Subpart G — Operating Limitations and Information

GENERAL

ED Decision 2016/025/R

(a)Each operating limitation specified in CS 29.1503 to 29.1525 and other limitations and information necessary for safe operation must be established.

(b)The operating limitations and other information necessary for safe operation must be made available to the crew members as prescribed in CS 29.1541 to 29.1593.

[Amdt 29/4]

OPERATING LIMITATIONS

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

(a)An operating speed range must be established.

(b)When airspeed limitations are a function of weight, weight distribution, altitude, rotor speed, power, or other factors, airspeed limitations corresponding with the critical combinations of these factors must be established.

ED Decision 2023/001/R

(a)The never-exceed speed, VNE, must be established so that it is:

(1)Not less than 74 km/h (40 knots) (CAS); and

(2)Not more than the lesser of:

(i)0.9 times the maximum forward speeds established under CS 29.309;

(ii)0.9 times the maximum speed shown under CS 29.251 and 29.629; or

(iii)0.9 times the maximum speed substantiated for advancing blade tip mach number effects under critical altitude conditions.

(b)VNE may vary with altitude, rpm, temperature, and weight, if:

(1)No more than two of these variables (or no more than two instruments integrating more than one of these variables) are used at one time; and

(2)The ranges of these variables (or of the indications on instruments integrating more than one of these variables) are large enough to allow an operationally practical and safe variation of VNE.

(c)For helicopters, a stabilised power-off VNE denoted as VNE (power-off) may be established at a speed less than VNE established pursuant to sub-paragraph (a), if the following conditions are met:

(1)VNE (power-off) is not less than a speed midway between the power-on VNE and the speed used in meeting the requirements of:

(i)CS 29.67(a)(3) for Category A helicopters;

(ii)CS 29.65(a) for Category B helicopters, except multi-engine helicopters meeting the requirements of CS 29.67(b); and

(iii)CS 29.67(b) for multi-engine Category B helicopters meeting the requirements of CS 29.67(b).

(2)Unless it is automatically displayed to the crew, the VNE (power-off) is:

(i)A constant airspeed; or

(ii)A constant amount less than power-on VNE; or

(iii)A constant airspeed for a portion of the altitude range for which certification is requested, and a constant amount less than power-on VNE for the remainder of the altitude range.

[Amdt No: 29/11]

ED Decision 2023/001/R

This AMC replaces FAA AC 29-2C, § AC 29.1505 and should be used when showing compliance with CS 29.1505.

(a)Explanation

(1)General

CS 29.1505 requires the never-exceed speed (VNE) for both Power-ON and Power-OFF flight to be established as operating limitations. The rule specifies how to establish and substantiate these limits.

(2)Power-ON limits

(i)All engines operative (AEO)

(A)The all-engines-operating VNE is established by design and substantiated by flight tests. The VNE limits are the most conservative value that demonstrates compliance with the structural requirements (CS 29.309), the manoeuvrability and controllability requirements (CS 29.143), the stability requirements (CS 29.173 and CS 29.175), or the vibration requirements (CS 29.251). The Power-ON VNE will normally decrease as density altitude or weight increases. A variation in rotor speed may also require a variation in the VNE. The regulation restricts to two the number of variables that are used to determine the VNE at any given time so that a single pilot can readily ascertain the correct VNE for the flight condition with a minimum of mental effort. Helicopter manufacturers have typically presented never-exceed-speed limitation data as a function of pressure altitude and temperature. This information was placarded as well as contained in the flight manual. As the weight of some derivative models was increased, EASA and the FAA accepted altitude/temperature/ VNE limitations that were categorised or contained within a weight range. Literal compliance with the regulation then required that the take-off weight be calculated and then the indicated, appropriate airspeed limitation chart or placard be used for the entire flight. However, VNE charts or placards based on longitudinal centre of gravity have been found to be unacceptable, since the same chart would potentially not be used throughout the flight and the pilot would thus be dealing with more than two variables to determine the VNE. Alternatively, rotorcraft that are equipped with modern avionics systems may be able to automatically calculate and display the VNE in an unambiguous manner as a function of the different parameters upon which it depends. For these designs, the applicant is expected to appropriately address the criticality associated with the loss and misleading presentation of the VNE when compliance of such systems with CS 29.1309 is carried out. These rotorcraft should also have a method for determining the VNE that complies with the regulation for all failure conditions or combinations of failure conditions that are not extremely improbable. This method is usually more conservative than the automatic system because of the limitation in the number of parameters that can be varied. A placard may be used or appropriate RFM instructions.

(B)To ensure compliance with the structural requirements (CS 29.309), vibration requirements (CS 29.251), and flutter requirements (CS 29.629), the all-engines-operating VNE should be restricted so that the maximum demonstrated main rotor tip Mach number will not be exceeded at 1.11 VNE for any approved combination of altitude and ambient temperature. Previous rotorcraft cold weather tests have shown that the rotor system may exhibit several undesirable and possibly hazardous characteristics due to compressibility effects at high advancing blade tip Mach numbers. As the centre of pressure of the advancing rotor blade moves aft near the blade tip due to the formation of localised upper surface shock waves, rotor system loads may increase, the rotor system may exhibit an aerodynamic instability such as rotor weave, rotorcraft vibration may increase substantially, and rotorcraft static or dynamic stability may be adversely affected. Which, if any, of these adverse characteristics are exhibited at high rotor tip Mach numbers is dependent on the design of each particular rotor system. EASA and the FAA experience has shown that some adverse characteristics exist for all the types of rotor systems (articulated, semirigid, rigid, etc.) and the various rotor blade designs evaluated at high advancing blade tip Mach numbers during past certification programmes. Therefore, it has been EASA and the FAA policy to establish VNE so that it is not more than 0.9 times the maximum speed substantiated for advancing blade tip Mach number effects for the critical combination of altitude, approved Power-ON rotor speed, and ambient temperature conditions. This policy was incorporated as a specific regulatory requirement with Amendment 29-24 to § 29.1505. High main rotor tip Mach numbers obtained power off at higher-than-normal main rotor rotational speeds should not be used to establish the maximum Power-ON tip Mach number VNE limit. In addition, since the onset of adverse conditions associated with high tip Mach numbers can occur with little or no warning and amplify very rapidly, no extrapolation of the maximum demonstrated main rotor tip Mach number VNE limitation should be allowed.

