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The case a) is a general situation which does not mean a failure of any kind.It can be when you like to enter a traffic circuit where the tower is not present or out of operative hours.In this case you inform the other traffics in circuit of your intention.Some times it is even reccomended in the map and rules of that airport. The case a) is generally applicable any time you intend to inform all other traffic around of your presence.For example when you fly a wide area covered by a Flight Information Service Station (FIS) in space G very far from your position.You receive them because of their power trasmission by they cannot receive you due to your low power radio,nevertheless you want to inform the other traffic around you ,who listen the same FIS ,of your presence

Hi Abdullah, IATA Strategic Partnership Program is a platform consisted by companies. You may find more information about the Program as well as the directory of its Strategic Partners in the website of IATA: https://www.iata.org/en/about/sp/

EASA, as the Aviation Safety Agency of the EU, works closely with a number of aviation safety organisations and initiatives including IATA. More information regarding the International Cooperation of the Agency can be found here: https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/light/topics/international-cooperation

In the article “EASA/ECDC provide guidelines for aviation as part of European response to COVID-19 developments in China” it has been stated that “the following recommendations apply with ***immediate effect*** for flights arriving in the EU from China” and in the list there is the requirement of “waste water should be monitored at airports with international flights and aircraft arriving from China to monitor the level of infection and detect any new variants”
The guidance for wastewater sampling of aircraft states “ this document provides guidance for public helt authorities…”
Question:
When should an aircraft operator expect a directive from the authorities in order to comply with EASA's "immediate effect" requirement for wastewater sampling? Meanwhile, it is unclear whether the aircraft operator should take compensatory measures for wastewater sampling

Thanks for the comment, I will share this with my colleagues who are leading this work and will try to reply as quickly as we can.

Happy new year everyone in the aviation cyber world. I wish you great success and a year without any hacks, cracks and attacks.

Torben, we considering to address UL94 with the next revision of CS-STAN. However, to our knowledge UL94 is not available in the EU yet. Do you have access to it in DK?
Please find here the link to CS-STAN incl. SC202c:
https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/certification-specificat…

Just to add, in an organisational context - yes, there is only one accountable manager for the safety of the operation/ work/ approval such as the Part 145, Part M etc. This is different from the accountability of individual staff for performing their jobs correctly.

My answer would be yes. The basis is item 104 in Annex I (Definitions) to the Air Ops regulation:

"‘runway visual range (RVR)’ means the range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centre line of a runway can see the runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its centre line;"

As RVR as is defined to be what the *pilot* can see, the determination of the RVR for take-off can be made by the pilot. (It is different for approaches as the pilot can't determine the RVR him/herself until the aircraft has already touched down and then it is too late.)

Hi John, thanks for reply. No other reactions added. Could be non-existent in EUR then at this moment. Best regards.

One of the reasons (maybe the most common one) for pilots not following an RA is that the regulation includes the infamous "unless doing so ..." exception - but no guidance on it! Even instructors and examiners have few clues about how to make best use of it.

During initial implementation of TCAS there were still numerous false or nuisance alerts. Nowadays the system is much improved and working very well. So well, that it is against human nature to trust it completely. There may still be some unnecessary RAs, but it is still the lowest risk option to follow them.

Now, what would be valid reasons to ignore an RA?
1. The intruder transmits a wrong altitude: then the RA cannot be correct. Should be controlled to a very low probability by Air Traffic Control. When observing an aircraft at the wrong altitude (not always easy to detect), the controller would advise the pilot to correct the problem or to switch off Mode C.

2. There is an additional aircraft, not squawking Mode C or not squawking at all, but happening to be exactly in the airspace that TCAS advises to manoeuver in response to a valid threat. Extremely unlikely scenario.

3. A failure of the TCAS system, e.g. a programming error. Extremely unlikely following decades of operational experience and software improvements.

Can anybody suggest any other reason that has a high enough probability to be concerned?

This leaves us with the Human Factors problem: the knowledge is there, a lot of guidance for "FOLLOW THE RA" too, but the exception clause is misused for various reasons, including the lack of guidance on valid reasons for using the exception.

Train the Trainer, Check the Examiners!

and a pretty good didactic page here from the industry (from 2019, but still very relevant) https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/gnss-interference/
There are also several research projects aiming at the detection of jamming and spoofing, impact reduction and localization of source. I do not have direct links to offer, but I would invite to crawl the sister Agency EUSPA https://www.euspa.europa.eu/euspace-applications/project-portfolio/sear… for a start