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engineers (authorized person/ certifyng staff) didn't need remote supervision. mechanics not AP or CS will need supervision.. EASA didn't detailed if yes and how applicable remote supervision. Personally never imagine to accept remote supervision (pictures), for example,, for an engine change.

Great article, indeed.
Informative, well documented and well illustrated.
Published in 2024 but that doesn't matter, as it addresses a seasonal risk.

Thank you for your comment Luca. Including consideration of these Time-Limited Systems in our flight planning tool will have the most impact.🙂

Kudos to Wendell for his quest. Indeed, the poor safety record of GA compared to CAT should not be considered as given.
IMHO this evil has two roots. One is based in training and the other in the equipment we operate. Both are subject to regulation by EASA and both seem to be regulated commerce-centric rather than safety-centric.
In regard to training, GA means essentially single pilot no-safety nets non-routine operations. For-profit training organizations, "anecdotally" use the cheapest equipment and offset the risks as much as allowed. The tragedy is that what is allowed is aligned with CAT, where multi crew, safety nets, routine operations is the norm thinking that this rises the bar, while in fact it lowers the bar.
In regard to equipment, I can't think of any incentive for OEMs to add risk reducing features beyond the minimum requirements, if this could bring the cost up, or the performance down. Also no incentive to add features which could facilitate single pilot-oriented training like for example in the military.
In conclusion, shifting more responsibility to pilots as suggested in intro, does not seem right to me. I am sure none of the GA victims wanted to die and they all had EASA licenses. This begs the question, whether an EASA license is adequate proof of ability to weigh own capacity versus risks?

Many thanks for this document which brings clarification for both competent authorities and organizations on the deliverables needed to be compliant on the applicability date. Still I have a question of consistency regarding a particular point. The expectation is for organizations to demonstrate we are at the "present & suitable" level. On page 7, expectation #4 is "The organisation has performed an initial risk assessment (e.g. major risks and related threat
scenarios both internal and at the interfaces).". To perform the initial risk assessment as described, organisations must have an Information Security Risk Assessment process not only present and suitable but fully operating and effective. Could you please provide your view on this point?