3)assess the impact on safety of operational changes; and

(4)ensure that safety actions are implemented within agreed timescales.

(e)The safety action group should review the effectiveness of previous safety recommendations and safety promotion.

ED Decision 2017/007/R

MEANING OF THE TERMS ‘ACCOUNTABILITY’ AND ‘RESPONSIBILITY’

In the English language, the notion of accountability is different from the notion of responsibility. Whereas ‘accountability’ refers to an obligation which cannot be delegated, ‘responsibility’ refers to an obligation that can be delegated.

ED Decision 2014/017/R

COMPLEX OPERATORS — SAFETY POLICY

(a)The safety policy should:

(1)be endorsed by the accountable manager;

(2)reflect organisational commitments regarding safety and its proactive and systematic management;

(3)be communicated, with visible endorsement, throughout the operator; and

(4)include safety reporting principles.

(b)The safety policy should include a commitment:

(1)to improve towards the highest safety standards;

(2)to comply with all applicable legislation, meet all applicable standards and consider best practices;

(3)to provide appropriate resources;

(4)to enforce safety as one primary responsibility of all managers; and

(5)not to blame someone for reporting something which would not have been otherwise detected.

(c)Senior management should:

(1)continually promote the safety policy to all personnel and demonstrate their commitment to it;

(2)provide necessary human and financial resources for its implementation; and

(3)establish safety objectives and performance standards.

ED Decision 2014/017/R

SAFETY POLICY

The safety policy is the means whereby the operator states its intention to maintain and, where practicable, improve safety levels in all its activities and to minimise its contribution to the risk of an aircraft accident as far as is reasonably practicable.

The safety policy should state that the purpose of safety reporting and internal investigations is to improve safety, not to apportion blame to individuals.

ED Decision 2025/020/R

SAFETY POLICY REGARDING THE USE OF DATA FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT

If a data source that is needed to support safety risk management is required to be protected, then it is recommended that the safety policy required by point ORO.GEN.200 provide for consistent protection of this data source when it is used for purposes other than safety risk management. An example is using flight data for a flight data monitoring programme (protection of the data source is required by points ORO.AOC.130 and SPA.HOFO.145) and for other programmes, such as a fuel efficiency programme or a preventive maintenance programme. In this example, the safety policy consistently addresses the protection of flight crew identity across all the programmes in which flight data is used.

[applicable from 1 January 2028 — ED Decision 2025/020/R]

ED Decision 2025/020/R

COMPLEX OPERATORS — SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT

(a)Hazard identification processes

(1)Reactive and proactive schemes for hazard identification should be the formal means of collecting, recording, analysing, acting on and generating feedback about hazards and the associated risks that affect the safety of the operational activities of the operator.

[applicable until 31 December 2027 — ED Decision 2014/017/R]

(1)Reactive and proactive schemes for hazard identification should be the formal means of collecting, recording, analysing, acting on and generating feedback about hazards and the associated risks that affect the safety of the operational activities of the operator. Such schemes should include the flight data monitoring programme when such a programme is required.

[applicable from 1 January 2028 — ED Decision 2025/020/R]

(2)All reporting systems, including confidential reporting schemes, should include an effective feedback process.

(b)Risk assessment and mitigation processes

(1)A formal risk management process should be developed and maintained that ensures analysis (in terms of likelihood and severity of occurrence), assessment (in terms of tolerability) and control (in terms of mitigation) of risks to an acceptable level.

(2)The levels of management who have the authority to make decisions regarding the tolerability of safety risks, in accordance with (b)(1), should be specified.

(c)Internal safety investigation

(1)The scope of internal safety investigations should extend beyond the scope of occurrences required to be reported to the competent authority.

(d)Safety performance monitoring and measurement

(1)Safety performance monitoring and measurement should be the process by which the safety performance of the operator is verified in comparison to the safety policy and objectives.

(2)This process should include:

(i)safety reporting, addressing also the status of compliance with the applicable requirements;

(ii)safety studies, that is, rather large analyses encompassing broad safety concerns;

(iii)safety reviews including trends reviews, which would be conducted during introduction and deployment of new technologies, change or implementation of procedures, or in situations of structural change in operations;

(iv)safety audits focussing on the integrity of the operator’s management system, and periodically assessing the status of safety risk controls; and

(v)safety surveys, examining particular elements or procedures of a specific operation, such as problem areas or bottlenecks in daily operations, perceptions and opinions of operational personnel and areas of dissent or confusion.

