Easy Access Rules for Air Operations

ED Decision 2022/005/R

PLANNING MINIMA AND SAFETY MARGINS FOR A DESTINATION AERODROME AND SELECTION OF ALTERNATE AERODROMES

(a)When selecting the destination aerodrome, the operator should ensure that one of the following conditions is met:

(1)for a land destination, the duration of the flight and the prevailing meteorological conditions are such that during a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome or operating site, an approach and landing is possible under VMC from the minimum safe altitude at the IAF or before;

(2)for a land destination:

(i)the available current meteorological information indicates that the following meteorological conditions at the destination aerodrome will exist from 2 hours before to 2 hours after the estimated time of arrival, or from the actual time of departure to 2 hours after the estimated time of arrival, whichever is shorter:

(A)a ceiling of at least 120 m (400 ft) above the DA/H or MDA/H of the instrument approach procedure; and

(B)visibility of at least 3 000 m;

(ii)a runway and two published instrument approaches with independent navigation aids are available at the aerodrome of intended landing; and

(iii)fuel planning is based upon the approach procedure that requires the most fuel, and 15-minute fuel is added to the trip fuel;

(3)one destination alternate aerodrome is selected, and the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that during a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival at the destination, the weather conditions at the destination will be at or above the applicable planning minima as follows:

(i)RVR or VIS specified in accordance with point CAT.OP.MPA.110; and

(ii)for type A instrument approach operations, ceiling at or above (M)DH;

(4)one destination alternate aerodrome is selected, and based on the meteorological information that is obtained in accordance with the procedures of the operations manual (OM), there is a reasonable probability of landing at the destination;

(5)two destination alternate aerodromes are selected; or

(6)the destination aerodrome is isolated, and the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that during a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival at the destination, the weather conditions at the destination will be at or above the applicable planning minima defined in Table 1.

(b)The operator should specify any alternate aerodrome(s) in the operational flight plan.

(c)If the site of intended landing is isolated and no alternate aerodrome is available, a PNR should be determined.

PLANNING MINIMA FOR DESTINATION ALTERNATE AERODROMES AND ISOLATED AERODROMES

(d)The operator should select the destination alternate aerodrome(s) only if the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that during a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival at the aerodrome or operating site, the weather conditions will be at or above the applicable planning minima as follows:

(1)if the destination aerodrome is selected by meeting the conditions in points (a)(3) or (a)(5), the planning minima for the destination alternate aerodrome(s) and an isolated aerodrome are as shown in Table 1:

Table 1 — Planning minima for a destination alternate aerodrome and an isolated aerodrome

or

(2)if the destination aerodrome is selected by meeting the condition in point (a)(4), the planning minima for the destination alternate aerodrome(s) are as shown in Table 2:

Table 2 — Planning minima for a destination alternate aerodrome with a reasonable probability of landing at the destination

DETERMINATION OF THE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR A SAFE LANDING AT THE DESTINATION

(e)To assess the probability of landing at the destination, when flying under IFR to heliports/operating sites without the meteorological information from a certified service provider, the operator should use supplemental meteorological information, or the operator should select two destination alternates. Such meteorological information is usually available at aerodromes. In Europe, the certification of service providers is based on Annex V (Part-MET) to Regulation (EU) 2017/373. In addition, all the following conditions should be met:

(1)The operator should establish a system for observing and assessing the weather, as well as for distributing meteorological information.

(2)The operator should describe in the OM the system defined in point (1).

(3)The operator should assess the weather at the destination aerodrome, and if different, also at the location of the instrument approach. The assessment should be based on the following:

(i)an appropriate weather forecast at an aerodrome where it is reasonable to expect that the local conditions are not significantly different from the conditions at the destination and the location of the instrument approach;

(ii)if the aerodrome described in point (e)(3)(i) is farther than 15 NM away from the location of the approach and the destination, the following conditions should be met:

(A)supplemental meteorological information should be available and confirm that the current weather conditions at destination and at the location of the instrument approach are expected to remain similar to the conditions at the aerodrome described in point (e)(3)(i); and

(B)low-level area forecasts should confirm that the weather is expected to remain similar at destination and at the aerodrome used for the weather assessment, at the expected time of landing; and

(iii)any risk of adverse local weather condition forecast in the low-level area forecasts and relevant to the destination and the location of the instrument approach.

(4)The following should qualify as supplemental meteorological information:

(i)a reliable, timestamped image from a serviceable digital camera of known location, bearing, and altitude, which shows the weather conditions in the approach path at destination;

(ii)a meteorological observation from a properly trained observer; and

(iii)a report from non-certified automatic weather observation systems to which the operator should apply relevant margins based on the reliability and precision of the system.

(5)The operator should establish that there is a reasonable probability of landing at the destination only if the flight time to the destination and then to the alternate aerodrome is less than 3 hours, and if according to the assessment described in point (e)(3), during a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival at the location of the approach, the following conditions are met:

(i)the weather conditions will be at or above the planning minima for the approach; and

(ii)if the location of the approach is different from that of the destination aerodrome, the weather conditions will allow to continue the flight to the destination.

(6)Weather observations from the aerodrome described in point (e)(3)(i), or the supplemental meteorological information that is described in point (e)(4), should be available, be no more than 30 minutes old, and be used to assess approach and landing conditions in accordance with point CAT.OP.MPA.300.

(7)The weather observations or information that are described in point (e)(6) may be transmitted to the flight crew using installed equipment, a T-PED, radio communication with trained personnel, or any equivalent means.

(8)The operator should store the weather assessments established in point (e)(3) and the weather observations referred to in point (e)(6) for a period of 3 months.

(9)In case a landing at the destination is not possible due to the weather, even though it was assessed that it would be, the operator should investigate and take all necessary measures to improve future weather assessments.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

PLANNING MINIMA FOR TAKE-OFF ALTERNATE AERODROMES

The operator should select an aerodrome or landing site as a take-off alternate aerodrome or landing site only when the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that during a period commencing 1 hour before and ending 1 hour after the estimated time of arrival at the take-off alternate aerodrome or landing site, the weather conditions will be at or above the applicable landing minima specified in accordance with point CAT.OP.MPA.110. The ceiling should be taken into account when the only available approach operations are type A. Any limitations related to OEI operations should be also taken into account.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

(a)Meteorological data conforms to ICAO Annex 3 and to Annex V (Part-MET) to Regulation (EU) 2017/373. As the following meteorological data is point specific, caution should be exercised when associating it with nearby aerodromes (or helidecks).

(b)METARs

(1)Routine and special meteorological observations at offshore installations should be made during periods and at a frequency agreed between the competent authority of the meteorological services provider and the operator concerned. They should conform to points MET.TR.200 and MET.TR.205 of Part-MET, including the desirable accuracy of observations, which is specified in GM2 MET.TR.210.

(2)Routine and selected special reports are exchanged between meteorological offices in the METAR (aerodrome routine meteorological report) or SPECI (aerodrome special meteorological report) code forms that are prescribed by the World Meteorological Organization.

(c)Aerodrome forecasts (TAFs)

(1)The aerodrome forecast consists of a concise statement of the expected meteorological conditions at an aerodrome and any significant changes expected to occur during a specified period of validity, which is usually not less than 9 hours, and not more than 30 hours. The forecast includes surface wind, visibility, weather and cloud, and expected changes of one or more of these elements during the period. Additional elements may be included as agreed between the meteorological authority and the operators concerned. Where these forecasts relate to offshore installations, barometric pressure and temperature should be included to facilitate the planning of helicopter landing and take-off performance.

(2)Aerodrome forecasts are most commonly exchanged in the TAF code form, and the detailed description of an aerodrome forecast is promulgated in point MET.TR.220 of Part-MET, together with the operationally desirable accuracy elements that are specified in GM3 MET.TR.220.

(d)Landing forecasts (TRENDS)

(1)The landing forecast consists of a concise statement that indicates any significant changes expected to occur at an aerodrome during the 2-hour period immediately following the time of the observation to which it is appended. It contains one or more of the following meteorological elements: surface wind, visibility, weather phenomena, clouds, and other significant information, such as barometric pressure and temperature, as may be agreed between the meteorological authority and the operators concerned.

(2)The detailed description of the landing forecast is promulgated in point MET.TR.225 of Part-MET, together with the operationally desirable accuracy of the forecast elements. In particular, the value of the observed cloud height and visibility elements should remain within ± 30 % of the forecast values in 90 % of the cases.

(3)Landing forecasts most commonly take the form of a TREND forecast appended to a local routine report, local special report, METAR, or SPECI.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

SUPPLEMENTAL METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION USING DIGITAL IMAGERY

(a)One or more digital images from a digital camera may be considered as supplemental meteorological information if the following criteria are met:

(1)the camera has a known altitude, azimuth, elevation, and field of view; if pan, tilt or zoom functions are available, the image includes the elevation, azimuth, and an indication of how much the image is zoomed;

(2)the camera is robustly fixed to a solid surface and protected from deliberate or accidental interference; it is secured from the effects of wind and precipitation;

(3)the digital image contains date and timestamp information or other means to ensure that the image is up to date; and

(4)the digital image has a clearly specified update frequency.

(b)If the operator uses the digital image to assess ceiling and visibility, the operator should document the height, bearing, and distance of clearly distinguishable features, and provide a reference image taken on a clear day with negligible cloud or mist.

(c)The operator may achieve the purpose of point (b) with a selectable reference image or a selectable data layer to be superposed on the image. Any selectable reference image should clearly indicate that it is a reference image, and not a current image.

(d)If the operator uses night-time digital images, the quality of those images should remain sufficient to be compared to the reference image, and the darkness should not obscure the distinguishable features described in point (b). This may be achieved by adapting the camera to the current luminosity.

(e)If the digital image is stamped with the value of one or more weather parameters, there should be a means to ensure that each parameter is up to date and provided by a reliable and functional sensor; otherwise, that parameter should not be displayed.

(f)If the camera is exposed to local meteorological conditions such as the foehn effect, the operator should document these local conditions, or the supplemental meteorological information should only be valid in the immediate vicinity of the camera.

ED Decision 2023/007/R

PBN OPERATIONS

(a)To comply with CAT.OP.MPA.192(d), when the operator intends to use PBN, the operator should either:

(1)demonstrate that the GNSS is robust against loss of capability; or

(2)select an aerodrome as a destination alternate aerodrome only if an instrument approach procedure that does not rely on a GNSS is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.

GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS

(b)The operator may demonstrate robustness against the loss of capability of the GNSS if all of the following criteria are met:

(1)At flight planning stage, SBAS or GBAS are expected to be available and used.

(2)The failure of a single receiver or system should not compromise the navigation capability required for the intended instrument approach.

(3)The temporary jamming of all GNSS frequencies should not compromise the navigation capability required for the intended route. The operator should establish a procedure to deal with such cases unless other sensors are available to continue on the intended route.

(4)The duration of a jamming event should be determined as follows:

(i)Considering the average speed and height of a helicopter flight, the duration of a jamming event may be considered to be less than 2 minutes.

(ii)The time needed for the GNSS system to re-start and provide the aircraft position and navigation guidance should also be considered.

(iii)Based on (i) and (ii) above, the operator should establish the duration of the loss of GNSS navigation data due to jamming. This duration should be no less than 3 minutes, and may be no longer than 4 minutes.

(5)The operator should ensure resilience to jamming for the duration determined in (4) above, as follows:

(i)If the altitude of obstacles on both sides of the flight path is higher than the planned altitude for a given segment of the flight, the operator should ensure no excessive drift on either side by relying on navigation sensors such as an inertial system with performance in accordance with the intended function.

(ii)If (i) does not apply and the operator cannot rely on sensors other than GNSS, the operator should develop a procedure to ensure that a drift from the intended route during the jamming event has no adverse consequences on the safety of the flight. This procedure may involve air traffic services.

(6)The operator should ensure that no space weather event is predicted to disrupt the GNSS reliability and integrity at both the destination and the alternate aerodrome.

(7)The operator should verify the availability of RAIM for all phases of flight based on GNSS, including navigation to the alternate aerodrome.

(8)The operator’s MEL should reflect the elements in points (b)(1) and (b)(2).

OPERATIONAL CREDITS

(c)To comply with point CAT.OP.MPA.192(d), when the operator intends to use ‘operational credits’ (e.g. EFVS, SA CAT I, etc.), the operator should select an aerodrome as destination alternate aerodrome only if an approach procedure that does not rely on the same ‘operational credit’ is available either at that aerodrome or at the destination aerodrome.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

DESTINATION AND DESTINATION ALTERNATE AERODROMES — PBN OPERATIONS

(a)AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.192(d) applies only to destination alternate aerodromes in flights that require a destination alternate aerodrome. A take-off or ERA aerodrome with instrument approach procedures that rely on a GNSS may be planned without restrictions. A destination aerodrome with all instrument approach procedures that rely solely on a GNSS may be used without a destination alternate aerodrome if the conditions for a flight without a destination alternate aerodrome are met.