(C)A maximum speed for use of power in excess of maximum continuous power (MCP) should be established unless structural requirements have been substantiated for the use of take-off power (TOP) at the maximum approved VNE airspeed. TOP is intended for use during take-off and climb for not more than 5 minutes at relatively low airspeeds. However, EASA and the FAA experience has shown that pilots will not hesitate to use TOP at much higher than best-rate-of-climb airspeeds unless a specific limitation against TOP use above a specified airspeed is included in the RFM. Structural and fatigue substantiations have not normally included loads associated with the use of TOP at VNE. Thus, a TOP airspeed limitation should be established from the structural substantiation data to preclude the accumulation of damaging rotor system and control mechanism loads through intentional use of the TOP rating at high airspeeds.

(ii)One engine inoperative (OEI)

An OEI VNE is generally established through flight test and is usually near the OEI VH of the rotorcraft. It is the highest speed at which the failure of the remaining engine must be demonstrated. For rotorcraft with more than two engines, the appropriate designation would be ‘one-engine-operating’ VNE and would be that speed at which the last remaining engine could be failed with satisfactory handling qualities. It is possible that a rotorcraft with more than two engines could have different VNE speeds depending upon the number of engines still operating. It is recommended that the OEI VNE not be significantly lower than the OEI best range airspeed. For the last remaining engine failure case, a multiengine rotorcraft may require an OEI VNE if the handling qualities are not satisfactory, if the rotor speed decays below the Power-OFF transient limits, or if any other unacceptable characteristic is found at speeds below the all-engine-operating VNE.

(3)Power-OFF limits

(i)A Power-OFF VNE may be established either by design or flight test and should be substantiated by flight tests. A Power-OFF VNE that is less than the maximum Power-ON VNE is generally required if the handling qualities or stability characteristics at high speed in autorotation are not acceptable. A limitation of the Power-OFF VNE may also be used if the rotorcraft has undesirable or objectionable flying qualities, such as large lateral-directional oscillations, at high autorotational airspeeds. The Power-OFF VNE must meet the same criteria for control margins as the Power-ON VNE. The regulation requires that the Power-OFF VNE be no less than the speed midway between the Power-ON VNE and the speed used to comply with the rate of climb requirements for the rotorcraft. When the regulation was written, rotorcraft VNE speeds were significantly lower than those of recently certificated rotorcraft. The high VNE speeds of current rotorcraft result in relatively high values for the Power-OFF VNE. Speeds lower than those specified in the regulation have been found acceptable through a finding of equivalent safety if the selected Power-OFF VNE is equal to or greater than the Power-OFF speed for best range. In any case, the Power-OFF VNE must be a high enough speed to be practical. A demonstration is required of the deceleration from the Power-ON VNE for Category B rotorcraft, or OEI VNE for transport rotorcraft with Category A engine isolation, to the Power-OFF VNE. The transition must be made in a controlled manner with normal pilot reaction and skill.

(ii)In addition to the minimum speed requirements for Power-OFF VNE, the rule restricts the manner in which Power-OFF VNE can be specified when it is not automatically calculated and displayed to the crew. To reduce the crew workload, in all the cases where the Power-OFF VNE is not automatically calculated, Power-OFF VNE may be a constant airspeed which is less than Power-ON VNE for all approved ambient conditions/gross weight combinations; a series of airspeeds varying with altitude, temperature or gross weight that is always a constant amount less than the Power-ON VNE for the same ambient condition/gross weight combination; or some combination of a constant airspeed for a portion of the approved altitude range and a constant amount less than Power-ON VNE for the remainder of the approved altitude range.

(b)Procedures

The tests to substantiate the different VNE speeds are ordinarily conducted during the flight characteristics flight tests. The flight test procedures are discussed for the various limiting areas in earlier paragraphs of this AMC. The controllability test techniques are covered in § AC 29.143, static stability test techniques in § AC 29.175, and the vibration test techniques in § AC 29.251.

[Amdt No: 29/11]

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

(a)Maximum power-off (autorotation). The maximum power-off rotor speed must be established so that it does not exceed 95% of the lesser of:

(1)The maximum design rpm determined under CS 29.309(b); and

(2)The maximum rpm shown during the type tests,

(b)Minimum power-off. The minimum power-off rotor speed must be established so that it is not less than 105% of the greater of:

(1)The minimum shown during the type tests; and

(2)The minimum determined by design substantiation.

(c)Minimum power-on. The minimum power-on rotor speed must be established so that it is:

(1)Not less than the greater of:

(i)The minimum shown during the type tests; and

(ii)The minimum determined by design substantiation; and

(2)Not more than a value determined under CS 29.33(a)(1) and (c)(1).

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

For Category A rotorcraft, if a range of heights exists at any speed, including zero, within which it is not possible to make a safe landing following power failure, the range of heights and its variation with forward speed must be established, together with any other pertinent information, such as the kind of landing surface.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

The weight and centre of gravity limitations determined under CS 29.25 and 29.27, respectively, must be established as operating limitations.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

(a)General. The powerplant limitations prescribed in this paragraph must be established so that they do not exceed the corresponding limits for which the engines are type certificated.

(b)Take-off operation. The powerplant take- off operation must be limited by:

(1)The maximum rotational speed, which may not be greater than:

(i)The maximum value determined by the rotor design; or

(ii)The maximum value shown during the type tests;

(2)The maximum allowable manifold pressure (for reciprocating engines);

(3)The maximum allowable turbine inlet or turbine outlet gas temperature (for turbine engines);

(4)The maximum allowable power or torque for each engine, considering the power input limitations of the transmission with all engines operating;

(5)The maximum allowable power or torque for each engine considering the power input limitations of the transmission with one engine inoperative;

(6)The time limit for the use of the power corresponding to the limitations established in sub-paragraphs (b)(1) to (5); and

(7)If the time limit established in sub-paragraph (b)(6) exceeds 2 minutes:

(i)The maximum allowable cylinder head or coolant outlet temperature (for reciprocating engines); and

(ii)The maximum allowable engine and transmission oil temperatures.

