Easy Access Rules for U-space (Regulation (EU) 2021/664)

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Depending on the U-space airspace design and constraints, not all UAS types are capable of being safely operated within the U-space airspace. The UAS capabilities and performance requirements may be expressed in terms of expected:

(a)climb/descent rates or vertical speed, horizontal speed, autonomy/range/endurance,

(b)noise levels,

(c)connectivity,

(d)required navigation equipment,

(e)flight data accuracy, integrity and latencies (refresh rate),

(f)availability and integrity of the command-and-control link,

(g)resilience to environmental conditions (e.g. as applicable: wind, icing, electrical interference),

(h)resilience to cyberthreats and related security measures.

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

Where a Member State designates a U-space airspace within controlled airspace, it shall ensure that the dynamic reconfiguration of the airspace within that U-space airspace as laid down in ATS.TR.237 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/665 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/373 is applied in order to make sure that manned aircraft which are provided with an air traffic control service and UAS remain segregated.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

SEGREGATION ASSURANCE

(a)Protection buffers should be applied internally in the design phase, when assessing the volume of airspace to be designated as U-space airspace, so that flight authorisations are only granted to a specified vertical/horizontal distance from the U-space airspace limits.

(b)The values of the protection buffers should be taken into account and should be consistent with the UAS performance requirements for a given U-space airspace, specifically those requirements related to the lateral and vertical navigation performance or containment criteria.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

PRELIMINARY ALERT TO UAS OPERATORS

When the location where UAS operations take place is to become deactivated, a preliminary alert should be issued soon enough by the USSPs to UAS operators to allow them to revise the UAS flight authorisations, or enable safe landing, before the restriction becomes active.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION

Once the U-space airspace, or parts of it, are clear of UAS traffic (i.e. UAS have been redirected to portions of the U-space airspace that remain active or have landed), the implementation of the dynamic airspace reconfiguration should be acknowledged to the ATC unit.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

GENERAL

(a)Article 4 introduces the concept of dynamic reconfiguration of the U-space airspace and requires Member States to ensure that this concept is effectively put in place to avoid proximity between manned and unmanned aircraft within the U-space airspace.

(b)The dynamic reconfiguration of the U-space airspace is an important element of the overall safety argument for safe operations in the U-space airspace. It applies to a U-space airspace that is established in controlled airspace and allows manned aircraft to fly clear of the U-space airspace whilst ensuring the containment of the U-space traffic. Dynamic reconfiguration is carried out by the ATC unit in response to variable manned traffic patterns, which demand short-term U-space airspace adaptations.

GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

(c)Initially, at least, the number of instances where dynamic airspace reconfiguration would be required should be limited. In addition, certain strategic measures could be taken to limit the extent of the dynamic airspace reconfiguration through, for example, the design of the U-space airspace itself. The better the airspace is designed, the easier it will be for ATC units to segregate manned from unmanned aircraft in the U-space airspace.

(d)Operationally, the ATC unit will inform USSPs that, depending on the U-space airspace design, certain portions of the U-space airspace (or its entirety) are (is) not eligible for flight authorisation, activation, and utilisation by the UAS. When these portions of the U-space airspace are dynamically deactivated, for tactical, short-term changes in manned traffic demand, USSPs should not grant flight authorisation/activation and should request the UAS operator that already flies into the deactivated portion of the U-space airspace to either exit it or land.

(e)The time margins (time within which, after deactivation, it is expected that the UAS that occupies the relevant portions of the U-space airspace will exit them or will have to land) for these operations may be established on a case-by-case basis, based on different factors, such as the proximity of the ATC route to the U-space airspace, including standard instrument departure / standard instrument arrival (SID/STAR), typical performance of manned aircraft in that particular airspace, constraints in the controlled airspace, or unexpected situations (e.g. non-standard go-around, emergency).

OPERATIONAL SCENARIO

(f)When the ATC unit intends to issue a clearance to a manned aircraft to enter the U-space airspace, it will initiate a dynamic airspace reconfiguration procedure. The ATC unit will preliminarily alert, through its respective USSPs, UAS operators about the imminent deactivation of the entirety, or the relevant portions, of the U-space airspace to let them anticipate and engage the appropriate manoeuvres. The ATC unit will then publish a temporary U-space airspace restriction for UAS as part of the CIS for that U-space airspace. USSPs that are active in that U-space airspace will adhere to this newly published restriction and provide the corresponding information to all UAS operators connected to their services through the geoawareness service. In addition, they will check authorised UAS flights against the newly published restriction and cancel or amend flight authorisations accordingly.