(b)The term ‘available’ means that the procedure can be used in the planning stage and should comply with planning minima requirements.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

GNSS ROBUSTNESS AGAINST LOSS OF CAPABILITY — HELICOPTERS

(a)Redundancy of on-board systems ensures that no single on-board equipment failure (e.g. antenna, GNSS receiver, FMS, or navigation display failure) results in the loss of the GNSS capability.

(b)Any shadowing of the GNSS signal or jamming of all GNSS frequencies from the ground is expected to be of a very short duration and affect a very small area. Additional sensors or functions, such as inertial coasting, may be used during jamming events. Jamming should be considered on all segments of the intended route, including the approach.

(c)The availability of GNSS signals can be compromised if space weather events cause ‘loss of lock’ conditions and more than one satellite signal may be lost on a given GNSS frequency. Until space weather forecasts are available, the operator may use ‘nowcasts’ as short-term predictions for helicopter flights of short durations.

(d)SBAS also contributes to the mitigation of space weather effects, by both providing integrity messages and correcting ionosphere-induced errors.

(e)Even though SBAS should be available and used, RAIM should remain available autonomously. In case of loss of SBAS, the route and the approach to the destination or alternate aerodrome should still be flown with an available RAIM function.

(f)When available, GNSS based on more than one constellation and more than one frequency may provide better integrity and redundancy regarding failures in the space segment of GNSS, jamming, and resilience to space weather events.

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

(a)The operator shall establish procedures to ensure that in-flight fuel/energy checks and fuel/energy management are performed.

(b)The commander shall monitor the amount of usable fuel/energy remaining on board to ensure that it is protected and not less than the fuel/energy that is required to proceed to an aerodrome or operating site where a safe landing can be made.

(c)The commander shall advise air traffic control (ATC) of a ‘minimum fuel/energy’ state by declaring ‘MINIMUM FUEL’ when the commander has:

(1)committed to land at an aerodrome or operating site; and

(2)calculated that any change to the existing clearance to that aerodrome or operating site, or other air traffic delays, may result in landing with less than the planned final reserve fuel/energy.

(d)The commander shall declare a situation of ‘fuel/energy emergency’ by broadcasting ‘MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL’ when the usable fuel/energy estimated to be available upon landing at the nearest aerodrome or operating site where a safe landing can be made is less than the planned final reserve fuel/energy.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

ENSURING A SAFE LANDING FOR COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED HELICOPTERS IN OTHER THAN LOCAL OPERATIONS

The operator should base in-flight fuel management procedures on the following criteria:

(a)in-flight fuel checks:

(1)the commander should establish a procedure to ensure that in-flight fuel checks are carried out at regular intervals; the remaining usable fuel should be recorded and evaluated to:

(i)compare the actual consumption with the planned consumption;

(ii)check that the remaining usable fuel is sufficient to complete the flight; and

(iii)determine the usable fuel that is expected to remain upon landing at the destination; and

(2)the relevant fuel data should be recorded;

(b)in-flight fuel management:

(1)if an in-flight fuel check shows that the usable fuel that is expected to remain upon landing at the destination is less than the required alternate fuel plus the FRF, the commander should:

(i)divert; or

(ii)replan the flight in accordance with point SPA.HOFO.120(b)(1) unless the commander considers it safer to proceed to the destination; and

(2)at an onshore destination, when two suitable, separate touchdown and lift-off areas are available at the destination, and the expected weather conditions at the destination are as specified for planning in point CAT.OP.MPA.245(a)(2), the commander may permit alternate fuel to be used before landing at the destination; and

(c)if an in-flight fuel check on a flight to an isolated destination shows that the usable fuel expected to remain at the point of the last possible diversion is less than the sum of the following:

(1)trip fuel from the point of the last possible diversion to the destination isolated aerodrome;

(2)contingency fuel; and

(3)FRF, or the additional fuel required for isolated aerodromes,

the commander should either divert or proceed to the destination, provided that at onshore destinations, two suitable, separate touchdown and lift-off areas are available at the destination, and the expected weather conditions at the destination are as specified for planning in point CAT.OP.MPA.245(a).

ED Decision 2022/005/R

‘MINIMUM FUEL’ DECLARATION

(a)The ‘MINIMUM FUEL’ declaration informs the ATC that all planned landing-site options have been reduced to a specific aerodrome or operating site of intended landing. It also informs the ATC that no other operating site is available, and that any change to the existing clearance, or air traffic delays, may result in landing with less than the planned FRF. This is not an emergency situation but an indication that an emergency situation is possible, should any additional delay occur.

SAFE LANDING — final reserve fuel PROTECTION

(b)The protection of the FRF is intended to ensure that a safe landing is made at any aerodrome or operating site when unforeseen circumstances may not allow to safely complete the operation, as originally planned.

(c)When the FRF can no longer be protected, then a fuel emergency needs to be declared, as per point CAT.OP.MPA.195(d), and any landing option explored, including deviating from rules, operational procedures, and methods in the interest of safety (as per point CAT.GEN.MPA.105(b)).

(d)The ‘MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY FUEL’ declaration informs the ATC that all available landing options have been reduced to a specific landing site, and that an FRF portion may be consumed prior to landing.

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

(a)Special refuelling or defuelling shall only be conducted if the operator:

(1)has performed a risk assessment;

(2)has developed procedures; and

(3)has established a training programme for its personnel involved in such operations.

(b)Special refuelling or defuelling applies to:

(1)refuelling with an engine running or rotors turning;

(2)refuelling/defuelling with passengers embarking, on board, or disembarking; and

(3)refuelling/defuelling with wide-cut fuel.

(c)For aeroplanes, any special refuelling or defuelling procedures and any change to them shall require prior approval by the competent authority.

(d)For helicopters, refuelling procedures with rotors turning and any change to them shall require prior approval by the competent authority.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

REFUELLING WITH AN ENGINE RUNNING — AEROPLANES

(a)Refuelling with an engine running should only be conducted:

(1)when there are no other sources of electrical or pneumatic power to start the engine if shut down;

(2)in accordance with the specific procedures established by the type certificate (TC) holder of the aeroplane;

(3)with aeroplanes that use JET A, JET A-1 or TS-1 fuel types or any other fuel type that has a flash point above 38 °C and is approved by the operators’ competent authority;

(4)with no passengers embarking, on board, or disembarking;

(5)with permission from the aerodrome operator; and

(6)in the presence of the aerodrome rescue and firefighting services (RFFSs).

(b)The operator should assess the risks associated with refuelling with an engine running and establish appropriate procedures to be followed by all involved personnel, such as flight crew, cabin crew, and ground operations personnel. These procedures should be specified in the OM.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES for REFUELLING WITH AN ENGINE RUNNING — AEROPLANES

(a)To reduce the likelihood of conducting refuelling with an engine running, the operator should include in the MEL an operational procedure for dispatch criteria in case of an unserviceable APU, if applicable, to prevent a flight from being dispatched to an aerodrome where no suitable ground support equipment is available.

(b)Appropriate training should be provided to flight crew and maintenance/ground operations personnel that are involved in refuelling with one engine running, as well as to cabin crew, if present on board.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

REFUELLING WITH THE ENGINE(S) RUNNING AND/OR ROTORS TURNING — HELICOPTERS

(a)Refuelling with the engine(s) running and/or rotors turning should only be conducted:

(1)with no passengers or technical-crew members embarking or disembarking;

(2)if the operator of the aerodrome/operating site allows such operations;

(3)in accordance with any specific procedures and limitations in the AFM;

(4)using JET A or JET A-1 fuel types; and

(5)in the presence of the appropriate rescue and firefighting (RFF) facilities or equipment.

(b)In addition, operational procedures in the OM should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:

(1)all necessary information should be exchanged in advance with the aerodrome operator, operating-site operator, and refuelling operator;

(2)the procedures to be used by crew members should be defined;

(3)the procedures to be used by the operator’s ground operations personnel that may be in charge of refuelling or assisting in emergency evacuations should be described;

(4)the operator’s training programmes for crew members and for the operator’s ground operations personnel should be described;

(5)the minimum distance between the helicopter turning parts and the refuelling vehicle or installations should be defined when the refuelling takes place outside an aerodrome or at an aerodrome where there are no such limitations;

(6)besides any RFFSs that are required to be available by aerodrome regulations, an additional handheld fire extinguisher with the equivalent of 5 kg of dry powder should be immediately available and ready for use;

(7)a means for a two-way communication between the crew and the person in charge of refuelling should be defined and established;

(8)if fuel vapour is detected inside the helicopter, or any other hazard arises, refuelling/defuelling should be stopped immediately;

(9)one pilot should stay at the controls, constantly monitor the refuelling, and be ready to shut off the engines and evacuate at all times; and

(10)any additional precautions should be taken, as determined by the risk assessment.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES — PASSENGERS ON BOARD for REFUELLING WITH THE ENGINE(S) RUNNING AND/OR ROTORS TURNING — HELICOPTERS

In addition to AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.200, for refuelling with passengers on board, operational procedures in the OM should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:

(a)the positioning of the helicopter and the corresponding helicopter evacuation strategy should be defined taking into account the wind as well as the refuelling facilities or vehicles;

(b)on a heliport, the ground area beneath the exits that are intended for emergency evacuation should be kept clear;

(c)an additional passenger briefing as well as instructions should be defined, and the ‘No smoking’ signs should be on unless ‘No smoking’ placards are installed;

(d)interior lighting should be set to enable identification of emergency exits;

(e)the use of doors during refuelling should be defined: doors on the refuelling side should remain closed, while doors on the opposite side should remain unlocked or, weather permitting, open, unless otherwise specified in the AFM;

(f)at least one suitable person capable of implementing emergency procedures for firefighting, communications, as well as for initiating and directing an evacuation, should remain at a specified location; this person should not be the qualified pilot at the controls or the person performing the refuelling; and

(g)unless passengers are regularly trained in emergency evacuation procedures, an additional crew member or ground crew member should be assigned to assist in the rapid evacuation of the passengers.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

REFUELLING OR DEFUELLING WITH PASSENGERS EMBARKING, ON BOARD OR DISEMBARKING

(a)When passengers are embarking, on board, or disembarking, an aircraft should not be refuelled/defuelled with avgas (aviation gasoline) or wide-cut type fuel or a mixture of these types of fuel.

(b)For all other types of fuel, the necessary precautions should be taken, and the aircraft should be properly manned by qualified personnel that should be ready to initiate and direct an evacuation of the aircraft by the most practical and expeditious means available.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES WITH PASSENGERS EMBARKING, ON BOARD OR DISEMBARKING — AEROPLANES

(a)When refuelling/defuelling with passengers on board, ground servicing activities and work inside the aeroplane, such as catering and cleaning, should be conducted in such a manner that they do not create a hazard and allow emergency evacuation through those aisles and exits that are intended for emergency evacuation.

(b)The deployment of integral aeroplane stairs or the opening of emergency exits are not necessarily a prerequisite to refuelling.