(c)Continuous operation. The continuous operation must be limited by:

(1)The maximum rotational speed, which may not be greater than:

(i)The maximum value determined by the rotor design; or

(ii)The maximum value shown during the type tests;

(2)The minimum rotational speed shown under the rotor speed requirements in CS 29.1509(c);

(3)The maximum allowable manifold pressure (for reciprocating engines);

(4)The maximum allowable turbine inlet or turbine outlet gas temperature (for turbine engines);

(5)The maximum allowable power or torque for each engine, considering the power input limitations of the transmission with all engines operating;

(6)The maximum allowable power or torque for each engine, considering the power input limitations of the transmission with one engine inoperative; and

(7)The maximum allowable temperatures for –

(i)The cylinder head or coolant outlet (for reciprocating engines);

(ii)The engine oil; and

(iii)The transmission oil.

(d)Fuel grade or designation. The minimum fuel grade (for reciprocating engines) or fuel designation (for turbine engines) must be established so that it is not less than that required for the operation of the engines within the limitations in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c).

(e)Ambient temperature. Ambient temperature limitations (including limitations for winterization installations if applicable) must be established as the maximum ambient atmospheric temperature at which compliance with the cooling provisions of CS 29.1041 to 29.1049 is shown.

(f)Two and one-half minute OEI power operation. Unless otherwise authorised, the use of 2½-minute OEI power must be limited to engine failure operation of multi-engine, turbine powered rotorcraft for not longer than 2½ minutes for any period in which that power is used. The use of 2½-minute OEI power must also be limited by:

(1)The maximum rotational speed, which may not be greater than:

(i)The maximum value determined by the rotor design; or

(ii)The maximum value shown during the type tests;

(2)The maximum allowable gas temperature;

(3)The maximum allowable torque; and

(4)The maximum allowable oil temperature.

(g)Thirty-minute OEI power operation. Unless otherwise authorised, the use of 30-minute OEI power must be limited to multi-engine, turbine-powered rotorcraft for not longer than 30 minutes after failure of an engine. The use of 30-minute OEI power must also be limited by:

(1)The maximum rotational speed, which may not be greater than:

(i)The maximum value determined by the rotor design; or

(ii)The maximum value shown during the type tests;

(2)The maximum allowable gas temperature;

(3)The maximum allowable torque; and

(4)The maximum allowable oil temperature.

(h)Continuous OEI power operation. Unless otherwise authorised, the use of continuous OEI power must be limited to multi-engine, turbine- powered rotorcraft for continued flight after failure of an engine. The use of continuous OEI power must also be limited by:

(1)The maximum rotational speed, which may not be greater than:

(i)The maximum value determined by the rotor design; or

(ii)The maximum value shown during the type tests.

(2)The maximum allowable gas temperature;

(3)The maximum allowable torque; and

(4)The maximum allowable oil temperature.

(i)Rated 30-second OEI power operation. Rated 30-second OEI power is permitted only on multi-engine, turbine-powered rotorcraft also certificated for the use of rated 2-minute OEI power, and can only be used for continued operation of the remaining engine(s) after a failure or precautionary shutdown of an engine. It must be shown that following application of 30-second OEI power, any damage will be readily detectable by the applicable inspections and other related procedures furnished in accordance with paragraph A29.4 of Appendix A of CS-29. The use of 30-second OEI power must be limited to not more than 30 seconds for any period in which the power is used and by:

(1)The maximum rotational speed which may not be greater than:

(i)The maximum value determined by the rotor design: or

(ii)The maximum value demonstrated during the type tests;

(2)The maximum allowable gas temperature; and

(3)The maximum allowable torque.

(j)Rated 2-minute OEI power operation. Rated 2-minute OEI power is permitted only on multi-engine, turbine-powered rotorcraft, also certificated for the use of rated 30-second OEI power, and can only be used for continued operation of the remaining engine(s) after a failure or precautionary shutdown of an engine. It must be shown that following application of 2-minute OEI power, any damage will be readily detectable by the applicable inspections and other related procedures furnished in accordance with paragraph A29.4 of Appendix A of CS-29. The use of 2-minute OEI power must be limited to not more than 2 minutes for any period in which that power is used, and by:

(1)The maximum rotational speed, which may not be greater than:

(i)The maximum value determined by the rotor designs; or

(ii)The maximum value demonstrated during the type tests;

(2)The maximum allowable gas temperature; and

(3)The maximum allowable torque.

ED Decision 2023/001/R

(a)Introduction

This AMC supplements FAA AC 29-2C, § AC 29.1521 and should be used in conjunction with that AC when demonstrating compliance with CS 29.1521.

(b)30-minute power rating

(1)Explanation

The 30-minute power rating may be set at any level between the maximum continuous up to and including the take-off rating, and may be used for multiple periods of up to 30 minutes each, at any time between the take-off and landing phases in any flight.

This rating is associated with some limitations which should be adequately established and declared.

(2)Procedure

CS 29.1521(a) refers to the limits for which the engines are type certificated. This should include the 30-minute power rating usage and:

—the associated usage limit:

—maximum duration in one single shot up to 30 minutes;

—cumulative limit, if any, in one flight; and

—any other limits associated with the usage of the 30-minute power rating declared in the installation and/or operating manual of the engine.

[Amdt No: 29/11]

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

If an auxiliary power unit that meets the requirements of CS-APU is installed in the rotorcraft, the limitations established for that auxiliary power unit including the categories of operation must be specified as operating limitations for the rotorcraft.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

The minimum flight crew must be established so that it is sufficient for safe operation, considering:

(a)The workload on individual crew members;

(b)The accessibility and ease of operation of necessary controls by the appropriate crew member; and

(c)The kinds of operation authorised under CS 29.1525.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

The kinds of operations (such as VFR, IFR, day, night, or icing) for which the rotorcraft is approved are established by demonstrated compliance with the applicable certification requirements and by the installed equipment.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

The maximum altitude up to which operation is allowed, as limited by flight, structural, powerplant, functional, or equipment characteristics, must be established.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

Instructions for continued airworthiness in accordance with Appendix A to CS-29 must be prepared.

ED Decision 2023/001/R

(a)Introduction

This AMC supplements FAA AC 29-2C, § AC 29.1529 and should be used in conjunction with that AC when demonstrating compliance with CS 29.1529.

(b)Abnormal events

The ICA should include instructions that ensure that operators conduct appropriate inspections or other actions following abnormal events in operation, maintenance or during transportation of components.

Abnormal events that should be considered include hard landings, severe gust encounters, lightning strike, exposure to high winds when parked and dropping components during maintenance or transport.

The instructions should consider the nature of the components, including but not limited to critical parts, and in particular the possibility of damage that can occur during impact or overload events that may not be detectable but could subsequently lead to premature failure in operation. In such cases, scrapping the component or parts of it may be the only appropriate action to take.

