Easy Access Rules for Air Operations

ED Decision 2014/018/R

ONSHORE AERODROME DEPARTURE PROCEDURES — OPERATIONS WITH NON-COMPLEX HELICOPTERS

The cloud base and visibility should be such as to allow the helicopter to be clear of cloud at the take-off decision point (TDP), and for the pilot flying to remain in sight of the surface until reaching the minimum speed for flight in instrument meteorological conditions, as given in the AFM.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

TAKE-OFF MINIMA — OPERATIONS WITH COMPLEX HELICOPTERS

(a)To ensure sufficient control of the helicopter in IMC, the speed, before entering in IMC, should be above the minimum authorised speed in IMC, Vmini. This is a limitation in the AFM. Therefore, the lowest speed before entering in IMC is the highest of Vtoss (velocity take-off safety speed) and Vmini.

(b)As example, Vtoss is 45 kt and Vmini 60 kt. In that case, the take–off minima have to include the distance to accelerate to 60 kt. The take-off distance should be increased accordingly.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

APPROACH LIGHTING SYSTEMS — ICAO, FAA

The following table provides a comparison of the ICAO and FAA specifications.

Table 17

Approach lighting systems — ICAO and FAA specifications

ED Decision 2022/012/R

IAPs — SBAS OPERATIONS

(a)SBAS LPV operations with a DH of 200 ft depend on an SBAS approved for operations down to a DH of 200 ft.

(b)The following systems are in operational use or in a planning phase:

(1)European geostationary navigation overlay service (EGNOS), operational in Europe;

(2)wide area augmentation system (WAAS), operational in the USA;

(3)multi-functional satellite augmentation system (MSAS), operational in Japan;

(4)system of differential correction and monitoring (SDCM), planned by Russia;

(5)GPS-aided geo-augmented navigation (GAGAN) system, planned by India; and

(6)satellite navigation augmentation system (SNAS), planned by China.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

MEANS TO DETERMINE THE REQUIRED RVR BASED ON DH AND LIGHTING FACILITIES

The values in Table 8 are derived from the formula below:

RVR (m) = [(DH/MDH (ft) × 0.3048)/tanα] – length of approach lights (m),

where α is the calculation angle, being a default value of 3.00° increasing in steps of 0.10° for each line in Table 8 up to 3.77° and then remaining constant. An upper RVR limit of 2 400 m has been applied to the table.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

USE OF DH FOR NPAs FLOWN USING THE CONTINUOUS DESCENT FINAL APPROACH (CDFA) TECHNIQUE

The safety of using the MDH as DH in CDFA operations has been verified by at least two independent analyses concluding that a CDFA using MDH as DH without any add-on is safer than the traditional step-down and level flight NPA operation. A comparison was made between the safety level of using MDH as DH without an add-on with the well-established safety level resulting from the ILS collision risk model (CRM). The NPA used was the most demanding, i.e. most tightly designed NPA, which offers the least additional margins. It should be noted that the design limits of the ILS approach design, e.g. the maximum glide path (GP) angle of 3.5 degrees, must be observed for the CDFA in order to keep the validity of the comparison.

There is a wealth of operational experience in Europe confirming the above-mentioned analytical assessments. It cannot be expected that each operator is able to conduct similar safety assessments, and this is not necessary. The safety assessments already performed take into account the most demanding circumstances at hand, like the most tightly designed NPA procedures and other ‘worst-case scenarios’. The assessments naturally focus on cases where the controlling obstacle is located in the missed approach area.

However, it is necessary for operators to assess whether their cockpit procedures and training are adequate to ensure minimal height loss in case of a go-around manoeuvre. Suitable topics for the safety assessment required by each operator may include:

—understanding of the CDFA concept including use of the MDA/H as DA/H;

—cockpit procedures that ensure flight on speed, on path, and with proper configuration and energy management;

—cockpit procedures that ensure gradual decision-making; and

—identification of cases where an increase of the DA/H may be necessary because of non-standard circumstances, etc.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

INCREMENTS SPECIFIED BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY

Additional increments to the published minima may be specified by the competent authority in order to take into account certain operations, such as downwind approaches, single-pilot operations, or approaches flown not using the CDFA technique.

ED Decision 2022/014/R

USE OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION

When an operator uses commercially available information to establish aerodrome operating minima, the operator remains responsible for ensuring that the information used is accurate and suitable for its operation, and that the aerodrome operating minima are calculated in accordance with the method specified in Part C of its operations manual.

The operator should apply the procedures in ORO.GEN.205 ‘Contracted activities’.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

VISUAL AND NON-VISUAL AIDS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

‘Visual and non-visual aids and infrastructure’ refers to all equipment and facilities required for the procedure to be used for the intended instrument approach operation. This includes but is not limited to lights, markings, ground- or space-based radio aids, etc.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

(a)The minimum descent height (MDH) for a circling approach operation with aeroplanes shall not be lower than the highest of:

(1)the published circling OCH for the aeroplane category;

(2)the minimum circling height derived from Table 1; or

(3)the decision height (DH)/MDH of the preceding IAP.

(b)The minimum visibility for a circling approach operation with aeroplanes shall be the highest of:

(1)the circling visibility for the aeroplane category, if published; or

(2)the minimum visibility derived from Table 1.

Table 1

ED Decision 2022/012/R

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

(a)The purpose of this guidance material is to provide operators with supplemental information regarding the application of aerodrome operating minima in relation to circling approaches.

(b)Conduct of flight — general:

(1)the MDH and OCH included in the procedure are referenced to aerodrome elevation;

(2)the MDA is referenced to mean sea level;

(3)for these procedures, the applicable visibility is the VIS; and

(4)operators should provide tabular guidance of the relationship between height above threshold and the in-flight visibility required to obtain and sustain visual contact during the circling manoeuvre.

(c)Instrument approach followed by visual manoeuvring (circling) without prescribed tracks:

(1)When the aeroplane is on the initial instrument approach, before visual reference is stabilised, but not below MDA/H, the aeroplane should follow the corresponding instrument approach procedure (IAP) until the appropriate instrument MAPt is reached.

(2)At the beginning of the level flight phase at or above the MDA/H, the instrument approach track should be maintained until the pilot:

(i)estimates that, in all probability, visual contact with the runway of intended landing or the runway environment will be maintained during the entire circling procedure;

(ii)estimates that the aeroplane is within the circling area before commencing circling; and

(iii)is able to determine the aeroplane’s position in relation to the runway of intended landing with the aid of the appropriate visual references.

(3)If the pilot cannot comply with the conditions in (c)(2) at the MAPt, then a missed approach should be executed in accordance with the IAP.

(4)After the aeroplane has left the track of the initial instrument approach, the flight phase outbound from the runway should be limited to an appropriate distance, which is required to align the aeroplane onto the final approach. Such manoeuvres should be conducted to enable the aeroplane to:

(i)attain a controlled and stable descent path to the intended landing runway; and

(ii)remain within the circling area and in such a way that visual contact with the runway of intended landing or runway environment is maintained at all times.

(5)Flight manoeuvres should be carried out at an altitude/height that is not less than the circling MDA/H.

(6)Descent below the MDA/H should not be initiated until the threshold of the runway to be used has been appropriately identified. The aeroplane should be in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent and land within the touchdown zone (TDZ).

(d)Instrument approach followed by a visual manoeuvring (circling) with prescribed track.

(1)The aeroplane should remain on the initial IAP until one of the following is reached:

(i)the prescribed divergence point to commence circling on the prescribed track; or

(ii)the MAPt.

(2)The aeroplane should be established on the instrument approach track in level flight at or above the MDA/H at or by the circling manoeuvre divergence point.

(3)If the divergence point is reached before the required visual reference is acquired, a missed approach should be initiated not later than the MAPt and completed in accordance with the initial instrument approach procedure.

(4)When commencing the prescribed circling manoeuvre at the published divergence point, the subsequent manoeuvres should be conducted to comply with the published routing and published heights/altitudes.

(5)Unless otherwise specified, once the aeroplane is established on the prescribed track(s), the published visual reference does not need to be maintained unless:

(i)required by the State of the aerodrome; or

(ii)the circling MAPt (if published) is reached.

(6)If the prescribed circling manoeuvre has a published MAPt and the required visual reference has not been obtained by that point, a missed approach should be executed in accordance with (e)(2) and (e)(3).

(7)Subsequent further descent below MDA/H should only commence when the required visual reference has been obtained.

(8)Unless otherwise specified in the procedure, final descent should not be commenced from the MDA/H until the threshold of the intended landing runway has been identified and the aeroplane is in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent to land within the TDZ.

(e)Missed approach

(1)Missed approach during the instrument procedure prior to circling:

(i)if the missed approach procedure is required to be flown when the aeroplane is positioned on the instrument approach track, and before commencing the circling manoeuvre, the published missed approach for the instrument approach should be followed; or

(ii)if the IAP is carried out with the aid of an ILS, an MLS or a SAp, the MAPt associated with an ILS or an MLS procedure without glide path (GP-out procedure) or the SAp, where applicable, should be used.

(2)If a prescribed missed approach is published for the circling manoeuvre, this overrides the manoeuvres prescribed below.

(3)If visual reference is lost while circling to land after the aeroplane has departed from the initial instrument approach track, the missed approach specified for that particular instrument approach should be followed. It is expected that the pilot will make an initial climbing turn toward the intended landing runway to a position overhead of the aerodrome where the pilot will establish the aeroplane in a climb on the instrument missed approach segment.

(4)The aeroplane should not leave the visual manoeuvring (circling) area, which is obstacle protected, unless:

(i)established on the appropriate missed approach procedure; or

(ii)at minimum sector altitude (MSA).

(5)All turns should be made in the same direction and the aeroplane should remain within the circling protected area while climbing to either:

(i)the altitude assigned to any published circling missed approach manoeuvre if applicable;

(ii)the altitude assigned to the missed approach of the initial instrument approach;

(iii)the MSA;

(iv)the minimum holding altitude (MHA) applicable for transition to a holding facility or fix, or continue to climb to an MSA; or

(v)as directed by ATS.

When the missed approach procedure is commenced on the ‘downwind’ leg of the circling manoeuvre, an ‘S’ turn may be undertaken to align the aeroplane on the initial instrument approach missed approach path, provided the aeroplane remains within the protected circling area.

The pilot-in-command should be responsible for ensuring adequate terrain clearance during the above-stipulated manoeuvres, particularly during the execution of a missed approach initiated by ATS.

(6)Because the circling manoeuvre may be accomplished in more than one direction, different patterns will be required to establish the aeroplane on the prescribed missed approach course depending on its position at the time visual reference is lost. In particular, all turns are to be in the prescribed direction if this is restricted, e.g. to the west/east (left or right hand) to remain within the protected circling area.

(7)If a missed approach procedure is published for a particular runway onto which the aeroplane is conducting a circling approach and the aeroplane has commenced a manoeuvre to align with the runway, the missed approach for this direction may be accomplished. The ATS unit should be informed of the intention to fly the published missed approach procedure for that particular runway.

(8)The pilot-in-command should advise ATS when any missed approach procedure has been commenced, the height/altitude the aeroplane is climbing to and the position the aeroplane is proceeding towards and/or heading the aeroplane is established on.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

The MDH for an onshore circling operation with helicopters shall not be lower than 250 ft and the meteorological visibility not less than 800 m.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)The pilot-in-command shall use the departure and approach procedures established by the State of the aerodrome, if such procedures have been published for the runway or FATO to be used.

(b)The pilot-in-command may deviate from a published departure route, arrival route or approach procedure:

(1)provided obstacle clearance criteria can be observed, full account is taken of the operating conditions and any ATC clearance is adhered to; or

(2)when being radar-vectored by an ATC unit.