(c)Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:

(1)one qualified person should remain at a specified location during refuelling/defuelling operations with passengers on board, and be capable of using emergency procedures for fire protection and firefighting, communications, as well as for initiating and directing an evacuation;

(2)two-way communication should be established and remain available through the aeroplane’s intercommunications system, or other suitable means, between the ground crew that supervises the refuelling and the qualified personnel on board the aeroplane; all involved personnel should remain within easy reach of the intercommunications system;

(3)crew, personnel, and passengers should be warned that refuelling/defuelling will take place;

(4)the ‘FASTEN SEAT BELT’ signs should be off;

(5)‘NO SMOKING’ signs should be on, together with interior lighting to allow the identification of emergency exits;

(6)passengers should be instructed to unfasten their seat belts and refrain from smoking;

(7)the minimum required number of cabin crew should be on board and prepared for an immediate emergency evacuation;

(8)if fuel vapour is detected inside the aeroplane, or any other hazard arises, refuelling/defuelling should be stopped immediately;

(9)the ground area beneath the exits that are intended for emergency evacuation, as well as slide deployment areas, should be kept clear where stairs are not in position for use in the event of evacuation; and

(10)provision is made for a safe and rapid evacuation.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR REFUELLING WITH PASSENGERS DISEMBARKING OR EMBARKING — HELICOPTERS WITH THE ENGINE(S) AND ROTORS STOPPED

When the helicopter engine(s) and rotors are stopped, the efficiency and speed of passengers disembarking from and re-embarking on board helicopters should be such that disembarking before refuelling and re-embarking after refuelling is the general practice, except for HEMS or air ambulance operations. However, if such operations are needed, the operator should refer to AMC3 CAT.OP.MPA.200 and AMC4 CAT.OP.MPA.200. Operational procedures to be described in the OM should specify that at least the relevant precautions referred to in the aforementioned AMC are taken.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

REFUELLING OR DEFUELLING WITH WIDE-CUT FUEL

Refuelling/defuelling with wide-cut fuel should be conducted only if the operator has established appropriate procedures, taking into account the high risk of using wide-cut fuel types.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES for REFUELLING WITH AN ENGINE RUNNING — AEROPLANES

For the purpose of refuelling with an engine running, the operator’s procedures need to be aligned with the specific procedures laid down in the AFM. In case there are no specific procedures for refuelling with an engine running available in the AFM, the operator and the manufacturer may wish to cooperate to establish such procedures.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

RISK ASSESSMENT for REFUELLING WITH THE ENGINE(S) RUNNING AND/OR ROTORS TURNING — HELICOPTERS

The risk assessment should explain why it is not practical to refuel with the engine(s) and rotors stopped, identify any additional hazards, and describe how the additional risks are controlled. Helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) and helicopter offshore operations (HOFO) are typical operations where the benefits should outweigh the risks if mitigation measures are taken.

Guidance on safe refuelling practices is contained in ICAO Doc 9137 Airport Services Manual, Parts 1 and 8.

The operators’ risk assessment may include, but not be limited to, the following risks, hazards and mitigation measures:

(a)risk related to refuelling with rotors turning;

(b)risk related to the shutting down of the engines, including the risk of failures during start-up;

(c)environmental conditions, such as wind limitations, displacement of exhaust gases, and blade sailing;

(d)risk related to human factors and fatigue management, especially for single-pilot operations for long periods of time;

(e)risk mitigation, such as the safety features of the fuel installation, RFF capability, number of personnel members available, ease of emergency evacuation of the helicopter, etc.;

(f)assessment of the use of radio transmitting equipment;

(g)determination of the use of passenger seat belts;

(h)review of the portable electronic device (PED) policy; and

(i)if passengers are to disembark, consideration of their disembarking before rather than after the refuelling; and

(j)if passengers are to embark, consideration of their embarking after rather than before the refuelling.

ED Decision 2022/005/R

PROCEDURES FOR REFUELLING/DEFUELLING WITH WIDE-CUT FUEL

(a)‘Wide-cut fuel’ (designated JET B, JP-4 or AVTAG) is an aviation turbine fuel that falls between gasoline and kerosene in the distillation range and consequently, compared to kerosene (JET A or JET A1), it has the properties of higher volatility (vapour pressure), lower flash point and lower freezing point.

(b)Wherever possible, the operator should avoid the use of wide-cut fuel types. If a situation arises such that only wide-cut fuels are available for refuelling/defuelling, operators should be aware that mixtures of wide-cut fuels and kerosene turbine fuels can result in the air/fuel mixture in the tank being in the combustible range at ambient temperatures. The extra precautions set out below are advisable to avoid arcing in the tank due to electrostatic discharge. The risk of this type of arcing can be minimised by the use of a static dissipation additive in the fuel. When this additive is present in the proportions stated in the fuel specification, the normal fuelling precautions set out below are considered adequate.

(c)Wide-cut fuel is considered to be ‘involved’ when it is being supplied or when it is already present in aircraft fuel tanks.

(d)When wide-cut fuel has been used, this should be recorded in the technical log. The next two uplifts of fuel should be treated as though they too involved the use of wide-cut fuel.

(e)When refuelling/defuelling with turbine fuels not containing a static dissipator, and where wide-cut fuels are involved, a substantial reduction on fuelling flow rate is advisable. Reduced flow rate, as recommended by fuel suppliers and/or aeroplane manufacturers, has the following benefits:

(1)it allows more time for any static charge build-up in the fuelling equipment to dissipate before the fuel enters the tank;

(2)it reduces any charge which may build up due to splashing; and

(3)until the fuel inlet point is immersed, it reduces misting in the tank and consequently the extension of the flammable range of the fuel.

(f)The flow rate reduction necessary is dependent upon the fuelling equipment in use and the type of filtration employed on the aeroplane fuelling distribution system. It is difficult, therefore, to quote precise flow rates. Reduction in flow rate is advisable whether pressure fuelling or over-wing fuelling is employed.

(g)With over-wing fuelling, splashing should be avoided by making sure that the delivery nozzle extends as far as practicable into the tank. Caution should be exercised to avoid damaging bag tanks with the nozzle.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

Push back and towing procedures specified by the operator shall be conducted in accordance with established aviation standards and procedures.

ED Decision 2014/015/R

BARLESS TOWING

(a)Barless towing should be based on the applicable SAE ARP (Aerospace Recommended Practices), i.e. 4852B/4853B/5283/5284/5285 (as amended).

(b)Pre- or post-taxi positioning of the aeroplanes should only be executed by barless towing if one of the following conditions are met:

(1)an aeroplane is protected by its own design from damage to the nose wheel steering system;

(2)a system/procedure is provided to alert the flight crew that damage referred to in (b)(1) may have or has occurred;

(3)the towing vehicle is designed to prevent damage to the aeroplane type; or

(4)the aeroplane manufacturer has published procedures and these are included in the operations manual.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a)Flight crew members

(1)During take-off and landing each flight crew member required to be on duty in the flight crew compartment shall be at the assigned station.

(2)During all other phases of flight each flight crew member required to be on duty in the flight crew compartment shall remain at the assigned station, unless absence is necessary for the performance of duties in connection with the operation or for physiological needs, provided at least one suitably qualified pilot remains at the controls of the aircraft at all times.

(3)During all phases of flight each flight crew member required to be on duty in the flight crew compartment shall remain alert. If a lack of alertness is encountered, appropriate countermeasures shall be used. If unexpected fatigue is experienced, a controlled rest procedure, organised by the commander, may be used if workload permits. Controlled rest taken in this way shall not be considered to be part of a rest period for purposes of calculating flight time limitations nor used to justify any extension of the duty period.

(b)Cabin crew members

During critical phases of flight, each cabin crew member shall be seated at the assigned station and shall not perform any activities other than those required for the safe operation of the aircraft.

ED Decision 2014/015/R

CABIN CREW SEATING POSITIONS

(a)When determining cabin crew seating positions, the operator should ensure that they are:

(1)close to a floor level door/exit;

(2)provided with a good view of the area(s) of the passenger cabin for which the cabin crew member is responsible; and

(3)evenly distributed throughout the cabin, in the above order of priority.

(b)Item (a) should not be taken as implying that, in the event of there being more cabin crew stations than required cabin crew, the number of cabin crew members should be increased.

ED Decision 2014/015/R

MITIGATING MEASURES — CONTROLLED REST

(a)This GM addresses controlled rest taken by the minimum certified flight crew. It is not related to planned in-flight rest by members of an augmented crew.

(b)Although flight crew members should stay alert at all times during flight, unexpected fatigue can occur as a result of sleep disturbance and circadian disruption. To cover for this unexpected fatigue, and to regain a high level of alertness, a controlled rest procedure in the flight crew compartment, organised by the commander may be used, if workload permits and a controlled rest procedure is described in the operations manual. ‘Controlled rest’ means a period of time ‘off task’ that may include actual sleep. The use of controlled rest has been shown to significantly increase the levels of alertness during the later phases of flight, particularly after the top of descent, and is considered to be good use of crew resource management (CRM) principles. Controlled rest should be used in conjunction with other on-board fatigue management countermeasures such as physical exercise, bright cockpit illumination at appropriate times, balanced eating and drinking, and intellectual activity.

(c)Controlled rest taken in this way should not be considered to be part of a rest period for the purposes of calculating flight time limitations, nor used to justify any duty period. Controlled rest may be used to manage both sudden unexpected fatigue and fatigue that is expected to become more severe during higher workload periods later in the flight. Controlled rest is not related to fatigue management, which is planned before flight.

(d)Controlled rest periods should be agreed according to individual needs and the accepted principles of CRM; where the involvement of the cabin crew is required, consideration should be given to their workload.

(e)When applying controlled rest procedures, the commander should ensure that:

(1)the other flight crew member(s) is (are) adequately briefed to carry out the duties of the resting flight crew member;

(2)one flight crew member is fully able to exercise control of the aircraft at all times; and

(3)any system intervention that would normally require a cross-check according to multi-crew principles is avoided until the resting flight crew member resumes his/her duties.

(f)Controlled rest procedures should satisfy all of the following criteria:

(1)Only one flight crew member at a time should take rest at his/her station; the restraint device should be used and the seat positioned to minimise unintentional interference with the controls.

(2)The rest period should be no longer than 45 minutes (in order to limit any actual sleep to approximately 30 minutes) to limit deep sleep and associated long recovery time (sleep inertia).

(3)After this 45-minute period, there should be a recovery period of 20 minutes to overcome sleep inertia during which control of the aircraft should not be entrusted to the flight crew member. At the end of this recovery period, an appropriate briefing should be given.

(4)In the case of two-crew operations, means should be established to ensure that the non-resting flight crew member remains alert. This may include:

(i)appropriate alarm systems;

(ii)on-board systems to monitor flight crew activity; and

(iii)frequent cabin crew checks. In this case, the commander should inform the senior cabin crew member of the intention of the flight crew member to take controlled rest, and of the time of the end of that rest; frequent contact should be established between the non-resting flight crew member and the cabin crew by communication means, and the cabin crew should check that the resting flight crew member is awake at the end of the period.

(5)There should be a minimum of 20 minutes between two subsequent controlled rest periods in order to overcome the effects of sleep inertia and allow for adequate briefing.

(6)If necessary, a flight crew member may take more than one rest period, if time permits, on longer sectors, subject to the restrictions above.

(7)Controlled rest periods should terminate at least 30 minutes before the top of descent.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a)Each flight crew member required to be on duty in the flight crew compartment shall wear a headset with boom microphone or equivalent. The headset shall be used as the primary device for voice communications with ATS:

(1)when on the ground:

(i)when receiving the ATC departure clearance via voice communication; and

(ii)when engines are running;

(2)when in flight:

(i)below transition altitude; or

(ii)10 000 ft, whichever is higher;

and

(3)whenever deemed necessary by the commander.

(b)In the conditions of (a), the boom microphone or equivalent shall be in a position that permits its use for two-way radio communications.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

Each flight crew member required to be on duty in the flight crew compartment shall wear a headset with boom microphone, or equivalent, and use it as the primary device to communicate with ATS.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

The operator shall establish procedures to ensure that before taxiing, take-off and landing and when safe and practicable to do so, all means of assistance for emergency evacuation that deploy automatically are armed.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a)Crew members

(1)During take-off and landing, and whenever decided by the commander in the interest of safety, each crew member shall be properly secured by all safety belts and restraint systems provided.

(2)During other phases of the flight, each flight crew member in the flight crew compartment shall keep the assigned station safety belt fastened while at his/her station.

(b)Passengers

(1)Before take-off and landing, and during taxiing, and whenever deemed necessary in the interest of safety, the commander shall be satisfied that each passenger on board occupies a seat or berth with his/her safety belt or restraint system properly secured.

(2)The operator shall make provisions for multiple occupancy of aircraft seats that is only allowed on specified seats. The commander shall be satisfied that multiple occupancy does not occur other than by one adult and one infant who is properly secured by a supplementary loop belt or other restraint device.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a)The operator shall establish procedures to ensure that before taxiing, take-off and landing all exits and escape paths are unobstructed.

(b)The commander shall ensure that before take-off and landing, and whenever deemed necessary in the interest of safety, all equipment and baggage are properly secured.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

The operator shall establish procedures to ensure that, when operating a helicopter over water in performance class 3, account is taken of the duration of the flight and conditions to be encountered when deciding if life-jackets are to be worn by all occupants.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

The commander shall not allow smoking on board:

(a) whenever considered necessary in the interest of safety;

(b)during refuelling and defuelling of the aircraft;

(c)while the aircraft is on the surface unless the operator has determined procedures to mitigate the risks during ground operations;

(d)outside designated smoking areas, in the aisle(s) and lavatory(ies);

(e)in cargo compartments and/or other areas where cargo is carried that is not stored in flame-resistant containers or covered by flame-resistant canvas; and

(f)in those areas of the passenger compartment where oxygen is being supplied.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

(a)On IFR flights, the commander shall only:

(1)commence the flight; or

(2)continue beyond the point from which a revised ATS flight plan applies in the event of inflight re-planning,

when information is available indicating that the expected meteorological conditions, at the time of arrival, at the destination and/or required alternate aerodrome(s) are at or above the planning minima.