[applicable until 31 December 2027 — ED Decision 2014/017/R]

(2)This process should include:

(i)safety reporting, addressing also the status of compliance with the applicable requirements;

(ii)the flight data monitoring programme, for those aircraft required to be included in such a programme;

(iii)safety studies, that is, rather large analyses encompassing broad safety concerns;

(iv)safety reviews including trends reviews, which would be conducted during introduction and deployment of new technologies, change or implementation of procedures, or in situations of structural change in operations;

(v)safety audits focussing on the integrity of the operator’s management system, and periodically assessing the status of safety risk controls; and

(vi)safety surveys, examining particular elements or procedures of a specific operation, such as problem areas or bottlenecks in daily operations, perceptions and opinions of operational personnel and areas of dissent or confusion.

[applicable from 1 January 2028 — ED Decision 2025/020/R]

(e)The management of change

The operator should manage safety risks related to a change. The management of change should be a documented process to identify external and internal change that may have an adverse effect on safety. It should make use of the operator’s existing hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation processes.

(f)Continuous improvement

The operator should continuously seek to improve its safety performance. Continuous improvement should be achieved through:

(1)proactive and reactive evaluations of facilities, equipment, documentation and procedures through safety audits and surveys;

(2)proactive evaluation of individuals’ performance to verify the fulfilment of their safety responsibilities; and

(3)reactive evaluations in order to verify the effectiveness of the system for control and mitigation of risk.

(g)The emergency response plan (ERP)

(1)An ERP should be established that provides the actions to be taken by the operator or specified individuals in an emergency. The ERP should reflect the size, nature and complexity of the activities performed by the operator.

(2)The ERP should ensure:

(i)an orderly and safe transition from normal to emergency operations;

(ii)safe continuation of operations or return to normal operations as soon as practicable; and

(iii)coordination with the emergency response plans of other organisations, where appropriate.

ED Decision 2025/001/R

RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH FLYING OVER OR NEAR CONFLICT ZONES – CAT OPERATIONS WITH AEROPLANES

(a)When intending to operate over or near conflict zones, an operator of commercial air transport operations with aeroplanes should conduct a risk assessment to properly identify, evaluate and manage the associated risks, and take appropriate risk-mitigation measures. The risk assessment and mitigation measures put in place should ensure that a flight does not commence or continue as planned unless it has been verified by every reasonable means available that the airspace containing the intended route from the aerodrome of departure to the aerodrome of arrival, including the intended take-off, destination and en-route alternate aerodromes, can be safely used for the planned operation.

Note: The term ‘reasonable means’ is meant to denote the use, at the point of departure or while the aircraft is in flight, of information available to the operator either through official information published by the aeronautical information services or readily obtainable from other sources.

(b)ICAO Doc 10084 ‘The Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones’ provides further guidance on the risk assessment to be performed when flying over or near conflict zones.

ED Decision 2017/007/R

INTERNAL SAFETY REPORTING SCHEME

(a)The overall purpose of the internal safety reporting scheme is to use reported information to improve the level of the safety performance of the operator and not to attribute blame.

(b)The objectives of the scheme are to:

(1)enable an assessment to be made of the safety implications of each relevant incident and accident, including previous similar occurrences, so that any necessary action can be initiated; and

(2)ensure that knowledge of relevant incidents and accidents is disseminated, so that other persons and operators may learn from them.

(c)The scheme is an essential part of the overall monitoring function and it is complementary to the normal day-to-day procedures and ‘control’ systems and is not intended to duplicate or supersede any of them. The scheme is a tool to identify those instances where routine procedures have failed.

(d)All occurrence reports judged reportable by the person submitting the report should be retained as the significance of such reports may only become obvious at a later date.

ED Decision 2017/007/R

RISK MANAGEMENT OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITH KNOWN OR FORECAST VOLCANIC ASH CONTAMINATION

(a)Responsibilities

The operator is responsible for the safety of its operations, including within an area with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination.

The operator should complete this assessment of safety risks related to known or forecast volcanic ash contamination as part of its management system before initiating operations into airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash.

This process is intended to ensure the operator takes account of the likely accuracy and quality of the information sources it uses in its management system and to demonstrate its own competence and capability to interpret data from different sources in order to achieve the necessary level of data integrity reliably and correctly resolve any conflicts among data sources that may arise.

In order to decide whether or not to operate into airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash, the operator should make use of the safety risk assessment within its management system, as required by ORO.GEN.200.

The operator’s safety risk assessment should take into account all relevant data including data from the type certificate holders (TCHs) regarding the susceptibility of the aircraft they operate to volcanic cloud-related airworthiness effects, the nature and severity of these effects and the related pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight precautions to be observed by the operator.