(c)In the case of operations with complex motor-powered aircraft, the final approach segment shall be flown visually or in accordance with the published approach procedures.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

APPROACH FLIGHT TECHNIQUE — AEROPLANES

(a)All approach operations should be flown as SAp operations.

(b)The CDFA technique should be used for NPA procedures.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1199

The operator shall ensure that, when PBN is required for the route or procedure to be flown:

(a)the relevant PBN specification is stated in the AFM or other document that has been approved by the certifying authority as part of an airworthiness assessment or is based on such approval; and

(b)the aircraft is operated in conformance with the relevant navigation specification and limitations in the AFM or other document mentioned above.

ED Decision 2016/021/R

PBN OPERATIONS

For operations where a navigation specification for performance-based navigation (PBN) has been prescribed and no specific approval is required in accordance with SPA.PBN.100, the operator should:

(a)establish operating procedures specifying:

(1)normal, abnormal and contingency procedures;

(2)electronic navigation database management; and

(3)relevant entries in the minimum equipment list (MEL);

(b)specify the flight crew qualification and proficiency constraints and ensure that the training programme for relevant personnel is consistent with the intended operation; and

(c)ensure continued airworthiness of the area navigation system.

ED Decision 2022/014/R

MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

(a)Preflight and general considerations

(1)At navigation system initialisation, the flight crew should confirm that the navigation database is current and verify that the aircraft position has been entered correctly, if required.

(2)The active flight plan, if applicable, should be checked by comparing the charts or other applicable documents with navigation equipment and displays. This includes confirmation of the departing runway and the waypoint sequence, reasonableness of track angles and distances, any altitude or speed constraints, and, where possible, which waypoints are fly-by and which are fly-over. Where relevant, the RF leg arc radii should be confirmed.

(3)The flight crew should check that the navigation aids critical to the operation of the intended PBN procedure are available.

(4)The flight crew should confirm the navigation aids that should be excluded from the operation, if any.

(5)An arrival, approach or departure procedure should not be used if the validity of the procedure in the navigation database has expired.

(6)The flight crew should verify that the navigation systems required for the intended operation are operational.

(b)Departure

(1)Prior to commencing a take-off on a PBN procedure, the flight crew should check that the indicated aircraft position is consistent with the actual aircraft position at the start of the take-off roll (aeroplanes) or lift-off (helicopters).

(2)Where GNSS is used, the signal should be acquired before the take-off roll (aeroplanes) or lift-off (helicopters) commences.

(3)Unless automatic updating of the actual departure point is provided, the flight crew should ensure initialisation on the runway or FATO by means of a manual runway threshold or intersection update, as applicable. This is to preclude any inappropriate or inadvertent position shift after take-off.

(c)Arrival and approach

(1)The flight crew should verify that the navigation system is operating correctly and the correct arrival procedure and runway (including any applicable transition) are entered and properly depicted.

(2)Any published altitude and speed constraints should be observed.

(3)The flight crew should check approach procedures (including alternate aerodromes if needed) as extracted by the system (e.g. CDU flight plan page) or presented graphically on the moving map, in order to confirm the correct loading and the reasonableness of the procedure content.

(4)Prior to commencing the approach operation (before the IAF), the flight crew should verify the correctness of the loaded procedure by comparison with the appropriate approach charts. This check should include:

(i)the waypoint sequence;

(ii)reasonableness of the tracks and distances of the approach legs and the accuracy of the inbound course; and

(iii)the vertical path angle, if applicable.

(d)Altimetry settings for RNP APCH operations using Baro VNAV

(1)Barometric settings

(i)The flight crew should set and confirm the correct altimeter setting and check that the two altimeters provide altitude values that do not differ more than 100 ft at the most at or before the FAF.

(ii)The flight crew should fly the procedure with:

(A)a current local altimeter setting source available — a remote or regional altimeter setting source should not be used; and

(B)the QNH/QFE, as appropriate, set on the aircraft’s altimeters.

(2)Temperature compensation

(i)For RNP APCH operations to LNAV/VNAV minima using Baro VNAV:

(A)the flight crew should not commence the approach when the aerodrome temperature is outside the promulgated aerodrome temperature limits for the procedure unless the area navigation system is equipped with approved temperature compensation for the final approach;

(B)when the temperature is within promulgated limits, the flight crew should not make compensation to the altitude at the FAF; and

(C)since only the final approach segment is protected by the promulgated aerodrome temperature limits, the flight crew should consider the effect of temperature on terrain and obstacle clearance in other phases of flight.

(ii)For RNP APCH operations to LNAV minima, the flight crew should consider the effect of temperature on terrain and obstacle clearance in all phases of flight, in particular on any step-down fix.

(e)Sensor and lateral navigation accuracy selection

(1)For multi-sensor systems, the flight crew should verify, prior to approach, that the GNSS sensor is used for position computation.

(2)Flight crew of aircraft with RNP input selection capability should confirm that the indicated RNP value is appropriate for the PBN operation.

ED Decision 2016/021/R

MANAGAMENT OF THE NAVIGATION DATABASE

(a)For RNAV 1, RNAV 2, RNP 1, RNP 2, and RNP APCH, the flight crew should neither insert nor modify waypoints by manual entry into a procedure (departure, arrival or approach) that has been retrieved from the database. User-defined data may be entered and used for waypoint altitude/speed constraints on a procedure where said constraints are not included in the navigation database coding.

(b)For RNP 4 operations, the flight crew should not modify waypoints that have been retrieved from the database. User-defined data (e.g. for flex-track routes) may be entered and used.

(c)The lateral and vertical definition of the flight path between the FAF and the missed approach point (MAPt) retrieved from the database should not be revised by the flight crew.

ED Decision 2016/021/R

DISPLAYS AND AUTOMATION

(a)For RNAV 1, RNP 1, and RNP APCH operations, the flight crew should use a lateral deviation indicator, and where available, flight director and/or autopilot in lateral navigation mode.

(b)The appropriate displays should be selected so that the following information can be monitored:

(1)the computed desired path;

(2)aircraft position relative to the lateral path (cross-track deviation) for FTE monitoring; and

(3)aircraft position relative to the vertical path (for a 3D operation).

(c)The flight crew of an aircraft with a lateral deviation indicator (e.g. CDI) should ensure that lateral deviation indicator scaling (full-scale deflection) is suitable for the navigation accuracy associated with the various segments of the procedure.

(d)The flight crew should maintain procedure centrelines unless authorised to deviate by ATC or demanded by emergency conditions.

(e)Cross-track error/deviation (the difference between the area-navigation-system-computed path and the aircraft-computed position) should normally be limited to ± ½ time the RNAV/RNP value associated with the procedure. Brief deviations from this standard (e.g. overshoots or undershoots during and immediately after turns) up to a maximum of 1 time the RNAV/RNP value should be allowable.

(f)For a 3D approach operation, the flight crew should use a vertical deviation indicator and, where required by AFM limitations, a flight director or autopilot in vertical navigation mode.

(g)Deviations below the vertical path should not exceed 75 ft at any time, or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, and not more than 75 ft above the vertical profile, or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, at or below 1 000 ft above aerodrome level. The flight crew should execute a missed approach if the vertical deviation exceeds this criterion unless the flight crew has in sight the visual references required to continue the approach.

ED Decision 2016/021/R

VECTORING AND POSITIONING

(a)ATC tactical interventions in the terminal area may include radar headings, ‘direct to’ clearances which bypass the initial legs of an approach procedure, interceptions of an initial or intermediate segments of an approach procedure or the insertion of additional waypoints loaded from the database.

(b)In complying with ATC instructions, the flight crew should be aware of the implications for the navigation system.

(c)‘Direct to’ clearances may be accepted to the IF provided that it is clear to the flight crew that the aircraft will be established on the final approach track at least 2 NM before the FAF.

(d)‘Direct to’ clearance to the FAF should not be acceptable. Modifying the procedure to intercept the final approach track prior to the FAF should be acceptable for radar-vectored arrivals or otherwise only with ATC approval.

(e)The final approach trajectory should be intercepted no later than the FAF in order for the aircraft to be correctly established on the final approach track before starting the descent (to ensure terrain and obstacle clearance).

(f)‘Direct to’ clearances to a fix that immediately precede an RF leg should not be permitted.

(g)For parallel offset operations en route in RNP 4 and A-RNP, transitions to and from the offset track should maintain an intercept angle of no more than 45° unless specified otherwise by ATC.

ED Decision 2016/021/R

ALERTING AND ABORT

(a)Unless the flight crew has sufficient visual reference to continue the approach operation to a safe landing, an RNP APCH operation should be discontinued if:

(1)navigation system failure is annunciated (e.g. warning flag);

(2)lateral or vertical deviations exceed the tolerances; and

(3)loss of the on-board monitoring and alerting system.

(b)Discontinuing the approach operation may not be necessary for a multi-sensor navigation system that includes demonstrated RNP capability without GNSS in accordance with the AFM.

(c)Where vertical guidance is lost while the aircraft is still above 1 000 ft AGL, the flight crew may decide to continue the approach to LNAV minima, when supported by the navigation system.

ED Decision 2016/021/R

CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES

(a)The flight crew should make the necessary preparation to revert to a conventional arrival procedure where appropriate. The following conditions should be considered:

(1)failure of the navigation system components including navigation sensors, and a failure effecting flight technical error (e.g. failures of the flight director or autopilot);

(2)multiple system failures affecting aircraft performance;

(3)coasting on inertial sensors beyond a specified time limit; and

(4)RAIM (or equivalent) alert or loss of integrity function.

(b)In the event of loss of PBN capability, the flight crew should invoke contingency procedures and navigate using an alternative means of navigation.

(c)The flight crew should notify ATC of any problem with PBN capability.

(d)In the event of communication failure, the flight crew should continue with the operation in accordance with published lost communication procedures.

ED Decision 2016/021/R

RNAV 10

(a)Operating procedures and routes should take account of the RNAV 10 time limit declared for the inertial system, if applicable, considering also the effect of weather conditions that could affect flight duration in RNAV 10 airspace.

(b)The operator may extend RNAV 10 inertial navigation time by position updating. The operator should calculate, using statistically-based typical wind scenarios for each planned route, points at which updates can be made, and the points at which further updates will not be possible.

ED Decision 2016/021/R

DESCRIPTION

(a)For both, RNP X and RNAV X designations, the ‘X’ (where stated) refers to the lateral navigation accuracy (total system error) in NM, which is expected to be achieved at least 95 % of the flight time by the population of aircraft operating within the airspace, route or procedure. For RNP APCH and A-RNP, the lateral navigation accuracy depends on the segment.

(b)PBN may be required on notified routes, for notified procedures and in notified airspace.

RNAV 10

(c)For purposes of consistency with the PBN concept, this Regulation is using the designation ‘RNAV 10’ because this specification does not include on-board performance monitoring and alerting.

(d)However, it should be noted that many routes still use the designation ‘RNP 10’ instead of ‘RNAV 10’. ‘RNP 10’ was used as designation before the publication of the fourth edition of ICAO Doc 9613 in 2013. The terms ‘RNP 10’ and ‘RNAV 10’ should be considered equivalent.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

The pilot-in-command shall take into account published noise abatement procedures to minimise the effect of aircraft noise while ensuring that safety has priority over noise abatement.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

NADP DESIGN — OPERATIONS WITH COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AIRCRAFT

(a)For each aeroplane type two departure procedures should be defined, in accordance with ICAO Doc. 8168 (Procedures for Air Navigation Services, ‘PANS-OPS’), Volume I:

(1)noise abatement departure procedure one (NADP 1), designed to meet the close-in noise abatement objective; and

(2)noise abatement departure procedure two (NADP 2), designed to meet the distant noise abatement objective.

