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AMC4 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2022/014/R
RECOMMENDED GRADING SYSTEM METHODOLOGY — VENN MODEL
(a)To grade a competency, the instructor should assess the associated OBs of each competency against the following dimensions by determining:
(1)what was the outcome of the threat management, error management and undesired aircraft state management relating specifically to the competency being assessed;
(2)how well the flight crew member demonstrated the OB(s) when they were required. This includes:
(i)how many OBs the flight crew member demonstrated over the EBT phase (e.g. EVAL, MT, SBT) when they were required; and
(ii)how often the flight crew member demonstrated the OB(s) when they were required;
Abbreviated word picture VENN model | ||||
TEM | Observable behaviours | |||
Grading | OUTCOME (1) | HOW WELL (2) = | HOW MANY (i)+ | HOW OFTEN (ii) |
1 | unsafe situation | ineffectively | few, hardly any | rarely |
2 | not an unsafe situation | minimally acceptable | some | occasionally |
3 | safe situation | adequately | many | regularly |
4 | safe situation | effectively | most | regularly |
5 | enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency | in an exemplary manner | all, almost all | always |
(b)Grades should be determined during each EBT module as follows:
(1)EVAL — overall performance of the phase for each competency at level 1 grading metrics.
(2)MT — overall performance of the phase at level 0 grading metrics. When the phase is graded ‘not competent’, it requires level 2 grading metrics.
Note: Only a limited number of competencies may be observed and graded in this phase (e.g. PRO, FPA, FPM); the others are ‘to be left in blank’.
(3)SBT — overall performance of the phase for each competency at level 1 grading metrics. Unless just culture and the necessary non-jeopardy environment during training may be compromised. In that case, level 0 grading metrics.
Note: In-seat instruction (ISI) should not be included in any assessment.
(c)Where any competency is graded below the minimum acceptable level of performance (grade 1 on a 5-point scale), an outcome of additional FSTD training is required.
(1)Additional level 2 grading metrics must be recorded.
(2)The flight crew member should not be released to unsupervised line operations until each competency is demonstrated at or above the minimum acceptable level of performance.
(d)Where all competencies are determined at or above the minimum acceptable level of performance (grade 2 on a 5-point scale), the outcome should be COMPETENT. Consistent grading below the average (2 on a 5-point scale) may indicate a need for training to elevate the performance to the average (grade 3 on a 5-point scale). As a minimum, the following conditions apply:
(1)Any competency graded with 2 requires level 2 grading metrics.
(2)Any competency graded with 2 in any simulator session of the 1st module followed by a grade 2 in the same competency in the EVAL of the 2nd module requires individual tailored training in the SBT of the 2nd module. (First example: 1st Module SBT graded with 2, 2nd Module EVAL graded with 2 in the same competency, thus the 2nd SBT should be an individual tailored training on that competency. Second example: 1s module EVAL graded 2, 2nd module EVAL graded 2 on the same competency, thus the 2nd module SBT should be individual tailored training on that competency).
(3)Any competency graded with 2 in three consecutive modules requires individual tailored training. If at the end of the tailored training (3rd SBT) the competency continues being graded with 2, additional FSTD training is required within the next 3 months. For instance, following the example above, the SBT in the 2nd Module was an individual tailored training. In the 3rd Module during the EVAL the same competency is graded with 2 and individual tailored training is applied. The SBT is graded with 2 again. The pilot may continue line operations but should receive additional FSTD training within the next 3 months.
(4)The operator should not release a flight crew member to unsupervised line operations when more than four competencies (the majority of the competencies — five competencies or above) are graded with 2 in any single simulator session of the module.
(5)Any EVAL graded with 2 in more than three competencies requires individual tailored training in the SBT. If at the end of the module more than three competencies continue being graded with 2, the pilot may continue line operations but should receive additional FSTD training within the next 3 months.
(e)‘Individual tailored training’ refers to a simulator session tailored to the pilot’s individual training needs, which may require a different programme or syllabus. Normally, it may be done during the SBT and normally there is not an increase of FSTD volume (no extra simulator session). It may require an increased volume of training such as CBT, additional briefings, etc. Any individual tailored training may be substituted by additional FSTD training before the start of the next module.
(f)‘Additional FSTD training’ refers to the fact that in addition to the requirements of tailored training, there is an increase of FSTD volume (extra simulator session). It normally happens after individual tailored training.
GM1 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2022/014/R
RECOMMENDED CONDUCT OF THE GRADING — ORCA
(a)At the end of the EVAL, after the facilitated de-briefing, the instructor may, as a minimum, record level 1 grading metrics.
(b)The instructor may conduct the simulator session of the EVAL following the principles of a summative assessment and the facilitated de-briefing following the principles of a formative assessment. The MT and SBT simulator sessions may be conducted as a formative assessment.
(c)At the end of each training phase, it is recommended to record level 1 grading metrics unless just culture and the necessary non-jeopardy environment during training may be compromised. In that case, the following alternative may be recommended: level 0 grading metrics for all competencies may be recorded (exceptionally ‘not observed’ or ‘left in blank’ may be recorded) and de-identified level 1 grading metrics may be recorded for the data collection and analysis purposes.
(d)A simple practice to classify the observations recorded during the simulator session is to classify the OB as positive, negative, neutral.
GM2 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2022/014/R
RECOMMENDED GRADING SYSTEM METHODOLOGY — VENN MODEL
(a)Grades may be determined during each EBT module as follows:
(1)For each assigned grade:
(i)the observed performance should be identified with one or more OBs; and
(ii)the OB(s) should simply link the observed performance to the competency; they are not to be used as a checklist.
(2)At the completion of the EVAL, the grade should be the overall assessment of the performance of each competency during the EVAL. Although it is not recommended, if the instructor performs an overall grade (additional to level 1), it should be at level 0 grading metric (competent or not).