(c)Time between overhaul (TBO) development

(1)Explanation

The purpose of this AMC is to provide guidance for establishing a TBO for rotorcraft drive system gearboxes at type certificate approval and to increase it during the service life of the product.

A rotorcraft rotor drive system gearbox is usually a complex assembly composed of many parts of which a significant proportion can be critical parts. Many are rotating parts which are subject to high torque and fatigue loads, such as bearings, shafts, gears, and free wheels with the primary function of transmitting power from the engine to the rotors. Non-rotating components have other functions such as support, lubrication, load transfer or condition monitoring.

Most gearbox components are enclosed inside the housings, which prevents the possibility of detailed maintenance inspections without disassembly. As a result, to ensure that the internal gearbox components remain in serviceable condition, periodic overhauls of the assembly are typically scheduled. Overhaul allows an in-depth and periodic inspection of gearbox components, controlling and limiting the development of degradation and build-up of debris, as well as checking for cracks and other damages that may be developing. In addition, the inspection findings can determine whether parts are sufficiently protected and whether they remain in serviceable condition. In summary, the overhaul of the gearbox is intended to verify the condition of its elements, restore them to a serviceable condition or replace them where needed, and ensure that the gearbox will be safe for operation until the following overhaul. The TBO is the periodic interval between two overhauls and is traditionally defined in flight hours and calendar time.

During the type-certification process, rotorcraft drive system gearbox components are subject to various forms of analyses and tests, which assess their criticality, integrity and reliability. These assessments rely on a number of assumptions regarding the condition of the components during their service life and have an impact on aspects such as contact conditions between elements, fretting, wear, loads and environmental deterioration. The applicant should consider that the continued validity of these assumptions is typically linked to an appropriate TBO. As a result, the validation of these assumptions and the development of the TBO are processes that should be progressed in parallel after entry into service (EIS).

The final and mature TBO should normally be based on the results of investigations from in-service aircraft, overhauled gearboxes and data acquired during development, certification, and maturity tests substantiating the reliability of the parts and their capability to operate safely. However, until this data becomes available, the applicant should maintain a conservative TBO, extending it throughout the life of the product as positive supporting data from service becomes available.

(2)Guidance

For drive system gearboxes that are essential to drive the rotors, EASA considers that the initial TBO at EIS and the plan to increase it in service should be justified. For this purpose, the following should be considered by the applicant:

—Initial TBO (applicable at EIS)

At EIS, the available data supporting the justification of the TBO of a rotor drive system gearbox is typically limited. The applicant should, therefore, propose a conservative initial TBO supported by the data coming from:

the endurance test,

flight tests,

other relevant tests, and

experience on similar design having the same characteristics.

The applicant should take into account that, in general, only limited experience of the real operating environment and conditions for a new gearbox is available at EIS.

This initial TBO should ensure enough opportunities to verify the condition of internal gearbox components in order to validate the assumptions made at the time of certification, preventing that any compromised assumption may lead to an in-service catastrophic or hazardous failure.

—TBO step increase

The increase of a gearbox TBO in service should be accomplished in steps providing confidence progressively in the validity of the certification assumptions. Each TBO step increase should:

—only be proposed when the current TBO is supported by a sufficient number of gearbox overhaul inspection results;

—be based on a sufficient number of gearboxes from the fleet to be inspected, and take into account the representativeness of operational and environmental aspects of the selected samples to represent the full spectrum of gearbox usage;

—be based on technical justifications from overhauled gearboxes (e.g. condition of inspected parts, evidence from similar designs, etc.), maturity testing and in-service feedback (incidents, health and usage monitoring system (HUMS) data, etc.); and

—be completed prior to formally increasing the TBO to verify acceptable behaviour and condition of the gearbox components prior to starting a new increase phase.

—Management of TBO steps

The process for managing the evolution of the TBO of drive system gearboxes should be documented in a TBO maturity plan. This should include:

—planned increase steps and target TBO, technical criteria for the validation of the steps planned and justification of the proposed plan (see note 1);

—definition of the number of gearboxes and selection criteria considering operation and environment (see note 1);

—definition of responsible parties for performing the TBO step increase validation inspections, activities involved and information to be reported;

—proposed analysis process of the inspection results, responsible parties and methods of analysis; and

—the TBO step increase validation process and associated deliverables (see note 2).

Any findings arising from the TBO development process which might bring into question the suitability of the current TBO or impair the capability of the gearbox to reach the planned increase in TBO should be reported to the Agency.

Finally, if a major change is introduced to or affecting a drive system gearbox, the applicant should evaluate the need to revise the TBO and incorporate additional steps in the gearbox TBO maturity plan.

Note 1: The TBO maturity plan and the associated TBO increase validation criteria should be defined by the applicant and provided to the Agency during the certification process. The results of the process of validation of each step might lead to revisions of the maturity plan.

Note 2: The acceptance of each individual step as well as the closure of the maturity plan should be formally endorsed by the applicant and duly documented.

[Amdt No: 29/11]

ED Decision 2020/006/R

A29.1 General

(a)This appendix specifies requirements for the preparation of instructions for continued airworthiness as required by CS 29.1529.

(b)The instructions for continued airworthiness for each rotorcraft must include the instructions for continued airworthiness for each engine and rotor (hereinafter designated ‘products’), for each appliance required by any applicable CS or operating rule, and any required information relating to the interface of those appliances and products with the rotorcraft. If instructions for continued airworthiness are not supplied by the manufacturer of an appliance or product installed in the rotorcraft, the instructions for continued airworthiness for the rotorcraft must include the information essential to the continued airworthiness of the rotorcraft.

A29.2 Format

(a)The instructions for continued airworthiness must be in the form of a manual or manuals as appropriate for the quantity of data to be provided.

(b)The format of the manual or manuals must provide for a practical arrangement.

A29.3 Content

The contents of the manual or manuals must be prepared in a language acceptable to the Agency. The instructions for continued airworthiness must contain the following manuals or sections, as appropriate, and information:

(a)Rotorcraft maintenance manual or section.

(1)Introduction information that includes an explanation of the rotorcraft’s features and data to the extent necessary for maintenance or preventive maintenance.

(2)A description of the rotorcraft and its systems and installations including its engines, rotors, and appliances.

