Easy Access Rules for Standardised European Rules of the Air

Regulation (EU) 2024/1111

(a)When a pilot reports a state of minimum fuel/energy, the controller shall inform the pilot as soon as practicable of any anticipated delays or that no delays are expected.

(b)When the level of fuel/energy renders declaring a situation of distress necessary, the pilot, in accordance with point SERA.14095, shall indicate that by using the radiotelephony distress signal (MAYDAY), preferably spoken three times, followed by the nature of the distress condition (FUEL).

ED Decision 2025/012/R

The declaration by the pilot of minimum fuel/energy using the phrase ‘MINIMUM FUEL’ informs ATC that all planned aerodrome options have been reduced to a specific aerodrome of intended landing, and any change to the existing clearance may result in landing with less than the planned final reserve fuel/energy. This is not an emergency situation but an indication that an emergency situation is possible should any additional delay occur.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1185

(a)Whenever, as a result of failure or degradation of navigation, communications, altimetry, flight control or other systems, aircraft performance is degraded below the level required for the airspace in which it is operating, the flight crew shall advise the ATC unit concerned without delay. Where the failure or degradation affects the separation minimum currently being employed, the controller shall take action to establish another appropriate type of separation or separation minimum.

(b)Degradation or failure of the RNAV system

When an aircraft cannot meet the specifications as required by the RNAV route or procedure, as a result of a failure or degradation of the RNAV system, a revised clearance shall be requested by the pilot.

(c)Loss of vertical navigation performance required for reduced vertical separation minima (RVSM) airspace

(1)The pilot shall inform ATC as soon as possible of any circumstances where the vertical navigation performance requirements for RVSM airspace cannot be maintained. In such cases, the pilot shall obtain a revised ATC clearance prior to initiating any deviation from the cleared route and/or flight level, whenever possible. When a revised ATC clearance cannot be obtained prior to such a deviation, the pilot shall obtain a revised clearance as soon as possible thereafter.

(2)During operations in, or vertical transit through, RVSM airspace with aircraft not approved for RVSM operations, pilots shall report non-approved status as follows:

(i)at initial call on any channel within RVSM airspace;

(ii)in all requests for level changes; and

(iii)in all read-backs of level clearances.

(3)Air traffic controllers shall explicitly acknowledge receipt of messages from aircraft reporting RVSM non-approved status.

(4)Degradation of aircraft equipment — pilot-reported:

(i)When informed by the pilot of an RVSM-approved aircraft operating in RVSM airspace that the aircraft's equipment no longer meets the RVSM requirements, ATC shall consider the aircraft as non-RVSM-approved.

(ii)ATC shall take action immediately to provide a minimum vertical separation of 600 m (2 000 ft) or an appropriate horizontal separation from all other aircraft concerned that are operating in RVSM airspace. An aircraft rendered non-RVSM-approved shall normally be cleared out of RVSM airspace by ATC when it is possible to do so.

(iii)Pilots shall inform ATC, as soon as practicable, of any restoration of the proper functioning of equipment required to meet the RVSM requirements.

(iv)The first ACC to become aware of a change in an aircraft's RVSM status shall coordinate with adjacent ACCs, as appropriate.

(5)Severe turbulence — not forecast:

(i)When an aircraft operating in RVSM airspace encounters severe turbulence due to weather or wake vortex that the pilot believes will impact the aircraft's capability to maintain its cleared flight level, the pilot shall inform ATC. ATC shall establish either an appropriate horizontal separation or an increased minimum vertical separation.

(ii)ATC shall, to the extent possible, accommodate pilot requests for flight level and/or route changes and shall pass on traffic information, as required.

(iii)ATC shall solicit reports from other aircraft to determine whether RVSM should be suspended entirely or within a specific flight level band and/or area.

(iv)The ACC suspending RVSM shall coordinate with adjacent ACCs such suspension(s) and any required adjustments to sector capacities, as appropriate, to ensure an orderly progression of the transfer of traffic.

(6)Severe turbulence — forecast:

(i)When a meteorological forecast is predicting severe turbulence within RVSM airspace, ATC shall determine whether RVSM should be suspended and, if so, for how long and for which specific flight level(s) and/or area.

(ii)In cases where RVSM will be suspended, the ACC suspending RVSM shall coordinate with adjacent ACCs with regard to the flight levels appropriate for the transfer of traffic, unless a contingency flight level allocation scheme has been determined by letter of agreement. The ACC suspending RVSM shall also coordinate applicable sector capacities with adjacent ACCs, as appropriate.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

DEGRADATION OR FAILURE OF THE RNAV SYSTEM

(a)If an aircraft cannot meet the requirements due to a failure or degradation of the RNAV system that is detected before departure from an aerodrome where it is not practicable to effect a repair, the aircraft concerned should be permitted to proceed to the nearest suitable aerodrome where the repair can be made. When granting clearance to such aircraft, ATC should take into consideration the existing or anticipated traffic situation and may have to modify the time of departure, flight level or route of the intended flight. Subsequent adjustments may become necessary during the course of the flight.