(b)On IFR flights, the commander shall only continue towards the planned destination aerodrome when the latest information available indicates that, at the expected time of arrival, the meteorological conditions at the destination, or at least one destination alternate aerodrome, are at or above the applicable aerodrome operating minima.

(c)On VFR flights, the commander shall only commence the flight when the appropriate meteorological reports and/or forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions along the part of the route to be flown under VFR will, at the appropriate time, be at or above the VFR limits.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

In addition to CAT.OP.MPA.245, on IFR flights with aeroplanes, the commander shall only continue beyond:

(a)the decision point when using the reduced contingency fuel/energy (RCF) procedure; or

(b)point of no return when using the isolated aerodrome procedure,

when information is available indicating that the expected meteorological conditions, at the time of arrival, at the destination and/or required alternate aerodrome(s) are at or above the applicable aerodrome operating minima.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

In addition to CAT.OP.MPA.245:

(a)On VFR flights overwater out of sight of land with helicopters, the commander shall only commence take-off when the appropriate meteorological reports and/or forecasts indicate that the ceiling will be above 600 ft by day or 1 200 ft by night.

(b)[deleted with Reg. (EU) 2016/1199]

(c)Flight with helicopters to a helideck or elevated FATO shall only be operated when the mean wind speed at the helideck or elevated FATO is reported to be less than 60 kt.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a)The operator shall establish procedures to be followed when ground de-icing and anti-icing and related inspections of the aircraft are necessary to allow the safe operation of the aircraft.

(b)The commander shall only commence take-off if the aircraft is clear of any deposit that might adversely affect the performance or controllability of the aircraft, except as permitted under (a) and in accordance with the AFM.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

TERMINOLOGY

Terms used in the context of de-icing/anti-icing have the meaning defined in the following subparagraphs.

(a)‘Anti-icing’: the process of protecting the aircraft to prevent contamination due to existing or expected weather, typically by applying anti-icing fluids on uncontaminated aircraft surfaces.

(b)‘Anti-icing fluid’ includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(1)Typically, Type II, III or IV fluid (neat or diluted), normally applied unheated (*);

(2)Type I fluid/water mixture heated to minimum 60°C at the nozzle.

(*) When de-icing and anti-icing in a one-step process, Type II and Type IV fluids are typically applied diluted and heated.

(c)‘Clear ice’: a coating of ice, generally clear and smooth, but with some air pockets. It forms on exposed objects, the temperatures of which are at, below or slightly above the freezing temperature, by the freezing of super-cooled drizzle, droplets or raindrops. Clear ice is very difficult to be detected visually.

(d)‘Cold soaked surface frost (CSSF)’: frost developed on cold soaked aircraft surfaces by sublimation of air humidity. This effect can take place at ambient temperatures above 0° C. Cold soaked aircraft surfaces are more common on aircraft that have recently landed. External surfaces of fuel tanks (e.g. wing skins) are typical areas of CSSF formation (known in this case as cold soaked fuel frost (CSFF)), due to the thermal inertia of very cold fuel that remains on the tanks after landing.

(e)‘Conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground’: freezing fog, freezing precipitation, frost, rain or high humidity (on cold soaked wings), hail, ice pellets, snow or mixed rain and snow, etc.

(f)‘Contamination’: all forms of frozen or semi-frozen deposits on an aircraft, such as frost, snow, slush or ice.

(g)‘Contamination check’: a check of the aircraft for contamination to establish the need for de-icing.

(h)‘De-icing’: the process of eliminating frozen contamination from aircraft surfaces, typically by applying de-icing fluids.

(i)‘De-icing fluid’: such fluid includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(1)Heated water;

(2)Preferably, Type I fluid (neat or diluted (typically));

(3)Type II, III or IV fluid (neat or diluted).

The de-icing fluid is normally applied heated to ensure maximum efficiency and its freezing point should be at the outside air temperature (OAT) or below.

(j)‘De-icing/anti-icing’: this is the combination of de-icing and anti-icing performed in either one or two steps.

(k)‘Ground ice detection system (GIDS)’: a system used during aircraft ground operations to inform the personnel involved in the operation and/or the flight crew about the presence of frost, ice, snow or slush on the aircraft surfaces.

(l)‘Holdover time (HOT)’: the period of time during which an anti-icing fluid provides protection against frozen contamination to the treated aircraft surfaces. It depends among other variables, on the type and intensity of the precipitation, OAT, wind, the particular fluid (or fluid Type) and aircraft design and aircraft configuration during the treatment.

(m)‘Liquid water equivalent (LWE) system’: an automated weather measurement system that determines the LWE precipitation rate in conditions of frozen or freezing precipitation. The system provides flight crew with continuously updated information on the fluid protection capability under varying weather conditions.

(n)‘Lowest operational use temperature (LOUT)’: the lowest temperature at which a fluid has been tested and certified as acceptable in accordance with the appropriate aerodynamic acceptance test whilst still maintaining a freezing point buffer of not less than:

(1)10°C for a Type I fluid; or

(2)7°C for Type II, III or IV fluids.

(o)‘Post-treatment check’, ‘Post- de-icing check’ or ‘Post- de-icing/anti-icing check’: an external check of the aircraft after de-icing and/or anti-icing treatment accomplished by qualified staff and from suitably elevated observation points (e.g. from the de-icing/anti-icing equipment itself or other elevated equipment) to ensure that the aircraft is free from frost, ice, snow, or slush.

(p)‘Pre-take-off check’: The flight crew should continuously monitor the weather conditions after the de-icing/anti-icing treatment to assess whether the applied holdover time is still appropriate. Within the aircraft’s HOT and prior to take-off, the flight crew should check the aircraft’s wings or representative aircraft surfaces for frozen contaminants.

(q)‘Pre-take-off contamination check’: a check of the treated surfaces for contamination, performed when the HOT has been exceeded or if any doubt exists regarding the continued effectiveness of the applied anti-icing treatment. It is normally accomplished externally, just before commencement of the take-off run.

ANTI-ICING CODES

(r)Upon completion of the anti-icing treatment, a qualified staff provides the anti-icing code to the flight crew as follows: ‘the fluid Type/the fluid name (except for Type I)/concentration (except for Type I)/local time at start of anti-icing/date (optional)/the statement ‘post- de-icing/anti-icing check completed’ (if check completed). Example:

‘TYPE II / MANUFACTURER, BRAND X / 75% / 1335 / 15FEB20 / POST- DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING CHECK COMPLETED’.

(s)When a two-step de-icing/anti-icing operation has been carried out, the anti-icing code should be determined by the second step fluid.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING — PROCEDURES

(a)De-icing and/or anti-icing procedures should take into account manufacturer’s recommendations, including those that are type-specific and cover:

(1)contamination checks, including detection of clear ice and under-wing frost; limits on the thickness/area of contamination published in the AFM or other manufacturers’ documentation should be followed;

(2)procedures to be followed if de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures are interrupted or unsuccessful;

(3)post-treatment checks;

(4)pre-take-off checks;

(5)pre-take-off contamination checks;

(6)the recording of any incidents relating to de-icing and/or anti-icing; and

(7)the responsibilities of all personnel involved in de-icing and/or anti-icing.

(b)Operator’s procedures should ensure the following:

(1)When aircraft surfaces are contaminated by ice, frost, slush or snow, they are de-iced prior to take-off according to the prevailing conditions. Removal of contaminants may be performed with mechanical tools, fluids (including hot water), infrared heat or forced air, taking account of aircraft type-specific provisions.

(2)Account is taken of the wing skin temperature versus OAT, as this may affect:

(i)the need to carry out aircraft de-icing and/or anti-icing; and/or

(ii)the performance of the de-icing/anti-icing fluids.

(3)When freezing precipitation occurs or there is a risk of freezing precipitation occurring that would contaminate the surfaces at the time of take-off, aircraft surfaces should be anti-iced. Anti-icing fluids (neat or diluted) should not be applied at OAT below their LOUT. If both de-icing and anti-icing are required, the procedure may be performed in a one- or two-step process, depending upon weather conditions, available equipment, available fluids and the desired HOT. One-step de-icing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried out at the same time, using a mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water. Two-step de-icing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried out in two separate steps. The aircraft is first de-iced using heated water only or a heated mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water. After completion of the de-icing operation, a layer of a mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water, or of de-icing /anti-icing fluid only, is sprayed over the aircraft surfaces. The second step will be taken before the first step fluid freezes (typically within 3 minutes but severe conditions may shorten this) and, if necessary, area by area.

(4)When an aircraft is anti-iced and a longer HOT is needed/desired, the use of a less diluted fluid should be considered.

(5)All restrictions relative to OAT and fluid application (including, but not necessarily limited to, temperature and pressure) published by the fluid manufacturer and/or aircraft manufacturer, are followed. and procedures, limitations and recommendations to prevent the formation of fluid residues are followed.

(6)During conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground or after de-icing and/or anti-icing, an aircraft is not dispatched for departure unless it has been given a contamination check or a post-treatment check by a trained and qualified person. This check should cover all treated surfaces of the aircraft and be performed from points offering sufficient visibility to these parts. To ensure that there is no clear ice on suspect areas, it may be necessary to make a physical check (e.g. tactile).

(7)The required entry is made in the technical log.

(8)The commander continually monitors the environmental situation after the performed treatment. Prior to take-off, he/she performs a pre-take-off check, which is an assessment of whether the applied HOT is still appropriate. This pre-take-off check includes, but is not limited to, factors such as precipitation, wind and OAT.

(9) If any doubt exists as to whether a deposit may adversely affect the aircraft’s performance and/or controllability characteristics, the commander should arrange for a re-treatment or a pre-take-off contamination check to be performed in order to verify that the aircraft’s surfaces are free of contamination. Special methods and/or equipment may be necessary to perform this check, especially at night time or in extremely adverse weather conditions. If this check cannot be performed just before take-off, re-treatment should be applied.

(10)When re-treatment is necessary, any residue of the previous treatment should be removed, and a completely new de-icing/anti-icing treatment should be applied.

(11)When a ground ice detection system (GIDS) is used to perform an aircraft surfaces check prior to and/or after a treatment, the use of GIDS by suitably trained personnel should be part of the procedure.

(c)Special operational considerations

(1)When using thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids, the operator should consider a two-step de-icing/anti-icing procedure, the first step preferably with hot water and/or un-thickened fluids.

(2)The use of de-icing/anti-icing fluids should be in accordance with the aircraft manufacturer’s documentation. This is particularly important for thickened fluids to assure sufficient flow-off during take-off. Avoid applying excessive thickened fluid on the horizontal tail of aircraft with unpowered elevator controls.

(3)The operator should comply with any type-specific operational provision(s), such as an aircraft mass decrease and/or a take-off speed increase associated with a fluid application.

(4)The operator should take into account any flight handling procedures (stick force, rotation speed and rate, take-off speed, aircraft attitude etc.) laid down by the aircraft manufacturer when associated with a fluid application.

(5)The limitations or handling procedures resulting from (c)(3) and/or (c)(4) above should be part of the flight crew pre take-off briefing.

(d)Communications

(1)Before aircraft treatment. When the aircraft is to be treated with the flight crew on board, the flight and personnel involved in the operation should confirm the fluid to be used, the extent of treatment required and any aircraft type-specific procedure(s) to be used. Any other information needed to apply the HOT tables should be exchanged.

(2)Anti-icing code. The operator’s procedures should include an anti-icing code, which indicates the treatment the aircraft has received. This code provides the flight crew with the minimum details necessary to estimate a HOT and confirms that the aircraft is free of contamination.

(3)After treatment. Before reconfiguring or moving the aircraft, the flight crew should receive a confirmation from the personnel involved in the operation that all de-icing and/or anti-icing operations are complete and that all personnel and equipment are clear of the aircraft.

(e)Holdover protection & LWE systems

The operator should publish in the OM, when required, the HOTs in the form of a table or a diagram, to account for the various types of ground icing conditions and the different types and concentrations of fluids used. However, the times of protection shown in these tables are to be used as guidelines only and are normally used in conjunction with the pre-take-off check.

An operator may choose to operate using LWE systems instead of HOT tables whenever the required means for using these systems are in place.