(3)The underlying philosophy of the individual tailored training and additional FSTD training is the identification of the pilot’s individual training needs during the EVAL or EVALs. However, there may be cases in which such an identification may be complemented using other phases or combination of phases along the EBT programme. Nevertheless, when this happens consistently to a large number of pilots, it may indicate a problem of instructor standardisation.
(4)At the completion of the MT, only a limited number of competencies can be graded. The others are to be left in blank. Note: The grade of a competency as ‘not observed’ is a relevant set of data to be used in the EBT programme (e.g. may be used for instructor concordance assurance programme, programme design, etc.), while ‘competency left in blank’ is stating the obvious, which is that MT is a skill retention phase and therefore it focuses on only some of the competencies which may provide NO opportunity to observe all the competencies.
(5)At the completion of the module, grades should be assigned for each competency, based on the overall assessment of training during the SBT.
(6)In exceptional occasions, the instructor may have been unable to assess one or two competencies in the EVAL or SBT. A ‘not observed’ may be graded. The training system performance and concordance assurance system may use these metrics to improve instructors’ standardisation and the EBT programme design. When the operator grades the MT alone (instead of grading the MT and EVAL together), a ‘not observed’ grading may be frequent. It also occurs when the instructor grades each one of the manoeuvres.
(b)The word pictures are standardised according to the VENN model but may be simplified once instructors become familiar with the system.
Word picture VENN model | |
Application of procedures (PRO) | |
5 | The pilot applied procedures in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency |
4 | The pilot applied procedures effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
3 | The pilot applied procedures adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
2 | The pilot applied procedures at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation |
1 | The pilot applied procedures ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation |
Communication (COM) | |
5 | The pilot communicated in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency |
4 | The pilot communicated effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
3 | The pilot communicated adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
2 | The pilot communicated at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation |
1 | The pilot communicated ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation |
Flight path management — automation (FPA) | |
5 | The pilot managed the automation in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency |
4 | The pilot managed the automation effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
3 | The pilot managed the automation adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
2 | The pilot managed the automation at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation |
1 | The pilot managed the automation ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation |
Flight path management — manual control (FPM) | |
5 | The pilot controlled the aircraft in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency |
4 | The pilot controlled the aircraft effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
3 | The pilot controlled the aircraft adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
2 | The pilot controlled the aircraft at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation |
1 | The pilot controlled the aircraft ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation |
Application of knowledge (KNO) | |
5 | The pilot showed exemplary knowledge, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency |
4 | The pilot showed adequate knowledge, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
3 | The pilot showed adequate knowledge, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
2 | The pilot showed knowledge at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation |
1 | The pilot showed inadequate knowledge, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation |
Leadership & teamwork (LTW) | |
5 | The pilot led and worked as a team member in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency |
4 | The pilot led and worked as a team member effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
3 | The pilot led and worked as a team member adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
2 | The pilot led and worked as a team member at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation |
1 | The pilot led or worked as a team member ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation |
Problem-solving & decision-making (PSD) | |
5 | The pilot solved problems and made decisions in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency |
4 | The pilot solved problems and made decisions effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
3 | The pilot solved problems and made decisions adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
2 | The pilot solved problems and made decisions at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation |
1 | The pilot solved problems or made decisions ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation |
Situation awareness (SAW) | |
5 | The pilot’s situation awareness was exemplary, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency |
4 | The pilot’s situation awareness was good, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
3 | The pilot’s situation awareness was adequate, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
2 | The pilot’s situation awareness was at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation |
1 | The pilot’s situation awareness was inadequate, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation |
Workload management (WLM) | |
5 | The pilot managed the workload in an exemplary manner, by always demonstrating almost all of the observable behaviours to a high standard when required, which enhanced safety, effectiveness and efficiency |
4 | The pilot managed the workload effectively, by regularly demonstrating most of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
3 | The pilot managed the workload adequately, by regularly demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation |
2 | The pilot managed the workload at the minimum acceptable level, by only occasionally demonstrating some of the observable behaviours when required, but which did not result in an unsafe situation |
1 | The pilot managed the workload ineffectively, by rarely demonstrating any of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in an unsafe situation |
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(d)(2) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2022/014/R
VERIFICATION OF THE ACCURACY OF THE GRADING SYSTEM
(a)The purpose is to provide data to assess the accuracy of the grading system.
(b)The items defined below are based on Part-FCL Appendix 9. They should be included in the EVAL and MT of the applicable module. The minimum items to be included are: rejected take-off, failure of critical engine between V1 & V2, 3D approaches down to a decision height (DH) not less than 60 m (200 ft), engine-out approach & go-around, 2D approach down to the MDH/A, engine-out approach & go-around, engine-out landing.
(c)Instructors should record if the exercises are flown to proficiency using Appendix 9 references (define criteria). Note: Individual pilots’ grading and assessment remains according to the EBT grading system and Appendix 10.
(d)This verification should be performed once every 3 years.
