ANNEX V (Part-SPA)

SUBPART A: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

Regulation (EU) 2024/1111

(a)The competent authority for the issuing of a specific approval shall be:

(1)for a commercial operator of aeroplanes or helicopters, the authority of the Member State where the operator has its principal place of business;

(2)for a non-commercial operator of aeroplanes or helicopters, the authority of the Member State where the operator has its principal place of business, is established or resides;

(3)for an IAM operator of VTOL-capable aircraft (VCA), the authority of the Member State where the operator has its principal place of business or resides.

(b)Notwithstanding point (a)(2), for a non-commercial operator that uses an aeroplane or a helicopter registered in a third country, the applicable requirements under this Annex for the approval of the following operations shall not apply if that approval is issued by a third-country State of Registry:

(1)performance-based navigation (PBN);

(2)minimum navigation performance specifications (MNPS);

(3)reduced vertical separation minima (RVSM) airspace;

(4)low-visibility operations (LVOs).

ED Decision 2025/010/R

DETERMINING THE PLACE WHERE AN OPERATOR RESIDES

For the purpose of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, the concept of ‘place where the operator resides’ mainly concerns a natural person.

The place where the operator resides is the place where the operator complies with his or her tax obligations.

Several criteria can be used to help determining a person’s place of residence. These include, for example:

(a)the duration of a person’s presence on the territory of the countries concerned;

(b)the person’s family status and ties;

(c)the person’s housing situation and how permanent it is;

(d)the place where the person pursues professional or non-profit activities;

(e)the characteristics of the person’s professional activity; and

(f)the Member State where the person resides for taxation purposes.

Regulation (EU) No 71/2014

(a)The operator applying for the initial issue of a specific approval shall provide to the competent authority the documentation required in the applicable Subpart, together with the following information:

(1)the name, address and mailing address of the applicant;

(2)a description of the intended operation.

(b)The operator shall provide the following evidence to the competent authority:

(1)compliance with the requirements of the applicable Subpart;

(2)that the relevant elements defined in the mandatory part of the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 are taken into account.

(c)The operator shall retain records relating to (a) and (b) at least for the duration of the operation requiring a specific approval, or, if applicable, in accordance with Annex III (Part-ORO).

ED Decision 2013/020/R

DOCUMENTATION

(a)Operating procedures should be documented in the operations manual.

(b)If an operations manual is not required, operating procedures may be described in a manual specifying procedures (procedures manual). If the aircraft flight manual (AFM) or the pilot operating handbook (POH) contains such procedures, they should be considered as acceptable means to document the procedures.

Regulation (EU) No 800/2013

The scope of the activity that an operator is approved to conduct shall be documented and specified:

(a)for operators holding an air operator certificate (AOC) in the operations specifications to the AOC;

(b)for all other operators in the list of specific approvals.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

When the conditions of a specific approval are affected by changes, the operator shall provide the relevant documentation to the competent authority and obtain prior approval for the operation.

Regulation (EU) No 71/2014

Specific approvals shall be issued for an unlimited duration and shall remain valid subject to the operator remaining in compliance with the requirements associated with the specific approval and taking into account the relevant elements defined in the mandatory part of the operational suitability data established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012.

SUBPART B: PERFORMANCE-BASED NAVIGATION (PBN) OPERATIONS

Regulation (EU) 2016/1199

(a)An approval is required for each of the following PBN specifications:

(1)RNP AR APCH; and

(2)RNP 0.3 for helicopter operation.

(b)An approval for RNP AR APCH operations shall allow operations on public instrument approach procedures which meet the applicable ICAO procedure design criteria.

(c)A procedure-specific approval for RNP AR APCH or RNP 0.3 shall be required for private instrument approach procedures or any public instrument approach procedure that does not meet the applicable ICAO procedure design criteria, or where required by the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) or the competent authority.

ED Decision 2016/020/R

GENERAL

(a)PBN operations are based on performance requirements, which are expressed in navigation specifications (RNAV specification and RNP specification) in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity, availability and functionality needed for the proposed operation in the context of a particular airspace concept.

Table 1 provides a simplified overview of:

(1)PBN specifications and their applicability for different phases of flight; and

(2)PBN specifications requiring a specific approval.

(b)More detailed guidance material for the operational use of PBN applications can be found in ICAO Doc 9613 Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Manual.

(c)Guidance material for the design of RNP AR APCH procedures can be found in ICAO Doc 9905 RNP AR Procedure Design Manual.

(d)Guidance material for the operational approval of PBN operations can be found in ICAO Doc 9997 Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Operational Approval Manual.

Table 1: Overview of PBN specifications

Numbers specify the accuracy level

Regulation (EU) 2016/1199

To obtain a PBN specific approval from the competent authority, the operator shall provide evidence that:

(a)the relevant airworthiness approval, suitable for the intended PBN operation, is stated in the AFM or other document that has been approved by the certifying authority as part of an airworthiness assessment or is based on such approval;

(b)a training programme for the flight crew members and relevant personnel involved in the flight preparation has been established;

(c)a safety assessment has been carried out;

(d)operating procedures have been established specifying:

(1)the equipment to be carried, including its operating limitations and appropriate entries in the minimum equipment list (MEL);

(2)flight crew composition, qualification and experience;

(3)normal, abnormal and contingency procedures; and

(4)electronic navigation data management;

(e)a list of reportable events has been specified; and

(f)a management RNP monitoring programme has been established for RNP AR APCH operations, if applicable.

ED Decision 2016/020/R

FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS — GENERAL PROVISIONS

(a)The operator should ensure that flight crew members training programmes for RNP AR APCH include structured courses of ground and FSTD training.

(1)Flight crew members with no RNP AR APCH experience should complete the full training programme prescribed in (b), (c), and (d) below.

(2)Flight crew members with RNP AR APCH experience with another EU operator may undertake an:

(i)abbreviated ground training course if operating a different type or class from that on which the previous RNP AR experience was gained;

(ii)abbreviated ground and FSTD training course if operating the same type or class and variant of the same type or class on which the previous RNP. AR experience was gained.

(iii)the abbreviated course should include at least the provisions of (d)(1), (c)(1) and (c)(2)(x) as appropriate.

(iv)The operator may reduce the number of approaches/landings required by (c)(2)(xii) if the type/class or the variant of the type or class has the same or similar:

(A)level of technology (flight guidance system (FGS));

(B)operating procedures for navigation performance monitoring; and

(C)handling characteristics

as the previously operated type or class.

(3)Flight crew members with RNP AR APCH experience with the operator may undertake an abbreviated ground and FSTD training course:

(i)when changing aircraft type or class, the abbreviated course should include at least the provisions of (d)(1), (c)(1), (c)(2);

(ii)when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has the same or similar of all of the following:

(A)level of technology (flight guidance system (FGS));

(B)operating procedures for navigation performance monitoring; and

(C)handling characteristics

as the previously operated type or class.

A difference course or familiarisation appropriate to the change of variant should fulfil the abbreviated course provisions.

(iii)when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has significantly different at least one of the following:

(A)level of technology (FGS);

(B)operating procedures for navigation performance monitoring; and

(C)handling characteristics,

the provisions of (c)(1) and (c)(2) should be fulfilled.

(4)The operator should ensure when undertaking RNP AR APCH operations with different variant(s) of aircraft within the same type or class rating, that the differences and/or similarities of the aircraft concerned justify such operations, taking into account at least the following:

(i)the level of technology, including the:

(A)FGS and associated displays and controls;

(B)FMS and its integration or not with the FGS; and

(C)on-board performance monitoring and alerting (OBPMA) system;

(ii)operating procedures, including:

(A)navigation performance monitoring;

(B)approach interruption and missed approach including while in turn along an RF leg;

(C)abnormal procedures in case of loss of system redundancy affecting the guidance or the navigation; and

(D)abnormal and contingency procedures in case of total loss of RNP capability; and

(iii)handling characteristics, including:

(A)manual approach with RF leg;

(B)manual landing from automatic guided approach; and

(C)manual missed approach procedure from automatic approach.