(b)For each type of NADP (1 and 2), a single climb profile should be specified for use at all aerodromes, which is associated with a single sequence of actions. The NADP 1 and NADP 2 profiles may be identical.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

TERMINOLOGY — OPERATIONS WITH COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AEROPLANES

(a)‘Climb profile’ means in this context the vertical path of the NADP as it results from the pilot’s actions (engine power reduction, acceleration, slats/flaps retraction).

(b)‘Sequence of actions’ means the order in which these pilot’s actions are done and their timing.

GENERAL

(c)The rule addresses only the vertical profile of the departure procedure. Lateral track has to comply with the standard instrument departure (SID).

EXAMPLE

(d)For a given aeroplane type, when establishing the distant NADP, the operator should choose either to reduce power first and then accelerate, or to accelerate first and then wait until slats/flaps are retracted before reducing power. The two methods constitute two different sequences of actions.

(e)For an aeroplane type, each of the two departure climb profiles may be defined by one sequence of actions (one for close-in, one for distant) and two above aerodrome level (AAL) altitudes/heights. These are:

(1)the altitude of the first pilot’s action (generally power reduction with or without acceleration). This altitude should not be less than 800 ft AAL; or

(2)the altitude of the end of the noise abatement procedure. This altitude should usually not be more than 3 000 ft AAL.

(f)These two altitudes may be runway specific when the aeroplane flight management system (FMS) has the relevant function that permits the crew to change thrust reduction and/or acceleration altitude/height. If the aeroplane is not FMS equipped or the FMS is not fitted with the relevant function, two fixed heights should be defined and used for each of the two NADPs.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)The operator shall specify a method to establish minimum flight altitudes that provide the required terrain clearance for all route segments to be flown in IFR.

(b)The pilot-in-command shall establish minimum flight altitudes for each flight based on this method. The minimum flight altitudes shall not be lower than those published by the State overflown.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

GENERAL

Commercially available information specifying minimum obstacle clearance altitudes may be used.

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

(a)The operator shall establish, implement, and maintain a fuel/energy scheme that comprises:

(1)a fuel/energy planning and in-flight re-planning policy; and

(2)an in-flight fuel/energy management policy.

(b)The fuel/energy scheme shall:

(1)be appropriate for the type(s) of operation performed; and

(2)correspond to the capability of the operator to support its implementation.

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

(a)As part of the fuel/energy scheme, the operator shall establish a fuel/energy planning and inflight re-planning policy to ensure that the aircraft carries a sufficient amount of usable fuel/energy to safely complete the planned flight and to allow for deviations from the planned operation.

(b)The operator shall ensure that the fuel/energy planning of flights is based upon at least the following elements:

(1)procedures contained in the operations manual as well as:

(i)current aircraft-specific data derived from a fuel/energy consumption monitoring system or, if not available;

(ii)data provided by the aircraft manufacturer; and

(2)the operating conditions under which the flight is to be conducted including:

(i)aircraft fuel/energy consumption data;

(ii)anticipated masses;

(iii)anticipated meteorological conditions;

(iv)the effects of deferred maintenance items and/or configuration deviations; and

(v)anticipated delays.

(c)For aeroplanes, the operator shall ensure that the pre-flight calculation of the usable fuel/energy that is required for a flight includes:

(1)taxi fuel/energy that shall not be less than the amount expected to be used prior to takeoff;

(2)trip fuel/energy that shall be the amount of fuel/energy that is required to enable the aeroplane to fly from take-off, or from the point of in-flight re-planning, to landing at the destination aerodrome;

(3)contingency fuel/energy that shall be the amount of fuel/energy required to compensate for unforeseen factors;

(4)destination alternate fuel/energy

(i)when a flight is operated with at least one destination alternate aerodrome, it shall be the amount of fuel/energy required to fly from the destination aerodrome to the destination alternate aerodrome; or

(ii)when a flight is operated with no destination alternate aerodrome, it shall be the amount of fuel/energy required to hold at the destination aerodrome to compensate for the lack of a destination alternate aerodrome;

(5)final reserve fuel/energy that shall be protected to ensure a safe landing; the operator shall take into account all of the following, and in the following order of priority, to determine the quantity of the final reserve fuel/energy:

(i)the severity of the hazard to persons or property that may result from an emergency landing after fuel/energy starvation;

(ii)the likelihood of unexpected circumstances that the final reserve fuel/energy may no longer be protected;

(6)additional fuel/energy, if required by the type of operation; it shall be the amount of fuel/energy to enable the aeroplane to perform a safe landing at a fuel/energy en route alternate aerodrome (fuel/energy ERA aerodrome critical scenario) in the event of an engine failure or loss of pressurisation, whichever requires the greater amount of fuel/energy, based on the assumption that such a failure occurs at the most critical point along the route; this additional fuel/energy is required only if the minimum amount of fuel/energy that is calculated according to points (c)(2) to (c)(5) is not sufficient for such an event;

(7)extra fuel/energy to take into account anticipated delays or specific operational constraints; and

(8)discretionary fuel/energy, if required by the pilot-in-command.

(d)For helicopters, the operator shall ensure that the pre-flight calculation of the usable fuel/energy that is required for a flight includes all of the following:

(1)fuel/energy to fly to the aerodrome or operating site of intended landing;

(2)if a destination alternate is required, destination alternate fuel/energy, which shall be the amount of fuel/energy that is required to execute a missed approach at the aerodrome or operating site of intended landing, and thereafter, to fly to the specified destination alternate, approach and land; and

(3)final reserve fuel/energy, which shall be protected to ensure a safe landing; the operator shall take into account all of the following, and in the following order of priority, to determine the quantity of the final reserve fuel/energy:

(i)the severity of the hazard to persons or property that may result from an emergency landing after fuel/energy starvation; and

(ii)the likelihood of such unexpected circumstances that the final reserve fuel/energy may no longer be protected;

(4)extra fuel/energy to take into account anticipated delays or specific operational constraints; and

(5)discretionary fuel/energy, if required by the pilot-in-command.

(e)The operator shall ensure that, if a flight has to proceed to a destination aerodrome other than the one originally planned, in-flight re-planning procedures for calculating the required usable fuel/energy are available and comply with points (c)(2) to (c)(7) for aeroplanes, and point (d) for helicopters.

(f)The pilot in command shall only commence a flight or continue in the event of in-flight replanning, when satisfied that the aircraft carries at least the planned amount of usable fuel/energy and oil to safely complete the flight.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

AEROPLANES

For the fuel planning policy, the amount of the required usable fuel for a flight should not be less than the sum of the following:

(a)taxi fuel that should take into account the local conditions at the departure aerodrome and the APU consumption;

(b)trip fuel that should include:

(1)fuel for take-off and climb from the aerodrome elevation to the initial cruising level/altitude, taking into account the expected departure routing;

(2)fuel from the top of climb to the top of descent, including any step climb/descent;

(3)fuel from the top of descent to the point where the approach procedure is initiated, taking into account the expected arrival routing; and

(4)fuel for making an approach and landing at the destination aerodrome;

(c)contingency fuel that should be:

(1)5 % of the planned trip fuel or, in the event of in-flight re-planning, 5 % of the trip fuel for the remainder of the flight; or

(2)an amount to fly for 5 minutes at holding speed at 1 500 ft (450 m) above the destination aerodrome in standard conditions,

whichever is higher;

(d)destination alternate fuel that should be:

(1)when the aeroplane is operated with one destination alternate aerodrome:

(i)fuel for a missed approach from the applicable DA/H or MDA/H at the destination aerodrome to the missed-approach altitude, taking into account the complete missed-approach procedure;

(ii)fuel for climb from the missed-approach altitude to the cruising level/altitude, taking into account the expected departure routing;

(iii)fuel for cruising from the top of climb to the top of descent, taking into account the expected routing;

(iv)fuel for descent from the top of descent to the point where the approach is initiated, taking into account the expected arrival routing; and

(v)fuel for making an approach and landing at the destination alternate aerodrome;

(2)when the aeroplane is operated with no destination alternate aerodrome, the amount of fuel to hold for 15 minutes at 1 500 ft (450 m) in standard conditions above the destination aerodrome elevation;

(3)when the aerodrome of intended landing is an isolated aerodrome:

(i)for aeroplanes with reciprocating engines, the amount of fuel required to fly either for 45 minutes plus 15 % of the flight time planned for cruising, including the FRF, or for 2 hours, whichever is less; or

(ii)for turbine-engined aeroplanes, the amount of fuel required to fly for 2 hours with normal cruise consumption above the destination aerodrome, including the FRF.

(e)FRF that should not be less than the fuel required to fly:

(1)for 10 minutes at normal cruising altitude under VFR by day, taking off and landing at the same aerodrome/landing site, and always remaining within sight of that aerodrome/landing site;

(2)for 30 minutes at normal cruising altitude for other VFR flights by day; and

(3)for 45 minutes at normal cruising altitude under VFR by night, and under IFR for aeroplanes with reciprocating engines; and

(4)for 30 minutes at holding speed at 1 500 ft (450 m) above the aerodrome elevation in standard conditions, which is calculated according to the estimated mass on arrival under VFR by night and under IFR for turbine-engined aeroplanes,

Note: When the operator follows point (e)(1) for the FRF, the operator should specify in the standard operating procedures (SOPs):

the type of operation in which such reduced RFR may be used; and

the methods of reading and calculating the remaining fuel.

(f)additional fuel that should be the amount of fuel that allows the aeroplane to proceed, in the event of an engine failure or loss of pressurisation, from the most critical point along the route to a fuel en route alternate (fuel ERA) aerodrome in the relevant aircraft configuration, hold there for 15 minutes at 1 500 ft (450 m) above the aerodrome elevation in standard conditions, make an approach, and land;

(g)extra fuel if there are anticipated delays or specific operational constraints; and

(h)discretionary fuel, if required by the pilot-in-command.

HELICOPTERS

(i)The FRF should not be less than the fuel required to fly:

(1)for 10 minutes at best-range speed, provided that the helicopter remains within 25 NM of the aerodrome/operating site of departure, under VFR;

(2)for 20 minutes at best-range speed for flights other than the ones referred to in (i)(1) under VFR; and

(3)for 30 minutes at holding speed at 1 500 ft (450 m) above the destination or destination alternate under IFR.

(j)If point (i)(1) is used for the FRF, the operator should specify in the SOPs:

(1)the type of operation in which such reduced FRF may be used; and

(2)methods of reading and calculating the remaining fuel.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

REDUCED RESERVE FUEL

(a)The operator should specify in the SOP:

(1)the type of activity where such reduced reserve fuel may be used; and

(2)methods of reading and calculating the remaining fuel.

(b)Refuelling facilities should be available at the aerodrome/operating site.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)The operator shall ensure that, prior to take-off task specialists are given a briefing on:

(1)emergency equipment and procedures;

(2)operational procedures associated with the specialised task before each flight or series of flights

(b)The briefing referred to in (a)(2) may be replaced by an initial and recurrent training programme. In such case the operator shall also define recency requirements.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

TASK SPECIALISTS — GENERAL

(a)The purpose of operational briefing is to ensure that task specialists are familiar with all aspects of the operation, including their responsibilities.

(b)Such briefing should include, as appropriate:

(1)behaviour on the ground and in-flight, including emergency procedures;

(2)procedures for boarding and disembarking;

(3)procedures for loading and unloading the aircraft;

(4)use of doors in normal and emergency operations;

(5)use of communication equipment and hand signals;

(6)precautions in case of a landing on sloping ground; and

(7)in addition to the items listed from (b)(1) to (b)(6) before take-off:

(i)location of emergency exits;

(ii)restrictions regarding smoking;

(iii)restrictions regarding the use of portable electronic equipment; and

(iv)stowage of tools and hand baggage.