GM1 ORO.FC.231(d)(2) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
VERIFICATION OF THE ACCURACY OF THE GRADING SYSTEM
Items that may be included in a verification of the accuracy of the grading system:
Assessment and training topic | Flight phase for activation | Description (includes type of topic, being threat, error or focus) | Desired outcome (includes performance criteria OR training outcome) | Guidance material (GM) Example scenario elements | PRO | COM | FPA | FPM | LTW | PSD | SAW | WLM | KNO |
Use of checklist prior to starting engines (1.4 AP9) | GND | Use of checklist prior to starting engines, starting procedures, radio and navigation equipment check, selection and setting of navigation and communication frequencies | This element is not required | Intentionally left in blank | Intentionally left in blank |
Before take-off checks (1.6 AP9) | GND | This element is not required | Intentionally left in blank | Intentionally left in blank |
Rejected take-off at a reasonable speed before reaching V1 (2.6 AP9) | TO | Engine failure after the application of take-off thrust and before reaching V1 | PRO - demonstrate adequate knowledge of the technique and procedure for accomplishing a rejected take-off after power-plant/system(s) failure/warnings, including related safety factors; - take into account, prior to beginning the take-off, operational factors which could affect the manoeuvre, such as take-off warning inhibit systems or other aeroplane characteristics, runway length, surface conditions, wind, obstructions that could affect take-off performance and could adversely affect safety; - perform all required pre-take-off checks as required by the appropriate checklist items. FPM - align the aeroplane on the runway centreline; - reduce the power smoothly and promptly, if appropriate to the aeroplane, when power-plant failure is recognised. Maintain the aeroplane under control close to the runway centreline; - use spoilers, prop reverse, thrust reverse, wheel brakes, and other drag/braking devices, as appropriate, maintaining positive control in such a manner as to bring the aeroplane to a safe stop. Accomplish the appropriate power-plant failure or other procedures and/or checklists as set forth in the POH or AFM or SOPs. | From initiation of take-off to complete stop (or as applicable to procedure) | x | x |
3.8.1* Adherence to departure and arrival routes and ATC instructions | CLBAPP | This element is not required | Intentionally left in blank |
Take-off with engine failure between V1 and V2 (2.5.2 AP9) | TO | Failure of the critical engine from V1 and before reaching V2 in the lowest CAT I visibility conditions | FPM - establish a bank of approximately 5°, if required, or as recommended by the manufacturer, to maintain coordinated flight, and properly trim for that condition; maintain the operating engine within acceptable operating limits; - establish the best engine inoperative airspeed as appropriate to the aircraft and condition of flight; - establish and maintain the recommended flight attitude and configuration for the best performance for all manoeuvring necessary for the phase of flight; - maintain desired altitude within given limits, when a constant altitude is specified and is within the capability of the aeroplane; - maintain the desired airspeed and heading within given limits. PRO - recognise an engine failure or the need to shut down an engine as simulated by the examiner; - complete engine failure vital action checks from memory; - follow the prescribed aeroplane checklist, and verify the procedures for securing the inoperative engine; - demonstrate proper engine restart or shutdown procedures (whatever appropriate) in accordance with approved procedure/checklist or the manufacturer’s recommended procedures and pertinent checklist items; and monitor all functions of the operating engine and make necessary adjustments. | The manoeuvre is considered to be complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at normal engine-out climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition and, as applicable, autopilot engagement. | x | x | |||||||
The manoeuvre is considered to be complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised in a clean configuration with engine-out procedures completed. | x | x |
3.8.3* 3D operations to DH/A of 200 ft (60 m) or to higher minima if required by the approach procedure | APP | Manually, with one engine simulated inoperative; engine failure has to be simulated during final approach before passing 1 000 ft above aerodrome level until touchdown or through the complete missed approach procedure. | PRO - select and comply with the ILS or LPV instrument approach procedure to be performed; - prior to final approach course, maintain declared or assigned altitudes within given limits without descending below applicable minimum altitudes and maintain headings within given limits; - select, tune, identify and confirm the operational status of ground and aircraft navigation equipment to be used for the approach procedure. COM - establish two-way communications with ATC using the proper communications phraseology and techniques, either personally, or, if appropriate, direct co-pilot/safety pilot to do so, as required for the phase of flight or approach segment; - comply in a timely manner with all clearances, instructions, and procedures issued by ATC and advise accordingly if unable to comply. FPA/FPM - establish the appropriate aircraft configuration and airspeed/V-speed considering turbulence, wind shear or other meteorological and operating conditions; - complete the aircraft checklist items appropriate to the phase of flight or approach segment, including engine out approach and landing checklist, as appropriate; - apply necessary adjustment to the published DH and visibility criteria for the aeroplane approach category when required, such as NOTAMs, inoperative aeroplane and ground navigation equipment, inoperative visual aids associated with the landing environment; - on final approach course, allow no more than ½ scale deflection of the localiser and/or glideslope indications; - maintain declared approach airspeeds within given limits; - maintain a stabilised descent to the DH to permit completion of the visual portion of the approach and landing with minimal manoeuvring; and - initiate the missed approach procedure, upon reaching the DH, when the required visual references for the intended runway are not obtained. 3D linear vertical deviations (e.g. RNP APCH (LNAV/VNAV) using BaroVNAV): not more than – 75 ft below the vertical profile at any time, and not more than + 75 ft above the vertical profile at or below 1 000 ft above aerodrome level. 3D (LNAV/VNAV) ‘linear’ lateral deviations: cross-track error/deviation should normally be limited to ± ½ the RNP value associated with the procedure. Brief deviations from this standard up to a maximum of 1 time the RNP value are allowable. | Intentionally left in blank | Intentionally left in blank |
Or | |||||
Manually, with one engine simulated inoperative; engine failure has to be simulated during final approach after passing the outer marker (OM) within a distance of not more than 4 NM until touchdown or through the complete missed approach procedure. |