(b)Ground training

(1)Ground training for RNP AR APCH should address the following subjects during the initial introduction of a flight crew member to RNP AR APCH systems and operations. For recurrent programmes, the curriculum need only review initial curriculum items and address new, revised, or emphasised items.

(2)General concepts of RNP AR APCH operation

(i)RNP AR APCH training should cover RNP AR APCH systems theory to the extent appropriate to ensure proper operational use. Flight crew members should understand basic concepts of RNP AR APCH systems, operation, classifications, and limitations.

(ii)The training should include general knowledge and operational application of RNP AR APCH instrument approach procedures. This training module should in particular address the following specific elements:

(A)the definitions of RNAV, RNP, RNP APCH, RNP AR APCH, RAIM, and containment areas;

(B)the differences between RNP AR APCH and RNP APCH;

(C)the types of RNP AR APCH procedures and familiarity with the charting of these procedures;

(D)the programming and display of RNP and aircraft specific displays, e.g. actual navigation performance;

(E)the methods to enable and disable the navigation updating modes related to RNP;

(F)the RNP values appropriate for different phases of flight and RNP AR APCH instrument procedures and how to select, if necessary;

(G)the use of GNSS RAIM (or equivalent) forecasts and the effects of RAIM ‘holes’ on RNP AR APCH procedures availability;

(H)when and how to terminate RNP navigation and transfer to conventional navigation due to loss of RNP and/or required equipment;

(I)the method to determine if the navigation database is current and contains required navigational data;

(J)the explanation of the different components that contribute to the total system error and their characteristics, e.g. drift characteristics when using IRU with no radio updating, QNH mistakes;

(K)the temperature compensation: Flight crew members operating avionics systems with compensation for altimetry errors introduced by deviations from ISA may disregard the temperature limits on RNP AR APCH procedures if flight crew training on use of the temperature compensation function is provided by the operator and the compensation function is utilised by the crew. However, the training should also recognise if the temperature compensation by the system is applicable to the VNAV guidance and is not a substitute for the flight crew compensating for the temperature effects on minimum altitudes or the DA/H;

(L)the effect of wind on aircraft performance during RNP AR APCH operations and the need to positively remain within RNP containment area, including any operational wind limitation and aircraft configuration essential to safely complete an RNP AR APCH operation;

(M)the effect of groundspeed on compliance with RNP AR APCH procedures and bank angle restrictions that may impact on the ability to remain on the course centreline. For RNP procedures, aircraft are expected to maintain the standard speeds associated with the applicable category unless more stringent constraints are published;

(N)the relationship between RNP and the appropriate approach minima line on an approved published RNP AR APCH procedure and any operational limitations if the available RNP degrades or is not available prior to an approach (this should include flight crew operating procedures outside the FAF versus inside the FAF);

(O)understanding alerts that may occur from the loading and use of improper RNP values for a desired segment of an RNP AR APCH procedure;

(P)understanding the performance requirement to couple the autopilot/flight director to the navigation system’s lateral guidance on RNP AR APCH procedures requiring an RNP of less than RNP 0.3;

(Q)the events that trigger a missed approach when using the aircraft’s RNP capability to complete an RNP AR APCH procedure;

(R)any bank angle restrictions or limitations on RNP AR APCH procedures;

(S)ensuring flight crew members understand the performance issues associated with reversion to radio updating, know any limitations on the use of DME and VOR updating; and

(T)the familiarisation with the terrain and obstacles representations on navigation displays and approach charts.

(3)ATC communication and coordination for use of RNP AR APCH

(i)Ground training should instruct flight crew members on proper flight plan classifications and any ATC procedures applicable to RNP AR APCH operations.

(ii)Flight crew members should receive instruction on the need to advise ATC immediately when the performance of the aircraft’s navigation system is no longer adequate to support continuation of an RNP AR APCH operation.

(4)RNP AR APCH equipment components, controls, displays, and alerts

(i)Theoretical training should include discussion of RNP terminology, symbology, operation, optional controls, and display features, including any items unique to an operator’s implementation or systems. The training should address applicable failure alerts and limitations.

(ii)Flight crew members should achieve a thorough understanding of the equipment used in RNP operations and any limitations on the use of the equipment during those operations.

(iii)Flight crew members should also know what navigation sensors form the basis for their RNP AR APCH compliance, and they should be able to assess the impact of failure of any avionics or a known loss of ground systems on the remainder of the flight plan.

(5)AFM information and operating procedures

(i)Based on the AFM or other aircraft eligibility evidence, the flight crew should address normal and abnormal operating procedures, responses to failure alerts, and any limitations, including related information on RNP modes of operation.

(ii)Training should also address contingency procedures for loss or degradation of the RNP AR APCH capability.

(iii)The manuals used by the flight should contain this information.

(6)MEL operating provisions

(i)Flight crew members should have a thorough understanding of the MEL entries supporting RNP AR APCH operations.

(c)Initial FSTD training

(1)In addition to ground training, flight crew members should receive appropriate practical skill training in an FSTD.

(i)Training programmes should cover the proper execution of RNP AR APCH operations in compliance with the manufacturer’s documentation.

(ii)The training should include:

(A)RNP AR APCH procedures and limitations;

(B)standardisation of the set-up of the cockpit’s electronic displays during an RNP AR APCH operation;

(C)recognition of the aural advisories, alerts and other annunciations that can impact on compliance with an RNP AR APCH procedure; and

(D)the timely and correct responses to loss of RNP AR APCH capability in a variety of scenarios embracing the breadth of the RNP AR APCH procedures the operator plans to complete.

(2)FSTD training should address the following specific elements:

(i)procedures for verifying that each flight crew member’s altimeter has the current setting before commencing the final approach of an RNP AR APCH operation, including any operational limitations associated with the source(s) for the altimeter setting and the latency of checking and setting the altimeters for landing;

(ii)use of aircraft RADAR, TAWS or other avionics systems to support the flight crew’s track monitoring and weather and obstacle avoidance;

(iii)concise and complete flight crew briefings for all RNP AR APCH procedures and the important role crew resource management (CRM) plays in successfully completing an RNP AR APCH operation;

(iv)the importance of aircraft configuration to ensure the aircraft maintains any mandated speeds during RNP AR APCH operations;

(v)the potentially detrimental effect of reducing the flap setting, reducing the bank angle or increasing airspeeds may have on the ability to comply with an RNP AR APCH operation;

(vi)flight crew members understand and are capable of programming and/or operating the FMC, autopilot, autothrottles, RADAR, GNSS, INS, EFIS (including the moving map), and TAWS in support of RNP AR APCH operations;

(vii)handling of TOGA to LNAV transition as applicable, particularly while in turn;

(viii)monitoring of flight technical error (FTE) and related go-around operation;

(ix)handling of loss of GNSS signals during a procedure;

(x)handling of engine failure during the approach operation;

(xi)applying contingency procedures for a loss of RNP capability during a missed approach. Due to the lack of navigation guidance, the training should emphasise the flight crew contingency actions that achieve separation from terrain and obstacles. The operator should tailor these contingency procedures to their specific RNP AR APCH procedures; and

(xii)as a minimum, each flight crew member should complete two RNP approach procedures for each duty position (pilot flying and pilot monitoring) that employ the unique RNP AR APCH characteristics of the operator’s RNP AR APCH procedures (e.g. RF legs, missed approach). One procedure should culminate in a transition to landing and one procedure should culminate in execution of an RNP missed approach procedure.

FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS — CONVERSION TRAINING

(d)Flight crew members should complete the following RNP AR APCH training if converting to a new type or class or variant of aircraft in which RNP AR operations will be conducted. For abbreviated courses, the provisions prescribed in (a)(2), (a)(3) and (a)(4) should apply.

(1)Ground training

Taking into account the flight crew member's RNP AR APCH previous training and experience, flight crew members should undertake an abbreviated ground training that should include at least the provisions of (b)(2)(D) to (I), (b)((2)(N) to (R), (b)(2)(S), and (b)(3) to (6).

(2)FSTD training

The provisions prescribed in (a) should apply, taking into account the flight crew member's RNP AR APCH training and experience.

FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS — RNP AR APCH PROCEDURES REQUIRING A PROCEDURE-SPECIFIC APPROVAL

(e)Before starting an RNP AR APCH procedure for which a procedure-specific approval is required, flight crew members should undertake additional ground training and FSTD training, as appropriate.

(1)The operator should ensure that the additional training programmes for such procedures include as at least all of the following:

(i)the provisions of (c)(1), (c)(2)(x) as appropriate and customised to the intended operation;

(ii)the crew training recommendations and mitigations stated in the procedure flight operational safety assessment (FOSA); and

(iii)specific training and operational provision published in the AIP, where applicable.

(2)Flight crew members with prior experience of RNP AR APCH procedures for which a procedure-specific approval is required may receive credit for all or part of these provisions provided the current operator’s RNP AR APCH procedures are similar and require no new pilot skills to be trained in an FSTD.

(3)Training and checking may be combined and conducted by the same person with regard to (f)(2).

(4)In case of a first RNP AR APCH application targeting directly RNP AR APCH procedures requiring procedure-specific approvals, a combined initial and additional training and checking, as appropriate, should be acceptable provided the training and checking includes all provisions prescribed by (a), (b), (c), (d) as appropriate, (e) and (f).

FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS — CHECKING OF RNP AR APCH KNOWLEDGE

(f)Initial checking of RNP AR APCH knowledge and procedures

(1)The operator should check flight crew members’ knowledge of RNP AR APCH procedures prior to employing RNP AR APCH operations. As a minimum, the check should include a thorough review of flight crew procedures and specific aircraft performance requirements for RNP AR APCH operations.

(2)The initial check should include one of the following:

(i)A check by an examiner using an FSTD.

(ii)A check by a TRE, CRE, SFE or a commander nominated by the operator during LPCs, OPCs or line flights that incorporate RNP AR APCH operations that employ the unique RNP AR APCH characteristics of the operator’s RNP AR APCH procedures.

(iii)Line-oriented flight training (LOFT)/line-oriented evaluation (LOE). LOFT/LOE programmes using an FSTD that incorporates RNP AR APCH operations that employ the unique RNP AR APCH characteristics (i.e. RF legs, RNP missed approach) of the operator’s RNP AR APCH procedures.

(3)Specific elements that should be addressed are:

(i)demonstration of the use of any RNP AR APCH limits/minimums that may impact various RNP AR APCH operations;

(ii)demonstration of the application of radio-updating procedures, such as enabling and disabling ground-based radio updating of the FMC (e.g. DME/DME and VOR/DME updating) and knowledge of when to use this feature;

(iii)demonstration of the ability to monitor the actual lateral and vertical flight paths relative to programmed flight path and complete the appropriate flight crew procedures when exceeding a lateral or vertical FTE limit;

(iv)demonstration of the ability to read and adapt to a RAIM (or equivalent) forecast, including forecasts predicting a lack of RAIM availability;

(v)demonstration of the proper set-up of the FMC, the weather RADAR, TAWS, and moving map for the various RNP AR APCH operations and scenarios the operator plans to implement;

(vi)demonstration of the use of flight crew briefings and checklists for RNP AR APCH operations with emphasis on CRM;

(vii)demonstration of knowledge of and ability to perform an RNP AR APCH missed approach procedure in a variety of operational scenarios (i.e. loss of navigation or failure to acquire visual conditions);

(viii)demonstration of speed control during segments requiring speed restrictions to ensure compliance with an RNP AR APCH procedure;

(ix)demonstration of competent use of RNP AR APCH plates, briefing cards, and checklists;

(x)demonstration of the ability to complete a stable RNP AR APCH operation: bank angle, speed control, and remaining on the procedure’s centreline; and

(xi)knowledge of the operational limit for deviation from the desired flight path and of how to accurately monitor the aircraft’s position relative to vertical flight path.

FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS — RECURRENT TRAINING

(g)The operator should incorporate recurrent training that employs the unique RNP AR APCH characteristics of the operator’s RNP AR APCH procedures as part of the overall training programme.

(1)A minimum of two RNP AR APCH should be flown by each flight crew member, one for each duty position (pilot flying and pilot monitoring), with one culminating in a landing and one culminating in a missed approach, and may be substituted for any required 3D approach operation.

(2)In case of several procedure-specific RNP AR APCH approvals, the recurrent training should focus on the most demanding RNP AR APCH procedures giving credit on the less demanding ones.

TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE FLIGHT PREPARATION

(h)The operator should ensure that training for flight operation officers/dispatchers should include:

(1)the different types of RNP AR APCH procedures;

(2)the importance of specific navigation equipment and other equipment during RNP AR APCH operations and related RNP AR APCH requirements and operating procedures;

(3)the operator’s RNP AR APCH approvals;

(4)MEL requirements;

(5)aircraft performance, and navigation signal availability, e.g. GNSS RAIM/predictive RNP capability tool, for destination and alternate aerodromes.

ED Decision 2016/020/R

FLIGHT OPERATIONAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT (FOSA)

(a)For each RNP AR APCH procedure, the operator should conduct a flight operational safety assessment (FOSA) proportionate to the complexity of the procedure.

(b)The FOSA should be based on:

(1)restrictions and recommendations published in AIPs;

(2)the flyability check;

(3)an assessment of the operational environment;

(4)the demonstrated navigation performance of the aircraft; and

(5)the operational aircraft performance.

(c)The operator may take credit from key elements from the safety assessment carried out by the ANSP or the aerodrome operator.

ED Decision 2016/020/R

FLIGHT OPERATIONAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT (FOSA)

(a)Traditionally, operational safety has been defined by a target level of safety (TLS) and specified as a risk of collision of 10-7 per approach operation. For RNP AR APCH operations, conducting the FOSA methodology contributes to achieving the TLS. The FOSA is intended to provide a level of flight safety that is equivalent to the traditional TLS, but using methodology oriented to performance-based flight operations. Using the FOSA, the operational safety objective is met by considering more than the aircraft navigation system alone. The FOSA blends quantitative and qualitative analyses and assessments by considering navigation systems, aircraft performance, operating procedures, human factor aspects and the operational environment. During these assessments conducted under normal and failure conditions, hazards, risks and the associated mitigations are identified. The FOSA relies on the detailed criteria for the aircraft capabilities and instrument procedure design to address the majority of general technical, procedure and process factors. Additionally, technical and operational expertise and prior operator experience with RNP AR APCH operations are essential elements to be considered in the conduct and conclusion of the FOSA.

(b)The following aspects need to be considered during FOSA, in order to identify hazards, risks and mitigations relevant to RNP AR APCH operations:

(1)Normal performance: lateral and vertical accuracy are addressed in the aircraft airworthiness standards, aircraft and systems operate normally in standard configurations and operating modes, and individual error components are monitored/truncated through system design or flight crew procedure.

