Air Operations

To my understanding a yellow taxi line is also a visual means to guide an aircraft during parking manoeuvers. Of course when obstacles or other aircraft are in close proximity an advanced visual docking guidance system or a marshaller(s) should be used.

In the article “EASA/ECDC provide guidelines for aviation as part of European response to COVID-19 developments in China” it has been stated that “the following recommendations apply with ***immediate effect*** for flights arriving in the EU from China” and in the list there is the requirement of “waste water should be monitored at airports with international flights and aircraft arriving from China to monitor the level of infection and detect any new variants”
The guidance for wastewater sampling of aircraft states “ this document provides guidance for public helt authorities…”
Question:
When should an aircraft operator expect a directive from the authorities in order to comply with EASA's "immediate effect" requirement for wastewater sampling? Meanwhile, it is unclear whether the aircraft operator should take compensatory measures for wastewater sampling

Just to add, in an organisational context - yes, there is only one accountable manager for the safety of the operation/ work/ approval such as the Part 145, Part M etc. This is different from the accountability of individual staff for performing their jobs correctly.

Hi John, thanks for reply. No other reactions added. Could be non-existent in EUR then at this moment. Best regards.

One of the reasons (maybe the most common one) for pilots not following an RA is that the regulation includes the infamous "unless doing so ..." exception - but no guidance on it! Even instructors and examiners have few clues about how to make best use of it.

During initial implementation of TCAS there were still numerous false or nuisance alerts. Nowadays the system is much improved and working very well. So well, that it is against human nature to trust it completely. There may still be some unnecessary RAs, but it is still the lowest risk option to follow them.

Now, what would be valid reasons to ignore an RA?
1. The intruder transmits a wrong altitude: then the RA cannot be correct. Should be controlled to a very low probability by Air Traffic Control. When observing an aircraft at the wrong altitude (not always easy to detect), the controller would advise the pilot to correct the problem or to switch off Mode C.

2. There is an additional aircraft, not squawking Mode C or not squawking at all, but happening to be exactly in the airspace that TCAS advises to manoeuver in response to a valid threat. Extremely unlikely scenario.

3. A failure of the TCAS system, e.g. a programming error. Extremely unlikely following decades of operational experience and software improvements.

Can anybody suggest any other reason that has a high enough probability to be concerned?

This leaves us with the Human Factors problem: the knowledge is there, a lot of guidance for "FOLLOW THE RA" too, but the exception clause is misused for various reasons, including the lack of guidance on valid reasons for using the exception.

Train the Trainer, Check the Examiners!