Thanks for your comments Gian Andrea and Kristof. I posted this since I found myself involved in this NPA
Join your community
Join a community to be part of the discussion.
Jean-Paul Moreaux created a topic in Cybersecurity
Christoph Schnyder commented on a post in Cybersecurity
U-Space service providers are also in scope of EASA Part-IS. The NPA 2021-14 (AMC/GM for U-space regulation) also contains cyber security guidance especially for the risk assessment methodology. (see GM6 Article 3 (1) U-space airspace)
Is that already fully in line with Part-IS, or do we need to pay extra attention here ?
Jon Nielsen posted in Cybersecurity
This is great
Blandine DENAT posted in Cybersecurity
Thanks for the initiative
AKWangChas Wang commented on a post in General Aviation
hello guys pre flight inspections are regulated under EASA implementing rule of PART-145 ? or PART-M
.
John FRANKLIN created a topic in General Aviation
John FRANKLIN created a topic in Rotorcraft
John FRANKLIN created a topic in Air Operations
SOROR BOUAZZA posted in Cybersecurity
Great initiative
Nozmul Huda posted in Cybersecurity
Thanks for the initiative.
Robert Gottwald commented on a post in Air Operations
Dear All
For clarification MMEL item related with FCU Channel (written in A320 MMEL as FLIGHT PREPARATION/LIMITATIONS: RNP APCH operations are not permitted). For complied this operational restriction can we classify VOR or NDB apch as RNP approaches when they are planned to fly as fully managed (e.g FINAL APP) by using navigation data base?
Thank you
Best regards
Sorry, just realized I never responded to this. Two FCU channels are required to not have a single point of failure. This is always a requirement for RNP AR APCHs already by the navigation specification. For RNP APCHs AP/FD is not even required when the TSE is otherwise low enough.
If the MMEL explicitly states "RNP APCH operations are not permitted. For aircraft with the RNP AR capability, RNP AR operations are not permitted", then this applies to both RNP and RNP AR APCHs.
Which redundancy/equipment is needed depends on any applicable (your operator's) MEL restrictions and operating minima (both general and aerodrome/approach-specific).
Also refer to your FCTM "APPROACH USING FINAL APP GUIDANCE" or similar section.
basselnaboulsi posted in General Aviation
hello guys pre flight inspections are regulated under EASA implementing rule of PART-145 ? or PART-M
Angeles Pozo posted in Cybersecurity
Thanks for the initiative
Marios Koulakiotis commented on a post in Rotorcraft
Air Ambulance Helicopter Safety video by Air Ambulance Victoria, Australia
https://youtu.be/rjflOuFsZXk
Air Ambulance Victoria operating under CASA rules freely issued this safety video designed as a training tool for ground emergency responders involved in helicopter operations.
Initially posted by Andy Evans in the LinkedIn ESPN-R Group and reposted here for the record.
Well presented! Nice job. Stay safe and keep the rotors turning!
Mari Ruuhi posted in Cybersecurity
Great initiative! Happy to join :)
Gerry Ngu posted in Cybersecurity
What a pleasure that it finally materialized!
We are all thrilled to welcome you on this new platform!!
Let’s make the best use of it.?
Kieran O'CARROLL posted in Cybersecurity
Useful in the context of aircraft cybersecurity to remember that the FAA has issued "Special Conditions" for a number of aircraft types equipped with "a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. This design feature is a digital systems architecture for the installation of a system with wireless network and hosted application functionality that allows access from external sources to the airplane’s internal electronic components."
This set of quotes come from FAA Special Conditions 2021-14974 published in the USA Federal Register on 14th July 2021.
Additional ... "This proposed network architecture is used for a diverse set of airplane functions, including: flight-safety related control and navigation systems; airline business and administrative support; passenger entertainment, and access by systems external to the airplane."
"The airplane-control domain and airline information-services domain of these networks perform functions required for the safe operation and maintenance of the airplane.
Previously, these domains had very limited connectivity with external network sources."
"This network architecture creates a potential for unauthorized persons to access the airplane-control domain and airline information-services domain from sources external to the airplane, and presents security vulnerabilities related to the introduction of computer viruses and worms, user errors, and intentional sabotage of airplane electronic assets (networks, systems, and databases) critical to the safety and maintenance of the airplane."
In summary - in the context of aircraft cybersecurity, it is useful to review the "Special Conditions" already issued by the FAA for a range of aircraft types.
John Vincent posted in Cybersecurity
Thanks for setting up this community... great to be on board!
Christoph Schnyder posted in Cybersecurity
U-Space service providers are also in scope of EASA Part-IS. The NPA 2021-14 (AMC/GM for U-space regulation) also contains cyber security guidance especially for the risk assessment methodology. (see GM6 Article 3 (1) U-space airspace)
Is that already fully in line with Part-IS, or do we need to pay extra attention here ?
Constantina Galani created a topic in Cybersecurity