(c)The briefing may be given as a verbal presentation or by issuing the appropriate procedures and instructions in written form. Before commencement of the flight, their understanding should be confirmed.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

(a)Before commencing a flight, the pilot-in-command shall ascertain by every reasonable means available that the space-based facilities, ground and/or water facilities, including communication facilities and navigation aids available and directly required on such flight, for the safe operation of the aircraft, are adequate for the type of operation under which the flight is to be conducted.

(b)Before commencing a flight, the pilot-in-command shall be familiar with all available meteorological information appropriate to the intended flight. Preparation for a flight away from the vicinity of the place of departure, and for every flight under IFR, shall include:

(1)a study of the available current meteorological reports and forecasts; and

(2)the planning of an alternative course of action to provide for the eventuality that the flight cannot be completed as planned, because of meteorological conditions.

ED Decision 2023/004/R

ADEQUACY OF GROUND FACILITIES

When deciding on the adequacy of facilities and services available at an aerodrome of intended operation, the operator should:

(a)consult the aeronautical information publication (AIP) for information on the availability of rescue and firefighting services (RFFS) at the aerodrome of intended operation; and

(b)assess the level of safety risk that is associated with the aircraft type and nature of the operation in relation to the availability of RFFS.

ED Decision 2023/004/R

ADEQUACY OF GROUND FACILITIES — SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONS WITHOUT RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING SERVICES AT THE AERODROME OF INTENDED OPERATION

To operate at an aerodrome with downgraded or unavailable rescue and firefighting services (RFFS), the operator may consider including in its operations manual, for each aircraft type, certain criteria to be used when conducting a safety risk assessment of such operations. For aircraft in rescue and firefighting (RFF) category 3 and higher, the conditions under which the pilot-in-command may decide to conduct a flight may include, but not be limited to the following:

(a)acceptable downgrades of RFFS for planning and in-flight purposes such as departure, destination, and alternate aerodromes;

(b)aircraft characteristics related to mass, landing speed, fuel capacity;

(c)possible limitation to daytime only or a certain time of the day (due to fatigue);

(d)weather constraints;

(e)aerodromes that are unacceptable with unavailable or downgraded RFFS.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

An aerodrome shall not be specified as a destination alternate aerodrome unless the available current meteorological information indicates, for the period from 1 hour before until 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival, or from the actual time of departure to 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival, whichever is the shorter period,

(a)for an alternate aerodrome with an available instrument approach operation with DH less than 250 ft,

(1)a ceiling of at least 200 ft above the DH or MDH associated with the instrument approach operation; and

(2)a visibility of at least the higher of 1 500 m and 800 m above the instrument approach operation RVR/VIS minima; or

(b)for an alternate aerodrome with an instrument approach operation with DH or MDH 250 ft or more,

(1)a ceiling of at least 400 ft above the DH or MDH associated with the instrument approach operation; and

(2)a visibility of at least 3 000 m; or

(c)for an alternate aerodrome without an instrument approach procedure,

(1)a ceiling of at least the higher of 2 000 ft and the minimum safe IFR height; and

(2)a visibility of at least 5 000 m.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

The operator shall only select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome if the available current meteorological information indicates, for the period from 1 hour before until 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival, or from the actual time of departure to 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival, whichever is the shorter period,

(a)for an alternate aerodrome with an IAP:

(1)a ceiling of at least 200 ft above the DH or MDH associated with the IAP; and

(2)a visibility of at least 1 500 m by day or 3 000 m by night; or

(b)for an alternate aerodrome without an IAP:

(1)a ceiling of at least 2 000 ft or the minimum safe IFR height, whichever is greater; and

(2)a visibility of at least 1 500 m by day or 3 000 m by night.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

(a)For IFR flights, the pilot-in-command shall specify at least one weather-permissible take-off alternate aerodrome in the flight plan if the meteorological conditions at the aerodrome of departure are at or below the applicable aerodrome operating minima or if it would not be possible to return to the aerodrome of departure for other reasons.

(b)The take-off alternate aerodrome shall be located within the following distance from the aerodrome of departure:

(1)for aeroplanes having two engines, not more than a distance equivalent to a flight time of 1 hour at the single-engine cruise speed in still air standard conditions; and

(2)for aeroplanes having three or more engines, not more than a distance equivalent to a flight time of 2 hours at the one-engine-inoperative (OEI) cruise speed according to the AFM in still air standard conditions.

(c)For an aerodrome to be selected as a take-off alternate aerodrome the available information shall indicate that, at the estimated time of use, the conditions will be at or above the aerodrome operating minima for that operation.

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

For IFR flights, the pilot-in-command shall specify at least one weather-permissible destination alternate aerodrome in the flight plan, unless:

(a)the available current meteorological information indicates that, for the period from 1 hour before until 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival, or from the actual time of departure to 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival, whichever is the shorter period, the approach and landing may be made under visual meteorological conditions (VMC); or

(b)the place of intended landing is designated as an isolated aerodrome and:

(1)an instrument approach procedure is prescribed for the aerodrome of intended landing; and

(2)available current meteorological information indicates that both following meteorological conditions will exist from 2 hours before to 2 hours after the estimated time of arrival, or from the actual time of departure to 2 hours after the estimated time of arrival whichever is the shorter period:

(i)a cloud base of at least 300 m (1 000 ft) above the minimum associated with the instrument approach procedure;

(ii)visibility of at least 5,5 km or of 4 km more than the minimum associated with the procedure.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1199

For IFR flights, the pilot-in-command shall specify at least one weather-permissible destination alternate aerodrome in the flight plan, unless:

(a)an instrument approach procedure is prescribed for the aerodrome of intended landing and the available current meteorological information indicates that the following meteorological conditions will exist from 2 hours before to 2 hours after the estimated time of arrival, or from the actual time of departure to 2 hours after the estimated time of arrival, whichever is the shorter period:

(1)a cloud base of at least 120 m (400 ft) above the minimum associated with the instrument approach procedure; and

(2)visibility of at least 1 500 m more than the minimum associated with the procedure; or

(b)the place of intended landing is isolated and:

(1)an instrument approach procedure is prescribed for the aerodrome of intended landing;

(2)available current meteorological information indicates that the following meteorological conditions will exist from 2 hours before to 2 hours after the estimated time of arrival:

(i)the cloud base is at least 120 m (400 ft) above the minimum associated with the instrument approach procedure;

(ii)visibility is at least 1 500 m more than the minimum associated with the procedure.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1199

The pilot-in-command shall ensure that sufficient means are available to navigate and land at the destination aerodrome or at any destination alternate aerodrome in the case of loss of capability for the intended approach and landing operation.

ED Decision 2023/007/R

PBN OPERATIONS

(a)When the operator intends to use PBN, the operator should either:

(1)demonstrate that the GNSS is robust against loss of capability; or

(2)select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome only if an IAP that does not rely on a GNSS is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.

GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS

(b)The operator may demonstrate robustness against the loss of capability of the GNSS if all of the following criteria are met:

(1)At flight planning stage, SBAS or GBAS are expected to be available and used.

(2)The failure of a single receiver or system should not compromise the navigation capability required for the intended instrument approach.

(3)The temporary jamming of all GNSS frequencies should not compromise the navigation capability required for the intended route. The operator should provide a procedure to deal with such cases unless other sensors are available to continue on the intended route.

(4)The duration of a jamming event should be determined as follows:

(i)Considering the average speed and height of a helicopter flight, the duration of a jamming event may be considered to be less than 2 minutes.

(ii)The time needed for the GNSS system to re-start and provide the aircraft position and navigation guidance should also be considered.

(iii)Based on (i) and (ii) above, the operator should establish the duration of the loss of GNSS navigation data due to jamming. This duration should be no less than 3 minutes, and may be no longer than 4 minutes.

(5)The operator should ensure resilience to jamming for the duration determined in (4) above, as follows:

(i)If the altitude of obstacles on both sides of the flight path are higher than the planned altitude for a given segment of the flight, the operator should ensure no excessive drift on either side by relying on navigation sensors such as an inertial system with performance in accordance with the intended function.

(ii)If (i) does not apply and the operator cannot rely on sensors other than GNSS, the operator should develop a procedure to ensure that a drift from the intended route during the jamming event has no adverse consequences on the safety of the flight. This procedure may involve air traffic services.

(6)The operator should ensure that no space weather event is predicted to disrupt the GNSS reliability and integrity at both the destination and the alternate aerodromes.

(7)The operator should verify the availability of RAIM for all phases of flight based on GNSS, including navigation to the alternate aerodrome.

(8)The operator’s MEL should reflect the elements in points (b)(1) and (b)(2).

OPERATIONAL CREDITS

(c)To comply with point SPO.OP.153, when the operator intends to use ‘operational credits’ (e.g. EFVS, SA CAT I, etc.), the operator should select an aerodrome as destination alternate aerodrome only if an approach procedure that does not rely on the same ‘operational credit’ is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.

ED Decision 2016/021/R

INTENT OF AMC1

(a)The limitation applies only to destination alternate aerodromes for flights when a destination alternate aerodrome is required. A take-off or en route alternate aerodrome with instrument approach procedures relying on GNSS may be planned without restrictions. A destination aerodrome with all instrument approach procedures relying solely on GNSS may be used without a destination alternate aerodrome if the conditions for a flight without a destination alternate aerodrome are met.

(b)The term ‘available’ means that the procedure can be used in the planning stage and complies with planning minima requirements.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS

(a)Redundancy of on-board systems ensures that no single on-board equipment failure (e.g. antenna, GNSS receiver, FMS, or navigation display failure) results in the loss of the GNSS capability.

(b)Any shadowing of the GNSS signal or jamming of all GNSS frequencies from the ground is expected to be of a very short duration and affect a very small area. Additional sensors or functions such as inertial coasting may be used during jamming events. Jamming should be considered on all segments of the intended route, including the approach.

(c)The availability of GNSS signals can be compromised if space weather events cause ‘loss of lock’ conditions and more than one satellite signal may be lost on a given GNSS frequency. Until space weather forecasts are available, the operator may use ‘nowcasts’ as short-term predictions for helicopter flights of short durations.

(d)SBAS also contributes to mitigate space weather effects, both by providing integrity messages and by correcting ionosphere-induced errors.

(e)Even though SBAS should be available and used, RAIM should remain available autonomously. In case of loss of the SBAS, the route and the approach to the destination or alternate should still be flown with an available RAIM function.

(f)When available, GNSS based on more than one constellation and more than one frequency may provide better integrity and redundancy regarding failures in the space segment of the GNSS, jamming, and resilience to space weather events.

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

(a)The aircraft shall not be refuelled with aviation gasoline (AVGAS) or wide-cut type fuel or a mixture of these types of fuel, when persons are embarking, on board or disembarking.

(b)For all other types of fuel/energy, necessary precautions shall be taken and the aircraft shall be properly manned by qualified personnel ready to initiate and direct an evacuation of the aircraft by the most practical and expeditious means available.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES — AEROPLANES

(a)Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:

(1)One qualified person should remain at a specified location during fuelling operations with persons on board. This qualified person should be capable of handling emergency procedures concerning fire protection and firefighting, handling communications and initiating and directing an evacuation.

(2)Two-way communication should be established and should remain available by the aeroplane's inter-communication system or other suitable means between the ground crew supervising the refuelling and the qualified personnel on board the aeroplane; the involved personnel should remain within easy reach of the system of communication.

(3)Flight crew members and task specialists should be warned that refuelling will take place.

(4)‘Fasten seat belts’ signs should be off.

(5)‘No smoking’ signs should be on, together with interior lighting to enable emergency exits to be identified.

(6)Task specialists should be instructed to unfasten their seat belts and refrain from smoking.