(3)Basic control and operation information describing how the rotorcraft components and systems are controlled and how they operate, including any special procedures and limitations that apply.

(4)Servicing information that covers details regarding servicing points, capacities of tanks, reservoirs, types of fluids to be used, pressures applicable to the various systems, location of access panels for inspection and servicing, locations of lubrication points, the lubricants to be used, equipment required for servicing, tow instructions and limitations, mooring, jacking, and levelling information.

(b)Maintenance Instructions.

(1)Scheduling information for each part of the rotorcraft and its engines, auxiliary power units, rotors, accessories, instruments, and equipment that provides the recommended periods at which they should be cleaned, inspected, adjusted, tested, and lubricated, and the degree of inspection, the applicable wear tolerances, and work recommended at these periods. However, it is allowed to refer to an accessory, instrument, or equipment manufacturer as the source of this information if it is shown that the item has an exceptionally high degree of complexity requiring specialised maintenance techniques, test equipment, or expertise. The recommended overhaul periods and necessary cross references to the airworthiness limitations section of the manual must also be included. In addition, an inspection program that includes the frequency and extent of the inspections necessary to provide for the continued airworthiness of the rotorcraft must be included.

(2)Trouble-shooting information describing probable malfunctions, how to recognise those malfunctions, and the remedial action for those malfunctions.

(3)Information describing the order and method of removing and replacing products and parts with any necessary precautions to be taken.

(4)Other general procedural instructions including procedures for system testing during ground running, symmetry checks, weighing and determining the centre of gravity, lifting and shoring, and storage limitations.

(c)Diagrams of structural access plates and information needed to gain access for inspections when access plates are not provided.

(d)Details for the application of special inspection techniques including radiographic and ultrasonic testing where such processes are specified.

(e)Information needed to apply protective treatments to the structure after inspection.

(f)All data relative to structural fasteners such as identification, discard recommendations, and torque values.

(g)A list of special tools needed.

A29.4 Airworthiness Limitations Section

The instructions for continued airworthiness must contain a section titled airworthiness limitations that is segregated and clearly distinguishable from the rest of the document. This section must set forth each mandatory replacement time, structural inspection interval, and related structural inspection required for type-certification. If the instructions for continued airworthiness consist of multiple documents, the section required by this paragraph must be included in the principal manual. This section must contain a legible statement in a prominent location that reads – ‘The airworthiness limitations section is approved and variations must also be approved’.

A29.5 Information system security Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

The applicant must prepare Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) that are applicable to aircraft information system security protection as required by CS 29.1319 (see AMC 20-42 Section 9).

[Amdt No: 29/2]

[Amdt No: 29/3]

[Amdt No: 29/8]

MARKINGS AND PLACARDS

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

(a)The rotorcraft must contain:

(1)The markings and placards specified in CS 29.1545 to 29.1565; and

(2)Any additional information, instrument markings, and placards required for the safe operation of the rotorcraft if it has unusual design, operating or handling characteristics.

(b)Each marking and placard prescribed in sub-paragraph (a):

(1)Must be displayed in a conspicuous place; and

(2)May not be easily erased, disfigured, or obscured.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

For each instrument:

(a)When markings are on the cover glass of the instrument there must be means to maintain the correct alignment of the glass cover with the face of the dial; and

(b)Each arc and line must be wide enough, and located to be clearly visible to the pilot.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

(a)Each airspeed indicator must be marked as specified in sub-paragraph (b), with the marks located at the corresponding indicated airspeeds.

(b)The following markings must be made:

(1)A red line:

(i)For rotorcraft other than helicopters, at VNE; and

(ii)For helicopters, at VNE (power-on).

(2)A red, cross-hatched line at VNE (power-off) for helicopters, if VNE (power- off) is less than VNE (power-on).

(3)For the caution range, a yellow range.

(4)For the safe operating range, a green or unmarked range.

[Amdt: 29/11]

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

(a)A placard meeting the requirements of this paragraph must be installed on or near the magnetic direction indicator.

(b)The placard must show the calibration of the instrument in level flight with the engines operating.

(c)The placard must state whether the calibration was made with radio receivers on or off.

(d)Each calibration reading must be in terms of magnetic heading in not more than 45° increments.

ED Decision 2023/001/R

For each required powerplant instrument, as appropriate to the type of instruments –

(a)Each maximum and, if applicable, minimum safe operating limit must be marked with a red line;

(b)Each normal operating range must be depicted as a green or unmarked range;

(c)Each take-off and precautionary range must be marked with a yellow range or yellow line;

(d)Each engine or propeller range that is restricted because of excessive vibration stresses must be marked with red ranges or red lines; and

(e)Each OEI limit or approved operating range must be marked to be clearly differentiated from the markings of sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) except that no marking is normally required for the 30-second OEI limit.

[Amdt No: 29/11]

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

Each oil quantity indicator must be marked with enough increments to indicate readily and accurately the quantity of oil.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

If the unusable fuel supply for any tank exceeds 3.8 litres (0.8 Imperial gallon/1 US gallon), or 5% of the tank capacity, whichever is greater, a red arc must be marked on its indicator extending from the calibrated zero reading to the lowest reading obtainable in level flight.

ED Decision 2023/001/R

(a)Each cockpit control, other than primary flight controls or controls whose function is obvious, must be plainly marked as to its function and method of operation.

(b)For powerplant fuel controls:

(1)Each fuel tank selector valve control must be marked to indicate the position corresponding to each tank and to each existing cross feed position;

(2)If safe operation requires the use of any tanks in a specific sequence, that sequence must be marked on, or adjacent to, the selector for those tanks; and

(3)Each valve control for any engine of a multi-engine rotorcraft must be marked to indicate the position corresponding to each engine controlled.

(c)Usable fuel capacity must be marked as follows:

(1)For fuel systems having no selector controls, the usable fuel capacity of the system must be indicated at the fuel quantity indicator unless it is:

(i)provided by another system or equipment readily accessible to the pilot; and

(ii)contained in the limitations section of the rotorcraft flight manual.

(2)For fuel systems having selector controls, the usable fuel capacity available at each selector control position must be indicated near the selector control.

(d)For accessory, auxiliary, and emergency controls:

(1)Each essential visual position indicator, such as those showing rotor pitch or landing gear position, must be marked so that each crew member can determine at any time the position of the unit to which it relates; and

(2)Each emergency control must be marked as to method of operation and be red unless it may need to be operated underwater, in which case it must be marked with yellow and black stripes.