The operator should ensure that personnel required to be familiar with the details of the safety risk assessments receives all relevant information (both pre-flight and in-flight) in order to be in a position to apply appropriate mitigation measures as specified by the safety risk assessments.

(b)Procedures

The operator should have documented procedures for the management of operations into airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash.

These procedures should ensure that, at all times, flight operations remain within the accepted safety boundaries as established through the management system allowing for any variations in information sources, equipment, operational experience or organisation. Procedures should include those for flight crew, flight planners, dispatchers, operations, continuing airworthiness personnel such that they are in a position to evaluate correctly the risk of flights into airspace forecast to be contaminated by volcanic ash and to plan accordingly.

Continuing airworthiness personnel should be provided with procedures allowing them to correctly assess the need for and to execute relevant continuing airworthiness interventions.

The operator should retain sufficient qualified and competent staff to generate well supported operational risk management decisions and ensure that its staff are appropriately trained and current. It is recommended that the operator make the necessary arrangements for its relevant staff to take up opportunities to be involved in volcanic ash exercises conducted in their areas of operation.

(c)Volcanic activity information and operator’s potential response

Before and during operations, information valuable to the operator is generated by various volcano agencies worldwide. The operator’s risk assessment and mitigating actions need to take account of, and respond appropriately to, the information likely to be available during each phase of the eruptive sequence from pre-eruption through to end of eruptive activity. It is nevertheless noted that eruptions rarely follow a deterministic pattern of behaviour. A typical operator’s response may consist of the following:

(1)Pre-eruption

The operator should have in place a robust mechanism for ensuring that it is constantly vigilant for any alerts of pre-eruption volcanic activity relevant to its operations. The staff involved need to understand the threat to safe operations that such alerts represent.

An operator whose routes traverse large, active volcanic areas for which immediate International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) alerts may not be available, should define its strategy for capturing information about increased volcanic activity before pre-eruption alerts are generated. For example, an operator may combine elevated activity information with information concerning the profile and history of the volcano to determine an operating policy, which could include re-routing or restrictions at night. This would be useful when dealing with the 60% of volcanoes which are unmonitored.

Such an operator should also ensure that its crews are aware that they may be the first to observe an eruption and so need to be vigilant and ready to ensure that this information is made available for wider dissemination as quickly as possible.

(2)Start of an eruption

Given the likely uncertainty regarding the status of the eruption during the early stages of an event and regarding the associated volcanic cloud, the operator’s procedures should include a requirement for crews to initiate re-routes to avoid the affected airspace.

The operator should ensure that flights are planned to remain clear of the affected areas and that consideration is given to available aerodromes/operating sites and fuel requirements.

It is expected that the following initial actions will be taken by the operator:

(i)determine if any aircraft in flight could be affected, alert the crew and provide advice on re-routing and available aerodromes/operating sites as required;

(ii)alert management;

(iii)for flight departures, brief flight crew and revise flight and fuel planning in accordance with the safety risk assessment;

(iv)alert flight crew and operations staff to the need for increased monitoring of information (e.g. special air report (AIREP), volcanic activity report (VAR), significant weather information (SIGMET), NOTAMs and company messages);

(v)initiate the gathering of all data relevant to determining the risk; and

(vi)apply mitigations identified in the safety risk assessment.

(3)On-going eruption

As the eruptive event develops, the operator can expect the responsible Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC) to provide volcanic ash advisory messages (VAA/VAGs) defining, as accurately as possible, the vertical and horizontal extent of areas and layers of volcanic clouds. As a minimum, the operator should monitor, and take account of, this VAAC information as well as of relevant SIGMETs and NOTAMs.

Other sources of information are likely to be available such as VAR/AIREPs, satellite imagery and a range of other information from State and commercial organisations. The operator should plan its operations in accordance with its safety risk assessment taking into account the information that it considers accurate and relevant from these additional sources.

The operator should carefully consider and resolve differences or conflicts among the information sources, notably between published information and observations (pilot reports, airborne measurements, etc.).

Given the dynamic nature of the volcanic hazards, the operator should ensure that the situation is monitored closely and operations adjusted to suit changing conditions.

The operator should be aware that the affected or danger areas may be established and presented in a different way than the one currently used in Europe, as described in EUR Doc 019-NAT Doc 006.

The operator should require reports from its crews concerning any encounters with volcanic emissions. These reports should be passed immediately to the appropriate air traffic services (ATS) unit and to the operator’s competent authority.