(2)Performance under failure conditions: lateral and vertical accuracy are evaluated for aircraft failures as part of the aircraft certification. Additionally, other rare-normal and abnormal failures and conditions for ATC operations, flight crew procedures, infrastructure and operating environment are assessed. Where the failure or condition results are not acceptable for continued operation, mitigations are developed or limitations established for the aircraft, flight crew and/or operation.

(3)Aircraft failures

(i)System failure: Failure of a navigation system, flight guidance system, flight instrument system for the approach, or missed approach (e.g. loss of GNSS updating, receiver failure, autopilot disconnect, FMS failure, etc.). Depending on the aircraft, this may be addressed through aircraft design or operating procedure to cross-check guidance (e.g. dual equipage for lateral errors, use of terrain awareness and warning system).

(ii)Malfunction of air data system or altimetry: flight crew procedure cross-check between two independent systems may mitigate this risk.

(4)Aircraft performance

(i)Inadequate performance to conduct the approach operation: the aircraft capabilities and operating procedures ensure that the performance is adequate on each approach, as part of flight planning and in order to begin or continue the approach. Consideration should be given to aircraft configuration during approach and any configuration changes associated with a missed approach operation (e.g. engine failure, flap retraction, re-engagement of autopilot in LNAV mode).

(ii)Loss of engine: loss of an engine while on an RNP AR APCH operation is a rare occurrence due to high engine reliability and the short exposure time. The operator needs to take appropriate action to mitigate the effects of loss of engine, initiating a go-around and manually taking control of the aircraft if necessary.

(5)Navigation services

(i)Use of a navigation aid outside of designated coverage or in test mode: aircraft airworthiness standards and operating procedures have been developed to address this risk.

(ii)Navigation database errors: instrument approach procedures are validated through flight validation specific to the operator and aircraft, and the operator should have a process defined to maintain validated data through updates to the navigation database.

(6)ATC operations

(i)Procedure assigned to non-approved aircraft: flight crew are responsible for rejecting the clearance.

(ii)ATC provides ‘direct to’ clearance to or vectors aircraft onto approach such that performance cannot be achieved.

(iii)Inconsistent ATC phraseology between controller and flight crew.

(7)Flight crew operations

(i)Erroneous barometric altimeter setting: flight crew entry and cross-check procedures may mitigate this risk.

(ii)Incorrect procedure selection or loading: flight crew procedures should be available to verify that the loaded procedure matches the published procedure, line of minima and aircraft airworthiness qualification.

(iii)Incorrect flight control mode selected: training on importance of flight control mode, flight crew procedure to verify selection of correct flight control mode.

(iv)Incorrect RNP entry: flight crew procedure to verify RNP loaded in system matches the published value.

(v)Missed approach: balked landing or rejected landing at or below DA/H.

(vi)Poor meteorological conditions: loss or significant reduction of visual reference that may result in a go-around.

(8)Infrastructure (i)GNSS satellite failure: this condition is evaluated during aircraft qualification to ensure obstacle clearance can be maintained, considering the low likelihood of this failure occurring.

(ii)Loss of GNSS signals: relevant independent equipage, e.g. IRS/INS, is mandated for RNP AR APCH procedures with RF legs and approaches where the accuracy for the missed approach is less than 1 NM. For other approaches, operating procedures are used to approximate the published track and climb above obstacles.

(iii)Testing of ground navigation aids in the vicinity of the approach: aircraft and operating procedures should detect and mitigate this event.

(9)Operating conditions

(i)Tailwind conditions: excessive speed on RF legs may result in inability to maintain track. This is addressed through aircraft airworthiness standards on the limits of command guidance, inclusion of 5 degrees of bank manoeuvrability margin, consideration of speed effect and flight crew procedure to maintain speeds below the maximum authorised for the RNP AR APCH procedure.

(ii)Wind conditions and effect on FTE: nominal FTE is evaluated under a variety of wind conditions, and flight crew procedures to monitor and limit deviations to ensure safe operation.

(iii)Extreme temperature effects of barometric altitude (e.g. extreme cold temperatures, known local atmospheric or weather phenomena, high winds, severe turbulence, etc.): the effect of this error on the vertical path is mitigated through the procedure design and flight crew procedures, with an allowance for aircraft that compensate for this effect to conduct procedures regardless of the published temperature limit. The effect of this error on minimum segment altitudes and the DA/H are addressed in an equivalent manner to all other approach operations.

ED Decision 2016/020/R

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RNP AR APCH

(a)MEL

(1)The operator’s MEL should be developed/revised to address the equipment provisions for RNP AR APCH operations.

(2)An operational TAWS Class A should be available for all RNP AR APCH operations. The TAWS should use altitude values that are compensated for local pressure and temperature effects (e.g. corrected barometric and GNSS altitude), and include significant terrain and obstacle data.

(b)Autopilot and flight director

(1)For RNP AR APCH operations with RNP values less than RNP 0.3 or with RF legs, the autopilot or flight director driven by the area navigation system should be used. Thus, the flight crew should check that the autopilot/flight director is installed and operational.

(c)Preflight RNP assessment

(1)The operator should have a predictive performance capability, which can determine if the specified RNP will be available at the time and location of a desired RNP operation. This capability can be a ground service and need not be resident in the aircraft’s avionics equipment. The operator should establish procedures requiring use of this capability as both a preflight preparation tool and as a flight-following tool in the event of reported failures.

(2)This predictive capability should account for known and predicted outages of GNSS satellites or other impacts on the navigation system’s sensors. The prediction programme should not use a mask angle below 5 degrees, as operational experience indicates that satellite signals at low elevations are not reliable. The prediction should use the actual GNSS constellation with the RAIM (or equivalent) algorithm identical to or more conservative than that used in the actual equipment.

(3)The RNP assessment should consider the specific combination of the aircraft capability (sensors and integration), as well as their availability.

(d)NAVAID exclusion

(1)The operator should establish procedures to exclude NAVAID facilities in accordance with NOTAMs (e.g. DMEs, VORs, localisers). Internal avionics reasonableness checks may not be adequate for RNP operations.

(e)Navigation database currency

(1)During system initialisation, the flight crew should confirm that the navigation database is current. Navigation databases should be current for the duration of the flight. If the AIRAC cycle is due to change during flight, the flight crew should follow procedures established by the operator to ensure the accuracy of navigation data.

(2)The operator should not allow the flight crew to use an expired database.

ED Decision 2016/020/R

FLIGHT CONSIDERATIONS

(a)Modification of flight plan

The flight crew should not be authorised to fly a published RNP AR APCH procedure unless it is retrievable by the procedure name from the aircraft navigation database and conforms to the charted procedure. The lateral path should not be modified; with the exception of accepting a clearance to go direct to a fix in the approach procedure that is before the FAF and that does not immediately precede an RF leg. The only other acceptable modification to the loaded procedure is to change altitude and/or airspeed waypoint constraints on the initial, intermediate, or missed approach segments flight plan fixes (e.g. to apply temperature corrections or comply with an ATC clearance/instruction).

(b)Mandatory equipment

The flight crew should have either a mandatory list of equipment for conducting RNP AR APCH operations or alternate methods to address in-flight equipment failures that would prohibit RNP AR APCH operations (e.g. crew warning systems, quick reference handbook).

(c)RNP management

Operating procedures should ensure that the navigation system uses the appropriate RNP values throughout the approach operation. If the navigation system does not extract and set the navigation accuracy from the on-board navigation database for each segment of the procedure, then operating procedures should ensure that the smallest navigation accuracy required to complete the approach or the missed approach is selected before initiating the approach operation (e.g. before the IAF). Different IAFs may have different navigation accuracy, which are annotated on the approach chart.