(7)If the presence of fuel vapour is detected inside the aeroplane, or any other hazard arises during refuelling, fuelling should be stopped immediately.

(8)The ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation and slide deployment areas should be kept clear.

(9)Provision should be made for a safe and rapid evacuation.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES — helicopters

When the helicopter rotors are stopped, the efficiency and speed of task specialists disembarking from and re-embarking on board helicopters is such that disembarking before refuelling and re-embarking after refuelling is the general practice. However, if such operations are needed, the operator should refer to AMC1 SPO.OP.157 and AMC2 SPO.OP.157. Operational procedures to be described in the operations manual (OM) should specify that at least the relevant precautions of the aforementioned AMC are taken.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

AIRCRAFT REFUELLING PROVISIONS AND GUIDANCE ON SAFE REFUELLING PRACTICES

Provisions concerning aircraft refuelling are contained in Volume I (Aerodrome Design and Operations) of ICAO Annex 14 (Aerodromes), and guidance on safe refuelling practices is contained in Parts 1 and 8 of the ICAO Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137).

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

(a)Refuelling with engine(s) and/or rotors turning shall only be conducted:

(1)with no task specialists embarking or disembarking;

(2)if the operator of the aerodrome or operating site allows such operations;

(3)in accordance with any specific procedures and limitations in the aircraft flight manual (AFM);

(4)with JET A or JET A-1 fuel types; and

(5)in the presence of the appropriate rescue and firefighting (RFF) facilities or equipment.

(b)The operator shall assess the risks associated with refuelling with engine(s) and/or rotors turning.

(c)The operator shall establish appropriate procedures to be followed by all involved personnel, such as crew members, task specialists, and ground operations personnel.

(d)The operator shall ensure that its crew members, ground operations personnel, as well as any task specialist involved in the procedures, are appropriately trained.

(e)The operator shall ensure that the helicopter refuelling procedures with engine(s) and/or rotors turning are specified in the operations manual.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES — NO TASK SPECIALISTS ON BOARD

Operational procedures in the OM should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:

(a)all necessary information should be exchanged in advance with the aerodrome operator, operating-site operator, and refuelling operator;

(b)the procedures to be used by crew members should be defined;

(c)the procedures to be used by the operator’s ground operations personnel that may be in charge of refuelling or assisting in emergency evacuations should be described;

(d)the operator’s training programmes for crew members and for the operator’s ground operations personnel should be described;

(e)the minimum distance between the helicopter turning parts and the refuelling vehicle or installations should be defined when the refuelling takes place outside an aerodrome or at an aerodrome where there are no such limitations;

(f)besides any rescue and firefighting services (RFFSs) that are required to be available by aerodrome regulations, an additional handheld fire extinguisher with the equivalent of 5 kg of dry powder should be immediately available and ready for use;

(g)a means for a two-way communication between the crew and the person in charge of refuelling should be defined and established;

(h)if fuel vapour is detected inside the helicopter, or any other hazard arises, refuelling/defuelling should be stopped immediately;

(i)one pilot should stay at the controls, constantly monitor the refuelling, and be ready to shut off the engines and evacuate at all times; and

(j)any additional precautions should be taken, as determined by the risk assessment.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES — TASK SPECIALISTS ON BOARD

In addition to AMC1 SPO.OP.157, for refuelling with task specialists on board, operational procedures in the OM should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:

(a)the positioning of the helicopter and the corresponding helicopter evacuation strategy should be defined taking into account the wind as well as the refuelling facilities or vehicles;

(b)on a heliport, the ground area beneath the exits that are intended for emergency evacuation should be kept clear;

(c)an additional task specialist briefing as well as instructions should be defined, and the ‘No smoking’ signs should be on unless ‘No smoking’ placards are installed;

(d)interior lighting should be set to enable identification of emergency exits;

(e)the use of doors during refuelling should be defined: doors on the refuelling side should remain closed, while doors on the opposite side should remain unlocked or, weather permitting, open unless otherwise specified in the AFM; and

(f)at least one suitable person or appropriately trained task specialist capable of implementing emergency procedures for firefighting, communications, as well for initiating and directing an evacuation, should remain at a specified location; this person should not be the qualified pilot at the controls or the person performing the refuelling.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

RISK ASSESSMENT

The risk assessment should explain why it is not practical to refuel with the engine(s) and rotors stopped, identify the additional hazards, and describe how the additional risks are controlled. Helicopter offshore operations (HOFO) are typical operations where the benefits should outweigh the risks if mitigation measures are taken.

Guidance on safe refuelling practices is contained in ICAO Doc 9137 Airport Services Manual, Parts 1 and 8.

The operator’s risk assessment may include, but not be limited to, the following risks, hazards and mitigation measures:

(a)risk related to refuelling with rotors turning;

(b)risk related to the shutting down of the engines, including the risk of failures during start-up;

(c)environmental conditions, such as wind limitations, displacement of exhaust gases, and blade sailing;

(d)risk related to human factors and fatigue management, especially for single-pilot operations for long periods of time;

(e)risk mitigation, such as the safety features of the fuel installation, rescue and firefighting (RFF) capability, number of personnel members available, ease of emergency evacuation of the helicopter, etc.;

(f)assessment of the use of radio transmitting equipment;

(g)determination of the use of seat belts; and

(h)review of the portable electronic device (PED) policy.

Regulation (EU) 2018/394

Each flight crew member required to be on duty in the flight crew compartment shall wear a headset with boom microphone or equivalent and use it as the primary device to communicate with ATS, other crew members and task specialists.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

The pilot-in-command shall not allow smoking on board or during refuelling or defuelling of the aircraft.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

(a)The pilot-in-command shall only commence or continue a VFR flight if the latest available meteorological information indicates that the meteorological conditions along the route and at the intended destination at the estimated time of use will be at or above the applicable VFR operating minima.

(b)The pilot-in-command shall only commence or continue an IFR flight towards the planned destination aerodrome if the latest available meteorological information indicates that, at the estimated time of arrival, the meteorological conditions at the destination or at least one destination alternate aerodrome are at or above the applicable aerodrome operating minima.

(c)If a flight contains VFR and IFR segments, the meteorological information referred to in (a) and (b) shall be applicable as far as relevant.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

EVALUATION OF METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Pilots should carefully evaluate the available meteorological information relevant to the proposed flight, such as applicable surface observations, winds and temperatures aloft, terminal and area forecasts, air meteorological information reports (AIRMETs), significant meteorological information (SIGMET) and pilot reports. The ultimate decision whether, when, and where to make the flight rests with the pilot-in-command. Pilots should continue to re-evaluate changing weather conditions.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

APPLICATION OF AERODROME FORECASTS (TAF & TREND)

Where a terminal area forecast (TAF) or meteorological aerodrome or aeronautical report (METAR) with landing forecast (TREND) is used as forecast, the following criteria should be used:

(a)From the start of a TAF validity period up to the time of applicability of the first subsequent 'FM...' or 'BECMG' or, if no 'FM' or BECMG' is given, up to the end of the validity period of the TAF, the prevailing weather conditions forecast in the initial part of the TAF should be applied.

(b)From the time of observation of a METAR up to the time of applicability of the first subsequent 'FM...' or 'BECMG' or, if no 'FM' or BECMG' is given, up to the end of the validity period of the TREND, the prevailing weather conditions forecast in the METAR should be applied.

(c)Following FM (alone) or BECMG AT, any specified change should be applied from the time of the change.

(d)Following BECMG (alone), BECMG FM, BECMG TL, BECMG FM TL:

(1)in the case of deterioration, any specified change should be applied from the start of the change; and

(2)in the case of improvement, any specified change should be applied from the end of the change.

(e)In a period indicated by TEMPO (alone), TEMPO FM, TEMPO TL, TEMPO FM TL, PROB30/40 (alone):

(1)deteriorations associated with persistent conditions in connection with e.g. haze, mist, fog, dust/sandstorm, continuous precipitation should be applied;

(2)deteriorations associated with transient/showery conditions in connection with short-lived weather phenomena, e.g. thunderstorms, showers may be ignored; and

(3)improvements should in all cases be disregarded.

(f)In a period indicated by PROB30/40 TEMPO:

(1)deteriorations may be disregarded; and

(2)improvements should be disregarded.

Note: Abbreviations used in the context of this AMC are as follows:

FM: from

BECMG: becoming

AT: at

TL: till

TEMPO: temporarily

PROB: probability

ED Decision 2014/018/R

CONTINUATION OF A FLIGHT

In the case of in-flight re-planning, continuation of a flight refers to the point from which a revised flight plan applies.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)The pilot-in-command shall only commence take-off if the aircraft is clear of any deposit that might adversely affect the performance or controllability of the aircraft, except as permitted in the AFM.

(b)In the case of operations with complex motor-powered aircraft, the operator shall establish procedures to be followed when ground de-icing and anti-icing and related inspections of the aircraft are necessary to allow the safe operation of the aircraft.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

TERMINOLOGY

Terms used in the context of de-icing/anti-icing have the meaning defined in the following subparagraphs.

(a)‘Anti-icing’: the process of protecting the aircraft to prevent contamination due to existing or expected weather, typically by applying anti-icing fluids on uncontaminated aircraft surfaces.

(b)‘Anti-icing fluid’ includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(1)Typically, Type II, III or IV fluid (neat or diluted), normally applied unheated (*);

(2)Type I fluid/water mixture heated to minimum 60°C at the nozzle.

(*) When de-icing and anti-icing in a one-step process, Type II and Type IV fluids are typically applied diluted and heated.

(c)‘Clear ice’: a coating of ice, generally clear and smooth, but with some air pockets. It forms on exposed objects, the temperatures of which are at, below or slightly above the freezing temperature, by the freezing of super-cooled drizzle, droplets or raindrops. Clear ice is very difficult to be detected visually.

(d)‘Cold soaked surface frost (CSSF)’: frost developed on cold soaked aircraft surfaces by sublimation of air humidity. This effect can take place at ambient temperatures above 0 °C. Cold soaked aircraft surfaces are more common on aircraft that have recently landed. External surfaces of fuel tanks (e.g. wing skins) are typical areas of CSSF formation (known in this case as cold soaked fuel frost (CSFF)), due to the thermal inertia of very cold fuel that remains on the tanks after landing.

(e)‘Conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground’: freezing fog, freezing precipitation, frost, rain or high humidity (on cold soaked wings), hail, ice pellets, snow or mixed rain and snow, etc.

(f)‘Contamination’: all forms of frozen or semi-frozen deposits on an aircraft, such as frost, snow, slush or ice.

(g)‘Contamination check’: a check of the aircraft for contamination to establish the need for de-icing.

(h)‘De-icing’: the process of eliminating frozen contamination from aircraft surfaces, typically by applying de-icing fluids.

(i)‘De-icing fluid’: such fluid includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(1)Heated water;

(2)Preferably, Type I fluid (neat or diluted (typically));

(3)Type II, III or IV fluid (neat or diluted).

The de-icing fluid is normally applied heated to ensure maximum efficiency and its freezing point should be at the outside air temperature (OAT) or below.

(j)‘De-icing/anti-icing’: this is the combination of de-icing and anti-icing performed in either one or two steps.

(k)‘Ground ice detection system (GIDS)’: a system used during aircraft ground operations to inform the personnel involved in the operation and/or the flight crew about the presence of frost, ice, snow or slush on the aircraft surfaces.

(l)‘Holdover time (HOT)’: the period of time during which an anti-icing fluid provides protection against frozen contamination to the treated aircraft surfaces. It depends among other variables, on the type and intensity of the precipitation, OAT, wind, the particular fluid (or fluid Type) and aircraft design and aircraft configuration during the treatment.