2D operations down to the MDH/A (3.8.4 AP9) | APP | Non-precision approach down to the MDH/A | PRO - select and comply with the PBN, VOR/ LOC/ LOC BC or NDB instrument approach procedure to be performed; - complete the aircraft checklist items appropriate to the phase of flight or approach segment, including engine out approach and landing checklist, as appropriate; - prior to final approach course, maintain declared altitudes in given limits without descending below applicable minimum altitudes, and maintain headings as given; - select, tune, identify, confirm and monitor the operational status of ground and aircraft navigation equipment to be used for the approach procedure. COM - establish two-way communications with ATC using the proper communications phraseology and techniques, either personally, or, if appropriate, direct co-pilot/safety pilot to do so, as required for the phase of flight or approach segment; - comply in a timely manner with all clearances, instructions, and procedures issued by ATC and advise accordingly if unable to comply. FPA/FPM - apply necessary adjustment to the published minimum descent altitude (MDA) and visibility criteria for the aeroplane approach category when required, such as NOTAMs, inoperative aeroplane and ground navigation equipment, inoperative visual aids associated with the landing environment; - on the intermediate and final segments of the final approach course: a. maintain PBN, VOR/ LOC/ LOC BC tracking within ½ scale deflection of the course deviation indicator or within 5 degrees of the desired track in the case of an NDB approach; b. fly the approach in a stabilised manner without descending below the applicable minimum altitudes depicted on the approach chart (+as required/–0 feet); 2D (LNAV) ‘linear’ lateral deviations: cross-track error/deviation should normally be limited to ± ½ the RNP value associated with the procedure. Brief deviations from this standard up to a maximum of 1 time the RNP value are allowable. c. descend to and accurately maintain the MDA and track to the missed approach point (MAPt) or to the recommended minimum visibility that would permit completion of the visual portion of the approach with a normal rate of descent and minimal manoeuvring; d. maintain declared approach airspeeds (+10/-5 knots); e. initiate the missed approach procedure, if the required visual references for the intended runway are not obtained at the MAPt; f. execute a normal landing from a straight-in or circling approach as required. | Intentionally left in blank | Intentionally left in blank |
Engine-out approach & go-around (4.4* AP9) | APP | Manual go-around with the critical engine simulated inoperative after an instrument approach on reaching DH, MDH or MAPt | Demonstrate manual aircraft control skills with smoothness and accuracy as appropriate to the situation; Detect deviations through instrument scanning; Maintain spare mental capacity during manual aircraft control; Maintain the aircraft within the flight envelope; Apply knowledge of the relationship between aircraft attitude, speed and thrust. | This manoeuvre should be flown from intercept to centreline until acceleration after go-around. The manoeuvre is considered to be complete at a point when the aircraft is stabilised at normal engine-out climb speed with the correct pitch and lateral control, in trim condition and, as applicable, autopilot engagement (describe generally critical part of manoeuvre) | x | x | |||||||
Engine-out landing (5.5 AP9) | LDG | Landing with the critical engine inoperative | Initiation in a stabilised engine-out configuration from not less than 3 NM final approach, until completion of roll-out | x | x |
GM2 ORO.FC.231(d)(2) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
VERIFICATION OF THE ACCURACY OF THE GRADING SYSTEM — FEEDBACK PROCESS
The verification of the accuracy of the grading system provides valuable data for the training system performance and concordance assurance. Therefore, the verification is necessary from a systemic point of view and the intention is not to measure individual pilot against Appendix 9 criteria.
Concordance agreement between instructors may be high; however, the whole community of instructors may be grading too low or too high (accuracy).
The statistical result of the verification against Appendix 9 criteria can provide the operator with a criterion-referenced system to adjust the accuracy of the grading system. The verification does not require an examiner; EBT instructors may provide the necessary data.
Example 1: For the last 36 months, the operator has a rate of 3 % of pilots scoring 1 (assuming the data is statistically relevant). In this example, the rate of 3 % of the pilots scoring 1 is maintained across all the technical competencies. When the operator performs a verification, the rate of failure would have been only 0,5 %. This may indicate that instructors are rating too low in EBT and therefore some of the pilots scoring 1 should have been graded with a score higher than 1. This may be economically negative for the operator. On the other hand, it could be that the operator has decided to implement higher standards.
Example 2: The operator has an EBT programme with a negligible rate of pilots scoring 1 and a 1 % of pilots scoring 2 in two consecutive recurrent modules. The verification of the technical competencies against Appendix 9 criteria provides a rate of 5 % failure. The EBT manager should further investigate the reason behind this mismatch between EBT and Appendix 9 in the technical competencies. There may be factors influencing this mismatch (e.g. statistical issues, the events in the EBT modules are too benign compared to the events in Appendix 9), which may lead to a corrective action (e.g. redesign of the EBT modules). If the difficulty of the EBT scenarios is equivalent to Appendix 9 and the concordance is high between instructors, then the discrepancy in outcomes might be because the community of instructors are grading too high in the technical competencies (they are grading with 2 when they should have graded 1). Further instructor standardisation will be needed to address this.
The implementation of mixed EBT following GM1 ORO.FC.230(a);(b);(f) provides a good opportunity to fine-tune and verify the accuracy of the grading system because an Appendix 9 licence proficiency check is carried out every year. The authority may not allow full EBT unless the accuracy of the grading system is demonstrated.
Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(e) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
VOLUME AND FSTD QUALIFICATION LEVEL
(a)The EBT programme has been developed to include a notional exemplar of 48 FSTD hours over a 3-year programme for each flight crew member.
(b)Subject to ORO.GEN.120, the operator may reduce the number of FSTD hours provided that an equivalent level of safety is achieved. The programme should not be less than 36 FSTD hours.
(c)Each EBT module should be conducted in an FSTD with a qualification level adequate to complete proficiency checks; therefore, it should be conducted in a full-flight simulator (FFS) level C or D.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS — PROCESS
(a)The equivalency of malfunctions process should be undertaken by subject matter experts (SMEs) who hold or have held a type rating on the aeroplane type.
(b)Steps of the equivalency of malfunctions
Step 1: Look at (review) all aircraft system malfunctions provided by the OEM. For example, FCOM for Airbus, or AFM for other manufacturers, does not normally provide an exhaustive list of malfunctions.
Step 2: Determine and retain in a list only malfunctions that place a significant demand on a proficient crew, in isolation from an environmental or operational context.