With respect to the degradation/failure in flight of an RNAV system, while the aircraft is operating on an ATS route requiring the use of RNAV 5:

(1)aircraft should be routed via VOR/DME-defined ATS routes; or

(2)if no such routes are available, aircraft should be routed via conventional navigation aids, i.e. VOR/DME; or

When the above procedures are not feasible, the ATC unit should, where practicable, provide the aircraft with radar vectors until the aircraft is capable of resuming its own navigation.

With respect to the degradation/failure in flight of an RNAV system, while the aircraft is operating on an arrival or departure procedure requiring the use of RNAV:

(1)the aircraft should be provided with radar vectors until the aircraft is capable of resuming its own navigation; or

(2)the aircraft should be routed by conventional navigation aids, i.e. VOR/DME.

Subsequent ATC action in respect of an aircraft that cannot meet the specified requirements due to a failure or degradation of the RNAV system, will be dependent upon the nature of the reported failure and the overall traffic situation. Continued operation in accordance with the current ATC clearance may be possible in many situations. When this cannot be achieved, a revised clearance may be required to revert to VOR/DME navigation.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

LOSS OF VERTICAL NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE REQUIRED FOR RVSM

An in-flight contingency affecting flight in RVSM airspace pertains to unforeseen circumstances that directly impact on the ability of one or more aircraft to operate in accordance with the vertical navigation performance requirements of RVSM airspace.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1185

(a)ACAS II shall be used during flight, except as provided in the minimum equipment list specified in Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012¹⁵ in a mode that enables RA indications to be produced for the flight crew when undue proximity to another aircraft is detected. This shall not apply if inhibition of RA indication mode (using traffic advisory (TA) indication only or equivalent) is called for by an abnormal procedure or due to performance-limiting conditions.

(b)In the event of an ACAS RA, pilots shall:

(1)respond immediately by following the RA, as indicated, unless doing so would jeopardise the safety of the aircraft;

(2)follow the RA even if there is a conflict between the RA and an ATC instruction to manoeuvre;

(3)not manoeuvre in the opposite sense to an RA;

(4)as soon as possible, as permitted by flight crew workload, notify the appropriate ATC unit of any RA which requires a deviation from the current ATC instruction or clearance;

(5)promptly comply with any modified RAs;

(6)limit the alterations of the flight path to the minimum extent necessary to comply with the RAs;

(7)promptly return to the terms of the ATC instruction or clearance when the conflict is resolved; and

(8)notify ATC when returning to the current clearance.

(c)When a pilot reports an ACAS RA, the controller shall not attempt to modify the aircraft flight path until the pilot reports ‘CLEAR OF CONFLICT’.

(d)Once an aircraft departs from its ATC clearance or instruction in compliance with an RA, or a pilot reports an RA, the controller ceases to be responsible for providing separation between that aircraft and any other aircraft affected as a direct consequence of the manoeuvre induced by the RA. The controller shall resume responsibility for providing separation to all the affected aircraft when:

(1)the controller acknowledges a report from the flight crew that the aircraft has resumed the current clearance; or

(2)the controller acknowledges a report from the flight crew that the aircraft is resuming the current clearance and issues an alternative clearance which is acknowledged by the flight crew.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

Nothing in the procedures specified in SERA.11014 should prevent pilots-in-command from exercising their best judgement and full authority in the choice of the best course of action to resolve a traffic conflict or avert a potential collision.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

The ability of ACAS to fulfil its role of assisting pilots in the avoidance of potential collisions is dependent on the correct and timely response by pilots to ACAS indications. Operational experience has shown that the correct response by pilots is dependent on the effectiveness of the initial and recurrent training in ACAS procedures.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

Pilots should not manoeuvre their aircraft in response to traffic advisories (TAs) only.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

Visually acquired traffic may not be the same traffic causing an RA. The visual perception of an encounter may be misleading, particularly at night.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

In the case of an ACAS–ACAS coordinated encounter, the RAs complement each other in order to reduce the potential for a collision. Manoeuvres, or lack of manoeuvres, that result in vertical rates opposite to the sense of an RA could result in a collision with the intruder aircraft.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

Unless informed by the pilot, ATC does not know when ACAS issues RAs. It is possible for ATC to issue instructions that are unknowingly contrary to ACAS RA indications. Therefore, it is important that ATC be notified when an ATC instruction or clearance is not being followed because it conflicts with an RA.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

Pilots should use appropriate procedures by which an aeroplane climbing or descending to an assigned altitude or flight level may do so at a rate less than 8 m/s (or 1 500 ft/min) throughout the last 300 m (or 1 000 ft) of climb or descent to the assigned altitude or flight level when the pilot is made aware of another aircraft at or approaching an adjacent altitude or flight level, unless otherwise instructed by ATC. These procedures are intended to avoid unnecessary ACAS II RAs in aircraft at or approaching adjacent altitudes or flight levels. For commercial operations, these procedures should be specified by the operator.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1111

(a)Except for intercept and escort service provided on request to an aircraft, interception of civil aircraft shall be governed by appropriate regulations and administrative directives issued by Member States in compliance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and in particular Article 3(d) under which ICAO Contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their State aircraft, to have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