(f)Training

The operator’s initial and recurrent de-icing training programmes (including communication training) for flight crew and for other personnel involved in de-icing operations should include additional training if any of the following is introduced:

(1)a new method, procedure and/or technique;

(2)a new type of fluid and/or equipment; or

(3)a new type of aircraft.

(g)Contracting

When the operator contracts de-icing/anti-icing functions, the operator should ensure that the contractor complies with the operator’s training/qualification procedures, together with any specific procedures in respect of:

(1)roles and responsibilities;

(2)de-icing and/or anti-icing methods and procedures;

(3)fluids to be used, including precautions for storage, preparation for use and chemical incompatibilities;

(4)specific aircraft provisions (e.g. no-spray areas, propeller/engine de-icing, APU operation, etc.);

(5)different checks to be conducted; and

(6)procedures for communications with flight crew and any other third party involved.

(h)Special maintenance considerations

(1)General

The operator should take proper account of the possible side-effects of fluid use. Such effects may include, but are not necessarily limited to, dried and/or re-hydrated residues, corrosion and the removal of lubricants.

(2)Special considerations regarding residues of dried fluids

The operator should establish procedures to prevent or detect and remove residues of dried fluid. If necessary, the operator should establish appropriate inspection intervals based on the recommendations of the airframe manufacturers and/or the operator’s own experience:

(i)Dried fluid residues

Dried fluid residues could occur when surfaces have been treated and the aircraft has not subsequently been flown and has not been subject to precipitation. The fluid may then have dried on the surfaces.

(ii)Re-hydrated fluid residues

Repetitive application of thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids may lead to the subsequent formation/build-up of a dried residue in aerodynamically quiet areas, such as cavities and gaps. This residue may re-hydrate if exposed to high humidity conditions, precipitation, washing, etc., and increase to many times its original size/volume. This residue will freeze if exposed to conditions at or below 0 °C. This may cause moving parts, such as elevators, ailerons, and flap actuating mechanisms to stiffen or jam in-flight. Re-hydrated residues may also form on exterior surfaces, which can reduce lift, increase drag and stall speed. Re-hydrated residues may also collect inside control surface structures and cause clogging of drain holes or imbalances to flight controls. Residues may also collect in hidden areas, such as around flight control hinges, pulleys, grommets, on cables and in gaps.

(iii)Operators are strongly recommended to obtain information about the fluid dry-out and re-hydration characteristics from the fluid manufacturers and to select products with optimised characteristics.

(iv)Additional information should be obtained from fluid manufacturers for handling, storage, application and testing of their products.

ED Decision 2025/008/R

DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Further guidance material on this issue is given in the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations (Doc 9640).

(a)General

(1)Any deposit of frost, ice, snow or slush on the external surfaces of an aircraft may drastically affect its flying qualities because of reduced aerodynamic lift, increased drag, modified stability and control characteristics. Furthermore, freezing deposits may cause moving parts, such as elevators, ailerons, flap actuating mechanism etc., to jam and create a potentially hazardous condition. Propeller/engine/auxiliary power unit (APU)/systems performance may deteriorate due to the presence of frozen contaminants on blades, intakes and components. Also, engine operation may be seriously affected by the ingestion of snow or ice, thereby causing engine stall or compressor damage. In addition, ice/frost may form on certain external surfaces (e.g. wing upper and lower surfaces, etc.) due to the effects of cold fuel/structures, even in ambient temperatures well above 0 °C.

(2)Procedures established by the operator for de-icing and/or anti-icing are intended to ensure that the aircraft is clear of contamination so that degradation of aerodynamic characteristics or mechanical interference will not occur and, following anti-icing, to maintain the airframe in that condition during the appropriate HOT.

(3)Under certain meteorological conditions, de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures may be ineffective in providing sufficient protection for continued operations. Examples of these conditions are freezing rain, ice pellets and hail snow exceeding certain intensities, high wind velocity, and fast-dropping OAT. No HOT guidelines exist for these conditions.

(4)Material for establishing operational procedures can be found, for example, in:

(i)ICAO Annex 3 ‘Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation’;

(ii)ICAO ‘Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations’;

(iii)SAE AS6285 ‘Aircraft Ground Deicing/Anti-Icing Processes’;

(iv)SAE AS6286 ‘Aircraft Ground Deicing/Anti-Icing Training and Qualification Program’;

(iv)SAE AS6332 ‘Aircraft Ground Deicing/Anti-icing Quality Management’;

(v)SAE ARP6257 ‘Aircraft Ground De/Anti-Icing Communication Phraseology for Flight and Ground Crews’;

(vi)FAA Holdover Time Guidelines;

[applicable until 26 March 2028 — ED Decision 2021/005/R]

(vi)FAA Holdover Time Guidelines [for the corresponding Winter];

[applicable from 27 March 2028 — ED Decision 2025/008/R]

(vii)FAA 8900.xxx series Notice ‘Revised FAA-Approved Deicing Program Updates, Winter 20xx-20yy’.

[applicable until 26 March 2028 — ED Decision 2021/005/R]

(vii)FAA Ground Deicing Program – General Information.

[applicable from 27 March 2028 — ED Decision 2025/008/R]

(b)Fluids

(1)Type I fluid: Due to its properties, Type I fluid forms a thin, liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which it is applied which, under certain weather conditions, gives a very limited HOT. For anti-icing purposes the fluid/water mixture should have a freezing point of at least 10 °C below OAT; increasing the concentration of fluid in the fluid/water mix does not provide any extension in HOT.

(2)Type II and Type IV fluids contain thickeners which enable the fluid to form a thicker liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which it is applied. Generally, this fluid provides a longer HOT than Type I fluids in similar conditions.

(3)Type III fluid is a thickened fluid especially intended for use on aircraft with low rotation speeds.

(4)Fluids used for de-icing and/or anti-icing should be acceptable to the operator and the aircraft manufacturer. These fluids normally conform to specifications such as SAE AMS1424 (Type I) or SAE AMS1428 (Types II, III and IV). Use of non-conforming fluids is not recommended due to their characteristics being unknown. The anti-icing and aerodynamic properties of thickened fluids may be seriously degraded by, for example, inappropriate storage, treatment, application, application equipment, age and in case they are applied on top of non-chemically compatible de-icing fluids.

(c)Hold-over protection

(1)Hold-over protection is achieved by a layer of anti-icing fluid remaining on and protecting aircraft surfaces for a period of time. With an one-step de-icing/anti-icing procedure, the HOT begins at the commencement of de-icing/anti-icing. With a two-step procedure, the HOT begins at the commencement of the second (anti-icing) step. The hold-over protection runs out:

(i)at the commencement of the take-off roll (due to aerodynamic shedding of fluid); or

(ii)when frozen deposits start to form or accumulate on treated aircraft surfaces, thereby indicating the loss of effectiveness of the fluid.

(2)The duration of hold-over protection may vary depending on the influence of factors other than those specified in the HOT tables. Guidance should be provided by the operator to take account of such factors, which may include:

(i)atmospheric conditions, e.g. exact type and rate of precipitation, wind direction and velocity, relative humidity and solar radiation; and

(ii)the aircraft and its surroundings, such as aircraft component inclination angle, contour and surface roughness, surface temperature, operation in close proximity to other aircraft (jet or propeller blast) and ground equipment and structures.

(3)HOTs are not meant to imply that flight is safe in the prevailing conditions if the specified HOT has not been exceeded. Certain meteorological conditions, such as freezing drizzle or freezing rain, may be beyond the certification envelope of the aircraft.

ED Decision 2025/008/R

PREPARATION OF DE-ICING/ANTI-ICING OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH THE STAKEHOLDERS CONCERNED

(a)It is recommended that, whenever possible, CAT operators, aerodrome operators and ground handling organisations providing de-icing/anti-icing services coordinate the process of preparing for de-icing/anti-icing operations in sufficient time in advance of the cold season starting. The plan for the winter season should be communicated to all stakeholders concerned.

(b)Coordination includes the following elements for all stakeholders involved, as a minimum.

(1)Exchanging of documents/procedures/manuals covering cold season operations, with the CAT operator ensuring that the relevant instructions and procedures are accessible at all stations where it operates.

(2)Dissemination by the aerodrome operator of the local procedures to operators and ground handling organisations, including instructions and procedures for cold weather operations at the aerodrome of operation.

(c)The operator ensures that the relevant personnel receive training, as appropriate, in deicing/anti-icing operations.

(d)It is recommended that the operator participate, when possible, in the testing of the plan for winter operations at the relevant aerodromes of operation when such tests are organised by the aerodrome operators and the ground handling organisations providing de-icing/anti-icing services.

[applicable from 27 March 2028 — ED Decision 2025/008/R]

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a)The operator shall establish procedures for flights in expected or actual icing conditions.

(b)The commander shall only commence a flight or intentionally fly into expected or actual icing conditions if the aircraft is certified and equipped to cope with such conditions.

(c)If icing exceeds the intensity of icing for which the aircraft is certified or if an aircraft not certified for flight in known icing conditions encounters icing, the commander shall exit the icing conditions without delay, by a change of level and/or route, if necessary by declaring an emergency to ATC.

ED Decision 2014/015/R

FLIGHT IN EXPECTED OR ACTUAL ICING CONDITIONS — AEROPLANES

(a)In accordance with Article 2(a)5. of Annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 (Essential requirements for air operations), in case of flight into known or expected icing conditions, the aircraft must be certified, equipped and/or treated to operate safely in such conditions. The procedures to be established by the operator should take account of the design, the equipment, the configuration of the aircraft and the necessary training. For these reasons, different aircraft types operated by the same company may require the development of different procedures. In every case, the relevant limitations are those which are defined in the AFM and other documents produced by the manufacturer.

(b)The operator should ensure that the procedures take account of the following:

(1)the equipment and instruments which must be serviceable for flight in icing conditions;

(2)the limitations on flight in icing conditions for each phase of flight. These limitations may be imposed by the aircraft’s de-icing or anti-icing equipment or the necessary performance corrections that have to be made;

(3)the criteria the flight crew should use to assess the effect of icing on the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft;

(4)the means by which the flight crew detects, by visual cues or the use of the aircraft’s ice detection system, that the flight is entering icing conditions; and

(5)the action to be taken by the flight crew in a deteriorating situation (which may develop rapidly) resulting in an adverse effect on the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft, due to:

(i)the failure of the aircraft’s anti-icing or de-icing equipment to control a build-up of ice; and/or

(ii)ice build-up on unprotected areas.

(c)Training for dispatch and flight in expected or actual icing conditions. The content of the operations manual should reflect the training, both conversion and recurrent, which flight crew, cabin crew and all other relevant operational personnel require in order to comply with the procedures for dispatch and flight in icing conditions:

(1)For the flight crew, the training should include:

(i)instruction on how to recognise, from weather reports or forecasts which are available before flight commences or during flight, the risks of encountering icing conditions along the planned route and on how to modify, as necessary, the departure and in-flight routes or profiles;

(ii)instruction on the operational and performance limitations or margins;

(iii)the use of in-flight ice detection, anti-icing and de-icing systems in both normal and abnormal operation; and

(iv)instruction on the differing intensities and forms of ice accretion and the consequent action which should be taken.

(2)For the cabin crew, the training should include:

(i)awareness of the conditions likely to produce surface contamination; and

(ii)the need to inform the flight crew of significant ice accretion.

ED Decision 2014/015/R

FLIGHT IN EXPECTED OR ACTUAL ICING CONDITIONS — HELICOPTERS

(a)The procedures to be established by the operator should take account of the design, the equipment and the configuration of the helicopter and also of the training which is needed. For these reasons, different helicopter types operated by the same company may require the development of different procedures. In every case, the relevant limitations are those that are defined in the AFM and other documents produced by the manufacturer.

(b)For the required entries in the operations manual, the procedural principles that apply to flight in icing conditions are referred to under Subpart MLR of Annex III (ORO.MLR) and should be cross-referenced, where necessary, to supplementary, type-specific data.

(c)Technical content of the procedures

The operator should ensure that the procedures take account of the following:

(1)CAT.IDE.H.165;

(2)the equipment and instruments that should be serviceable for flight in icing conditions;

(3)the limitations on flight in icing conditions for each phase of flight. These limitations may be specified by the helicopter’s de-icing or anti-icing equipment or the necessary performance corrections which have to be made;

(4)the criteria the flight crew should use to assess the effect of icing on the performance and/or controllability of the helicopter;

(5)the means by which the flight crew detects, by visual cues or the use of the helicopter’s ice detection system, that the flight is entering icing conditions; and

(6)the action to be taken by the flight crew in a deteriorating situation (which may develop rapidly) resulting in an adverse effect on the performance and/or controllability of the helicopter, due to either:

(i)the failure of the helicopter’s anti-icing or de-icing equipment to control a build-up of ice; and/or

(ii)ice build-up on unprotected areas.