Step 3: For each retained malfunction, determine the applicable characteristic or characteristics.
Step 4: Develop the EBT FSTD programme to incorporate malfunctions at the frequency specified in the table of assessment and training topics.
(c)Malfunctions included in the equivalency of malfunctions but not included in the EBT FSTD programme require review and appropriate procedural knowledge training, conducted in a less qualified but suitable alternative environment (classroom, flight procedure training device, advance computer-based training, aviation blended learning environment (ABLE), etc.). Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual.
(d)The operator should establish procedures to determine what malfunctions should be included in the FSTD. This may include a different malfunction difficulty between the EVAL and the SBT.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(f)(3) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
CREW EXPOSURE TO AT LEAST ONE MALFUNCTION FOR EACH CHARACTERISTIC
(a)Unless specified in the OSD, each crew member should be exposed to the characteristics of degraded control and loss of instrumentation in the role of pilot flying.
(b)Notwithstanding point (a), for aircraft types with a limited number of malfunctions in the characteristic of degraded control or loss of instrumentation, the operator may use an alternative means of compliance in accordance with ORO.GEN.120.
GM1 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS — SIGNIFICANT DEMAND ON A PROFICIENT CREW
(a)The criteria to determine that a malfunction places a significant demand on a proficient crew are the following:
(1)The procedure includes one or more action items and not only a set of information for crew awareness.
(2)The flight crew’s cognitive load (resources required by the mental processes of perception, memory, judgement, and reasoning) significantly increases during or after the application of the associated abnormal or emergency procedure. The cognitive load is considered to be significantly increased when it is well above the cognitive load induced by the application of the normal standard operating procedures.
(3)The flight crew’s workload significantly increases during or after the application of the associated abnormal or emergency procedure. The workload is considered to be significantly increased when it is well above the workload induced by the application of the normal standard operating procedures.
(4)The aircraft handling perceived by the pilot when flying in abnormal conditions is different compared to the aircraft handling in normal conditions; e.g. the symmetry of the flight is affected.
(b)The criteria to determine that a malfunction places a significant demand on a proficient crew allow the identification of:
(1)the pilot competencies that are specifically challenged during the management of the related procedure, and
(2)the characteristic of the aircraft system malfunction procedure.
Note: The identification of the pilot competencies allows a consistent assessment to determine the proficiency of the crew member.
Criteria in (a) | Definition | Challenged Competency | Example of procedure characteristics |
(1) | The procedure includes one or more action items and not only a set of information for crew awareness. | PRO KNO | multiple paths within the procedure (e.g. decision trees) multiple inoperative or degraded systems |
(2) | The flight crew’s cognitive load (resources required by the mental processes of perception, memory, judgement, and reasoning) significantly increases, during, or after, the application of the abnormal/emergency procedure. The cognitive load is considered to be significantly increased when it is well above the cognitive load induced by the application of the normal standard operating procedures. | SAW PSD | multiple paths within the procedure (e.g. decision trees) multiple inoperative or degraded systems a high potential for undetected errors (e.g. removal of flight protections) |
(3) | The flight crew’s workload significantly increases, during, or after, the application of the abnormal/emergency procedure. The workload is considered to be significantly increased when it is well above the workload induced by the application of the normal standard operating procedures. | WLM | time criticality; multiple paths within the procedure (e.g. decision trees); multiple inoperative or degraded systems; a high potential for undetected errors (e.g. removal of flight protections); and a significant increase in workload (e.g. removal of automation). |
(4) | The aircraft handling perceived by the pilot when flying in abnormal conditions is different compared to the aircraft handling in normal conditions; e.g. the symmetry of the flight is affected. | FPM FPA | multiple inoperative or degraded systems a high potential for undetected errors (e.g. removal of flight protections) |
(c)When a malfunction is placing a significant demand on a proficient crew, it means it has one or more of the malfunction characteristics (see more in GM2.ORO.FC.231(f)).
GM2 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS — MALFUNCTION CHARACTERISTICS
The following may be considered suitable definitions for each of the characteristics:
(a)‘Immediacy’: System malfunctions that require immediate and urgent crew intervention or decision (e.g. malfunctions with memory items, loss of pressurisation at high altitude, brake failure during landing).
(b)‘Complexity’: System malfunctions that require recovery procedures with multiple options to analyse and/or multiple decision paths to apply (e.g. multiple hydraulic system failures, smoke and fumes procedures).
(c)‘Degradation of aircraft control’: System malfunctions that result in significant degradation of flight controls in combination with abnormal handling characteristics, such as modification of the normal pitch attitude during approach and landing or reconfiguration of the flight control laws or modes (e.g. jammed stabiliser, flaps/slats inoperative)
(d)‘Loss of instrumentation’: System malfunctions that require monitoring and management of the flight path using degraded or alternative displays such as temporary or permanent loss of any flight-path-related parameter displayed on the primary flight display (PFD), head-up display (HUD) or navigation display (ND), including loss of any setting capability of one of these indications. It includes primary instrumentation to monitor and manage primary aircraft systems (e.g. FLAPS indication, loss of fuel indications, etc.).
(e)‘Management of consequences’: System malfunctions that affect significantly the flight crew standard task sharing and/or the workload management and/or the decision-making process during an extensive period after the management of the malfunction itself (e.g. fuel leak or fuel not usable, altitude/speed limitations, malfunctions with ‘deferred’ items in later flight phases).
Note: Equivalency of malfunctions may be undertaken in consultation with the aircraft OEM. The objective of the OEM consultation is to review the operator analysis regarding the OEM operational certification (e.g. OSD) documents and the general OEM operation and training policy.