(d)Loss of RNP

The flight crew should ensure that no loss of RNP annunciation is received prior to commencing the RNP AR APCH operation. During the approach operation, if at any time a loss of RNP annunciation is received, the flight crew should abandon the RNP AR APCH operation unless the pilot has in sight the visual references required to continue the approach operation.

(e)Radio updating

Initiation of all RNP AR APCH procedures is based on GNSS updating. The flight crew should comply with the operator’s procedures for inhibiting specific facilities.

(f)Approach procedure confirmation

The flight crew should confirm that the correct procedure has been selected. This process includes confirmation of the waypoint sequence, reasonableness of track angles and distances, and any other parameters that can be altered by the flight crew, such as altitude or speed constraints. A navigation system textual display or navigation map display should be used.

(g)Track deviation monitoring

(1)The flight crew should use a lateral deviation indicator, flight director and/or autopilot in lateral navigation mode on RNP AR APCH operations. The flight crew of an aircraft with a lateral deviation indicator should ensure that lateral deviation indicator scaling (full-scale deflection) is suitable for the navigation accuracy associated with the various segments of the RNP AR APCH procedure. The flight crew is expected to maintain procedure centrelines, as depicted by on-board lateral deviation indicators and/or flight guidance during the entire RNP AR APCH operations unless authorised to deviate by ATC or demanded under emergency conditions. For normal operations, cross-track error/deviation (the difference between the area-navigation-system-computed path and the aircraft position relative to the path) should be limited to the navigation accuracy (RNP) associated with the procedure segment.

(2)Vertical deviation should be monitored above and below the glide-path; the vertical deviation should be within ±75 ft of the glide-path during the final approach segment.

(3)Flight crew should execute a missed approach operation if:

(i)the lateral deviation exceeds one time the RNP value; or

(ii)the deviation below the vertical path exceeds 75 ft or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, at any time; or

(iii)the deviation above the vertical path exceeds 75 ft or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated; at or below 1 000 ft above aerodrome level;

unless the pilot has in sight the visual references required to continue the approach operation.

(4)Where a moving map, low-resolution vertical deviation indicator (VDI), or numeric display of deviations are to be used, flight crew training and procedures should ensure the effectiveness of these displays. Typically, this involves demonstration of the procedure with a number of trained flight crew members and inclusion of this monitoring procedure in the recurrent RNP AR APCH training programme.

(5)For installations that use a CDI for lateral path tracking, the AFM should state which navigation accuracy and operations the aircraft supports and the operational effects on the CDI scale. The flight crew should know the CDI full-scale deflection value. The avionics may automatically set the CDI scale (dependent on phase of flight) or the flight crew may manually set the scale. If the flight crew manually selects the CDI scale, the operator should have procedures and training in place to assure the selected CDI scale is appropriate for the intended RNP operation. The deviation limit should be readily apparent given the scale (e.g. full-scale deflection).

(h)System cross-check

(1)The flight crew should ensure the lateral and vertical guidance provided by the navigation system is consistent.

(i)Procedures with RF legs

(1)When initiating a missed approach operation during or shortly after the RF leg, the flight crew should be aware of the importance of maintaining the published path as closely as possible. Operating procedures should be provided for aircraft that do not stay in LNAV when a missed approach is initiated to ensure the RNP AR APCH ground track is maintained.

(2)The flight crew should not exceed the maximum airspeed values shown in Table 1 throughout the RF leg. For example, a Category C A320 should slow to 160 KIAS at the FAF or may fly as fast as 185 KIAS if using Category D minima. A missed approach operation prior to DA/H may require compliance with speed limitation for that segment.

Table 1: Maximum airspeed by segment and category

* Airspeed restrictions may be used to reduce turn radius regardless of aircraft category.

(j)Temperature compensation

For aircraft with temperature compensation capabilities, the flight crew may disregard the temperature limits on RNP procedures if the operator provides pilot training on the use of the temperature compensation function. It should be noted that a temperature compensation by the system is applicable to the VNAV guidance and is not a substitute for the flight crew compensating for temperature effects on minimum altitudes or DA/H. The flight crew should be familiar with the effects of the temperature compensation on intercepting the compensated path as described in EUROCAE ED-75C/RTCA DO-236C Appendix H.

(k)Altimeter setting

Due to the performance-based obstruction clearance inherent in RNP instrument procedures, the flight crew should verify that the most current aerodrome altimeter is set prior to the FAF. The operator should take precautions to switch altimeter settings at appropriate times or locations and request a current altimeter setting if the reported setting may not be recent, particularly at times when pressure is reported or expected to be rapidly decreasing. Execution of an RNP operation necessitates the current altimeter setting for the aerodrome of intended landing. Remote altimeter settings should not be allowed.

(l)Altimeter cross-check

(1)The flight crew should complete an altimetry cross-check ensuring both pilots’ altimeters agree within ±100 ft prior to the FAF but no earlier than when the altimeters are set for the aerodrome of intended landing. If the altimetry cross-check fails, then the approach operation should not be continued.

(2)This operational cross-check should not be necessary if the aircraft systems automatically compare the altitudes to within 75 ft.

(m)Missed approach operation

Where possible, the missed approach operation should necessitate RNP 1.0. The missed approach portion of these procedures should be similar to a missed approach of an RNP APCH procedure. Where necessary, navigation accuracy less than RNP 1.0 may be used in the missed approach segment.

(1)In many aircraft, executing a missed approach activating take-off/go-around (TOGA) may cause a change in lateral navigation. In many aircraft, activating TOGA disengages the autopilot and flight director from LNAV guidance, and the flight director reverts to track-hold derived from the inertial system. LNAV guidance to the autopilot and flight director should be re-engaged as quickly as possible.

(2)Flight crew procedures and training should address the impact on navigation capability and flight guidance if the pilot initiates a missed approach while the aircraft is in a turn. When initiating an early missed approach operation, the flight crew should follow the rest of the approach track and missed approach track unless a different clearance has been issued by ATC. The flight crew should also be aware that RF legs are designed based on the maximum true airspeed at normal altitudes, and initiating an early missed approach operation will reduce the manoeuvrability margin and potentially even make holding the turn impractical at missed approach speeds.

(n)Contingency procedures

(1)Failure while en route

The flight crew should be able to assess the impact of GNSS equipment failure on the anticipated RNP AR APCH operation and take appropriate action.

(2)Failure on approach

The operator’s contingency procedures should address at least the following conditions:

(i)failure of the area navigation system components, including those affecting lateral and vertical deviation performance (e.g. failures of a GPS sensor, the flight director or autopilot);

(ii)loss of navigation signal-in-space (loss or degradation of external signal).

ED Decision 2016/020/R

NAVIGATION DATABASE MANAGEMENT

(a)The operator should validate every RNP AR APCH procedure before using the procedure in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) to ensure compatibility with their aircraft and to ensure the resulting path matches the published procedure. As a minimum, the operator should:

(1)compare the navigation data for the procedure(s) to be loaded into the FMS with the published procedure.

(2)validate the loaded navigation data for the procedure, either in an FSTD or in the actual aircraft in VMC. The depicted procedure on the map display should be compared to the published procedure. The entire procedure should be flown to ensure the path is flyable, does not have any apparent lateral or vertical path disconnects and is consistent with the published procedure.

(3)Once the procedure is validated, a copy of the validated navigation data should be retained for comparison with subsequent data updates.

(4)For published procedures, where FOSA demonstrated that the procedure is not in a challenging operational environment, the flight or FSTD validation may be credited from already validated equivalent RNP AR APCH procedures.

(b)If an aircraft system required for RNP AR APCH operations is modified, the operator should assess the need for a validation of the RNP AR APCH procedures with the navigation database and the modified system. This may be accomplished without any direct evaluation if the manufacturer verifies that the modification has no effect on the navigation database or path computation. If no such assurance from the manufacturer is available, the operator should conduct initial data validation with the modified system.

