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Michel, the crew team aspects are within the existing CRM training; no need for some 'new' competence.
Resilience is a property of a system; by limiting the 'system' to a crew, which misses the point of improving safety from a wider viewpoint.

The article 'Defining Resilience' identifies a general issue.
'Training by Definition' assumes understanding, - incorrect. Definitions also constrain, limiting practical aspects. e.g. from the research paper "… it outlines the "what," it falls short in explaining the "how."
and from the FSF article;
"Explaining the term is easy; putting the concept into practice is more challenging."

"From a resilience development perspective, humans are seen as a trained resource that provides system flexibility and resilience."
“Individual resilience can be developed through training and operational experience"
… gross assumptions about human behaviour, - and CRM training. The need is for a resilient system which is compatible with human behaviour. (Compare US / FAA / FSF views of CRM vs EASA)

Also see the discussion and references at: https://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/643738…

Resilience is better seen as a new way of thinking about safety - safety management; something which EASA needs to consider.

Is EASA resilient, has resilient qualities, or is willing to embrace resilience as a way of safety thinking; along with Safety-I & Safety-II ?

Yes, crews would get an OFP update e.g. via ACARS, from any suitable point en-route. Lido/Flight and many other modern flight planning systems have that ability.

Hi Mohammad, I'm not sure I understood your comment; The Easy Access Rules basically put together the material published by 2 different entities; The European Commission and EASA. Without the Easy Access Rules, we would need to check the requirements in one document published by the European Commission and then check the Alternates Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) in a document published by EASA. With ICAO Doc. 9 you don’t have that, There is only one entity/organisation and it is all in one place… I might be missing something…

"Type A" , in the context of the said AMC, refers to the MDH of the straight-in approach procedure. The MDH of the circling approach procedure (usually the opposite runway end) is usually significantly higher than that of the straight-in approach procedure (cf. Table 15 of AMC7 CAT.OP.MPA.110). The higher MDH of the circling approach procedure requires a higher ceiling when considering that approach procedure in fuel/flight planning. Furthermore, I do not see that definition 20a equates a circling approach with a Type A instrument approach operation but rather with a subset of it: it exempts those Type A instrument approach operations that bring an aircraft into position for landing on a runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) that ARE SUITABLY LOCATED for a straight-in approach.

Hello Hamad, LVO risk assessments (RA) usually contain confidental safety performance information and are, at least to my knowledge, not (publicly) shared amongst competing operators. So therefore maybe some general words on what I have so far agreed on with operators applying for an LVO approval. The RA is usually based on suitable (safety) performance indicators that reflect the intended operations / technology (ie approach coupler, autoland, HUD, EFVS) being used. The SPI should be measurable, most favourably based on flight data (FDM). A load full of best practice guidance on how to use flight data for performance monitoring is, for example, provided by EASAs European Operators Flight Data Monitoring forum (EOFDM), especially on runway excursion, LOC and CFIT. Some guidance is also given in GM1 SPA.LVO.105(g). However, pilot reporting and manual analysis on approach and landing performance usually contributes to the RA to some extend. A RA usually needs to be based on a number of operations (approaches/landings) using the LVO airborne equipment and the LVO-SOP in non-LVO weather conditions through which the suitability of the safety monitoring system and adequacy of the safety performance is demonstrated prior to receiving the approval. So the RA is basically a "test run" of the safety performance monitoring system to be used after having received the approval. A RA is required when introducing aircaft models/series or LVO airborne equipment or LVO-SOP/AOM which are new to the operator. It is usually not required when "only" adding a new aircraft to an existing fleet of identical or sufficiently similar aircraft for which the operator already holds an LVO approval.

Not being misunderstood - the more restrictive should categorize the airport generally!

Can I also ask questions? :-)

The course I refered to some months ago is now published on our website: https://jaato.com/courses/1219/easa-part-is/

Hi Tamara, you can definitely combine them into one OMM. We have done so and are happy about it. Having a complex organization, it is good to have all in one place, making it easier to control regulation and organization changes.