(b)The pilot-in-command of a civil aircraft, when intercepted, shall:

(1)immediately follow the instructions given by the intercepting aircraft, interpreting and responding to visual signals in accordance with the specifications in Tables S11-1 and
S11-2;

(2)notify, if possible, the appropriate air traffic services unit;

(3)attempt to establish radio-communication with the intercepting aircraft or with the appropriate intercept control unit, by making a general call on the emergency frequency 121,5 MHz, giving the identity of the intercepted aircraft and the nature of the flight; and if no contact has been established and if practicable, repeating this call on the emergency frequency 243 MHz,

(4)if equipped with SSR transponder, select Mode A, Code 7700, unless otherwise instructed by the appropriate air traffic services unit;

(5)if equipped with ADS-B or ADS-C, select the appropriate emergency functionality, if available, unless otherwise instructed by the appropriate air traffic services unit.

(c)If any instructions received by radio from any sources conflict with those given by the intercepting aircraft by visual signals, the intercepted aircraft shall request immediate clarification while continuing to comply with the visual instructions given by the intercepting aircraft.

(d)If any instructions received by radio from any sources conflict with those given by the intercepting aircraft by radio, the intercepted aircraft shall request immediate clarification while continuing to comply with the radio instructions given by the intercepting aircraft.

(e)If radio contact is established during interception but communication in a common language is not possible, attempts shall be made to convey instructions, acknowledgement of instructions and essential information by using the phrases and pronunciations in Table S11-3 and transmitting each phrase twice:

(f)As soon as an air traffic services unit learns that an aircraft is being intercepted in its area of responsibility, it shall take such of the following steps as are appropriate in the circumstances:

(1)attempt to establish two-way communication with the intercepted aircraft via any means available, including the emergency radio frequency 121,5 MHz, unless such communication already exists,

(2)inform the pilot of the intercepted aircraft of the interception;

(3)establish contact with the intercept control unit maintaining two-way communication with the intercepting aircraft and provide it with available information concerning the aircraft;

(4)relay messages between the intercepting aircraft or the intercept control unit and the intercepted aircraft, as necessary;

(5)in close coordination with the intercept control unit take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of the intercepted aircraft;

(6)inform air traffic services units serving adjacent flight information regions if it appears that the aircraft has strayed from such adjacent flight information regions.

(g)As soon as an air traffic services unit learns that an aircraft is being intercepted outside its area of responsibility, it shall take such of the following steps as are appropriate in the circumstances:

(1)inform the air traffic services unit serving the airspace in which the interception is taking place, providing this unit with available information that will assist in identifying the aircraft and requesting it to take action in accordance with (f);

(2)relay messages between the intercepted aircraft and the appropriate air traffic services unit, the intercept control unit or the intercepting aircraft.

ED Decision 2025/012/R

1.General

1.1Interception of civil aircraft should be avoided and should be undertaken only as a last resort. If undertaken, the interception should be limited to determining the identity of the aircraft, unless it is necessary to return the aircraft to its planned track, direct it beyond the boundaries of national airspace, guide it away from a prohibited, restricted or danger area or instruct it to effect a landing at a designated aerodrome. Practice interception of civil aircraft is not to be undertaken unless prior agreement has been reached to conduct such activity with the pilot and operator of the civil aircraft concerned.

1.2To eliminate or reduce the need for interception of civil aircraft, it is important that:

(a)all possible efforts be made by intercept control units to secure identification of any aircraft which may be a civil aircraft, and to issue any necessary instructions or advice to such aircraft, through the appropriate ATS units. To this end, it is essential that means of rapid and reliable communications between intercept control units and ATS units be established and that agreements be formulated concerning exchanges of information between such units on the movements of civil aircraft, in accordance with the provisions of SERA.4001(b)(4), SERA.11010(a)(1)(iv), SERA.11010(a)(3)(ii), SERA.11010(b), and SERA.11010(b)(5);

(b)areas prohibited to all civil flights and areas in which civil flight is not permitted without special authorisation by the State be clearly promulgated in the AIP together with the risk, if any, of interception in the event of penetration of such areas. When delineating such areas in close proximity to promulgated ATS routes, or other frequently used tracks, account should be taken of the availability and overall systems accuracy of the navigation systems to be used by civil aircraft and their ability to remain clear of the delineated areas;

(c)the establishment of additional navigation aids be considered where necessary to ensure that civil aircraft are able to safely circumnavigate prohibited or, as required, restricted areas.