(g)The UAS operators concerned will be notified through the UAS flight authorisation service and will need to either discontinue their flights or conform with the amended UAS flight authorisations, as applicable. USSPs will notify the ATC unit once the restricted portion of the U-space airspace is clear of UAS traffic as UAS will have exited the restricted portion of the Uspace airspace.

(h)The ATC unit will clear manned aircraft to enter the U-space airspace once it is ensured that the segregation from UAS traffic has been achieved.

(i)Upon completion of the manned flight through the U-space airspace, the ATC unit will complete the dynamic airspace reconfiguration procedure, by lifting the dynamic restriction, and USSPs will be allowed again to activate UAS flight authorisations or provide UAS new flight authorisations for UAS operators accordingly.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

SEGREGATION ASSURANCE

(a)The segregation effectiveness and assurance are highly dependent on the amount of time given to UAS operators to react according to the performance of the UAS they operate. As per GM2 to point ATS.TR.237 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665, the ATC unit is expected to raise an alert as soon as practicable and ensure a recommended time window of 10 minutes before the implementation, plus 2 minutes once the restriction becomes active.

(b)To ensure that manned aircraft that operate in controlled airspace within a U-space airspace are segregated from UAS that operate in that U-space airspace, there is a need for:

(1)performance standards for UAS (those for manned aircraft being already widely established) to make reasonably sure that UAS will have the capability to stay within the defined airspace volume, with reference to both position accuracy and horizontal/vertical speed, and to exit the deactivated U-space airspace or land within a reasonable time;

(2)criteria (e.g. applicable buffer) to determine the airspace volume required to consider that segregation has been reasonably assured.

(c)According to Article 3(4)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, UAS capabilities and performance requirements are determined by Member States for each U-space airspace, based on the related airspace risk assessment.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

SEGREGATION ASSURANCE

According to the GM to point ATS.TR.237 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665, it is recommended as best practice that the ATC unit raise an advisory alert to UAS operators either 10 minutes or 5 times the anticipation time before the U-space airspace becomes deactivated. This ‘anticipation time’ is suggested to be a minimum of 2 minutes.

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

1.Member States shall make the following data available as part of the common information services of each U-space airspace:

(a)horizontal and vertical limits of the U-space airspace;

(b)the requirements determined pursuant to Article 3(4);

(c)a list of certified U-space service providers offering U-space services in the U-space airspace, with the following information:

(i)identification and contact details of active U-space service providers;

(ii)U-space services provided;

(iii)certification limitation(s), if any;

(d)any adjacent U-space airspace (s);

(e)UAS geographical zones relevant to the U-space airspace and published by Member States in accordance with Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947;

(f)static and dynamic airspace restrictions defined by the relevant authorities and permanently or temporarily limiting the volume of airspace within the U-space airspace where UAS operations can take place.

2.Member States shall ensure that the relevant operational data referred to in ATS.OR.127 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/665 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/373, as well as the data resulting from the dynamic airspace reconfiguration referred to in ATS.TR.237 thereof, are made available as part of the common information services of each U-space airspace.

3.U-space service providers shall make the terms and conditions of their services available as part of the common information services of each U-space airspace in which they offer their services.

4.The providers of common information services shall ensure that the information referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3:

(a)is made available in accordance with Annex II;

(b)complies with the necessary data quality, latency and protection requirements established in Annex III.

5.Access to common information services shall be granted to relevant authorities, air traffic service providers, U-space service providers and UAS operators on a non-discriminatory basis, including with the same data quality, latency and protection levels.

6.Member States may designate a single common information service provider to supply the common information services on an exclusive basis in all or some of the U-space airspaces under their responsibility. In this case, the information referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall be made available to the single common information service provider who then shall provide it in accordance with paragraph 5.

7.Such a single common information service provider shall fulfil the requirements referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 and shall be certified in accordance with Chapter V of this Regulation.