(d)Training for dispatch and flight in expected or actual icing conditions

The content of the operations manual, Part D, should reflect the training, both conversion and recurrent, which flight crew, and all other relevant operational personnel will require in order to comply with the procedures for dispatch and flight in icing conditions.

(1)For the flight crew, the training should include:

(i)instruction on how to recognise, from weather reports or forecasts that are available before flight commences or during flight, the risks of encountering icing conditions along the planned route and on how to modify, as necessary, the departure and in-flight routes or profiles;

(ii)instruction on the operational and performance limitations or margins;

(iii)the use of in-flight ice detection, anti-icing and de-icing systems in both normal and abnormal operation; and

(iv)instruction on the differing intensities and forms of ice accretion and the consequent action which should be taken.

(2)For crew members other than flight crew, the training should include;

(i)awareness of the conditions likely to produce surface contamination; and

(ii)the need to inform the flight crew of significant ice accretion.

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

The commander shall only commence a flight or continue in the event of in-flight re-planning, when satisfied that the aircraft carries at least the planned amount of usable fuel/energy and oil to safely complete the flight, taking into account the expected operating conditions.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

Before commencing take-off, the commander shall be satisfied that:

(a)the meteorological conditions at the aerodrome or operating site and the condition of the runway/FATO intended to be used will not prevent a safe take-off and departure; and

(b)the selected aerodrome operating minima are consistent with all of the following:

(1)the operative ground equipment;

(2)the operative aircraft systems;

(3)the aircraft performance;

(4)flight crew qualifications.

ED Decision 2022/012/R

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS FOR TAKE-OFF — RUNWAYS

(a)The commander should not commence take-off unless the weather conditions at the aerodrome of departure are equal to or better than the applicable minima for landing at that aerodrome unless a weather-permissible take-off alternate aerodrome is available.

(b)If the reported VIS is below the minimum specified for take-off and RVR is not reported, then take-off should only be commenced if the commander can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway is equal to or better than the required minimum.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

The commander or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated shall not fly below specified minimum altitudes except when:

(a)necessary for take-off or landing; or

(b)descending in accordance with procedures approved by the competent authority.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

The operator shall ensure that when carrying passengers or cargo the following are not simulated:

(a)abnormal or emergency situations that require the application of abnormal or emergency procedures; or

(b)flight in IMC by artificial means.

Regulation (EU) 2021/1296

[INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK].

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

The commander shall ensure that flight crew members engaged in performing duties essential to the safe operation of an aircraft in flight use supplemental oxygen continuously whenever the cabin altitude exceeds 10 000 ft for a period of more than 30 minutes and whenever the cabin altitude exceeds 13 000 ft.

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

When undue proximity to the ground is detected by a flight crew member or by a ground proximity warning system, the pilot flying shall take corrective action immediately to establish safe flight conditions.

ED Decision 2025/001/R

TERRAIN AWARENESS WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS) FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES

(a)Introduction

(1)This GM contains performance-based training objectives for TAWS flight crew training.

(2)The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAWS cautions; and response to TAWS warnings.

(3)The term ‘TAWS’ in this GM means a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) enhanced by a forward-looking terrain avoidance function. Alerts include both cautions and warnings.

(4)The content of this GM is intended to assist operators who are producing training programmes. The information it contains has not been tailored to any specific aircraft or TAWS equipment, but highlights features which are typically available where such systems are installed. It is the responsibility of the individual operator to determine the applicability of the content of this guidance material to each aircraft and TAWS equipment installed and their operation. Operators should refer to the AFM and/or aircraft/flight crew operating manual (A/FCOM), or similar documents, for information applicable to specific configurations. If there should be any conflict between the content of this guidance material and that published in the other documents described above, then information contained in the AFM or A/FCOM will take precedence.

(b)Scope

(1)The scope of this GM is designed to identify training objectives in the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation; and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training items and those that are considered to be desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined.

(2)No attempt is made to define how the training programme should be implemented. Instead, objectives are established to define the knowledge that a pilot operating a TAWS is expected to possess and the performance expected from a pilot who has completed TAWS training. However, the guidelines do indicate those areas in which the pilot receiving the training should demonstrate his/her understanding, or performance, using a real-time, interactive training device, i.e. a flight simulator. Where appropriate, notes are included within the performance criteria which amplify or clarify the material addressed by the training objective.

(c)Performance-based training objectives

(1)TAWS academic training

(i)This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or by providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions.

(ii)Theory of operation. The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of TAWS operation and the criteria used for issuing cautions and warnings. This training should address system operation. Objective: To demonstrate knowledge of how a TAWS functions. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions:

(A)Surveillance

(a)The GPWS computer processes data supplied from an air data computer, a radio altimeter, an instrument landing system (ILS)/microwave landing system (MLS)/multi-mode (MM) receiver, a roll attitude sensor, and actual position of the surfaces and of the landing gear.

(b)The forward-looking terrain avoidance function utilises an accurate source of known aircraft position, such as that which may be provided by a flight management system (FMS) or GPS, or an electronic terrain database. The source and scope of the terrain, obstacle and airport data, and features such as the terrain clearance floor, the runway picker, and geometric altitude (where provided) should all be described.

(c)Displays required to deliver TAWS outputs include a loudspeaker for voice announcements, visual alerts (typically amber and red lights), and a terrain awareness display (that may be combined with other displays). In addition, means should be provided for indicating the status of the TAWS and any partial or total failures that may occur.

(B)Terrain avoidance. Outputs from the TAWS computer provides visual and audio synthetic voice cautions and warnings to alert the flight crew about potential conflicts with terrain and obstacles.

(C)Alert thresholds. Objective: To demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings. Criteria: The pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and alerts and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including:

(a)basic GPWS alerting modes specified in the ICAO Standard:

—Mode 1: excessive sink rate;

—Mode 2: excessive terrain closure rate;

—Mode 3: descent after take-off or go-around;

—Mode 4: unsafe proximity to terrain;

—Mode 5: descent below ILS glide slope (caution only); and

(b)an additional, optional alert mode — Mode 6: radio altitude call-out (information only); TAWS cautions and warnings which alert the flight crew to obstacles and terrain ahead of the aircraft in line with or adjacent to its projected flight path (forward-looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) and premature descent alert (PDA) functions).

(D)TAWS limitations. Objective: To verify that the pilot is aware of the limitations of TAWS. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of TAWS limitations identified by the manufacturer for the equipment model installed, such as:

(a)navigation should not be predicated on the use of the terrain display;

(b)unless geometric altitude data are provided, use of predictive TAWS functions is prohibited when altimeter subscale settings display ‘QFE’;

(c)nuisance alerts can be issued if the aerodrome of intended landing is not included in the TAWS airport database;

(d)in cold weather operations, corrective procedures should be implemented by the pilot unless the TAWS has in-built compensation, such as geometric altitude data;

(e)loss of input data to the TAWS computer could result in partial or total loss of functionality. Where means exist to inform the flight crew that functionality has been degraded, this should be known and the consequences understood;

(f)radio signals not associated with the intended flight profile (e.g. ILS glide path transmissions from an adjacent runway) may cause false alerts;

(g)inaccurate or low accuracy aircraft position data could lead to false or non-annunciation of terrain or obstacles ahead of the aircraft; and

(h)minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions should be applied in the event of the TAWS becoming partially or completely unserviceable. (It should be noted that basic GPWS has no forward-looking capability.)

(E)TAWS inhibits. Objective: To verify that the pilot is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of a TAWS are inhibited. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of the various TAWS inhibits, including the following means of:

(a)silencing voice alerts;

(b)inhibiting ILS glide path signals (as may be required when executing an ILS back beam approach);

(c)inhibiting flap position sensors (as may be required when executing an approach with the flaps not in a normal position for landing);

(d)inhibiting the FLTA and PDA functions; and

(e)selecting or deselecting the display of terrain information, together with appropriate annunciation of the status of each selection.

(2)Operating procedures. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate TAWS avionics and to interpret the information presented by a TAWS. This training should address the following topics:

(i)Use of controls. Objective: To verify that the pilot can properly operate all TAWS controls and inhibits. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following means by which:

(A)before flight, any equipment self-test functions can be initiated;

(B)TAWS information can be selected for display; and

(C)all TAWS inhibits can be operated and what the consequent annunciations mean with regard to loss of functionality.

(ii)Display interpretation. Objective: To verify that the pilot understands the meaning of all information that can be annunciated or displayed by a TAWS. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information annunciated or displayed by a TAWS, including the following:

(A)knowledge of all visual and aural indications that may be seen or heard;

(B)response required on receipt of a caution;

(C)response required on receipt of a warning; and

(D)response required on receipt of a notification that partial or total failure of the TAWS has occurred (including annunciation that the present aircraft position is of low accuracy).

(iii)Use of basic GPWS or use of the FLTA function only. Objective: To verify that the pilot understands what functionality will remain following loss of the GPWS or of the FLTA function. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate knowledge of how to recognise the following:

(A)un-commanded loss of the GPWS function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) protection (essentially, this is the FLTA function); and

(B)un-commanded loss of the FLTA function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining CFIT protection (essentially, this is the basic GPWS).

(iv)Crew coordination. Objective: To verify that the pilot adequately briefs other flight crew members on how TAWS alerts will be handled. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate that the pre-flight briefing addresses procedures that will be used in preparation for responding to TAWS cautions and warnings, including the following:

(A)the action to be taken, and by whom, in the event that a TAWS caution and/or warning is issued; and

(B)how multi-function displays will be used to depict TAWS information at take-off, in the cruise and for the descent, approach, landing (and any go-around). This will be in accordance with procedures specified by the operator, who will recognise that it may be more desirable that other data are displayed at certain phases of flight and that the terrain display has an automatic 'pop-up' mode in the event that an alert is issued.

(v)Reporting rules. Objective: To verify that the pilot is aware of the rules for reporting alerts to the controller and other authorities. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate knowledge of the following:

(A)when, following recovery from a TAWS alert or caution, a transmission of information should be made to the appropriate ATC unit; and

(B)the type of written report that is required, how it is to be compiled, and whether any cross reference should be made in the aircraft technical log and/or voyage report (in accordance with procedures specified by the operator), following a flight in which the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert, or if any part of the equipment appears not to have functioned correctly.

(vi)Alert thresholds. Objective: To demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings. Criteria: The pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and warnings and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including awareness of the following:

(A)modes associated with basic GPWS, including the input data associated with each; and

(B)visual and aural annunciations that can be issued by TAWS and how to identify which are cautions and which are warnings.

(3)TAWS manoeuvre training. The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to respond correctly to TAWS cautions and warnings. This training should address the following topics:

(i)Response to cautions:

(A)Objective: To verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to cautions. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the need, without delay:

(a)to initiate action required to correct the condition which has caused the TAWS to issue the caution and to be prepared to respond to a warning, if this should follow; and

(b)if a warning does not follow the caution, to notify the controller of the new position, heading and/or altitude/flight level of the aircraft, and what the commander intends to do next.

(B)The correct response to a caution might require the pilot to:

(a)reduce a rate of descent and/or to initiate a climb;

(b)regain an ILS glide path from below, or to inhibit a glide path signal if an ILS is not being flown;

(c)select more flap, or to inhibit a flap sensor if the landing is being conducted with the intent that the normal flap setting will not be used;

(d)select gear down; and/or

(e)initiate a turn away from the terrain or obstacle ahead and towards an area free of such obstructions if a forward-looking terrain display indicates that this would be a good solution and the entire manoeuvre can be carried out in clear visual conditions.

(ii)Response to warnings. Objective: To verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to warnings. Criteria: The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following:

(A)The need, without delay, to initiate a climb in the manner specified by the operator.

(B)The need, without delay, to maintain the climb until visual verification can be made that the aircraft will clear the terrain or obstacle ahead or until above the appropriate sector safe altitude (if certain about the location of the aircraft with respect to terrain) even if the TAWS warning stops. If, subsequently, the aircraft climbs up through the sector safe altitude, but the visibility does not allow the flight crew to confirm that the terrain hazard has ended, checks should be made to verify the location of the aircraft and to confirm that the altimeter subscale settings are correct.

(C)When the workload permits that, the flight crew should notify the air traffic controller of the new position and altitude/flight level, and what the commander intends to do next.