1.3To eliminate or reduce the hazards inherent in interceptions undertaken as a last resort, all possible efforts should be made to ensure coordinated actions by the pilots and ground units concerned. To this end, it is essential that steps be taken to ensure that:

(a)all pilots of civil aircraft are made fully aware of the actions to be taken by them and the visual signals to be used;

(b)operators or pilots-in-command of civil aircraft implement the capability of aircraft to communicate on 121,5 MHz and the availability of interception procedures and visual signals on board aircraft,

(c)all ATS personnel are made fully aware of the actions to be taken by them in accordance with the provisions of SERA.4001(b)(4), SERA.11010(a)(1)(iv), SERA.11010(a)(3)(ii), SERA.11010(b) and SERA.11010(b)(5);

(d)all pilots-in-command of intercepting aircraft are made aware of the general performance limitations of civil aircraft and of the possibility that intercepted civil aircraft may be in a state of emergency due to technical difficulties or unlawful interference;

(e)clear and unambiguous instructions are issued to intercept control units and to pilots-in-command of potential intercepting aircraft, covering interception manoeuvres, guidance of intercepted aircraft, action by intercepted aircraft, air-to-air visual signals, radio-communication with intercepted aircraft, and the need to refrain from resorting to the use of weapons;

Note. See paragraphs 2 to 6.

(f)intercept control units and intercepting aircraft are provided with radiotelephony equipment so as to enable them to communicate with intercepted aircraft on the emergency frequency 121,5 MHz,

(g)secondary surveillance radar and/or ADS-B facilities are made available to the extent possible to permit intercept control units to identify civil aircraft in areas where they might otherwise be intercepted. Such facilities should permit recognition of aircraft identity and immediate recognition of any emergency or urgency conditions.

2.Interception manoeuvres

2.1A standard method should be established for the manoeuvring of aircraft intercepting a civil aircraft in order to avoid any hazard for the intercepted aircraft. Such method should take due account of the performance limitations of civil aircraft, the need to avoid flying in such proximity to the intercepted aircraft that a collision hazard may be created, and the need to avoid crossing the aircraft’s flight path or to perform any other manoeuvre in such a manner that the wake turbulence may be hazardous, particularly if the intercepted aircraft is a light aircraft.

2.2An aircraft equipped with an ACAS, which is being intercepted, may perceive the interceptor as a collision threat and thus initiate an avoidance manoeuvre in response to an ACAS RA. Such a manoeuvre might be misinterpreted by the interceptor as an indication of unfriendly intentions. It is important therefore that pilots of intercepting aircraft equipped with a secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponder suppress the transmission of pressure-altitude information (in Mode C replies or in the AC field of Mode S replies) within a range of at least 37 km (20 NM) of the aircraft being intercepted. This prevents the ACAS in the intercepted aircraft from using RAs in respect of the interceptor, while the ACAS traffic advisory information will remain available.

2.3Manoeuvres for visual identification

The following method is recommended for the manoeuvring of intercepting aircraft for the purpose of visually identifying a civil aircraft:

Phase I

The intercepting aircraft should approach the intercepted aircraft from astern. The element leader, or the single intercepting aircraft, should normally take up a position on the left (port) side, slightly above and ahead of the intercepted aircraft, within the field of view of the pilot of the intercepted aircraft, and initially not closer to the aircraft than 300 m. Any other participating aircraft should stay well clear of the intercepted aircraft, preferably above and behind. After speed and position have been established, the aircraft should, if necessary, proceed with Phase II of the procedure.

Phase II

The element leader, or the single intercepting aircraft, should begin closing in gently on the intercepted aircraft, at the same level, until no closer than absolutely necessary to obtain the information needed. The element leader, or the single intercepting aircraft, should use caution to avoid startling the flight crew or the passengers of the intercepted aircraft, keeping constantly in mind the fact that manoeuvres considered normal to an intercepting aircraft may be considered hazardous to passengers and crews of civil aircraft. Any other participating aircraft should continue to stay well clear of the intercepted aircraft. Upon completion of identification, the intercepting aircraft should withdraw from the vicinity of the intercepted aircraft as outlined in Phase III.

Phase III

The element leader, or the single intercepting aircraft, should break gently away from the intercepted aircraft in a shallow dive. Any other participating aircraft should stay well clear of the intercepted aircraft and re-join their leader.

2.4Manoeuvres for navigational guidance

2.4.1If, following the identification manoeuvres in Phase I and Phase II above, it is considered necessary to intervene in the navigation of the intercepted aircraft, the element leader, or the single intercepting aircraft, should normally take up a position on the left (port) side, slightly above and ahead of the intercepted aircraft, to enable the pilot-in-command of the latter aircraft to see the visual signals given.

2.4.2It is indispensable that the pilot-in-command of the intercepting aircraft be satisfied that the pilot-in-command of the intercepted aircraft is aware of the interception and acknowledges the signals given. If repeated attempts to attract the attention of the pilot-in-command of the intercepted aircraft by use of the Series 1 signal in Table S11-1, are unsuccessful, other methods of signalling may be used for this purpose, including as a last resort the visual effect of the reheat/afterburner, provided that no hazard is created for the intercepted aircraft.

2.5It is recognised that meteorological conditions or terrain may occasionally make it necessary for the element leader, or the single intercepting aircraft, to take up a position on the right (starboard) side, slightly above and ahead of the intercepted aircraft. In such case, the pilot-in-command of the intercepting aircraft must take particular care that the intercepting aircraft is clearly visible at all times to the pilot-in-command of the intercepted aircraft.