(c)The operator should implement procedures that ensure timely distribution and insertion of current and unaltered electronic navigation data to all aircraft that require it.

ED Decision 2016/020/R

REPORTABLE EVENTS

The operator should report events which are listed in AMC2 ORO.GEN.160.

ED Decision 2016/020/R

RNP MONITORING PROGRAMME

(a)The operator approved to conduct RNP AR APCH operations, should have an RNP monitoring programme to ensure continued compliance with applicable rules and to identify any negative trends in performance.

(b)During an interim approval period, which should be at least 90 days, the operator should at least submit the following information every 30 days to the competent authority.

(1)Total number of RNP AR APCH operations conducted;

(2)Number of approach operations by aircraft/system which were completed as planned without any navigation or guidance system anomalies;

(3)Reasons for unsatisfactory approaches, such as:

(i)UNABLE REQ NAV PERF, NAV ACCUR DOWNGRAD, or other RNP messages during approaches;

(ii)excessive lateral or vertical deviation;

(iii)TAWS warning;

(iv)autopilot system disconnect;

(v)navigation data errors; or

(vi)flight crew reports of any anomaly;

(4)Flight crew comments.

(c)Thereafter, the operator should continue to collect and periodically review this data to identify potential safety concerns, and maintain summaries of this data.

SUBPART C: OPERATIONS WITH SPECIFIED MINIMUM NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE (MNPS)

Regulation (EU) 2024/1111

Aeroplanes and helicopters shall only be operated in designated minimum navigation performance specifications (MNPS) airspace in accordance with regional supplementary procedures, where MNPS are established, if the operator has been granted an approval by the competent authority to conduct such operations.

ED Decision 2012/019/R

DOCUMENTATION

MNPS and the procedures governing their application are published in the Regional Supplementary Procedures, ICAO Doc 7030, as well as in national AIPs.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

To obtain an MNPS operational approval from the competent authority, the operator shall provide evidence that:

(a)the navigation equipment meets the required performance;

(b)navigation displays, indicators and controls are visible and operable by either pilot seated at his/her duty station;

(c)a training programme for the flight crew members involved in these operations has been established;

(d)operating procedures have been established specifying:

(1)the equipment to be carried, including its operating limitations and appropriate entries in the MEL;

(2)flight crew composition and experience requirements;

(3)normal procedures;

(4)contingency procedures including those specified by the authority responsible for the airspace concerned;

(5)monitoring and incident reporting.

ED Decision 2012/019/R

LONG RANGE NAVIGATION SYSTEM (LRNS)

(a)For unrestricted operation in MNPS airspace an aircraft should be equipped with two independent LRNSs.

(b)An LRNS may be one of the following:

(1)one inertial navigation system (INS);

(2)one global navigation satellite system (GNSS); or

(3)one navigation system using the inputs from one or more inertial reference system (IRS) or any other sensor system complying with the MNPS requirement.

(c)In case of the GNSS is used as a stand-alone system for LRNS, an integrity check should be carried out.

(d)For operation in MNPS airspace along notified special routes the aeroplane should be equipped with one LRNS.

SUBPART D: OPERATIONS IN AIRSPACE WITH REDUCED VERTICAL SEPARATION MINIMA (RVSM)

Regulation (EU) 2024/1111

Aeroplanes and helicopters shall only be operated in designated airspace where a reduced vertical separation minimum of 300 m (1 000 ft) applies between flight level (FL) 290 and FL 410, inclusive, if the operator has been granted an approval by the competent authority to conduct such operations.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

To obtain an RVSM operational approval from the competent authority, the operator shall provide evidence that:

(a)the RVSM airworthiness approval has been obtained;

(b)procedures for monitoring and reporting height-keeping errors have been established;

(c)a training programme for the flight crew members involved in these operations has been established;

(d)operating procedures have been established specifying:

(1)the equipment to be carried, including its operating limitations and appropriate entries in the MEL;

(2)flight crew composition and experience requirements;

(3)flight planning;

(4)pre-flight procedures;

(5)procedures prior to RVSM airspace entry;

(6)in-flight procedures;

(7)post-flight procedures;

(8)incident reporting;

(9)specific regional operating procedures.

ED Decision 2017/009/R

CONTENT OF OPERATOR RVSM APPLICATION

The following material should be made available to the competent authority, in sufficient time to permit evaluation, before the intended start of RVSM operations:

(a)Airworthiness documents

Documentation that shows that the aircraft has RVSM airworthiness approval. This should include an aircraft flight manual (AFM) amendment or supplement.

(b)Description of aircraft equipment

A description of the aircraft appropriate to operations in an RVSM environment.

(c)Training programmes, operating practices and procedures

The operator should submit training syllabi for initial and recurrent training programmes together with other relevant material. The material should show that the operating practices, procedures and training items, related to RVSM operations in airspace that requires State operational approval, are incorporated.

(d)Manuals and checklists

The appropriate manuals and checklists should be revised to include information/guidance on standard operating procedures. Manuals should contain a statement of the airspeeds, altitudes and weights considered in RVSM aircraft approval, including identification of any operating limitations or conditions established for that aircraft type. Manuals and checklists may need to be submitted for review by the competent authority as part of the application process.

(e)Past performance

Relevant operating history, where available, should be included in the application. The applicant should show that any required changes have been made in training, operating or maintenance practices to improve poor height-keeping performance.

(f)Minimum equipment list

Where applicable, a minimum equipment list (MEL), adapted from the master minimum equipment list (MMEL), should include items pertinent to operating in RVSM airspace.

(g)Plan for participation in verification/monitoring programmes

The operator should establish a plan for participation in any applicable verification/monitoring programme acceptable to the competent authority. This plan should include, as a minimum, a check on a sample of the operator's fleet by an regional monitoring agency (RMA)’s independent height-monitoring system.

(h)Continuing airworthiness

Aircraft maintenance programme and continuing airworthiness procedures in support of the RVSM operations.

ED Decision 2017/009/R

OPERATING PROCEDURES

(a)Flight planning

(1)During flight planning the flight crew should pay particular attention to conditions that may affect operation in RVSM airspace. These include, but may not be limited to:

(i)verifying that the airframe is approved for RVSM operations;

(ii)reported and forecast weather on the route of flight;

(iii)minimum equipment requirements pertaining to height-keeping and alerting systems; and

(iv)any airframe or operating restriction related to RVSM operations.

(b)Pre-flight procedures

(1)The following actions should be accomplished during the pre-flight procedure:

(i)Review technical logs and forms to determine the condition of equipment required for flight in the RVSM airspace. Ensure that maintenance action has been taken to correct defects to required equipment.

(ii)During the external inspection of aircraft, particular attention should be paid to the condition of static sources and the condition of the fuselage skin near each static source and any other component that affects altimetry system accuracy. This check may be accomplished by a qualified and authorised person other than the pilot (e.g. a flight engineer or ground engineer).

(iii)Before take-off, the aircraft altimeters should be set to the QNH (atmospheric pressure at nautical height) of the airfield and should display a known altitude, within the limits specified in the aircraft operating manuals. The two primary altimeters should also agree within limits specified by the aircraft operating manual. An alternative procedure using QFE (atmospheric pressure at aerodrome elevation/runway threshold) may also be used. The maximum value of acceptable altimeter differences for these checks should not exceed 23 m (75 ft). Any required functioning checks of altitude indicating systems should be performed.

(iv)Before take-off, equipment required for flight in RVSM airspace should be operative and any indications of malfunction should be resolved.