(e)For rotorcraft incorporating retractable landing gear, the maximum landing gear operating speed must be displayed in clear view of the pilot.

[Amdt No: 29/5]

[Amdt No: 29/11]

ED Decision 2023/001/R

This AMC supplements FAA AC 29.1555.

(a)Explanation

CS-29 Amendment 5 introduced the need to mark emergency controls for use following a ditching or water impact with black and yellow stripes, instead of red, to make them more conspicuous when viewed underwater.

(b) Procedures

(1) Any emergency control that may be required to be operated underwater (e.g. an emergency flotation system deployment switch, a life raft deployment switch or handle) should be coloured with black and yellow stripes.

(2) Black and yellow markings should consist of at least two bands of each colour of approximately equal widths.

[Amdt No: 29/5]

[Amdt No: 29/11]

ED Decision 2023/001/R

CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

This AMC supplements FAA AC 29.1555.

The fuel quantity should be understood as the actual amount of usable fuel at a given time contained within a tank of constant fuel capacity.

The usable fuel capacity of a tank is the maximum amount of usable fuel that the tank can have. It was historically used to define the fuel quantity for flight planning when the fuel quantity indicator displayed only levels (such as full, half, etc.) of the total capacity. The pilot had to calculate the fuel quantity in an appropriate unit based on the usable fuel capacity of the tank and the level shown on the fuel quantity indicator.

The design and accuracy in all operating and environmental conditions of modern fuel quantity indication systems decreases the crew workload by displaying directly the fuel quantity in the appropriate unit. This data can be used for compliance demonstration.

[Amdt No: 29/11]

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

(a)Baggage and cargo compartments, and ballast location. Each baggage and cargo compartment, and each ballast location must have a placard stating any limitations on contents, including weight, that are necessary under the loading requirements.

(b)Seats. If the maximum allowable weight to be carried in a seat is less than 77 kg (170 pounds), a placard stating the lesser weight must be permanently attached to the seat structure.

(c)Fuel and oil filler openings. The following apply:

(1)Fuel filler openings must be marked at or near the filler cover with:

(i)The word ‘fuel’;

(ii)For reciprocating engine powered rotorcraft, the minimum fuel grade;

(iii)For turbine-engine-powered rotorcraft, the permissible fuel designations, except that if impractical, this information may be included in the rotorcraft flight manual, and the fuel filler may be marked with an appropriate reference to the flight manual; and

(iv)For pressure fueling systems, the maximum permissible fueling supply pressure and the maximum permissible defueling pressure.

(2)Oil filler openings must be marked at or near the filler cover with the word ‘oil’.

(d)Emergency exit placards. Each placard and operating control for each emergency exit must differ in colour from the surrounding fuselage surface as prescribed in CS 29.811(f)(2). A placard must be near each emergency exit control and must clearly indicate the location of that exit and its method of operation.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

There must be a placard in clear view of the pilot that specifies the kinds of operations (VFR, IFR, day, night or icing) for which the rotorcraft is approved.

ED Decision 2018/007/R

(a)Each safety equipment control to be operated by the crew or passenger in an emergency must be plainly marked with its identification and its method of operation.

(b)Each location, such as a locker or compartment, that carries any fire extinguishing, signalling, or other safety equipment, must be appropriately marked in order to identify the contents and if necessary indicate how to remove the equipment

(c)Each item of safety equipment carried must be marked with its identification and must have obviously marked operating instructions.

[Amdt No: 29/5]

ED Decision 2018/007/R

This AMC supplements FAA AC 29.1561.

(a) Explanation

CS 29.1561 requires each safety equipment control that can be operated by a crew member or passenger to be plainly marked to identify its function and method of operation. (Note that the marking of safety equipment controls located within the cockpit and intended for use by the flight crew is addressed in CS 29.1555.)

In addition, a location marking for each item of stowed safety equipment should be provided that identifies the contents and how to remove them. All safety equipment, including ditching and survival equipment, should be clearly identifiable and provided with operating instructions. Markings and placards should be conspicuous and durable as per CS 29.1541. Both passengers and crew should be able to easily identify and then use the safety equipment.

(b)Procedures

(1) Release devices such as levers or latch handles for life rafts and other safety equipment should be plainly marked to identify their function and method of operation. Stencils, permanent decals, placards, or other permanent labels or instructions may be used.

(2) Lockers, compartments, or pouches used to contain safety equipment such as life preservers, etc., should be marked to identify the equipment therein and to also identify, if not obvious, the method or means of accessing or releasing the equipment.

(3) Safety equipment should be labelled and provided with operating instructions for its use or operation.

(4)Locating signs for safety equipment should be legible in daylight from the furthest seated point in the cabin or recognisable from a distance equal to the width of the cabin. Letters, 2.5 cm (1 in) high, should be acceptable to satisfy the recommendation. Operating instructions should be legible from a distance of 76 cm (30 in). These recommendations are based on the exit requirements of CS 29.811(b) and (e)(1).

(5) As prescribed, each life raft and its installed equipment should be provided with clear operating instruction markings that cannot be easily erased or disfigured and are readable at low levels of illumination.

(6) Easily recognised or identified and easily accessible safety equipment located in sight of the occupants, such as a passenger compartment fire extinguisher that all passengers can see, may not require locating signs, stencils, or decals. However, operating instructions are required.

[Amdt No: 29/5]

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

Each tail rotor must be marked so that its disc is conspicuous under normal daylight ground conditions.

ROTORCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

(a)Furnishing information. A Rotorcraft Flight Manual must be furnished with each rotorcraft, and it must contain the following:

(1)Information required by CS 29.1583 to 29.1589.

(2)Other information that is necessary for safe operation because of design, operating, or handling characteristics.

(b)Approved information. Each part of the manual listed in CS 29.1583 to 29.1589 that is appropriate to the rotorcraft, must be furnished, verified, and approved, and must be segregated, identified, and clearly distinguished from each unapproved part of that manual.

(c)Reserved.

(d)Table of contents. Each Rotorcraft Flight Manual must include a table of contents if the complexity of the manual indicates a need for it.

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

(a)Airspeed and rotor limitations. Information necessary for the marking of airspeed and rotor limitations on or near their respective indicators must be furnished. The significance of each limitation and of the colour coding must be explained.

(b)Powerplant limitations. The following information must be furnished:

(1)Limitations required by CS 29.1521.