(m)‘Liquid water equivalent (LWE) system’: an automated weather measurement system that determines the LWE precipitation rate in conditions of frozen or freezing precipitation. The system provides flight crew with continuously updated information on the fluid protection capability under varying weather conditions.

(n)‘Lowest operational use temperature (LOUT)’: the lowest temperature at which a fluid has been tested and certified as acceptable in accordance with the appropriate aerodynamic acceptance test whilst still maintaining a freezing point buffer of not less than:

(1)10°C for a Type I fluid; or

(2)7°C for Type II, III or IV fluids.

(o)‘Post-treatment check’, ‘Post- de-icing check’ or ‘Post- de-icing/anti-icing check’: an external check of the aircraft after de-icing and/or anti-icing treatment accomplished by qualified staff and from suitably elevated observation points (e.g. from the de-icing/anti-icing equipment itself or other elevated equipment) to ensure that the aircraft is free from frost, ice, snow, or slush.

(p)‘Pre-take-off check’: The flight crew should continuously monitor the weather conditions after the de-icing/anti-icing treatment to assess whether the applied holdover time is still appropriate. Within the aircraft’s HOT and prior to take-off, the flight crew should check the aircraft’s wings or representative aircraft surfaces for frozen contaminants.

(q)‘Pre-take-off contamination check’: a check of the treated surfaces for contamination, performed when the HOT has been exceeded or if any doubt exists regarding the continued effectiveness of the applied anti-icing treatment. It is normally accomplished externally, just before commencement of the take-off run.

ANTI-ICING CODES

(r)Upon completion of the anti-icing treatment, a qualified staff provides the anti-icing code to the flight crew as follows: ‘the fluid Type/the fluid name (except for Type I)/concentration (except for Type I)/local time at start of anti-icing/date (optional)/the statement ‘post- de-icing/anti-icing check completed’ (if check completed). Example:

‘TYPE II / MANUFACTURER, BRAND X / 75% / 1335 / 15FEB20 / POST- DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING CHECK COMPLETED’.

(s)When a two-step de-icing/anti-icing operation has been carried out, the anti-icing code should be determined by the second step fluid.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING — PROCEDURES

(a)De-icing and/or anti-icing procedures should take into account manufacturer’s recommendations, including those that are type-specific, and should cover:

(1)contamination checks, including detection of clear ice and under-wing frost; limits on the thickness/area of contamination published in the AFM or other manufacturers’ documentation should be followed;

(2)procedures to be followed if de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures are interrupted or unsuccessful;

(3)post-treatment checks;

(4)pre-take-off checks;

(5)pre-take-off contamination checks;

(6)the recording of any incidents relating to de-icing and/or anti-icing; and

(7)the responsibilities of all personnel involved in de-icing and/or anti-icing.

(b)Operator’s procedures should ensure the following:

(1)When aircraft surfaces are contaminated by ice, frost, slush or snow, they are de-iced prior to take-off according to the prevailing conditions. Removal of contaminants may be performed with mechanical tools, fluids (including hot water), infrared heat or forced air, taking account of aircraft type-specific provisions.

(2)Account is taken of the wing skin temperature versus OAT, as this may affect:

(i)the need to carry out aircraft de-icing and/or anti-icing; and/or

(ii)the performance of the de-icing/anti-icing fluids.

(3)When freezing precipitation occurs or there is a risk of freezing precipitation occurring that would contaminate the surfaces at the time of take-off, aircraft surfaces should be anti-iced. Anti-icing fluids (neat or diluted) should not be applied at OAT below their LOUT. If both de-icing and anti-icing are required, the procedure may be performed in a one- or two-step process, depending upon weather conditions, available equipment, available fluids and the desired HOT. One-step de-icing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried out at the same time, using a mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water. Two-step de-icing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried out in two separate steps. The aircraft is first de-iced using heated water only or a heated mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water. After completion of the de-icing operation, a layer of a mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water, or of de-icing /anti-icing fluid only, is sprayed over the aircraft surfaces. The second step will be taken before the first step fluid freezes (typically within 3 minutes but severe conditions may shorten this) and, if necessary, area by area.

(4)When an aircraft is anti-iced and a longer HOT is needed/desired, the use of a less diluted thickened fluid may be considered.

(5)All restrictions relative to OAT and fluid application (including, but not necessarily limited to, temperature and pressure) published by the fluid manufacturer and/or aircraft manufacturer, are followed and procedures, limitations and recommendations to prevent the formation of fluid residues are followed.

(6)During conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground or after de-icing and/or anti-icing, an aircraft is not dispatched for departure unless it has been given a contamination check or a post-treatment check by a trained and qualified person. This check should cover all treated surfaces of the aircraft and be performed from points offering sufficient visibility to these parts. To ensure that there is no clear ice on suspect areas, it may also be necessary to make a physical check (e.g. tactile).

(7)The required entry is made in the technical log.

(8)The commander continually monitors the environmental situation after the performed treatment. Prior to take-off, he/she performs a pre-take-off check, which is an assessment of whether the applied HOT is still appropriate. This pre-take-off check includes, but is not limited to, factors such as precipitation, wind and OAT.

(9)If any doubt exists as to whether a deposit may adversely affect the aircraft’s performance and/or controllability characteristics, the commander should arrange for a re-treatment or a pre-take-off contamination check to be performed in order to verify that the aircraft’s surfaces are free of contamination. Special methods and/or equipment may be necessary to perform this check, especially at night time or in extremely adverse weather conditions. If this check cannot be performed just before take-off, re-treatment should be applied.

(10)When re-treatment is necessary, any residue of the previous treatment should be removed, and a completely new de-icing/anti-icing treatment should be applied.

(11)When a ground ice detection system (GIDS) is used to perform an aircraft surfaces check prior to and/or after a treatment, the use of GIDS by suitably trained personnel should be part of the procedure.

(c)Special operational considerations

(1)When using thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids, the operator should consider a two-step deicing/anti-icing procedure, the first step preferably with hot water and/or un-thickened fluids.

(2)The use of de-icing/anti-icing fluids should be in accordance with the aircraft manufacturer’s documentation. This is particularly important for thickened fluids to assure sufficient flow-off during take-off. Avoid applying excessive thickened fluid on the horizontal tail of aircraft with unpowered elevator controls.

(3)The operator should comply with any type-specific operational provision(s), such as an aircraft mass decrease and/or a take-off speed increase associated with a fluid application.

(4)The operator should take into account any flight handling procedures (stick force, rotation speed and rate, take-off speed, aircraft attitude etc.) laid down by the aircraft manufacturer when associated with a fluid application.

(5)The limitations or handling procedures resulting from (c)(3) and/or (c)(4) above should be part of the flight crew pre take-off briefing.

(d)Communications

(1)Before aircraft treatment. When the aircraft is to be treated with the flight crew on board, the flight and personnel involved in the operation should confirm the fluid to be used, the extent of treatment required and any aircraft type-specific procedure(s) to be used. Any other information needed to apply the HOT tables should be exchanged.

(2)Anti-icing code. The operator’s procedures should include an anti-icing code, which indicates the treatment the aircraft has received. This code provides the flight crew with the minimum details necessary to estimate a HOT and confirms that the aircraft is free of contamination.

(3)After treatment. Before reconfiguring or moving the aircraft, the flight crew should receive a confirmation from the qualified personnel involved in the operation that all de-icing and/or anti-icing operations are complete and that all personnel and equipment are clear of the aircraft.

(e)Holdover protection & LWE systems

The operator should publish in the operations manual (OM), when required, the HOTs in the form of a table or a diagram, to account for the various types of ground icing conditions and the different types and concentrations of fluids used. However, the times of protection shown in these tables are to be used as guidelines only and are normally used in conjunction with the pre-take-off check.

An operator may choose to operate using LWE systems instead of HOT tables whenever the required means for using these systems are in place.

(f)Training

The operator’s initial and recurrent de-icing training programmes (including communication training) for flight crew and for other personnel involved in de-icing operations should include additional training if any of the following is introduced:

(1)a new method, procedure and/or technique;

(2)a new type of fluid and/or equipment; or

(3)a new type of aircraft.

(g)Contracting

When the operator contracts de-icing/anti-icing functions, the operator should ensure that the contractor complies with the operator’s training/qualification procedures, together with any specific procedures in respect of:

(1)roles and responsibilities;

(2)de-icing and/or anti-icing methods and procedures;

(3)fluids to be used, including precautions for storage, preparation for use and chemical incompatibilities;

(4)specific aircraft provisions (e.g. no-spray areas, propeller/engine de-icing, APU operation etc.);

(5)different checks to be conducted; and

(6)procedures for communications with flight crew and any other third party involved.

(h)Special maintenance considerations

(1)General

The operator should take proper account of the possible side-effects of fluid use. Such effects may include, but are not necessarily limited to, dried and/or re-hydrated residues, corrosion and the removal of lubricants.

(2)Special considerations regarding residues of dried fluids

The operator should establish procedures to prevent or detect and remove residues of dried fluid. If necessary, the operator should establish appropriate inspection intervals based on the recommendations of the airframe manufacturers and/or the operator’s own experience:

(i)Dried fluid residues

Dried fluid residues could occur when surfaces have been treated and the aircraft has not subsequently been flown and has not been subject to precipitation. The fluid may then have dried on the surfaces.

(ii)Re-hydrated fluid residues

Repetitive application of thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids may lead to the subsequent formation/build-up of a dried residue in aerodynamically quiet areas, such as cavities and gaps. This residue may re-hydrate if exposed to high humidity conditions, precipitation, washing, etc., and increase to many times its original size/volume. This residue will freeze if exposed to conditions at or below 0 °C. This may cause moving parts, such as elevators, ailerons, and flap actuating mechanisms to stiffen or jam in-flight. Re-hydrated residues may also form on exterior surfaces, which can reduce lift, increase drag and stall speed. Re-hydrated residues may also collect inside control surface structures and cause clogging of drain holes or imbalances to flight controls. Residues may also collect in hidden areas, such as around flight control hinges, pulleys, grommets, on cables and in gaps.

(iii)Operators are strongly recommended to obtain information about the fluid dry-out and re-hydration characteristics from the fluid manufacturers and to select products with optimised characteristics.

(iv)Additional information should be obtained from fluid manufacturers for handling, storage, application and testing of their products.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING — BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Further guidance material on this issue is given in the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations (Doc 9640).

(a)General

(1)Any deposit of frost, ice, snow or slush on the external surfaces of an aircraft may drastically affect its flying qualities because of reduced aerodynamic lift, increased drag, modified stability and control characteristics. Furthermore, freezing deposits may cause moving parts, such as elevators, ailerons, flap actuating mechanism, etc., to jam and create a potentially hazardous condition. Propeller/engine/APU/systems performance may deteriorate due to the presence of frozen contaminants on blades, intakes and components. Also, engine operation may be seriously affected by the ingestion of snow or ice, thereby causing engine stall or compressor damage. In addition, ice/frost may form on certain external surfaces (e.g. wing upper and lower surfaces, etc.) due to the effects of cold fuel/structures, even in ambient temperatures well above 0°C.

(2)Procedures established by the operator for de-icing and/or anti-icing are intended to ensure that the aircraft is clear of contamination so that degradation of aerodynamic characteristics or mechanical interference will not occur and, following anti-icing, to maintain the airframe in that condition during the appropriate HOT.

(3)Under certain meteorological conditions, de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures may be ineffective in providing sufficient protection for continued operations. Examples of these conditions are freezing rain, ice pellets and hail snow exceeding certain intensities, high wind velocity, and fast-dropping OAT. No HOT guidelines exist for these conditions.