For the purpose of flight planning, the operator should treat the horizontal and vertical limits of the temporary danger area (TDA) or airspace forecast to be contaminated by volcanic ash as applicable, to be overflown as it would mountainous terrain, modified in accordance with its safety risk assessment. The operator should take account of the risk of cabin depressurisation or engine failure resulting in the inability to maintain level flight above a volcanic cloud, especially when conducting ETOPS operations. Additionally, minimum equipment list (MEL) provisions should be considered in consultation with the TCHs.

Flying below volcanic ash contaminated airspace should be considered on a case-by-case basis. It should only be planned to reach or leave an aerodrome/operating site close to the boundary of this airspace or where the ash contamination is very high and stable. The establishment of Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA) and the availability of aerodromes/operating sites should be considered.

(d)Safety risk assessment

When directed specifically at the issue of intended flight into airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash, the process should involve the following:

(1)Identifying the hazards

The generic hazard, in the context of this document, is airspace forecast to be or aerodromes/operating sites known to be contaminated with volcanic ash, and whose characteristics are harmful to the airworthiness and operation of the aircraft.

This GM is referring to volcanic ash contamination since it is the most significant hazard for flight operations in the context of a volcanic eruption. Nevertheless, it might not be the only hazard and therefore the operator should consider additional hazards which could have an adverse effect on aircraft structure or passengers safety such as gases.

Within this generic hazard, the operator should develop its own list of specific hazards taking into account its specific aircraft, experience, knowledge and type of operation, and any other relevant data stemming from previous eruptions.

(2)Considering the severity and consequences of the hazard occurring (i.e. the nature and actual level of damage expected to be inflicted on the particular aircraft from exposure to that volcanic ash cloud).

(3)Evaluating the likelihood of encountering volcanic ash clouds with characteristics harmful to the safe operation of the aircraft.

For each specific hazard within the generic hazard, the likelihood of adverse consequences should be assessed, either qualitatively or quantitatively.

(4)Determining whether the consequent risk is acceptable and within the operator’s risk performance criteria.

At this stage of the process, the safety risks should be classified as acceptable or unacceptable. The assessment of tolerability will be subjective, based on qualitative data and expert judgement, until specific quantitative data are available in respect of a range of parameters.

(5)Taking action to reduce the safety risk to a level that is acceptable to the operator’s management.

Appropriate mitigation for each unacceptable risk identified should then be considered in order to reduce the risk to a level acceptable to the operator’s management.

(e)Procedures to be considered when identifying possible mitigations actions

When conducting a volcanic ash safety risk assessment, the operator should consider the following non-exhaustive list of procedures and processes as mitigation:

(1)Type certificate holders

Obtaining advice from the TCHs and other engineering sources concerning operations in potentially contaminated airspace and/or aerodromes/operating sites contaminated by volcanic ash.

This advice should set out:

(i)the features of the aircraft that are susceptible to airworthiness effects related to volcanic ash;

(ii)the nature and severity of these effects;

(iii)the effect of volcanic ash on operations to/from contaminated aerodromes/operating sites, including the effect on take-off and landing aircraft performance;

(iv)the related pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight precautions to be observed by the operator including any necessary amendments to aircraft operating manuals, aircraft maintenance manuals, master minimum equipment list/dispatch deviation or equivalents; and

(v)the recommended inspections associated with operations in volcanic ash potentially contaminated airspace and operations to/from volcanic ash contaminated aerodromes/operating sites; this may take the form of instructions for continuing airworthiness or other advice.

(2)Operator/contracted organisations’ personnel

Definition of procedures for flight planning, operations, engineering and maintenance ensuring that:

(i)personnel responsible for flight planning are in a position to evaluate correctly the risk of encountering volcanic ash contaminated airspace, or aerodromes/operating sites, and can plan accordingly;

(ii)flight planning and operational procedures enable crews to avoid areas and aerodromes/operating sites with unacceptable volcanic ash contamination;

(iii)flight crew are aware of the possible signs of entry into a volcanic ash cloud and execute the associated procedures;

(iv)continuing airworthiness personnel are able to assess the need for and to execute any necessary maintenance or other required interventions; and

(v)crews are provided with appropriate aircraft performance data when operating to/from aerodromes/operating sites contaminated with volcanic ash.

(3)Provision of enhanced flight watch

This should ensure:

(i)close and continuous monitoring of VAA, VAR/AIREP, SIGMET, NOTAM, ASHTAM and other relevant information, and information from crews, concerning the volcanic ash cloud hazard;

(ii)access to plots of the affected areas from SIGMETs, NOTAMs and relevant company information for crews and personnel responsible for the management and the supervision of the flight operations; and

(iii)communication of the latest information to crews and personnel responsible for the management and the supervision of the flight operations in a timely fashion.