(2)Explanation of the limitations, when appropriate.

(3)Information necessary for marking the instruments required by CS 29.1549 to 29.1553.

(c)Weight and loading distribution. The weight and centre of gravity limits required by CS 29.25 and CS 29.27, respectively, must be furnished. If the variety of possible loading conditions warrants, instructions must be included to allow ready observance of the limitations.

(d)Flight crew. When a flight crew of more than one is required, the number and functions of the minimum flight crew determined under CS 29.1523 must be furnished.

(e)Kinds of operation. Each kind of operation for which the rotorcraft and its equipment installations are approved must be listed.

(f)Limiting heights. Enough information must be furnished to allow compliance with CS 29.1517.

(g)Maximum allowable wind. For Category A rotorcraft, the maximum allowable wind for safe operation near the ground must be furnished.

(h)Altitude. The altitude established under CS 29.1527 and an explanation of the limiting factors must be furnished.

(i)Ambient temperature. Maximum and minimum ambient temperature limitations must be furnished.

ED Decision 2016/025/R

This AMC provides further guidance and acceptable means of compliance to supplement FAA AC 29-2C Change 4 (AC 29.1583 § 29.1583 (Amendment 29-24) OPERATING LIMITATIONS), to meet the Agency's interpretation of CS 29.1583. As such it should be used in conjunction with the FAA AC but take precedence over it, where stipulated, in the showing of compliance.

Specifically, this AMC addresses an area where the FAA AC has been deemed by the Agency as being at variance to the Agency’s interpretation. This being as follows:

b.Procedures.

(7)Kinds of operations are established under CS 29.1525. This section should contain the following preamble: ‘This rotorcraft is certified in the Large Category (category B or category A and category B) and is eligible for the following kinds of operations when the appropriate instruments and equipment required by the airworthiness and operating rules are installed and approved and are in an operable condition.’ The following, and any other kinds of operations that are applicable, should be listed.

(i)Day and night VFR.

(ii)Approved to operate in known icing conditions.

(iii)IFR.

(iv)Category A vertical operations from ground level or elevated heliports.

(v)Extended overwater operations (ditching).

(vi)External load operation.

Each operating limitation must be clear, unambiguous, and consistent with any other applicable limitation or regulatory requirement.

[Amdt 29/4]

ED Decision 2018/007/R

(a)The parts of the manual containing operating procedures must have information concerning any normal and emergency procedures, and other information necessary for safe operation, including the applicable procedures, such as those involving minimum speeds, to be followed if an engine fails.

(b)For multi-engine rotorcraft, information identifying each operating condition in which the fuel system independence prescribed in CS 29.953 is necessary for safety must be furnished, together with instructions for placing the fuel system in a configuration used to show compliance with that paragraph.

(c)For helicopters for which a VNE (power-off) is established under CS 29.1505(c), information must be furnished to explain the VNE (power-off) and the procedures for reducing airspeed to not more than the VNE (power-off) following failure of all engines.

(d)For each rotorcraft showing compliance with CS 29.1353(c)(6)(ii) or (c)(6)(iii), the operating procedures for disconnecting the battery from its charging source must be furnished.

(e)If the unusable fuel supply in any tank exceeds 5% of the tank capacity, or 3.8 litres (0.8 Imperial gallon/1 US gallon), whichever is greater, information must be furnished which indicates that when the fuel quantity indicator reads ‘zero’ in level flight, any fuel remaining in the fuel tank cannot be used safely in flight.

(f)Information on the total quantity of usable fuel for each fuel tank must be furnished.

(g)For Category B rotorcraft, the airspeeds and corresponding rotor speeds for minimum rate of descent and best glide angle as prescribed in CS 29.71 must be provided.

(h)The maximum duration of operation after a failure resulting in a loss of lubrication of a rotor drive system gearbox and an associated oil pressure warning must be furnished and must not exceed the maximum period substantiated in accordance with CS 29.927(c).

[Amdt No: 29/5]

ED Decision 2018/007/R

CS 29.927(c) provides guidance for the completion of testing to simulate a loss of lubrication and on how to demonstrate confidence in the margin of safety associated with the maximum period of operation following loss of lubrication. This margin of safety is intended to substantiate a period of operation that has been evaluated as likely to be safer than making a forced landing over hostile terrain. Accordingly, the need to ‘Land as Soon as Possible’, which may include ditching where circumstances permit, should be reflected in the associated RFM emergency procedures. This can be supplemented with ’Land Immediately’ in the event of additional conditions to that of low oil pressure being present.

Emergency procedures should identify the need to minimise the power that is used for yaw and accessories following a loss of oil pressure warning.

[Amdt No: 29/5]

ED Decision 2018/007/R

Flight manual performance information which exceeds any operating limitation may be shown only to the extent necessary for presentation clarity or to determine the effects of approved optional equipment or procedures. When data beyond operating limits are shown, the limits must be clearly indicated. The following must be provided:

(a)Category A. For each Category A rotorcraft, the rotorcraft flight manual must contain a summary of the performance data, including data necessary for the application of any applicable operating rule, together with descriptions of the conditions, such as airspeeds, under which this data was determined, and must contain –

(1)The indicated airspeeds corresponding with those determined for take-off and the procedures to be followed if the critical engine fails during take-off;

(2)The airspeed calibrations;

(3)The techniques, associated airspeeds, and rates of descent for autorotative landings;

(4)The rejected take-off distance determined under CS 29.62 and the take-off distance determined under CS 29.61;

(5)The landing data determined under CS 29.81 and 29.85;

(6)The steady gradient of climb for each weight, altitude, and temperature for which take- off data are to be scheduled, along the take-off path determined in the flight conditions required in CS 29.67(a)(1) and (a)(2):

(i)In the flight conditions required in CS 29.67(a)(1) between the end of the take-off distance and the point at which the rotorcraft is 61 m (200 ft) above the take-off surface (or 61 m (200 ft) above the lowest point of the take-off profile for elevated heliports).

(ii)In the flight conditions required in CS 29.67(a)(2) between the points at which the rotorcraft is 61 m (200 ft) and 305 m (1000 ft) above the take-off surface (or 61 m (200 ft) and 305 m (1000 ft) above the lowest point of the take-off profile for elevated heliports).