GM3 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS — ISOLATION FROM AN ENVIRONMENTAL OR OPERATIONAL CONTEXT
When considering significant demand on a proficient crew, SMEs may consider that there are no significant environmental and operational threats. For example, the aircraft is close to a suitable aerodrome with environmental conditions permitting all published approaches to be made, with no pre-existing malfunctions and sufficient fuel for several hours (e.g. A320 or B737 overhead Ibiza - Spain, at FL350 with visible moisture at 30 000 ft, at the aerodrome wind calm, CAVOK, ISA).
GM4 ORO.FC.231(f) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS PROCESS — DELPHI
(a)The operator reviews/looks at aircraft system malfunctions provided in the official documentation of the OEM — for example, FCOM for Airbus, or AFM for other manufacturers.
(b)Before launching the equivalency of malfunctions survey and when the aircraft system malfunctions list is very long, the operator may slightly shorten the list by removing the malfunctions that surely will not place a significant demand of a proficient crew (see GM on SIGNIFICANT DEMAND ON A PROFICIENT CREW).
(c)A group of EBT instructors statistically relevant will be selected to perform the equivalency of malfunctions survey. 50 % of the instructors’ community will be used as a reference. In small instructors’ communities, it may be necessary to refer to 100 %. In operators with large instructors’ communities, the number of instructors statistically relevant may be less than 50 %.
(d)The group of instructors selected in point (c) will rate each of the malfunctions listed in points (a) and (b)
(1)Each instructor will rate each one of the 5 characteristics in each malfunction listed in point (b).
(2)The rate will be 0 when the malfunction does not have the characteristic (the characteristic does not appear in the malfunction).
(3)The rate will be 1 to 5 when the characteristic appears in the malfunction. Rating 1 when the characteristic is not relevant for the malfunction and rate 5 when the characteristic is very relevant.
(4)The instructors will rate individually (e.g. home, classroom, etc.) to avoid exchange of opinions with other instructors.
(e)An average rate of the whole instructors’ community as a result of point (d) will be calculated for each characteristic of each malfunction.
(f)A second round of survey will be performed with the same instructors and the same list. This time the operator will provide the average calculated in point (e) and ask them if in light of the average they would like to change their rating. Group discussion may substitute or complement the second survey.
(g)When an instructor changes their rating, the old rate will be discarded.
(h)A new average will be calculated for each characteristic of each malfunction at the end of the second survey. The final average will be rounded to the closest integer number.
(i)The operator may select an average rate of the characteristics (e.g. rate 2 or 3) at which or above which the characteristic is considered to be present in the malfunction, thus it places a significant demand on a proficient crew.
(j)The operator may use the rates of the characteristics to determine the difficulty of the malfunction. As SBT is a developing phase, the operator may select a higher difficulty of the malfunctions selected in this phase. Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual.
(k)The operator may refer to an aircraft OEM malfunction analysis to support all the steps of the session.
(l)A simpler version of the process may be acceptable provided that:
(1)the aircraft manufacturer provides equivalency of malfunction documentation;
(2)there is a minimum of three EBT instructors who have a deep knowledge of aircraft systems; and
(3)the instructors referred to in (2) above are properly standardised. The standardisation is based on the EBT programme design knowledge and in particular the concept, definitions and process of the equivalency of malfunctions. The simplified process may or may not use a survey and use either a two-point scale (0 and 1), three-point scale (1, 2 and 3) or five-point scale (1 to 5).
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(g) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
APPROACHES THAT PLACE AN ADDITIONAL DEMAND ON A PROFICIENT CREW
(a)In order to identify approaches that place an additional demand on a proficient crew, an operator should:
(1)review its operational network;
(2)select approaches with one or more of the following characteristics:
(i)unusual design;
(ii)low frequency of exposure; and
(iii)degraded approach guidance;
(3)select at least one approach of each type and method and include them in the EBT programme at the frequency given in the table of assessment and training topics; and
(4)ensure the approaches selected in (3) cover all the characteristics at the frequency given in the table of assessment and training topics.
Note: The approaches listed within Section 2 of the table of assessment and training topics should be selected in this process.
(b)Any approach that is required to be flown in the PF role specifically should be classified as ‘skills retention’ and may be trained in the MT.
AMC2 ORO.FC.231(g) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
EQUIVALENCY OF APPROACHES RELEVANT TO OPERATIONS — SPECIFIC APPROVAL
The operator may extend the interval for recurrent training and checking of approaches that require specific approval as defined in the AMC to Part-SPA (e.g. SPA.LVO) to the frequency given in the EBT programme.
GM1 ORO.FC.231(g) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
EQUIVALENCY OF APPROACHES RELEVANT TO OPERATIONS — APPROACH CHARACTERISTICS
The following may be considered suitable examples for each of the approach characteristics:
(a)Design
(1)Unusual approach design feature — for example, offset final approach track or steep approach, etc.
(2)Unusual runway design feature — for example, non-standard lighting or marking
(b)Frequency
(1)Infrequently visited airfields — for example, alternate airfields
(2)Infrequently flown approaches at commonly visited airfields — for example, circling approach, CAT 2, SA CATI
(c)Degraded guidance
(1)Degraded internal guidance or aircraft equipment — for example, head-up display (HUD) failure
(2)Degraded external guidance or ground equipment — for example, GPS signal failure
GM2 ORO.FC.231(g) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
SELECTED APPROACHES AT THE FREQUENCY GIVEN IN THE EBT PROGRAMME
The table of assessment and training topics for each generation provides the type of approach, flight method and frequency for the crew.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(h) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
LINE EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE
(a)The purpose of the line evaluation of competence is to verify the capability of the flight crew member(s) to undertake line operations, including preflight and post-flight activities as specified in the operations manual. Therefore, the line evaluation of competence should be performed in the aircraft. The route should be representative of typical sectors undertaken in normal operations. The commander, or any pilot who may be required to relieve the commander, should also demonstrate their competency in the role.