(4)Flight planning

Flexibility of the process to allow re-planning at short notice should conditions change.

(5)Departure, destination and alternate aerodromes

For the airspace to be traversed, or the aerodromes/operating sites in use, parameters to evaluate and take account of:

(i)the probability of contamination;

(ii)any additional aircraft performance requirements;

(iii)required maintenance considerations;

(iv)fuel requirements for re-routing and extended holding.

(6)Routing policy

Parameters to evaluate and take account of:

(i)the shortest period in and over the forecast contaminated area;

(ii)the hazards associated with flying over the contaminated area;

(iii)drift down and emergency descent considerations;

(iv)the policy for flying below the contaminated airspace and the associated hazards.

(7)Diversion policy

Parameters to evaluate and take account of:

(i)maximum allowed distance from a suitable aerodrome/operating site;

(ii)availability of aerodromes/operating sites outside the forecast contaminated area;

(iii)diversion policy after an volcanic ash encounter.

(8)Minimum equipment list (MEL)

Additional provisions in the MEL for dispatching aircraft with unserviceabilities that might affect the following non-exhaustive list of systems:

(i)air conditioning packs;

(ii)engine bleeds;

(iii)pressurisation system;

(iv)electrical power distribution system;

(v)air data system;

(vi)standby instruments;

(vii)navigation systems;

(viii)de-icing systems;

(ix)engine-driven generators;

(x)auxiliary power unit (APU);

(xi)airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS);

(xii)terrain awareness warning system (TAWS);

(xiii)autoland systems;

(xiv)provision of crew oxygen;

(xv)supplemental oxygen for passengers.

(9)Standard operating procedures

Crew training to ensure they are familiar with normal and abnormal operating procedures and particularly any changes regarding but not limited to:

(i)pre-flight planning;

(ii)in-flight monitoring of volcanic ash cloud affected areas and avoidance procedures;

(iii)diversion;

(iv)communications with ATC;

(v)in-flight monitoring of engine and systems potentially affected by volcanic ash cloud contamination;

(vi)recognition and detection of volcanic ash clouds and reporting procedures;

(vii)in-flight indications of a volcanic ash cloud encounter;

(viii)procedures to be followed if a volcanic ash cloud is encountered;

(ix)unreliable or erroneous airspeed;

(x)non-normal procedures for engines and systems potentially affected by volcanic ash cloud contamination;

(xi)engine-out and engine relight;

(xii)escape routes; and

(xiii)operations to/from aerodromes/operating sites contaminated with volcanic ash.

(10)Provision for aircraft technical log

This should ensure:

(i)systematic entry in the aircraft technical log related to any actual or suspected volcanic ash encounter whether in-flight or at an aerodrome/operating site; and

(ii)checking, prior to flight, of the completion of maintenance actions related to an entry in the aircraft technical log for a volcanic ash cloud encounter on a previous flight.

(11)Incident reporting

Crew requirements for:

(i)reporting an airborne volcanic ash cloud encounter (VAR);

(ii)post-flight volcanic ash cloud reporting (VAR);

(iii)reporting non-encounters in airspace forecast to be contaminated; and

(iv)filing a mandatory occurrence report in accordance with .

(12)Continuing airworthiness procedures

Procedures when operating in or near areas of volcanic ash cloud contamination:

(i)enhancement of vigilance during inspections and regular maintenance and appropriate adjustments to maintenance practices;

(ii)definition of a follow-up procedure when a volcanic ash cloud encounter has been reported or suspected;

(iii)thorough investigation for any sign of unusual or accelerated abrasions or corrosion or of volcanic ash accumulation;

(iv)reporting to TCHs and the relevant authorities observations and experiences from operations in areas of volcanic ash cloud contamination;

(v)completion of any additional maintenance recommended by the TCH or by the Competent Authority.

(f)Reporting

The operator should ensure that reports are immediately submitted to the nearest ATS unit using the VAR/AIREP procedures followed up by a more detailed VAR on landing together with, as applicable, a report, as defined in Commission Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 and Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, and an aircraft technical log entry for:

(1)any incident related to volcanic clouds;

(2)any observation of volcanic ash activity; and

(3)any time that volcanic ash is not encountered in an area where it was forecast to be.

(g)References

Further guidance on volcanic ash safety risk assessment is given in ICAO Doc. 9974 (Flight safety and volcanic ash — Risk management of flight operations with known or forecast volcanic ash contamination).