3.Guidance of an intercepted aircraft

3.1Navigational guidance and related information should be given to an intercepted aircraft by radiotelephony, whenever radio contact can be established.

3.2When navigational guidance is given to an intercepted aircraft, care must be taken that the aircraft is not led into conditions where the visibility may be reduced below that required to maintain flight in visual meteorological conditions and that the manoeuvres demanded of the intercepted aircraft do not add to already existing hazards in the event that the operating efficiency of the aircraft is impaired.

3.3In the exceptional case where an intercepted civil aircraft is required to land in the territory overflown, care must also be taken that:

(a)the designated aerodrome is suitable for the safe landing of the aircraft type concerned, especially if the aerodrome is not normally used for civil air transport operations;

(b)the surrounding terrain is suitable for circling, approach and missed approach manoeuvres;

(c)the intercepted aircraft has sufficient fuel/energy remaining to reach the aerodrome;

(d)if the intercepted aircraft is a civil transport aircraft, the designated aerodrome has a runway with a length equivalent to at least 2 500 m at MSL and a bearing strength sufficient to support the aircraft; and

(e)whenever possible, the designated aerodrome is one that is described in detail in the relevant AIP.

3.4When requiring a civil aircraft to land at an unfamiliar aerodrome, it is essential that sufficient time be allowed for it to prepare for a landing, bearing in mind that only the pilot-in-command of the civil aircraft can judge the safety of the landing operation in relation to runway length and aircraft mass at the time.

3.5It is particularly important that all information necessary to facilitate a safe approach and landing be given to the intercepted aircraft by radiotelephony.

4.Air-to-air visual signals

The visual signals to be used by intercepting and intercepted aircraft are those set forth in Tables S11-1 and S11-2. It is essential that intercepting and intercepted aircraft adhere strictly to those signals and interpret correctly the signals given by the other aircraft, and that the intercepting aircraft pay particular attention to any signals given by the intercepted aircraft to indicate that it is in a state of distress or urgency.

5.Radio communication between the intercept control unit or the intercepting aircraft and the intercepted aircraft

5.1When an interception is being made, the intercept control unit and the intercepting aircraft should:

(a)first attempt to establish two-way communication with the intercepted aircraft in a common language on the emergency frequency 121,5 MHz, using the call signs ‘INTERCEPT CONTROL’, ‘INTERCEPTOR (call sign)’ and ‘INTERCEPTED AIRCRAFT’ respectively, and

(b)failing this, attempt to establish two-way communication with the intercepted aircraft on such other frequency or frequencies as may have been prescribed by the competent authority, or to establish contact through the appropriate ATS unit(s).

5.2If radio contact is established during interception, but communication in a common language is not possible, attempts must be made to convey instructions, acknowledgement of instructions and essential information by using the phrases and pronunciations in Table S11-3 and transmitting each phrase twice.

6.Refraining from the use of weapons

The use of tracer bullets to attract attention is hazardous, and it is expected that measures will be taken to avoid their use so that the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft will not be endangered.

7.Coordination between intercept control units and ATS units

It is essential that close coordination be maintained between an intercept control unit and the appropriate ATS unit during all phases of an interception of an aircraft which is, or might be, a civil aircraft, in order for the ATS unit to be kept fully informed of the developments and of the action required of the intercepted aircraft.

ED Decision 2013/013/R

REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY MEMBER STATES GOVERNING INTERCEPTION OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT

(a)In accordance with the provisions on interception of civil aircraft in Annex 2 to the Convention on the International Civil Aviation, the national provisions put in place under SERA.11015(a) should ensure that:

(1)interception of civil aircraft is undertaken only as a last resort;

(2)an interception is limited to determining the identity of the aircraft, unless it is necessary to return the aircraft to its planned track, direct it beyond the boundaries of national airspace, guide it away from a prohibited, restricted or danger area or congested areas, or instruct it to effect a landing at a designated aerodrome;

(3)practice interception of civil aircraft is not undertaken, unless it has been previously agreed with the pilot-in-command of the aircraft to be intercepted and ATC has been informed accordingly that the interception is to take place;

(4)navigational guidance and related information is given to an intercepted aircraft by radiotelephony, whenever radio contact can be established; and

(5)in the case where an intercepted civil aircraft is required to land in the territory overflown, the aerodrome designated for the landing is suitable for the safe landing of the aircraft type concerned.

(b)Member States should publish a standard method that has been established for the manoeuvring of aircraft intercepting a civil aircraft. Such method should be designed to avoid any hazard for the intercepted aircraft.

(c)Member States should ensure that provision is made for the use of secondary surveillance radar or ADS-B, where available, to identify civil aircraft in areas where they may be subject to interception.

ED Decision 2013/013/R

REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY MEMBER STATES GOVERNING INTERCEPTION OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT

Member States that comply with an alternative means of compliance different from AMC1 SERA.11015(a) Interception over the territory and territorial waters of the State are required to notify ICAO of a difference to ICAO Annex 2. Over the high seas ICAO Annex 2 is to be applied without exception in accordance with the Chicago Convention and SERA.1001(a).