(b)Each flight crew member should be assessed according to the competency framework and grading system approved for their operator’s EBT programme.
(c)Flight crew members should be assessed in duties as pilot flying and pilot monitoring; they should be evaluated in each role. Therefore, they should be checked on one flight sector as pilot flying and on another flight sector as pilot monitoring.
(d)The operator should maintain a list and inform the competent authority about the line evaluators suitably qualified to undertake line evaluations of competence.
(e)The person that conducts the line evaluation of competence should occupy an observer’s seat. For aeroplanes, in the case of long-haul operations where additional operating flight crew members are carried, the person that conducts the line evaluation of competence may fulfil the function of a cruise relief pilot and should not occupy either pilot’s seat during take-off, departure, initial cruise, descent, approach and landing.
(f)The validity period should be counted from the end of the month when the line evaluation of competence was undertaken. When the line evaluation of competence is undertaken within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the original expiry date.
AMC2 ORO.FC.231(h) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
LINE EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE — LINE EVALUATOR
(a)The line evaluator should have a valid line evaluation of competence.
(b)The line evaluator should receive an acceptable training based on the EBT instructor training. The EBT assessment of competence is not required.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(h)(3) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
LINE EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE — EXTENSION OF THE VALIDITY
In order to extend the validity of the line evaluation of competence to:
(a)2 years, in every cycle, one EVAL for each pilot should be conducted by an EBT instructor (EBT instructors) who has (have) a valid line evaluation of competence in the same operator;
(b)3 years, in addition to point (a) above, the operator should have a feedback process for the monitoring of line operations which:
(1)identifies threats in the airline’s operating environment;
(2)identifies threats within the airline’s operations;
(3)assesses the degree of transference of training to the line operations;
(4)checks the quality and usability of procedures;
(5)identifies design problems in the human-machine interface;
(6)understands pilots’ shortcuts and workarounds; and
(7)assesses safety margins.
GM1 ORO.FC.231(h) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
LINE EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE
(a)Line evaluation of competence, route and aerodrome knowledge, and recent experience requirements are intended to verify the capability of the flight crew member(s) to operate safely, effectively and efficiently under line operating conditions, including preflight and post-flight activities as specified in the operations manual. Other EBT assessments, legacy checks and emergency and safety equipment training are primarily intended to prepare flight crew members for abnormal/emergency procedures.
(b)The line evaluation of competence is considered a particularly important factor in the development, maintenance and refinement of high operating standards, and can provide the operator with a valuable indication of the usefulness of its training policy and methods.
GM1 ORO.FC.231(h)(4) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
LINE EVALUATOR
(a)AMC1.ORO.FC.146(c) ‘EBT instructor training’ provides some learning objectives which may be used to qualify the commander nominated by the operator to perform line evaluation of competence. The training may be a minimum of 7 hours, where 1 hour may be done outside the classroom. The use of advance training environments such as advance computer-based training or ABLE may reduce further the need of classroom training. The assessment of competence may not be required. Further guidance can be found in the EASA EBT manual.
(b)The line evaluator training may be included in the EBT instructor standardisation and concordance programme. This option is however limited due to the limited number of line evaluations of competence that are required (every 2 or 3 years), the difficulties in observing the whole range of performance of competencies and the lack of control of the environment during a line evaluation of competence. Therefore, the operator may need to use EBT instructors to maintain an acceptable level of standardisation.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(i) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTINUOUS TECHNICAL GROUND TRAINING
(a)Technical ground training programme
(1)The objective of the technical ground training programme is to ensure that pilots have adequate:
(i) knowledge of:
(A)the aircraft systems; and
(B)the operational procedures and requirements; and
(ii) awareness of:
(A)the most significant accidents or incidents that could affect their operations following the ‘threat and error management model’ or an alternative risk model agreed with the authority; and
(B)the occurrences in the airline or occurrences from other airlines that may be relevant for their operations, accident/incident and occurrence review.
(2)The technical ground training should:
(i)be conducted as part of a 3-year programme;
(ii)allow a customisation of syllabi. The operator should describe in the operations manual the procedure to determine the customisation of syllabi. This customisation should be based on evidence both internal and external to the operator.
(iii)as a minimum, allow the pilot to receive technical ground training every 12 months. The validity period should be counted from the end of the month. When this training is conducted within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the original expiry date.
(3)The technical ground training syllabi should be delivered using different methods and tools.
(i)The selection of the method and tool results from a combination of the learning objectives and the target group receiving the training (WHAT needs to be trained and WHO needs to be trained).
(ii)The selection of the appropriate method and tool should be driven by the desired outcome in terms of adequate knowledge.
(iii)The delivery of the technical ground training syllabi should include the methods or tools to verify if the pilot has acquired the objective of the technical ground training programme. This may be achieved by means a questionnaire, assessment of application of the competency ‘knowledge’ (KNO) or other suitable methods.
(4)The measurement and evaluation of the training system performance through the feedback process should include the performance of the technical ground training.
(b)Emergency and safety equipment training
(1)Training on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment should be conducted in an aircraft or a suitable alternative training device.
(2)Every year the emergency and safety equipment training programme should include the following:
(i)actual donning of a life jacket, where fitted;
(ii)actual donning of protective breathing equipment, where fitted;
(iii)actual handling of fire extinguishers of the type used;
(iv)instruction on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment carried on the aircraft;
(v)instruction on the location and use of all types of exits; and
(vi)security procedures.