(4)Material for establishing operational procedures can be found, for example, in:

(i)ICAO Annex 3 ‘Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation’;

(ii)ICAO ‘Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations’;

(iii)SAE AS6285 ‘Aircraft Ground Deicing/Anti-Icing Processes’;

(iv)SAE AS6286 ‘Aircraft Ground Deicing/Anti-Icing Training and Qualification Program’;

(v)SAE AS6332 ‘Aircraft Ground Deicing/Anti-icing Quality Management’;

(vi)SAE ARP6257 ‘Aircraft Ground De/Anti-Icing Communication Phraseology for Flight and Ground Crews’;

(vii)FAA Holdover Time Guidelines

(viii)FAA 8900.xxx series Notice ‘Revised FAA-Approved Deicing Program Updates, Winter 20xx-20yy’.

(b)Fluids

(1)Type I fluid: Due to its properties, Type I fluid forms a thin, liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which it is applied which, under certain weather conditions, gives a very limited HOT. For anti-icing purposes the fluid/water mixture should have a freezing point of at least 10 °C below OAT; increasing the concentration of fluid in the fluid/water mix does not provide any extension in HOT.

(2)Type II and Type IV fluids contain thickeners which enable the fluid to form a thicker liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which it is applied. Generally, this fluid provides a longer HOT than Type I fluids in similar conditions.

(3)Type III fluid is a thickened fluid especially intended for use on aircraft with low rotation speeds.

(4)Fluids used for de-icing and/or anti-icing should be acceptable to the operator and the aircraft manufacturer. These fluids normally conform to specifications such as SAE AMS1424 (Type I) or SAE AMS1428 (Types II, III and IV). Use of non-conforming fluids is not recommended due to their characteristics being unknown. The anti-icing and aerodynamic properties of thickened fluids may be seriously degraded by, for example, inappropriate storage, treatment, application, application equipment, age and in case they are applied on top of non-chemically compatible de-icing fluids.

(c)Holdover protection

(1)Holdover protection is achieved by a layer of anti-icing fluid remaining on and protecting aircraft surfaces for a period of time. With a one-step de-icing/anti-icing procedure, the HOT begins at the commencement of de-icing/anti-icing. With a two-step procedure, the HOT begins at the commencement of the second (anti-icing) step. The holdover protection runs out:

(i)at the commencement of the take-off roll (due to aerodynamic shedding of fluid); or

(ii)when frozen deposits start to form or accumulate on treated aircraft surfaces, thereby indicating the loss of effectiveness of the fluid.

(2)The duration of holdover protection may vary depending on the influence of factors other than those specified in the HOT tables. Guidance should be provided by the operator to take account of such factors, which may include:

(i)atmospheric conditions, e.g. exact type and rate of precipitation, wind direction and velocity, relative humidity and solar radiation; and

(ii)the aircraft and its surroundings, such as aircraft component inclination angle, contour and surface roughness, surface temperature, operation in close proximity to other aircraft (jet or propeller blast) and ground equipment and structures.

(3)HOTs are not meant to imply that flight is safe in the prevailing conditions if the specified HOT has not been exceeded. Certain meteorological conditions, such as freezing drizzle or freezing rain, may be beyond the certification envelope of the aircraft.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)The pilot-in-command shall only commence a flight or intentionally fly into expected or actual icing conditions if the aircraft is certified and equipped to cope with such conditions as referred to in 2.a.5 of Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008.

(b)If icing exceeds the intensity of icing for which the aircraft is certified or if an aircraft not certified for flight in known icing conditions encounters icing, the pilot-in-command shall exit the icing conditions without delay, by a change of level and/or route, and if necessary by declaring an emergency to ATC.

(c)In the case of operations with complex motor-powered aircraft, the operator shall establish procedures for flights in expected or actual icing conditions.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

FLIGHT IN EXPECTED OR ACTUAL ICING CONDITIONS

(a)The procedures to be established by the operator should take account of the design, the equipment, the configuration of the aircraft and the necessary training. For these reasons, different aircraft types operated by the same company may require the development of different procedures. In every case, the relevant limitations are those that are defined in the AFM and other documents produced by the manufacturer.

(b)The operator should ensure that the procedures take account of the following:

(1)the equipment and instruments that should be serviceable for flight in icing conditions;

(2)the limitations on flight in icing conditions for each phase of flight. These limitations may be imposed by the aircraft’s de-icing or anti-icing equipment or the necessary performance corrections that have to be made;

(3)the criteria the flight crew should use to assess the effect of icing on the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft;

(4)the means by which the flight crew detects, by visual cues or the use of the aircraft’s ice detection system, that the flight is entering icing conditions; and

(5)the action to be taken by the flight crew in a deteriorating situation (which may develop rapidly) resulting in an adverse effect on the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft, due to:

(i)the failure of the aircraft’s anti-icing or de-icing equipment to control a build-up of ice; and/or

(ii)ice build-up on unprotected areas.

(c)Training for dispatch and flight in expected or actual icing conditions. The content of the operations manual should reflect the training, both conversion and recurrent, that flight crew and all other relevant operational personnel require in order to comply with the procedures for dispatch and flight in icing conditions:

(1)instruction on how to recognise, from weather reports or forecasts that are available before flight commences or during flight, the risks of encountering icing conditions along the planned route and on how to modify, as necessary, the departure and in-flight routes or profiles;

(2)instruction on the operational and performance limitations or margins;

(3)the use of in-flight ice detection, anti-icing and de-icing systems in both normal and abnormal operation; and

(4)instruction on the differing intensities and forms of ice accretion and the consequent action which should be taken.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

Before commencing take-off, the pilot-in-command shall be satisfied that:

(a)the meteorological conditions at the aerodrome or the operating site and the condition of the runway/FATO intended to be used will not prevent a safe take-off and departure; and

(b)the selected aerodrome operating minima are consistent with all of the following:

(1)the operative ground equipment;

(2)the operative aircraft systems;

(3)the aircraft performance;

(4)flight crew qualifications.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

Unless a task specialist is on-board the aircraft for training, the pilot-in-command shall, when carrying task specialists, not simulate:

(a)situations that require the application of abnormal or emergency procedures; or

(b)flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

(a)The operator of complex motor-powered aircraft shall establish procedures to ensure that inflight fuel/energy checks and fuel/energy management are performed.

(b)The pilot-in-command shall monitor the amount of usable fuel/energy remaining on board to ensure that it is protected and not less than the fuel/energy that is required to proceed to an aerodrome or operating site where a safe landing can be made.

(c)The pilot-in-command shall advise air traffic control (ATC) of a ‘minimum fuel/energy’ state by declaring ‘MINIMUM FUEL’ when the pilot-in-command has:

(1)committed to land at a specific aerodrome or operating site; and

(2)calculated that any change to the existing clearance to that aerodrome or operating site, or other air traffic delays, may result in landing with less than the planned final reserve fuel/energy.

(d)The pilot-in-command shall declare a situation of ‘fuel/energy emergency’ by broadcasting ‘MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL’ when the usable fuel/energy estimated to be available upon landing at the nearest aerodrome or operating site where a safe landing can be made is less than the planned final reserve fuel/energy.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

FINAL RESERVE FUEL PROTECTION

To ensure a safe landing, the pilot needs to protect the final reserve fuel (FRF) in accordance with point SPO.OP.131. The objective of the FRF protection is to ensure that a safe landing is made at any aerodrome or operating site when unforeseen circumstances may not allow to safely complete the flight, as originally planned.

When the FRF can no longer be protected, then a fuel emergency needs to be declared, as per point SPO.OP.190(d), and any landing option explored (e.g. for aeroplanes, aerodromes not assessed by the operator, military aerodromes, closed runways), including deviating from rules, operational procedures, and methods in the interest of safety (as per point CAT.GEN.MPA.105(b)).

ICAO Doc 9976 Flight Planning and Fuel Management (FPFM) Manual and the EASA Fuel Manual contain further detailed guidance on the development of a comprehensive in-flight fuel management policy and related procedures.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

‘MINIMUM FUEL’ DECLARATION

The ‘MINIMUM FUEL’ declaration informs the ATC that all planned landing options have been reduced to a specific aerodrome or operating site of intended landing, and for helicopters, that no other landing site is available. It also informs the ATC that any change to the existing clearance may result in landing with less than the planned FRF/energy. This is not an emergency situation but an indication that an emergency situation is possible, should any additional delay occur.

The pilot should not expect any form of priority handling as a result of a ‘MINIMUM FUEL’ declaration. However, the ATC should advise the flight crew of any additional expected delays, as well as coordinate with other ATC units when transferring the control of the aircraft, to ensure that the other ATC units are aware of the flight’s fuel/energy state.

ICAO Doc 9976 Flight Planning and Fuel Management (FPFM) Manual (1st Edition, 2015) and the EASA Fuel Manual contain guidance on declaring ‘MINIMUM FUEL’.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)The operator shall ensure that task specialists and crew members use supplemental oxygen continuously whenever the cabin altitude exceeds 10 000 ft for a period of more than 30 minutes and whenever the cabin altitude exceeds 13 000 ft, unless otherwise approved by the competent authority and in accordance with SOPs.

(b)Notwithstanding (a) and except for parachute operations, short excursions of a specified duration above 13 000 ft without using supplemental oxygen on other-than complex aeroplanes and helicopters may be undertaken with a prior approval of the competent authority based on the consideration of the following:

(1)the duration of the excursion above 13 000 ft is not more than 10 minutes or, if needed for a longer period, the time strictly necessary to the accomplishment of the specialised task;

(2)the flight is not conducted above 16 000 ft;

(3)the safety briefing in accordance with SPO.OP.135 includes adequate information to crew members and tasks specialists on the effects of hypoxia;

(4)SOPs for the concerned operation reflecting (1), (2) and (3);

(5)the previous experience of the operator in conducting operations above 13 000 ft without using supplemental oxygen;

(6)the individual experience of crew members and task specialists and their physiological adaptation to high altitudes; and

(7)the altitude of the base where the operator is established or the operations are conducted from.

Regulation (EU) No 379/2014

(a)When undue proximity to the ground is detected by a flight crew member or by a ground proximity warning system, the pilot flying shall take corrective action immediately in order to establish safe flight conditions.

(b)The ground proximity warning system may be disabled during those specialised tasks, which by their nature require the aircraft to be operated within a distance from the ground below that which would trigger the ground proximity warning system.

ED Decision 2014/018/R

GUIDANCE MATERIAL FOR TERRAIN AWARENESS WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES

(a)Introduction

(1)This GM contains performance-based training objectives for TAWS flight crew training.

(2)The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAWS cautions; response to TAWS warnings.

(3)The term ‘TAWS’ in this GM means a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) enhanced by a forward-looking terrain avoidance function. Alerts include both cautions and warnings.

(4)The content of this GM is intended to assist operators who are producing training programmes. The information it contains has not been tailored to any specific aircraft or TAWS equipment, but highlights features that are typically available where such systems are installed. It is the responsibility of the individual operator to determine the applicability of the content of this Guidance Material to each aircraft and TAWS equipment installed and their operation. Operators should refer to the AFM and/or aircraft/flight crew operating manual (A/FCOM), or similar documents, for information applicable to specific configurations. If there should be any conflict between the content of this Guidance Material and that published in the other documents described above, then the information contained in the AFM or A/FCOM will take precedence.

(b)Scope

(1)The scope of this GM is designed to identify training objectives in the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation; recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items that are considered essential training items and those that are considered to be desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined.

(2)No attempt is made to define how the training programme should be implemented. Instead, objectives are established to define the knowledge that a pilot operating a TAWS is expected to possess and the performance expected from a pilot who has completed TAWS training. However, the guidelines do indicate those areas in which the pilot receiving the training should demonstrate his/her understanding, or performance, using a real-time, interactive training device, i.e. a flight simulator. Where appropriate, notes are included within the performance criteria that amplify or clarify the material addressed by the training objective.