SECTION 12 Services related to meteorology — Aircraft observations and reports by voice communications

Regulation (EU) No 923/2012

(a)The following aircraft observations shall be made during any phase of the flight:

(1)special aircraft observations; and

(2)other non-routine aircraft observations.

Regulation (EU) 2020/1177

(a)Special observations shall be made and reported by all aircraft whenever the following conditions are encountered or observed:

(1)moderate or severe turbulence; or

(2)moderate or severe icing; or

(3)severe mountain wave; or

(4)thunderstorms, without hail, that are obscured, embedded, widespread or in squall lines; or

(5)thunderstorms, with hail, that are obscured, embedded, widespread or in squall lines; or

(6)heavy dust storm or heavy sandstorm; or

(7)volcanic ash cloud; or

(8)pre-eruption volcanic activity or a volcanic eruption; or

(9)the runway braking action encountered is not as good as reported.

(b)Competent authorities shall prescribe as necessary other conditions which shall be reported by all aircraft when encountered or observed.

(c)Flight crews shall compile the reports using forms based on the model AIREP SPECIAL form as set out in point A of Appendix 5. Those reports shall comply with the detailed instructions for reporting, as provided in point 2 of Appendix 5.

(1)The detailed instructions, including the formats of messages and the phraseologies provided in Appendix 5, shall be used by flight crews when transmitting air-reports and by ATS units when retransmitting such reports.

(2)Special air-reports containing observations of volcanic activity shall be recorded on the special air-report of volcanic activity form. Forms based on the model form for special air-reports of volcanic activity set out in point B of Appendix 5 shall be provided for flight crews operating on routes which could be affected by volcanic ash clouds.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

In a busy environment where the transmission of complete special aircraft observations would have a negative impact on the frequency occupancy, ATC may instruct the aircraft to make the complete report on an alternative frequency.

Regulation (EU) No 923/2012

When other meteorological conditions not listed under SERA.12005(a), e.g. wind shear, are encountered and which, in the opinion of the pilot-in-command, may affect the safety or markedly affect the efficiency of other aircraft operations, the pilot-in-command shall advise the appropriate air traffic services unit as soon as practicable.

Regulation (EU) No 923/2012

(a)Aircraft observations shall be reported during flight at the time the observation is made or as soon thereafter as is practicable.

(b)Aircraft observations shall be reported as air-reports and shall comply with the technical specifications in Appendix 5.

Regulation (EU) 2024/404

(a)Air traffic services units shall transmit, as soon as practicable, special and non-routine air-reports to:

(1)other aircraft concerned;

(2)the associated meteorological watch office (MWO) in accordance with point 3 of Point A Appendix 5; and

(3)other air traffic services units concerned.

(b)When receiving special air-reports by voice communications concerning braking action which does not correspond to the runway condition report, air traffic services units shall forward them without delay to the appropriate aerodrome operator.

(c)Transmissions to aircraft shall be repeated at a frequency and continued for a period of time which shall be determined by the air traffic services unit concerned.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

SPECIAL AIR-REPORTS

Special air-reports should be transmitted with the least possible delay to aircraft likely to be affected and should cover the portion of the route up to one hour’s flying time ahead of the aircraft.

ED Decision 2020/007/R

SPECIAL AND NON-ROUTINE AIR-REPORTS TO THE ASSOCIATED METEOROLOGICAL WATCH OFFICE (MWO)

The transmission of special and non-routine air-reports to their associated MWO is to be intended with the exceptions of runway braking action encountered and wind shear air-reports.

ED Decision 2013/013/R

OTHER ATS UNITS CONCERNED

Other ATS units concerned are those that have flights under their jurisdiction which are expected to enter the airspace concerned at a later stage of flight. Those flights could, for instance, require rerouting before entering the airspace concerned. As an example, a special air-report concerning volcanic ash or volcanic eruption could be necessary to transmit to aircraft by ATS units in the FIR adjacent to that affected by the air-report.

SECTION 13 SSR Transponder and ADS-B transmitters

Regulation (EU) 2016/1185

(a)When an aircraft carries a serviceable SSR transponder, the pilot shall operate the transponder at all times during flight, regardless of whether the aircraft is within or outside airspace where SSR is used for ATS purposes.

(b)Pilots shall not operate the IDENT feature unless requested by ATS.

(c)Except for flight in airspace designated by the competent authority for mandatory operation of transponder, aircraft without sufficient electrical power supply are exempted from the requirement to operate the transponder at all times.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

Pilots of aircraft engaged in formation join-ups are expected to continue operating the transponder until established in formation. Once established in formation, all except the lead aircraft should be instructed to ‘squawk standby’.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

Pilots of non-powered aircraft are also encouraged to operate the transponder during flight outside airspace where carriage and operation of SSR transponder is mandatory.

ED Decision 2025/012/R

AIRCRAFT WITHOUT SUFFICIENT ELECTRICAL POWER

This exemption addresses aircraft (e.g. sailplanes) that have electrical power supply only for the operation of on-board equipment, supporting notably communication, navigation and surveillance, which is not sufficient for the permanent operation of the SSR transponder.