(D)That the manner in which the climb is made should reflect the type of aircraft and the method specified by the aircraft manufacturer (which should be reflected in the operations manual) for performing the escape manoeuvre. Essential aspects will include the need for an increase in pitch attitude, selection of maximum thrust, confirmation that external sources of drag (e.g. spoilers/speed brakes) are retracted, and respect of the stick shaker or other indication of eroded stall margin.

(E)That TAWS warnings should never be ignored. However, the pilot’s response may be limited to that which is appropriate for a caution, only if:

(a)the aircraft is being operated by day in clear, visual conditions; and

(b)it is immediately clear to the pilot that the aircraft is in no danger in respect of its configuration, proximity to terrain or current flight path.

(4)TAWS initial evaluation:

(i)The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test.

(ii)The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a FSTD equipped with TAWS visual and aural displays and inhibit selectors similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft which the pilot will fly. The results should be assessed by a synthetic flight instructor, synthetic flight examiner, type rating instructor or type rating examiner.

(iii)The range of scenarios should be designed to give confidence that proper and timely responses to TAWS cautions and warnings will result in the aircraft avoiding a CFIT accident. To achieve this objective, the pilot should demonstrate taking the correct action to prevent a caution developing into a warning and, separately, the escape manoeuvre needed in response to a warning. These demonstrations should take place when the external visibility is zero, though there is much to be learnt if, initially, the training is given in 'mountainous' or 'hilly' terrain with clear visibility. This training should comprise a sequence of scenarios, rather than be included in line oriented flight training (LOFT).

(iv)A record should be made, after the pilot has demonstrated competence, of the scenarios that were practised.

(5)TAWS recurrent training:

(i)TAWS recurrent training ensures that pilots maintain the appropriate TAWS knowledge and skills. In particular, it reminds pilots of the need to act promptly in response to cautions and warnings, and of the unusual attitude associated with flying the escape manoeuvre.

(ii)An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to TAWS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique TAWS characteristics of which pilots should be aware.

(6)Reporting procedures:

(i)Verbal reports. Verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate air traffic control unit:

(A)whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance;

(B)when, following a manoeuvre which has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aircraft has returned to a flight path which complies with the clearance; and/or

(C)when an air traffic control unit issues instructions which, if followed, would cause the pilot to manoeuvre the aircraft towards terrain or obstacle or it would appear from the display that a potential CFIT occurrence is likely to result.

(ii)Written reports. Written reports should be submitted in accordance with the operator's occurrence reporting scheme and they also should be recorded in the aircraft technical log:

(A)whenever the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert (false, nuisance or genuine);

(B)whenever a TAWS alert has been issued and is believed to have been false; and/or

(C)if it is believed that a TAWS alert should have been issued, but was not.

(iii)Within this GM and with regard to reports:

(A)the term 'false' means that the TAWS issued an alert which could not possibly be justified by the position of the aircraft in respect to terrain and it is probable that a fault or failure in the system (equipment and/or input data) was the cause;

(B)the term 'nuisance' means that the TAWS issued an alert which was appropriate, but was not needed because the flight crew could determine by independent means that the flight path was, at that time, safe;

(C)the term 'genuine' means that the TAWS issued an alert which was both appropriate and necessary; and

(D)the report terms described in (c)(6)(iii) are only meant to be assessed after the occurrence is over, to facilitate subsequent analysis, the adequacy of the equipment and the programmes it contains. The intention is not for the flight crew to attempt to classify an alert into any of these three categories when visual and/or aural cautions or warnings are annunciated.

SPECIFIC ELEMENTS FOR CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN (CFIT) FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES

(d)The following items are typical performance-based training objectives for the training of flight crew in the avoidance of CFIT:

•anticipate terrain threats;

•prepare for terrain threats;

•recognise unsafe terrain clearance;

•take appropriate action;

•apply appropriate procedure correctly;

•maintain aircraft control;

•restore safe flight path;

•manage consequences.

(e)The following scenarios may be addressed as part of the training:

•ATC clearance giving insufficient terrain clearance;

•provision of a wrong QNH;

•demonstration of terrain avoidance warning systems (if TAWS is installed);

•engine failure making performance marginal, leading to a TAWS warning (if TAWS is installed);

•‘virtual mountain’ meaning the surprise element of an unexpected warning (if TAWS is installed).

(f)More details can be found in ICAO Doc 9995, Manual of Evidence-based Training.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1199

The operator shall establish operational procedures and training programmes when ACAS is installed and serviceable so that the flight crew is appropriately trained in the avoidance of collisions and competent in the use of ACAS II equipment.

ED Decision 2019/019/R

GENERAL

(a)The ACAS operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account this GM. It incorporates advice contained in:

(1)ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS), Volume III⁸⁰ Aircraft Operating Procedures, Chapter 3 and Attachment A (ACAS training guidelines for pilots) and Attachment B (ACAS high vertical rate (HVR) encounters) to Section 4, Chapter 3; and

(2)ICAO PANS-ATM⁸¹ Chapters 12 and 15 phraseology requirements;

(3)ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV;

(4)ICAO PANS-ATM.

(b)Additional guidance material on ACAS may be referred to, including information available from such sources as EUROCONTROL.

ACAS FLIGHT CREW TRAINING PROGRAMMES

(c)During the implementation of ACAS, several operational issues were identified which had been attributed to deficiencies in flight crew training programmes. As a result, the issue of flight crew training has been discussed within the ICAO, which has developed guidelines for operators to use when designing training programmes.

(d)This GM contains performance-based training objectives for ACAS II flight crew training. Information contained in this paper related to traffic advisories (TAs) is also applicable to ACAS I and ACAS II users. The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAs; and response to resolution advisories (RAs).

(e)The information provided is valid for version 7 and 7.1 (ACAS II). Where differences arise, these are identified.

(f)The performance-based training objectives are further divided into the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training items and those which are considered desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined.

(g)ACAS academic training

(1)This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or through providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions.

(2)Essential items

(i)Theory of operation. The flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of ACAS II operation and the criteria used for issuing TAs and RAs. This training should address the following topics:

(A)System operation

Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how ACAS functions.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions:

(a)Surveillance

(1)ACAS interrogates other transponder-equipped aircraft within a nominal range of 14 NM.

(2)ACAS surveillance range can be reduced in geographic areas with a large number of ground interrogators and/or ACAS II-equipped aircraft.

(3)If the operator's ACAS implementation provides for the use of the Mode S extended squitter, the normal surveillance range may be increased beyond the nominal 14 NM. However, this information is not used for collision avoidance purposes.

(b)Collision avoidance

(1)TAs can be issued against any transponder-equipped aircraft which responds to the ICAO Mode C interrogations, even if the aircraft does not have altitude reporting capability.

(2)RAs can be issued only against aircraft that are reporting altitude and in the vertical plane only.

(3)RAs issued against an ACAS-equipped intruder are co-ordinated to ensure complementary RAs are issued.

(4)Failure to respond to an RA deprives own aircraft of the collision protection provided by own ACAS.

(5)Additionally, in ACAS-ACAS encounters, failure to respond to an RA also restricts the choices available to the other aircraft's ACAS and thus renders the other aircraft's ACAS less effective than if own aircraft were not ACAS-equipped.

(B)Advisory thresholds

Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following:

(a)ACAS advisories are based on time to closest point of approach (CPA) rather than distance. The time should be short and vertical separation should be small, or projected to be small, before an advisory can be issued. The separation standards provided by ATS are different from the miss distances against which ACAS issues alerts.

(b)Thresholds for issuing a TA or an RA vary with altitude. The thresholds are larger at higher altitudes.

(c)A TA occurs from 15 to 48 seconds and an RA from 15 to 35 seconds before the projected CPA.

(d)RAs are chosen to provide the desired vertical miss distance at CPA. As a result, RAs can instruct a climb or descent through the intruder aircraft's altitude.

(C)ACAS limitations

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the limitations of ACAS.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of ACAS limitations, including the following:

(a)ACAS will neither track nor display non-transponder-equipped aircraft, nor aircraft not responding to ACAS Mode C interrogations.

(b)ACAS will automatically fail if the input from the aircraft’s barometric altimeter, radio altimeter or transponder is lost.

(1)In some installations, the loss of information from other on board systems such as an inertial reference system (IRS) or attitude heading reference system (AHRS) may result in an ACAS failure. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crews are aware of the types of failure that will result in an ACAS failure.

(2)ACAS may react in an improper manner when false altitude information is provided to own ACAS or transmitted by another aircraft. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crew are aware of the types of unsafe conditions that can arise. Flight crew members should ensure that when they are advised, if their own aircraft is transmitting false altitude reports, an alternative altitude reporting source is selected, or altitude reporting is switched off.

(c)Some aeroplanes within 380 ft above ground level (AGL) (nominal value) are deemed to be ‘on ground’ and will not be displayed. If ACAS is able to determine an aircraft below this altitude is airborne, it will be displayed.

(d)ACAS may not display all proximate transponder-equipped aircraft in areas of high density traffic.

(e)The bearing displayed by ACAS is not sufficiently accurate to support the initiation of horizontal manoeuvres based solely on the traffic display.

(f)ACAS will neither track nor display intruders with a vertical speed in excess of 10 000 ft/min. In addition, the design implementation may result in some short-term errors in the tracked vertical speed of an intruder during periods of high vertical acceleration by the intruder.

(g)Ground proximity warning systems/ground collision avoidance systems (GPWSs/GCASs) warnings and wind shear warnings take precedence over ACAS advisories. When either a GPWS/GCAS or wind shear warning is active, ACAS aural annunciations will be inhibited and ACAS will automatically switch to the 'TA only' mode of operation.

(D)ACAS inhibits

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of ACAS are inhibited.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the various ACAS inhibits, including the following:

(a)‘Increase Descent’ RAs are inhibited below 1 450 ft AGL;

(b)‘Descend’ RAs are inhibited below 1 100 ft AGL;

(c)all RAs are inhibited below 1 000 ft AGL;

(d)all TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL; and

(e)altitude and configuration under which ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are inhibited. ACAS can still issue ‘Climb’ and ‘Increase Climb’ RAs when operating at the aeroplane's certified ceiling. (In some aircraft types, ‘Climb’ or ‘Increase Climb’ RAs are never inhibited.)

(ii)Operating procedures

The flight crew member should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate the ACAS avionics and interpret the information presented by ACAS. This training should address the following:

(A)Use of controls

Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all ACAS and display controls.

Criteria: demonstrate the proper use of controls including:

(a)aircraft configuration required to initiate a self-test;

(b)steps required to initiate a self-test;

(c)recognising when the self-test was successful and when it was unsuccessful. When the self-test is unsuccessful, recognising the reason for the failure and, if possible, correcting the problem;

(d)recommended usage of range selection. Low ranges are used in the terminal area and the higher display ranges are used in the en-route environment and in the transition between the terminal and en-route environment;

(e)recognising that the configuration of the display does not affect the ACAS surveillance volume;

(f)selection of lower ranges when an advisory is issued, to increase display resolution;

(g)proper configuration to display the appropriate ACAS information without eliminating the display of other needed information;

(h)if available, recommended usage of the above/below mode selector. The above mode should be used during climb and the below mode should be used during descent; and

(i)if available, proper selection of the display of absolute or relative altitude and the limitations of using this display if a barometric correction is not provided to ACAS.

(B)Display interpretation

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands the meaning of all information that can be displayed by ACAS. The wide variety of display implementations require the tailoring of some criteria. When the training programme is developed, these criteria should be expanded to cover details for the operator's specific display implementation.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information displayed by ACAS, including the following:

(a)other traffic, i.e. traffic within the selected display range that is not proximate traffic, or causing a TA or RA to be issued;

(b)proximate traffic, i.e. traffic that is within 6 NM and ±1 200 ft;

(c)non-altitude reporting traffic;

(d)no bearing TAs and RAs;

(e)off-scale TAs and RAs: the selected range should be changed to ensure that all available information on the intruder is displayed;

(f)TAs: the minimum available display range which allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution;

(g)RAs (traffic display): the minimum available display range of the traffic display which allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution;

(h)RAs (RA display): flight crew members should demonstrate knowledge of the meaning of the red and green areas or the meaning of pitch or flight path angle cues displayed on the RA display. Flight crew members should also demonstrate an understanding of the RA display limitations, i.e. if a vertical speed tape is used and the range of the tape is less than 2 500 ft/min, an increase rate RA cannot be properly displayed; and

(i)if appropriate, awareness that navigation displays oriented on ‘Track-Up’ may require a flight crew member to make a mental adjustment for drift angle when assessing the bearing of proximate traffic.