(c)Performance-based training objectives

(1)TAWS academic training

(i)This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or by providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions.

(ii)Theory of operation. The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of TAWS operation and the criteria used for issuing cautions and warnings. This training should address system operation. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how a TAWS functions. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions:

(A)Surveillance

(a)The GPWS computer processes data supplied from an air data computer, a radio altimeter, an instrument landing system (ILS)/microwave landing system (MLS)/multi-mode (MM) receiver, a roll attitude sensor, and actual position of the surfaces and of the landing gear.

(b)The forward-looking terrain avoidance function utilises an accurate source of known aircraft position, such as that which may be provided by a flight management system (FMS) or global positioning system (GPS), or an electronic terrain database. The source and scope of the terrain, obstacle and airport data, and features such as the terrain clearance floor, the runway picker, and geometric altitude (where provided), should all be described.

(c)Displays required to deliver TAWS outputs include a loudspeaker for voice announcements, visual alerts (typically amber and red lights) and a terrain awareness display (that may be combined with other displays). In addition, means should be provided for indicating the status of the TAWS and any partial or total failures that may occur.

(B)Terrain avoidance. Outputs from the TAWS computer provide visual and audio synthetic voice cautions and warnings to alert the flight crew about potential conflicts with terrain and obstacles.

(C)Alert thresholds. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings. Criteria: the pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and alerts and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including:

(a)basic GPWS alerting modes specified in the ICAO standard:

—Mode 1: excessive sink rate;

—Mode 2: excessive terrain closure rate;

—Mode 3: descent after take-off or missed approach;

—Mode 4: unsafe proximity to terrain; and

—Mode 5: descent below ILS glide slope (caution only);

(b)an additional, optional alert mode:

Mode 6: radio altitude call-out (information only); and

(c)TAWS cautions and warnings that alert the flight crew to obstacles and terrain ahead of the aircraft in line with or adjacent to its projected flight path (forward-looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) and premature descent alert (PDA) functions).

(D)TAWS limitations. Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the limitations of TAWS. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of TAWS limitations identified by the manufacturer for the equipment model installed, such as:

(a)navigation should not be predicated on the use of the terrain display;

(b)unless geometric altitude data is provided, use of predictive TAWS functions is prohibited when altimeter subscale settings display ‘QFE’ (atmospheric pressure at aerodrome elevation/runway threshold);

(c)nuisance alerts can be issued if the aerodrome of intended landing is not included in the TAWS airport database;

(d)in cold weather operations, corrective procedures should be implemented by the pilot unless the TAWS has in-built compensation, such as geometric altitude data;

(e)loss of input data to the TAWS computer could result in partial or total loss of functionality. Where means exist to inform the flight crew that functionality has been degraded, this should be known and the consequences understood;

(f)radio signals not associated with the intended flight profile (e.g. ILS glide path transmissions from an adjacent runway) may cause false alerts;

(g)inaccurate or low accuracy aircraft position data could lead to false or non-annunciation of terrain or obstacles ahead of the aircraft; and

(h)minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions should be applied in the event of the TAWS becoming partially or completely unserviceable. (It should be noted that basic GPWS has no forward-looking capability.)

(E)TAWS inhibits. Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of a TAWS are inhibited. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of the various TAWS inhibits, including the following means of:

(a)silencing voice alerts;

(b)inhibiting ILS glide path signals (as may be required when executing an ILS back beam approach);

(c)inhibiting flap position sensors (as may be required when executing an approach with the flaps not in a normal position for landing);

(d)inhibiting the FLTA and PDA functions; and

(e)selecting or deselecting the display of terrain information, together with appropriate annunciation of the status of each selection.

(2)Operating procedures. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate TAWS avionics and to interpret the information presented by a TAWS. This training should address the following topics:

(i)Use of controls. Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all TAWS controls and inhibits. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following means by which:

(A)before flight, any equipment self-test functions can be initiated;

(B)TAWS information can be selected for display; and

(C)all TAWS inhibits can be operated and what the consequent annunciations mean with regard to loss of functionality.

(ii)Display interpretation. Objective: to verify that the pilot understands the meaning of all information that can be annunciated or displayed by a TAWS. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information annunciated or displayed by a TAWS, including the following:

(A)knowledge of all visual and aural indications that may be seen or heard;

(B)response required on receipt of a caution;

(C)response required on receipt of a warning; and

(D)response required on receipt of a notification that partial or total failure of the TAWS has occurred (including annunciation that the present aircraft position is of low accuracy).

(iii)Use of basic GPWS or use of the FLTA function only. Objective: to verify that the pilot understands what functionality will remain following loss of the GPWS or of the FLTA function. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge of how to recognise the following:

(A)un-commanded loss of the GPWS function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) protection (essentially, this is the FLTA function); and

(B)un-commanded loss of the FLTA function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining CFIT protection (essentially, this is the basic GPWS).

(iv)Crew coordination. Objective: to verify that the pilot adequately briefs other flight crew members on how TAWS alerts will be handled. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate that the pre-flight briefing addresses procedures that will be used in preparation for responding to TAWS cautions and warnings, including the following:

(A)the action to be taken, and by whom, in the event that a TAWS caution and/or warning is issued; and

(B)how multi-function displays will be used to depict TAWS information at take-off, in the cruise and for the descent, approach, landing (and any missed approach). This will be in accordance with procedures specified by the operator, who will recognise that it may be more desirable that other data is displayed at certain phases of flight and that the terrain display has an automatic 'pop-up' mode in the event that an alert is issued.

(v)Reporting rules. Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the rules for reporting alerts to the controller and other authorities. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge of the following:

(A)when, following recovery from a TAWS alert or caution, a transmission of information should be made to the appropriate ATC unit; and

(B)the type of written report that is required, how it is to be compiled and whether any cross-reference should be made in the aircraft technical log and/or voyage report (in accordance with procedures specified by the operator), following a flight in which the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert, or if any part of the equipment appears not to have functioned correctly.

(vi)Alert thresholds. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings. Criteria: the pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and warnings and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including awareness of the following:

(A)modes associated with basic GPWS, including the input data associated with each; and

(B)visual and aural annunciations that can be issued by TAWS and how to identify which are cautions and which are warnings.

(3)TAWS manoeuvre training. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to respond correctly to TAWS cautions and warnings. This training should address the following topics:

(i)Response to cautions:

(A)Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to cautions. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the need, without delay:

(a)to initiate action required to correct the condition that has caused the TAWS to issue the caution and to be prepared to respond to a warning, if this should follow; and

(b)if a warning does not follow the caution, to notify the controller of the new position, heading and/or altitude/flight level of the aircraft, and what the pilot-in-command intends to do next.

(B)The correct response to a caution might require the pilot to:

(a)reduce a rate of descent and/or to initiate a climb;

(b)regain an ILS glide path from below, or to inhibit a glide path signal if an ILS is not being flown;

(c)select more flap, or to inhibit a flap sensor if the landing is being conducted with the intent that the normal flap setting will not be used;

(d)select gear down; and/or

(e)initiate a turn away from the terrain or obstacle ahead and towards an area free of such obstructions if a forward-looking terrain display indicates that this would be a good solution and the entire manoeuvre can be carried out in clear visual conditions.

(ii)Response to warnings. Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to warnings. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following:

(A)The need, without delay, to initiate a climb in the manner specified by the operator.

(B)The need, without delay, to maintain the climb until visual verification can be made that the aircraft will clear the terrain or obstacle ahead or until above the appropriate sector safe altitude (if certain about the location of the aircraft with respect to terrain) even if the TAWS warning stops. If, subsequently, the aircraft climbs up through the sector safe altitude, but the visibility does not allow the flight crew to confirm that the terrain hazard has ended, checks should be made to verify the location of the aircraft and to confirm that the altimeter subscale settings are correct.

(C)When workload permits that, the flight crew should notify the air traffic controller of the new position and altitude/flight level and what the pilot-in-command intends to do next.

(D)That the manner in which the climb is made should reflect the type of aircraft and the method specified by the aircraft manufacturer (which should be reflected in the operations manual) for performing the escape manoeuvre. Essential aspects will include the need for an increase in pitch attitude, selection of maximum thrust, confirmation that external sources of drag (e.g. spoilers/speed brakes) are retracted and respect of the stick shaker or other indication of eroded stall margin.

(E)That TAWS warnings should never be ignored. However, the pilot’s response may be limited to that which is appropriate for a caution, only if:

(a)the aircraft is being operated by day in clear, visual conditions; and

(b)it is immediately clear to the pilot that the aircraft is in no danger in respect of its configuration, proximity to terrain or current flight path.

(4)TAWS initial evaluation:

(i)The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test.

(ii)The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a flight simulation training device (FSTD) equipped with TAWS visual and aural displays and inhibit selectors similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft that the pilot will fly. The results should be assessed by a flight simulation training instructor, synthetic flight examiner, type rating instructor or type rating examiner.

(iii)The range of scenarios should be designed to give confidence that proper and timely responses to TAWS cautions and warnings will result in the aircraft avoiding a CFIT accident. To achieve this objective, the pilot should demonstrate taking the correct action to prevent a caution developing into a warning and, separately, the escape manoeuvre needed in response to a warning. These demonstrations should take place when the external visibility is zero, though there is much to be learnt if, initially, the training is given in 'mountainous' or 'hilly' terrain with clear visibility. This training should comprise a sequence of scenarios, rather than be included in line orientated flight training (LOFT).

(iv)A record should be made, after the pilot has demonstrated competence, of the scenarios that were practised.

(5)TAWS recurrent training:

(i)TAWS recurrent training ensures that pilots maintain the appropriate TAWS knowledge and skills. In particular, it reminds pilots of the need to act promptly in response to cautions and warnings and of the unusual attitude associated with flying the escape manoeuvre.

(ii)An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to TAWS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique TAWS characteristics of which pilots should be aware.

(6)Reporting procedures:

(i)Verbal reports. Verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit:

(A)whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance;

(B)when, following a manoeuvre that has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aircraft has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or

(C)when an air traffic control unit issues instructions that, if followed, would cause the pilot to manoeuvre the aircraft towards terrain or obstacle or it would appear from the display that a potential CFIT occurrence is likely to result.

(ii)Written reports. Written reports should be submitted in accordance with the operator's occurrence reporting scheme and they should also be recorded in the aircraft technical log:

(A)whenever the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert (false, nuisance or genuine);

(B)whenever a TAWS alert has been issued and is believed to have been false; and/or

(C)if it is believed that a TAWS alert should have been issued, but was not.

(iii)Within this GM, and with regard to reports:

(A)the term 'false' means that the TAWS issued an alert that could not possibly be justified by the position of the aircraft in respect to terrain and it is probable that a fault or failure in the system (equipment and/or input data) was the cause;

(B)the term 'nuisance' means that the TAWS issued an alert that was appropriate, but was not needed because the flight crew could determine by independent means that the flight path was, at that time, safe;

(C)the term 'genuine' means that the TAWS issued an alert that was both appropriate and necessary;

(D)the report terms described above are only meant to be assessed after the occurrence is over, to facilitate subsequent analysis, the adequacy of the equipment and the programmes it contains. The intention is not for the flight crew to attempt to classify an alert into any of these three categories when visual and/or aural cautions or warnings are annunciated.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1199

(a)The operator shall establish operational procedures and training programmes when ACAS is installed and serviceable so that the flight crew is appropriately trained in the avoidance of collisions and competent in the use of ACAS II equipment.

(b)The ACAS II may be disabled during those specialised tasks, which by their nature require the aircraft to be operated within a distance from each other below that which would trigger the ACAS.