Welcome

Hi Vasileios, do you know if there are any plans to open a "consultation window" for ED-ISMS?

Well done. The presentation is appalling

How can I join ?

Thank you Benjamin

Thank you for information. I suppose that Examiner must check that all prerequisites are met before AoC. When I send notification to CAA I receive from most of authorities that exam is approved provided Examiner checked that all prerequisites are met.

Thanks both of you, it was very helpful. Especially the link to FOCA docs

Hello Nuno,

In the context of air traffic control and runway safety, runway incursions are a serious concern. There are several regulatory and best practice guidelines that address the issue of runway incursions and the role of runway wind indications. While I cannot point to a specific regulation that mentions “blockage of runway winds indication,” here are some relevant points and references you might consider:

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs):
• ICAO Annex 14 (Aerodromes) addresses the design and operation of aerodromes, including runway safety and the importance of providing accurate wind information.
• ICAO Doc 9870 (Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions) provides guidelines and best practices for preventing runway incursions. It emphasises the importance of clear communication and accurate information, including wind data, to pilots and ground personnel.

FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) Regulations and Guidance:
• FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5300-13A (Airport Design) outlines standards for airport design, including runway markings and signs that help prevent runway incursions.
• FAA Order JO 7110.65 (Air Traffic Control) contains procedures for air traffic controllers, including the provision of wind information to pilots. Accurate wind data is critical for safe runway operations.

EASA (European Union Aviation Safety Agency) Regulations:
• EASA CS-ADR-DSN (Certification Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Aerodromes Design) provides guidelines for the design and operation of aerodromes within Europe, including runway safety measures.

Best Practices and Mitigation Strategies:
• Ensuring that all wind sensors and indicators are properly maintained and free from obstructions to provide accurate wind information.
• Implementing advanced surface movement guidance and control systems (A-SMGCS) to enhance situational awareness and prevent runway incursions.
• Regular training and awareness programs for air traffic controllers and pilots on the importance of accurate wind information and communication.

While there may not be a specific regulation explicitly mentioning the “blockage of runway winds indication,” these references emphasise the importance of accurate wind data and clear communication to mitigate runway incursions. It would be beneficial to review these documents in detail to ensure compliance with the relevant regulations and best practices.

If you need more specific information or the latest updates, you might consider contacting your regulatory authority or consulting the latest versions of these documents.

A couple of years ago, at the 2022 FAA/EASA Intl Aviation Safety Conference in Washington, Larry Grossman (Senior Advisor, Cybersecurity & Privacy Services, FAA) presented an interesting slide that showed that EFBs are the only critical aspect of the aircraft where FAA performs little to no oversight/certification activity. Luc Tytgat (then Director, Strategy & Safety Management, EASA) stated that the (then upcoming) EU Part-IS (ISMS) will require EU operators to manage infosec risks for all their ops including for EFBs. At this year's conference, FAA said that their EFB Security Program requirements already covers Part 121 operators and their upcoming aircraft cybersecurity rulemaking will cover similar threats and objectives as EU's Part-IS for the rest, but they stayed hush about how they would reach those objectives. And while certain accountable executives at the EU operators have the security accountability, the reality is that pilots are the day to day users of those EFBs and they might never realize there's a vulnerability or threat until the accountable executive orders comprehensive app auditing and pen-testing. Think about it... A small non-commercial European operator might have less than a handful of aircraft and a dozen or so pilots, so they might not have the financial or human means to perform extensive pen-testing of all their EFB apps used by all their pilots. Practically speaking, this will be the greatest challenge, because the use of EFB apps is pretty ubiquitous nowadays (try taking the EFB away from a pilot and counting to 10, and see what happens).

Are there any plans to create Part-IS - NIS2 mapping table?