(7)Hover performance determined under CS 29.49 and the maximum weight for each altitude and temperature condition at which the rotorcraft can safely hover in-ground effect and out-of-ground effect in winds of not less than 31 km/h (17 knots) from all azimuths. This data must be clearly referenced to the appropriate hover charts.

(b)Category B. For each Category B rotorcraft, the Rotorcraft Flight Manual must contain:

(1)The take-off distance and the climbout speed together with the pertinent information defining the flight path with respect to autorotative landing if an engine fails, including the calculated effects of altitude and temperature;

(2)The steady rates of climb and hovering ceiling, together with the corresponding airspeeds and other pertinent information, including the calculated effects of altitude and temperature;

(3)The landing distance, appropriate airspeed and type of landing surface, together with any pertinent information that might affect this distance, including the effects of weight, altitude and temperature;

(4)The maximum safe wind for operation near the ground;

(5)The airspeed calibrations;

(6)The height-speed envelope except for rotorcraft incorporating this as an operating limitation;

(7)Glide distance as a function of altitude when autorotating at the speeds and conditions for minimum rate of descent and best glide angle, as determined in CS 29.71;

(8)Hover performance determined under CS 29.49 and the maximum safe wind demonstrated under the ambient conditions for data presented. In addition, the maximum weight for each altitude and temperature condition at which the rotorcraft can safely hover in-ground effect and out-of-ground effect in winds of not less than 31 km/h (17 knots) from all azimuths. This data must be clearly referenced to the appropriate hover charts; and

(9)Any additional performance data necessary for the application of any applicable operating rule.

(c) The RFM must contain the substantiated sea conditions and any associated information relating to the certification obtained with ditching or emergency flotation provisions.

[Amdt No: 29/1]

[Amdt No: 29/2]

[Amdt No: 29/5]

ED Decision 2018/007/R

This AMC supplements FAA AC 29.1587, AC 29.1587A and AC 29.1587B.

a. Explanation

The rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) is an important element in the certification process of the rotorcraft for approval with ditching or emergency flotation provisions. The material may be presented in the form of a supplement or a revision to the basic manual. This material should include:

(1) A statement in the ‘Limitations’ section stating that the rotorcraft is approved for ditching or emergency flotation, as appropriate.

If certification with ditching provisions is obtained in a segmented fashion (i.e. one applicant performing the safety equipment installation and operations portion and another designing and substantiating the safety equipment’s performance and deployment facilities), the RFM limitations should state that the ditching provisions are not approved until all the segments are completed. The outstanding ditching provisions for a complete certification should be identified in the ‘Limitations’ section.

(2) Procedures and limitations for the inflation of a flotation device.

(3) A statement in the performance information section of the RFM, identifying the substantiated sea conditions and any other pertinent information. If substantiation was performed using the default North Sea wave climate (JONSWAP), the maximum substantiated significant wave height (Hs) should be stated. If extended testing was performed in accordance with the AMC to 29.801(e) and 29.802(c) to demonstrate that the target level of capsize probability can be reached without any operational limitations, this should also be stated. If substantiation was performed for other sea conditions, the maximum substantiated significant wave height (Hs) and the limits of the geographical area represented should be stated.

(4) Recommended rotorcraft water entry attitude and speed.

(5) Procedures for the use of safety equipment.

(6) Egress and life raft entry procedures.

[Amdt No: 29/5]

ED Decision 2003/16/RM

There must be loading instructions for each possible loading condition between the maximum and minimum weights determined under CS 29.25 that can result in a centre of gravity beyond any extreme prescribed in CS 29.27, assuming any probable occupant weights.

ED Decision 2016/025/R

If required by an operating rule, the susceptibility of rotorcraft features to the effects of volcanic cloud hazards must be established.

[Amdt 29/4]

ED Decision 2016/025/R

The aim of CS 29.1593 is to support commercial and non-commercial operators operating complex motor-powered rotorcraft by identifying and assessing airworthiness hazards associated with operations in contaminated airspace. Providing such data to operators will enable those hazards to be properly managed as part of an established management system.

Acceptable means of establishing the susceptibility of rotorcraft features to the effects of volcanic clouds should include a combination of experience, studies, analysis, and/or testing of parts or sub-assemblies.

Information necessary for safe operation should be contained in the unapproved part of the flight manual or other appropriate manual, and should be readily usable by operators in preparing a safety risk assessment as part of their overall management system.

A volcanic cloud comprises volcanic ash together with gases and other chemicals. Although the primary hazard is volcanic ash itself, other elements of the volcanic cloud may also be undesirable to operate through, thus their effect on airworthiness should be assessed.

In determining the susceptibility of rotorcraft features to the effects of volcanic clouds as well as the necessary information to be provided to operators, the following points should be considered:

(a)Identify the features of the rotorcraft that are susceptible to airworthiness effects of volcanic clouds. These may include but are not limited to the following:

(1)malfunction or failure of one or more engines, leading not only to reduction or complete loss of thrust but also to failures of electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic systems;

(2)blockage of pitot and static sensors, resulting in unreliable airspeed indications and erroneous warnings;

(3)windscreen abrasion, resulting in windscreens rendered partially or completely opaque;

(4)fuel contamination;

(5)volcanic ash and/or toxic chemical contamination of cabin air-conditioning packs, possibly leading to loss of cabin pressurisation or noxious fumes in the cockpit and/or cabin;

(6)erosion, blockage or malfunction of external and internal rotorcraft components;

(7)volcanic cloud static discharge, leading to prolonged loss of communications; and

(8)reduced cooling efficiency of electronic components, leading to a wide range of rotorcraft system failures.

(b)The nature and severity of effects.

(c)Details of any device or system installed on the rotorcraft that can detect the presence of volcanic cloud hazards (e.g. volcanic ash (particulate) sensors or volcanic gas sensors)

(d)The effect of volcanic ash on operations arriving to or departing from contaminated aerodromes.

(e)The related pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight precautions to be taken by the operator including any necessary amendments to Aircraft Operating Manuals, Aircraft Maintenance Manuals, Master Minimum Equipment List/Dispatch Deviation or equivalents, required to support the operator. Pre-flight precautions should include clearly defined procedures for the removal of any volcanic ash detected on parked rotorcraft.

(f)The recommended continuing-airworthiness inspections associated with operations in airspace contaminated by volcanic cloud(s) and arriving to or departing from aerodromes contaminated by volcanic ash; this may take the form of Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) or other advice.

[Amdt 29/4]