Aircraft whose engines are electrically powered are not subject to this exemption since their certification provides for sufficient electrical power supply to cover both aircraft propulsion and other on-board supporting systems.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1185

(a)To indicate that it is in a specific contingency situation, the pilot of an aircraft equipped with SSR shall:

(1)select Code 7700 to indicate a state of emergency unless ATC has previously directed the pilot to operate the transponder on a specified code. In the latter case, a pilot may nevertheless select Code 7700 whenever there is a specific reason to believe that this would be the best course of action;

(2)select Code 7600 to indicate a state of radio-communication failure;

(3)attempt to select Code 7500 to indicate a state of unlawful interference. If circumstances so warrant, Code 7700 should be used instead.

(b)Except in the cases described in (a) above, the pilot shall:

(1)select codes as instructed by the ATS unit; or

(2)in the absence of ATS instructions related to code setting, select code 2000 or another code as prescribed by the competent authority; or

(3)when not receiving air traffic services, select code 7000 in order to improve the detection of suitably equipped aircraft unless otherwise prescribed by the competent authority.

(c)When it is observed that the code shown on the situation display is different from what has been assigned to the aircraft:

(1)the pilot shall be requested to confirm the code selected and, if the situation warrants, to reselect the correct code; and

(2)if the discrepancy between assigned and displayed codes still persists, the pilot may be requested to stop the operation of the aircraft's transponder. The next control position and any other affected unit using SSR and/or multilateration (MLAT) in the provision of ATS shall be informed accordingly.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

If a pilot has selected Mode A Code 7500 and has been requested to confirm this code by ATC, the pilot should, according to circumstances, either confirm this or not reply at all. If the pilot does not reply, ATC should take this as confirmation that the use of Code 7500 is not an inadvertent false code selection.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

When requested by ATC to confirm the code selected, the pilot should:

(a)verify the Mode A code setting on the transponder;

(b)reselect the assigned code if necessary; and

(c)confirm to ATC the setting displayed on the controls of the transponder.

Regulation (EU) 2020/469

(a)When the aircraft carries serviceable Mode C equipment, the pilot shall continuously operate this mode unless otherwise dictated by ATC.

(b)Unless otherwise prescribed by the competent authority, verification of the
pressure-altitude-derived level information displayed shall be effected at least once by each suitably equipped ATS unit on initial contact with the aircraft concerned or, if this is not feasible, as soon as possible thereafter.

ED Decision 2020/007/R

ERRONEOUS LEVEL INFORMATION IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICE PROVISION

(a)If the displayed level information is not within the approved tolerance value or when a discrepancy in excess of the approved tolerance value is detected subsequent to verification, the pilot should be advised accordingly and requested to check the pressure setting and confirm the aircraft’s level.

(b)If, following confirmation of the correct pressure setting, the discrepancy continues to exist, the following action should be taken by ATC according to circumstances:

(1)request the pilot to select and operate an alternative transponder, if available, and re-verify that the displayed level information is within the approved tolerance; or

(2)request the pilot to stop Mode C or ADS-B altitude data transmission, provided this does not cause the loss of position and identity information, and notify the next control positions or ATC unit concerned with the aircraft of the action taken; or

(3)inform the pilot of the discrepancy and request that the relevant operation continue in order to prevent loss of position and identity information of the aircraft and, when so prescribed by the local instructions, override the label-displayed level information with the reported level. In addition, the ATC unit should notify the next control position or ATC unit concerned with the aircraft of the action taken.

(c)It should be highlighted that ACAS will accept mode C replies that are erroneous, and it is possible to issue an RA based on these inputs. When the measures described in (b)(1) cannot be implemented, the controller should take into account the likelihood of generating ACAS RA in the provision of ATS.

ED Decision 2020/007/R

ERRONEOUS LEVEL INFORMATION IN FLIGHT INFORMATION SERVICE PROVISION

The procedures for the verification of pressure-altitude-derived displayed information in the provision of flight information service should be established by the competent authority taking into consideration GM1 ATS.TR.155(f) in EASA ED Decision 2020/008/R.

Regulation (EU) 2024/404

(a)Aircraft equipped with a Mode S or ADS-B transmitter that has an aircraft identification feature shall transmit the aircraft identification as specified in the flight plan or, when no flight plan has been filed, the aircraft registration, unless the aircraft operator holds an approval from the competent authority to use other than the aircraft registration as aircraft identification for flights without a flight plan.

(b)Whenever it is observed on the situation display that the aircraft identification transmitted by an aircraft equipped with a Mode S or ADS-B transmitter is different from that expected from the aircraft, the pilot shall be requested to confirm and, if necessary, re-enter the correct aircraft identification.

(c)If, following confirmation by the pilot that the correct aircraft identification has been set on the Mode S or ADS-B transmitter identification feature, the discrepancy continues to exist, the air traffic services unit shall take the following actions:

(1)inform the pilot of the persistent discrepancy;

(2)where possible, correct the label showing the aircraft identification on the situation display; and

(3)notify the next control position and any other unit concerned using Mode S or ADS-B for identification purposes that the aircraft identification transmitted by the aircraft is erroneous.