(c)Prior to RVSM airspace entry

(1)The following equipment should be operating normally at entry into RVSM airspace:

(i)two primary altitude measurement systems. A cross-check between the primary altimeters should be made. A minimum of two will need to agree within ±60 m (±200 ft). Failure to meet this condition will require that the altimetry system be reported as defective and air traffic control (ATC) notified;

(ii)one automatic altitude-control system;

(iii)one altitude-alerting device; and

(iv)operating transponder.

(2)Should any of the required equipment fail prior to the aircraft entering RVSM airspace, the pilot should request a new clearance to avoid entering this airspace.

(d)In-flight procedures

(1)The following practices should be incorporated into flight crew training and procedures:

(i)Flight crew should comply with any aircraft operating restrictions, if required for the specific aircraft type, e.g. limits on indicated Mach number, given in the RVSM airworthiness approval.

(ii)Emphasis should be placed on promptly setting the sub-scale on all primary and standby altimeters to 1013.2 hPa / 29.92 in Hg when passing the transition altitude, and rechecking for proper altimeter setting when reaching the initial cleared flight level.

(iii)In level cruise it is essential that the aircraft is flown at the cleared flight level. This requires that particular care is taken to ensure that ATC clearances are fully understood and followed. The aircraft should not intentionally depart from cleared flight level without a positive clearance from ATC unless the crew are conducting contingency or emergency manoeuvres.

(iv)When changing levels, the aircraft should not be allowed to overshoot or undershoot the cleared flight level by more than 45 m (150 ft). If installed, the level off should be accomplished using the altitude capture feature of the automatic altitude-control system.

(v)An automatic altitude-control system should be operative and engaged during level cruise, except when circumstances such as the need to re-trim the aircraft or turbulence require disengagement. In any event, adherence to cruise altitude should be done by reference to one of the two primary altimeters. Following loss of the automatic height-keeping function, any consequential restrictions will need to be observed.

(vi)Ensure that the altitude-alerting system is operative.

(vii)At intervals of approximately 1 hour, cross-checks between the primary altimeters should be made. A minimum of two will need to agree within ±60 m (±200 ft). Failure to meet this condition will require that the altimetry system be reported as defective and ATC notified.

The usual scan of flight deck instruments should suffice for altimeter cross-checking on most flights.

(viii)In normal operations, the altimetry system being used to control the aircraft should be selected for the input to the altitude reporting transponder transmitting information to ATC.

(ix)If the pilot is notified by ATC of a deviation from an assigned altitude exceeding ±90 m (±300 ft) then the pilot should take action to return to cleared flight level as quickly as possible.

(2)Contingency procedures after entering RVSM airspace are as follows:

(i)The pilot should notify ATC of contingencies (equipment failures, weather) that affect the ability to maintain the cleared flight level and coordinate a plan of action appropriate to the airspace concerned. The pilot should obtain to the guidance on contingency procedures is contained in the relevant publications dealing with the airspace.

(ii)Examples of equipment failures that should be notified to ATC are:

(A)failure of all automatic altitude-control systems aboard the aircraft;

(B)loss of redundancy of altimetry systems;

(C)loss of thrust on an engine necessitating descent; or

(D)any other equipment failure affecting the ability to maintain cleared flight level.

(iii)The pilot should notify ATC when encountering greater than moderate turbulence.

(iv)If unable to notify ATC and obtain an ATC clearance prior to deviating from the cleared flight level, the pilot should follow any established contingency procedures for the region of operation and obtain ATC clearance as soon as possible.

(e)Post-flight procedures

(1)In making technical log entries against malfunctions in height-keeping systems, the pilot should provide sufficient detail to enable maintenance to effectively troubleshoot and repair the system. The pilot should detail the actual defect and the crew action taken to try to isolate and rectify the fault.

(2)The following information should be recorded when appropriate:

(i)primary and standby altimeter readings;

(ii)altitude selector setting;

(iii)subscale setting on altimeter;

(iv)autopilot used to control the aircraft and any differences when an alternative autopilot system was selected;

(v)differences in altimeter readings, if alternate static ports selected;

(vi)use of air data computer selector for fault diagnosis procedure; and

(vii)the transponder selected to provide altitude information to ATC and any difference noted when an alternative transponder was selected.

(f)Crew training

(1)The following items should also be included in flight crew training programmes:

(i)knowledge and understanding of standard ATC phraseology used in each area of operations;

(ii)importance of crew members cross-checking to ensure that ATC clearances are promptly and correctly complied with;

(iii)use and limitations in terms of accuracy of standby altimeters in contingencies. Where applicable, the pilot should review the application of static source error correction/position error correction through the use of correction cards; such correction data should be available on the flight deck;

(iv)problems of visual perception of other aircraft at 300 m (1 000 ft) planned separation during darkness, when encountering local phenomena such as northern lights, for opposite and same direction traffic, and during turns;

(v)characteristics of aircraft altitude capture systems that may lead to overshoots;

(vi)relationship between the aircraft's altimetry, automatic altitude control and transponder systems in normal and abnormal conditions; and

(vii)any airframe operating restrictions, if required for the specific aircraft group, related to RVSM airworthiness approval.

ED Decision 2017/009/R

CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS

(a)Maintenance programme

The aircraft maintenance programme should include the instructions for continuing airworthiness issued by the type certificate holder in relation to the RVSM operations certification in accordance with AMC1 ACNS.A.GEN.010.

(b)Continuing airworthiness procedures

The continuing airworthiness procedures should establish a process to:

(1)assess any modification or design change which in any way affects the RVSM approval;

(2)evaluate any repairs that may affect the integrity of the continuing RVSM approval, e.g. those affecting the alignment of pitot/static probes, repairs to dents, or deformation around static plates;

(3)ensure the proper maintenance of airframe geometry for proper surface contours and the mitigation of altimetry system error, surface measurements or skin waviness as specified in the instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA), to ensure adherence to RVSM tolerances. These checks should be performed following repairs or alterations having an effect on airframe surface and airflow.

(c)Additional training may be necessary for continuing airworthiness and maintenance staff to support RVSM approval. Areas that may need to be highlighted for the initial and recurrent training of relevant personnel are:

(1)Aircraft geometric inspection techniques;

(2)Test equipment calibration and use of that equipment; and

(3)Any special instructions or procedures introduced for RVSM approval.

(d)Test equipment

The operator should ensure that maintenance organisations use test equipment adequate for maintenance of the RVSM systems. The adequacy of the test equipment should be established in accordance with the type certificate holder recommendations and taking into consideration the required test equipment accuracy and the test equipment calibration.

ED Decision 2017/009/R

SPECIFIC REGIONAL PROCEDURES

(a)The areas of applicability (by Flight Information Region) of RVSM airspace in identified ICAO regions is contained in the relevant sections of ICAO Document 7030/4. In addition, these sections contain operating and contingency procedures unique to the regional airspace concerned, specific flight planning requirements and the approval requirements for aircraft in the designated region.

(b)Comprehensive guidance on operational matters for European RVSM airspace is contained in ICAO EUR Doc 009 entitled ‘Guidance material on the implementation of a 300 m (1 000 ft) vertical separation minimum in the European RVSM airspace’ with further material included in the relevant State aeronautical publications.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

Aircraft used for operations in RVSM airspace shall be equipped with:

(a)two independent altitude measurement systems;

(b)an altitude alerting system;

(c)an automatic altitude control system;

(d)a secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponder with altitude reporting system that can be connected to the altitude measurement system in use for altitude control.