(3)Every 3 years the programme of training should include the following:
(i)actual operation of all types of exits;
(ii)demonstration of the method used to operate a slide, where fitted;
(iii)actual firefighting using equipment representative of that carried on the aircraft on an actual or simulated fire except that, with Halon extinguishers, an alternative extinguisher may be used;
(iv)the effects of smoke in an enclosed area and actual use of all relevant equipment in a simulated smoke-filled environment;
(v)actual handling of pyrotechnics, real or simulated, where applicable;
(vi)demonstration in the use of the life rafts, where fitted; and
(vii)particularly in the case where no cabin crew is required, first aid appropriate to the aircraft type, the kind of operation and the crew complement.
(4)The successful resolution of aircraft emergencies requires interaction between flight crew and cabin/technical crew and emphasis should be placed on the importance of effective coordination and two-way communication between all crew members in various emergency situations.
(5)Emergency and safety equipment training should include joint practice in aircraft evacuations so that all who are involved are aware of the duties other crew members should perform. When such practice is not possible, combined flight crew and cabin/technical crew training should include joint discussion of emergency scenarios.
(6)Emergency and safety equipment training should, as far as practicable, take place in conjunction with cabin/technical crew undergoing similar training with emphasis on coordinated procedures and two-way communication between the flight crew compartment and the cabin.
(7)The emergency and safety equipment training should include a pilot’s assessment of the training received; as a minimum, by means of a questionnaire, or computer-based exercises, or other suitable methods.
(8)When the emergency and safety equipment training is conducted within 3 calendar months prior to the expiry of the 12-calendar-month period, the next emergency and safety equipment training should be completed within 12 calendar months of the original expiry date of the previous training.
(c)Emergency and safety equipment training — extension of period of training
(1)The emergency and safety equipment training programme should establish and maintain at least an equivalent level of proficiency achieved by complying with the provisions of (b). The level of flight crew proficiency in the use of emergency and safety equipment should be demonstrated prior to being granted approval to extend the period of training by the competent authority.
(2)The operator applying for an approval to extend the period of emergency and safety equipment training should provide the competent authority with an implementation plan, including a description of the level of flight crew proficiency to be achieved in the use of emergency and safety equipment. The implementation plan should comprise the following:
(i)A safety case which should:
(A)demonstrate that the required or equivalent level of proficiency in the use of emergency and safety equipment is maintained;
(B)incorporate the programme of implementation, to include controls and validity checks;
(C)minimise risk during all phases of the programme’s implementation and operation; and
(D)include oversight, including review and audits.
(ii)The measurement and evaluation of the training system performance through the feedback process should include the performance of the emergency and safety equipment training. The feedback should be used as a tool to validate that the emergency and safety equipment training is correctly implemented; this enables substantiation of the emergency and safety equipment training and ensures that objectives have been met.
(iii)Documentation that details the scope and requirements of the programme, including the following:
(A)the operator’s training needs and established operational and training objectives;
(B)a description of the process for designing and obtaining approval for the operator’s emergency and safety equipment training programmes. This should include quantified operational and training objectives identified by the operator’s internal monitoring programmes. External sources may also be used; and
(C)a description of how the programme will develop a support and feedback process to form a self-correcting training system.
(3)When the emergency and safety equipment training is conducted within 6 calendar months prior to the expiry of the 24-calendar-month period, the next emergency and safety equipment training should be completed within 24 calendar months of the original expiry date of the previous training.
GM1 ORO.FC.231(i) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTINUOUS GROUND TRAINING — INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EVIDENCE
(a)Operator evidence (inner loop)
(1)Pilot data (individual or group);
(2)Population-based data according to the training metrics determined in the training system performance;
(3)Evidence identified or recognised through the safety management process covered in ORO.GEN.200.
(b)External evidence from the authority and manufacturers (external loop)
(1)Revision of existing rules and regulations, updated versions of the EBT data report, state safety plan;
(2)Training needs derived from updated OSD (if appropriate for ground training), etc.
(c)The evidence drives the selection of the methods and tools.
GM2 ORO.FC.231(i) Evidence-based training
ED Decision 2021/002/R
PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTINUOUS GROUND TRAINING — METHODS AND TOOLS
This is a non-exhaustive list of methods and tools to deliver ground training:
—classroom, presentations,
—web-based training,
—self-learning instructions,
—advance CBT such as virtual reality, chatbots, interactive scenario trainers.
ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics
Regulation (EU) 2020/2036
(a)The operator shall ensure that each pilot is exposed to the assessment and training topics.
(b)The assessment and training topics shall be:
(1)derived from safety and operational data that are used to identify the areas for improvement and prioritisation of pilot training to guide in the construction of suitable EBT programmes;
(2)distributed across a 3-year period at a defined frequency;
(3)relevant to the type or variant of aircraft on which the pilot operates.
AMC1 ORO.FC.232 EBT programme assessment and training topics
ED Decision 2021/002/R
ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING TOPICS
Each table of assessment and training topics is specific to the aeroplane generation specified in the title. The component elements in the column headings of the matrix are as follows:
(a)Assessment and training topic. A topic or grouping of topics derived from threats, errors or findings from data analysis, to be considered for assessment and mitigation by training.
(b)Frequency. The priority of the topic to be considered in an EBT programme, according to the evidence derived from a large-scale analysis of operational data, is linked to a recommended frequency. There are three levels of frequency:
(1)A — assessment and training topic to be included with defined scenario elements during every EBT module;
(2)B — assessment and training topic to be included with defined scenario elements during every cycle;
(3)C — assessment and training topic to be included with defined scenario elements at least once in the 3-year period of the EBT programme.
(c)Flight phase for activation. The flight phase for the realisation of the critical threat or error in the assessment and training scenario.
(d)Description (includes type of topic, being threat, error or focus). A description of the training topic.
(e)Desired outcome (includes performance criteria or training outcome). Simple evaluative statements on the desired outcome.
(f)Example scenario elements (guidance material). The example scenario elements address the training topic and detail the threat and/or error that the crew are exposed to.
(g)Competency map. Competencies marked are those considered critical in managing the scenario.