ED Decision 2024/007/R

AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION SETTING

(a)The aircraft identification transmitted should conform to the format specified for Item 7 of the ICAO flight plan form.

(b)The competent authority should only authorise aircraft operators to use other than aircraft registration as aircraft identification when operating without a flight plan provided that:

(1)the aircraft operator demonstrates that procedures have been implemented to ensure the uniqueness of the aircraft identification for flights that might operate simultaneously;

(2)the air traffic services providers have indicated that the air traffic services surveillance systems are capable of managing duplication of Mode S aircraft identification;

(3)the need for individual identification for other authorities is addressed accordingly.

ED Decision 2024/007/R

OPERATION OF ADS-B TRANSMITTERS

To indicate that it is in a state of emergency or to transmit other urgent information, an aircraft equipped with ADS-B may operate either of the emergency and/or urgency mode as follows:

(a)emergency,

(b)communication failure,

(c)unlawful interference,

(d)minimum fuel/energy,

(e)medical.

ED Decision 2024/007/R

OPERATION OF ADS-B TRANSMITTERS

Some aircraft equipped with first-generation ADS-B avionics do not have the capability described in GM1 SERA.13015 and only have the capability to transmit a general emergency alert regardless of the code selected by the pilot.

ED Decision 2024/007/R

AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION SETTING

Point (b)(1) of AMC1 SERA.13015 requires aircraft operators to incorporate into an operations manual a mechanism that ensures the uniqueness of aircraft call signs. For example, they may elect to assign each pilot-in-command or each airframe with a unique number, which may also be augmented with the addition of letters. The call sign, consisting of the operator designator issued by ICAO and the unique number together with any augmenting letter, is to be inserted into the Mode S identification feature prior to departure and used in all radio communications unless instructed otherwise by air traffic services.

ED Decision 2024/007/R

DUPLICATED AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION

To demonstrate the resilience of the ATS surveillance system to duplicated aircraft identification, as prescribed in point (b)(2) of AMC1 SERA.13015, it is normally enough to indicate that a duplicated downlinked aircraft identification would not affect, or reduce in any way, the performance of the surveillance tracker for generating and validating system tracks. In the case of a multisensor tracking system, using surveillance information from sensors belonging to neighbouring air traffic services providers, indication that the neighbouring surveillance tracker is not affected by potential duplication of the aircraft identification is needed.

ED Decision 2024/007/R

AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION SETTING

The ATS surveillance information used by an air navigation service provider is in many Member States also used by other authorities (e.g. air defence, search and rescue). The impact, if any, of allowing aircraft operating without a flight plan to transmit aircraft identification other than aircraft registration should be assessed and documented accordingly, as prescribed in point (b)(3) of AMC1 SERA.13015.

Regulation (EU) 2016/1185

(a)In case of a transponder failure after departure, ATC units shall attempt to provide for continuation of the flight to the destination aerodrome in accordance with the flight plan. Pilots may, however, be expected to comply with specific restrictions.

(b)In the case of a transponder which has failed and cannot be restored before departure, pilots shall:

(1)inform ATS as soon as possible, preferably before submission of a flight plan;

(2)insert in Item 10 of the ICAO flight plan form under SSR the character ‘N’ for complete unserviceability of the transponder or, in case of partial transponder failure, insert the character corresponding to the remaining transponder capability; and

(3)comply with any published procedures for requesting an exemption from the requirements to carry a functioning SSR transponder.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

TRANSPONDER FAILURE AFTER DEPARTURE

When an aircraft experiencing transponder failure after departure is operating or expected to operate in an area where the carriage of a functioning transponder with specified capabilities is mandatory, the ATC units concerned should endeavour to provide for continuation of the flight to the aerodrome of first intended landing in accordance with the flight plan. However, in certain traffic situations, either in terminal areas or en-route, continuation of the flight may not be possible, particularly when failure is detected shortly after take-off. The aircraft may then be required to return to the departure aerodrome or to land at the nearest suitable aerodrome acceptable to the operator concerned and to ATC.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

TRANSPONDER FAILURE BEFORE DEPARTURE

In case of a transponder failure which is detected before departure from an aerodrome where it is not practicable to effect a repair, the aircraft concerned should be permitted to proceed, as directly as possible, to the nearest suitable aerodrome where repair can be made. When granting clearance to such aircraft, ATC should take into consideration the existing or anticipated traffic situation and may have to modify the time of departure, flight level or route of the intended flight. Subsequent adjustments may become necessary during the course of the flight. Note that Article 4(4) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1207/2011¹⁹ also addresses this issue.

SECTION 14 Voice communication procedures

Regulation (EU) 2016/1185

Standardised phraseology shall be used in all situations for which it has been specified. Only when standardised phraseology cannot serve an intended transmission, plain language shall be used.

ED Decision 2016/023/R

For standardised phraseology, refer to the Appendix 1.