(C)Use of the TA-only mode

Objective: to verify that a flight crew member understands the appropriate times to select the TA-only mode of operation and the limitations associated with using this mode.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following:

(a)Knowledge of the operator's guidance for the use of TA only.

(b)Reasons for using this mode. If TA only is not selected when an airport is conducting simultaneous operations from parallel runways separated by less than 1 200 ft, and to some intersecting runways, RAs can be expected. If for any reason TA only is not selected and an RA is received in these situations, the response should comply with the operator's approved procedures.

(c)All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. As a result, TAs issued below 500 ft AGL may not be noticed unless the TA display is included in the routine instrument scan.

(D)Crew coordination

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands how ACAS advisories will be handled.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of the crew procedures that should be used when responding to TAs and RAs, including the following:

(a)task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring;

(b)expected call-outs; and

(c)communications with ATC.

(E)Phraseology rules

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the controller.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following:

(a)the use of the phraseology contained in ICAO PANS-OPS;

(b)an understanding of the procedures contained in ICAO PANS-ATM and ICAO Annex 2; and

(c)the understanding that verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit:

(1)whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance;

(2)when, subsequent to a manoeuvre that has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aeroplane has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or

(3)when air traffic issue instructions that, if followed, would cause the crew to manoeuvre the aircraft contrary to an RA with which they are complying.

(F)Reporting rules

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the operator.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of where information can be obtained regarding the need for making written reports to various states when an RA is issued. Various States have different reporting rules and the material available to the flight crew member should be tailored to the operator’s operating environment. For operators involved in commercial operations, this responsibility is satisfied by the flight crew member reporting to the operator according to the applicable reporting rules.

(3)Non-essential items: advisory thresholds

Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following:

(i)the minimum and maximum altitudes below/above which TAs will not be issued;

(ii)when the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be less than the ACAS-desired separation, a corrective RA which requires a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 300 ft at low altitude to a maximum of 700 ft at high altitude;

(iii)when the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be just outside the ACAS-desired separation, a preventive RA that does not require a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 600 to 800 ft; and

(iv)RA fixed range thresholds vary between 0.2 and 1.1 NM.

(h)ACAS manoeuvre training

(1)Demonstration of the flight crew member’s ability to use ACAS displayed information to properly respond to TAs and RAs should be carried out in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. If a full flight simulator is utilised, CRM should be practised during this training.

(2)Alternatively, the required demonstrations can be carried out by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made. The flight crew member should be informed whether or not the responses made were correct. If the response was incorrect or inappropriate, the CBT should show what the correct response should be.

(3)The scenarios included in the manoeuvre training should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-aircraft encounters. The consequences of failure to respond correctly should be demonstrated by reference to actual incidents such as those publicised in EUROCONTROL ACAS II Bulletins (available on the EUROCONTROL website).

(i)TA responses

Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAs.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following:

(A)Proper division of responsibilities between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should fly the aircraft using any type-specific procedures and be prepared to respond to any RA that might follow. For aircraft without an RA pitch display, the pilot flying should consider the likely magnitude of an appropriate pitch change. The pilot monitoring should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the ACAS display, using this information to help visually acquire the intruder.

(B)Proper interpretation of the displayed information. Flight crew members should confirm that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued. Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data tag) and its vertical speed direction (trend arrow).

(C)Other available information should be used to assist in visual acquisition, including ATC ‘party-line’ information, traffic flow in use, etc.

(D)Because of the limitations described, the pilot flying should not manoeuvre the aircraft based solely on the information shown on the ACAS display. No attempt should be made to adjust the current flight path in anticipation of what an RA would advise, except that if own aircraft is approaching its cleared level at a high vertical rate with a TA present, vertical rate should be reduced to less than 1 500 ft/min.

(E)When visual acquisition is attained, and as long as no RA is received, normal right of way rules should be used to maintain or attain safe separation. No unnecessary manoeuvres should be initiated. The limitations of making manoeuvres based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or at night, or without a definite horizon should be demonstrated as being understood.

(ii)RA responses

Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to RAs.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following:

(A)Proper response to the RA, even if it is in conflict with an ATC instruction and even if the pilot believes that there is no threat present.

(B)Proper task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should respond to a corrective RA with appropriate control inputs. The pilot monitoring should monitor the response to the RA and should provide updates on the traffic location by checking the traffic display. Proper crew resource management (CRM) should be used.

(C)Proper interpretation of the displayed information. The pilot should recognise the intruder causing the RA to be issued (red square on display). The pilot should respond appropriately.

(D)For corrective RAs, the response should be initiated in the proper direction within five seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ¼ g (gravitational acceleration of 9.81 m/sec²).

(E)Recognition of the initially displayed RA being modified. Response to the modified RA should be properly accomplished, as follows:

(a)For increase rate RAs, the vertical speed change should be started within two and a half seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g.

(b)For RA reversals, the vertical speed reversal should be started within two and a half seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately ⅓ g.

(c)For RA weakenings, the vertical speed should be modified to initiate a return towards the original clearance.

(d)An acceleration of approximately ¼ g will be achieved if the change in pitch attitude corresponding to a change in vertical speed of 1 500 ft/min is accomplished in approximately 5 seconds, and of ⅓ g if the change is accomplished in approximately three seconds. The change in pitch attitude required to establish a rate of climb or descent of 1 500 ft/min from level flight will be approximately 6° when the true airspeed (TAS) is 150 kt, 4° at 250 kt, and 2° at 500 kt. (These angles are derived from the formula: 1 000 divided by TAS.).

(F)Recognition of altitude crossing encounters and the proper response to these RAs.

(G)For preventive RAs, the vertical speed needle or pitch attitude indication should remain outside the red area on the RA display.

(H)For maintain rate RAs, the vertical speed should not be reduced. Pilots should recognise that a maintain rate RA may result in crossing through the intruder's altitude.

(I)When the RA weakens, or when the green 'fly to' indicator changes position, the pilot should initiate a return towards the original clearance and when ‘clear of conflict’ is annunciated, the pilot should complete the return to the original clearance.

(J)The controller should be informed of the RA as soon as time and workload permit, using the standard phraseology.

(K)When possible, an ATC clearance should be complied with while responding to an RA. For example, if the aircraft can level at the assigned altitude while responding to RA (an ‘adjust vertical speed’ RA (version 7) or ‘level off’ (version 7.1)) it should be done; the horizontal (turn) element of an ATC instruction should be followed.

(L)Knowledge of the ACAS multi-aircraft logic and its limitations, and that ACAS can optimise separations from two aircraft by climbing or descending towards one of them. For example, ACAS only considers intruders that it considers to be a threat when selecting an RA. As such, it is possible for ACAS to issue an RA against one intruder that results in a manoeuvre towards another intruder which is not classified as a threat. If the second intruder becomes a threat, the RA will be modified to provide separation from that intruder.

(i)ACAS initial evaluation

(1)The flight crew member’s understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test or interactive CBT that records correct and incorrect responses to phrased questions.

(2)The flight crew member’s understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the flight crew member will fly, and the results assessed by a qualified instructor, inspector, or check airman. The range of scenarios should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-threat encounters. The scenarios should also include demonstrations of the consequences of not responding to RAs, slow or late responses, and manoeuvring opposite to the direction called for by the displayed RA.

(3)Alternatively, exposure to these scenarios can be conducted by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the pilot will fly. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made and a record made of whether or not each response was correct.

(j)ACAS recurrent training

(1)ACAS recurrent training ensures that flight crew members maintain the appropriate ACAS knowledge and skills. ACAS recurrent training should be integrated into and/or conducted in conjunction with other established recurrent training programmes. An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to ACAS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique ACAS characteristics which flight crew members should be made aware of.

(2)It is recommended that the operator's recurrent training programmes using full flight simulators include encounters with conflicting traffic when these simulators are equipped with ACAS. The full range of likely scenarios may be spread over a 2-year period. If a full flight simulator, as described above, is not available, use should be made of interactive CBT that is capable of presenting scenarios to which pilot responses should be made in real time.

Regulation (EU) 2021/2237

Before commencing an approach operation, the commander shall be satisfied that:

(a)the meteorological conditions at the aerodrome or operating site and the condition of the runway/FATO intended to be used will not prevent a safe approach, landing or go-around, considering the performance information contained in the operations manual; and

(b)the selected aerodrome operating minima are consistent with all of the following:

(1)the operative ground equipment;

(2)the operative aircraft systems;

(3)the aircraft performance;

(4)flight crew qualifications.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT

(a)The in-flight landing distance assessment should be based on the latest available weather report and runway condition report (RCR) or equivalent information based on the RCR.

(b)The assessment should be initially carried out when the weather report and the RCR are obtained, usually around top of descent. If the planned duration of the flight does not allow the flight crew to carry out the assessment in non-critical phases of flight, the assessment should be carried out before departure.

(c)When meteorological conditions may lead to a degradation of the runway surface condition, the assessment should include consideration of how much deterioration in runway surface friction characteristics may be tolerated, so that a quick decision can be made prior to landing.

(d)The flight crew should monitor the evolution of the actual conditions during the approach, to ensure that they do not degrade below the condition that was previously determined to be the minimum acceptable.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

WIND DATA

The information on wind contained in METAR/SPECI/ATIS reports (average of a 10-minute period) should be the basis for the landing performance calculations, while instant wind information reported by the tower should be monitored during the approach to ensure that the wind speed does not exceed the assumptions made for landing performance calculations.

Regulation (EU) 2020/1176

Before commencing an approach to land, the commander shall be satisfied that according to the information available to him or her, the weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) intended to be used would not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach, having regard to the performance information contained in the operations manual (OM).

ED Decision 2021/005/R

IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE FATO

The in-flight determination of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) suitability for a safe approach, landing or missed approach should be based on the latest available meteorological or runway condition report, preferably no more than 30 minutes before the expected landing time.

Regulation (EU) 2020/1176

(a)No approach to land shall be continued unless the landing distance available (LDA) on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA) and the approach to land is performed with performance class A aeroplanes that are certified in accordance with either of the following certification specifications, as indicated in the type-certificate:

(1)CS-25 or equivalent;

(2)CS-23 at level 4 with performance level “High speed” or equivalent.

(b)For performance class A aeroplanes other than those referred to in point (a), no approach to land shall be continued, except in either of the following situations:

(1)the LDA on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the LDTA;

(2)if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is not available, the LDA on the intended runway at the estimated time of landing is at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with point CAT.POL.A.230 or point CAT.POL.A.235, as applicable.

(c)For performance class B aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued, except in either of the following situations:

(1)the LDA on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the LDTA;

(2)if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is not available, the LDA on the intended runway at the estimated time of landing is at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with point CAT.POL.A.330 or point CAT.POL.A.335, as applicable.

(d)For performance class C aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued, except in either of the following situations:

(1)the LDA on the intended runway is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing, determined in accordance with the performance information for the assessment of the LDTA;

(2)if performance information for the assessment of the LDTA is not available, the LDA on the intended runway at the estimated time of landing is at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with point CAT.POL.A.430 or point CAT.POL.A.435, as applicable.

(e)Performance information for the assessment of the LDTA shall be based on approved data contained in the AFM. When approved data contained in the AFM are insufficient in respect of the assessment of the LDTA, they shall be supplemented with other data which are either determined in accordance with the applicable certification standards for aeroplanes or determined in line with the AMCs issued by the Agency.

(f)The operator shall specify in the OM the performance information for the assessment of the LDTA and the assumptions made for its development, including other data that, in accordance with point (e), may be used to supplement that contained in the AFM.

ED Decision 2021/005/R

ASSESSMENT OF THE LDTA BASED ON DISPATCH CRITERIA

(a)The required landing distance for dry runways, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230(a), contains adequate margin to fulfil the intent of the assessment of the landing distance at time of arrival (LDTA) on a dry runway, as it includes allowance for the additional parameters considered in that calculation.

(b)The required landing distance for wet runways also contains adequate margin to fulfil the intent of the assessment of the LDTA on such runways with specific friction-improving characteristics, as it includes allowance for the additional parameters considered in that calculation.

(c)When at the time of arrival the runway is dry or is a wet runway with specific friction-improving characteristics and the overall conditions, including weather at the aerodrome and runway condition, have been confirmed as not changed significantly compared to those assumed at the time of dispatch, the assessment of the LDTA may be carried out by confirming that the assumptions made at the time of dispatch are still valid.

(d)Before taking any performance credit for the assessment of the LDTA for runways with friction-improving characteristics, the operator should verify that the runways intended to be operated on are maintained to the extent necessary to ensure the expected improved friction characteristics.