ED Decision 2012/019/R

TWO INDEPENDENT ALTITUDE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS

Each system should be composed of the following components:

(a)cross-coupled static source/system, with ice protection if located in areas subject to ice accretion;

(b)equipment for measuring static pressure sensed by the static source, converting it to pressure altitude and displaying the pressure altitude to the flight crew:

(c)equipment for providing a digitally encoded signal corresponding to the displayed pressure altitude, for automatic altitude reporting purposes;

(d)static source error correction (SSEC), if needed to meet the performance criteria for RVSM flight envelopes; and

(e)signals referenced to a flight crew selected altitude for automatic control and alerting. These signals will need to be derived from an altitude measurement system meeting the performance criteria for RVSM flight envelopes.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a)The operator shall report recorded or communicated occurrences of height-keeping errors caused by malfunction of aircraft equipment or of operational nature, equal to or greater than:

(1)a total vertical error (TVE) of ± 90 m (± 300 ft);

(2)an altimetry system error (ASE) of ± 75 m (± 245 ft); and

(3)an assigned altitude deviation (AAD) of ± 90 m (± 300 ft).

(b)Reports of such occurrences shall be sent to the competent authority within 72 hours. Reports shall include an initial analysis of causal factors and measures taken to prevent repeat occurrences.

(c)When height-keeping errors are recorded or received, the operator shall take immediate action to rectify the conditions that caused the errors and provide follow-up reports, if requested by the competent authority.

SUBPART E: LOW-VISIBILITY OPERATIONS (LVOS) AND OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS

Regulation (EU) 2024/1111

An operator of aeroplanes or helicopters shall conduct the following operations only if they are approved by the competent authority:

(a)take-off operations with visibility conditions of less than 400 m RVR;

(b)instrument approach operations in low-visibility conditions; and

(c)operations with operational credits, except for EFVS 200 operations, which shall not be subject to a specific approval.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

DOCUMENTS CONTAINING INFORMATION RELATED TO LVOs and OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS

The following documents provide further information related to low-visibility operations (LVOs):

(a)ICAO Annex 2 — Rules of the Air;

(b)ICAO Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft;

(c)ICAO Annex 10 — Aeronautical Telecommunications (Volume I — Radio Navigation Aids);

(d)ICAO Annex 14 — Aerodromes (Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations);

(e)ICAO Doc 8168 — PANS - OPS — Procedures For Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations;

(f)ICAO Doc 9365 — Manual of All-Weather Operations;

(g)ICAO Doc 9476 — Manual of surface movement guidance and control systems (SMGCS);

(h)ICAO Doc 9157 — Aerodrome Design Manual;

(i)ICAO Doc 9328 — Manual of RVR Observing and Reporting Practices;

(j)ICAO EUR Doc 013 — European Guidance Material on All Weather Operations at Aerodromes;

(k)ECAC Doc 17, Issue 3; and

(l)CS-AWO All-weather operations.

ED Decision 2023/007/R

ILS AND GLS CLASSIFICATION

(a)The ILS and GLS/GBAS classification systems are specified in ICAO Annex 10 and GM2 SPA.LVO.110.

LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS

(b)Low visibility conditions means meteorological conditions with a runway visual range (RVR) less than 550 m.

ED Decision 2022/014/R

LOW-VISIBILITY TAKE-OFF (LVTO) OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES IN AN RVR OF LESS THAN 400 M

(a)Required RVR

(1)For multi-engined aeroplanes which, in the event of a critical engine failure at any point during take-off, can either stop or continue the take-off to a height of 1 500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the required margins, the criteria in Table 1 should apply:

Table 1

LVTO operations with aeroplanes — RVR versus facilities

(2)For multi-engined aeroplanes not complying with the conditions in (a)(1), there may be a need to land immediately and to see and avoid obstacles. Such aeroplanes may be operated to the take-off minima shown in Table 2 and the marking and lighting criteria shown in Table 1, provided that they are able to comply with the applicable obstacle clearance criteria, assuming engine failure at the height specified:

Table 2

LVTO operations with aeroplanes — assumed engine failure height versus RVR

(b)The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment.

(c)The minimum RVR value specified in Table 1 or 2 should be achieved for all reporting points representative of the parts of the runway from the point at which the aircraft commences the take-off until the calculated accelerate-stop distance from that point.

LVTO OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES IN AN RVR OF LESS THAN 125 M

(d)For LVTO operations with an RVR of less than 125 m, the following additional elements should apply:

(1)The runway has centre line lights spaced at intervals of 15 m or less;

(2)If an ILS signal is used for lateral guidance, the ILS localiser signal meets the requirements for category III operations, unless otherwise stated in the AFM;

(3)If an ILS signal is to be used, low-visibility procedures (LVPs) include protection of the runway and, where an ILS localiser signal is used, it should include protection of the ILS-sensitive area unless otherwise stated in the AFM; and

(4)If a GLS signal is used for lateral guidance, the GLS performance type meets the requirements for category III operations (GAST D and to GBAS point to which guidance is required), unless otherwise stated in the AFM.

(e)For LVTO operations with an RVR of less than 125 m, the reported RVR should be not less than the minimum specified in the AFM or, if no such minimum is specified, not less than 75 m.

(f)The minimum required RVR should be achieved for all reporting points representative of the parts of the runway from the point at which the aircraft commences the take-off until the greater of the calculated take-off distance or accelerate-stop distance from that point.

(g)The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

LVTO OPERATIONS — HELICOPTERS

The following should apply to LVTOs for helicopters with an RVR of less than 400 m:

(a)For take-off from onshore aerodromes or operating sites with IFR departure procedures, the criteria in Table 3 should apply:

Table 3

LVTO operations with helicopters — RVR versus facilities onshore

*On PinS departures to IDF, VIS should not be less than 800 m and ceiling should not be less than 250 ft.

(b)For take-off from offshore helidecks where the take-off flight path is free of obstacles, the minimum RVR for take-off should not be less than:

—500 m for single-pilot operations; or

—250 m for two-pilot operations.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

CLASSIFICATION OF LVTO OPERATIONS

Take-off operations are classified as ‘normal take-off operations’ with an RVR at or above 550 m and ‘LVTO operations’ with an RVR below 550 m. Only LVTO operations in an RVR of less than 400 m require a specific approval.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

VISUAL SEGMENT FOR TAKE-OFF

The value of 125 m RVR for take-off with 15 m centre line light spacing has been selected because flight deck geometry means that this will provide at least a 90-m visual segment for the large majority of aircraft types. In a 90-m visual segment the pilot is expected to be able to see six centre line light intervals (seven centre line lights) at 15 m spacing once lined up on the runway centre line.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS — CAT II OPERATIONS

For CAT II operations, the following should apply:

(a)The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and be not lower than the highest of:

(1)the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated;

(2)the applicable obstacle clearance height (OCH) for the category of aircraft;

(3)the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate; or

(4)100 ft.

(b)The lowest RVR minima to be used are specified in Table 4:

Table 4

CAT II operation minima: RVR (m) versus DH (ft)

*An RVR of 300 m may be used for a Category D aeroplane conducting an autoland or using HUDLS to touchdown.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS — CAT III OPERATIONS

For CAT III operations, the following should apply:

(a)For operations in which a DH is used, the DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and be not lower than:

(1)the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated;

(2)the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate.

(b)Operations with no DH should only be conducted if:

(1)operation with no DH is specified in the AFM;

(2)there is no published information indicating that the approach aid or aerodrome facilities cannot support operations with no DH; and

(3)the flight crew is qualified to operate with no DH.

(c)The lowest RVR to be used should be determined in accordance with Table 5.

Table 5

CAT III operations minima: RVR (m) versus DH (ft)

*Note: For a fail-passive or HUD roll-out control system, a lower RVR value (no lower than 75 m) can be used if stated in the AFM provided that the equipment demonstrated such capability as part of the certification process. This is provided that the operator has implemented the appropriate operating procedures and training.