8.A Member State who designates a single common information service provider shall inform the Agency, and the other Member States without delay of any decision concerning the certificate of the single common information service provider. The Agency shall include in the repository referred to in Article 74 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 information about all decisions notified by Member States pursuant to this paragraph.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE ARCHITECTURE

(a)Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 defines the content and organises the distribution of ‘common information’ — that is, the necessary information that needs to be shared between the relevant operational stakeholders for the safe operation of UAS in the U-space airspace.

(b)Common information is a collection of data that originates mainly from three different sources:

(1)the Members States responsible for the design of the U-space airspace, including its dimensions, performance requirements, and static or dynamic restrictions;

(2)the ATS providers responsible for the transmission of manned traffic information as laid down in point ATS.OR.127 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665, and the ATS units when applying the dynamic reconfiguration of the U-space airspace;

(3)the USSPs, through the terms and conditions as regards access to their services.

(c)Member States may decide to designate a dedicated entity to provide CIS on an exclusive basis in a given U-space airspace. Such ‘single common information service provider’ (single CIS provider) would make the relevant information available to all relevant operational stakeholders. The single CIS provider would need to be certified for the services it provides. The designation of a single CIS provider would need to be notified to other Member States as well as to the Agency.

(d)In the absence of a single CIS provider, common information is directly exchanged between the relevant operational stakeholders in a distributed communication architecture, whereby each data provider communicates directly with another USSP for sharing information. Each USSP needs to communicate with other data providers. A clear allocation of common information elements between Member States, ATS providers and USSPs would allow data users to find target data quickly and efficiently. In the absence of a single CIS provider, there is no need for additional certification; the provision of common information elements by ATS providers and USSPs will be covered by their respective certificate and the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 and Regulation (EU) 2021/665 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/373.

(e)Members States may decide to designate different single CIS providers for different U-space airspace volumes, or designate a single CIS provider for some of their designated U-space airspace volumes only, otherwise opting for a distributed model of exchange of common information.

(f)To achieve a high level of data exchange and interoperability between the CIS and State services (law enforcement and potentially military authorities), the CIS may need to comply with the national security and defence requirements.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

STAKEHOLDERS

(a)As regards information and data provided to or by the CIS provider, a variety of different stakeholders may be involved. Member States may consider taking the needs and requirements of the stakeholders listed below into consideration.

(b)Stakeholders to provide information to, and retrieve information from, the CIS provider:

(1)competent authorities;

(2)ANSPs/ATSPs;

(3)military authorities (e.g. when being also ATSPs);

(4)USSPs;

(5)single CIS provider, when relevant;

(6)other relevant authorities or organisations (e.g. State agencies, municipalities, nature protection authorities, law enforcement authorities, rescue coordination centres, GNSS services, aerodrome/heliport/vertiport operators, meteorological authorities).

ED Decision 2022/022/R

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of Regulation (EU) 2021/664:

(a)‘common information services’ (CIS) refers to the digital environment (network or platform) in which the common information elements (data) that support the implementation and proper functioning of the U-space airspace are provided/exchanged.

(b)‘providers of common information’ refers to entities/organisations that provide common information elements (data) to the common information services (CIS).

(c)‘single CIS provider’ refers to a certified organisation that ensures the interface and exchange between the ‘providers of common information’ and the USSPs. There is one ‘single CIS provider’ per U-space airspace. On the principles, the single CIS provider supports the provision of U-space services by providing common information to USSPs, but does not have active operational roles and responsibilities. For instance, it should not take part in the flight authorisation, which is the sole responsibility of the USSP.

(d)‘distributed model’ or ‘decentralised model’ refers to a U-space architecture without a ‘single CIS provider’ where each ‘provider of common information’ makes common information elements (data) directly available to the other operational stakeholders (e.g. USSPs).

(e)‘centralised model’ refers to a U-space architecture with a ‘single CIS provider’ which collects common information elements (data) from ‘providers of common information’ and makes them available to all operational stakeholders (e.g. USSPs).

ED Decision 2022/022/R

FORMAT OF AIRSPACE INFORMATION

The format of airspace information, including geographical zones, static and dynamic airspace restrictions, adjacent U-space airspace, and the horizontal and vertical limits of the U-space airspace should be as described in Chapter VIII ‘UAS geographical zone data model’ of and Appendix 2 to the ED-269 ‘MINIMUM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR GEOFENCING’ standard in the version published in June 2020.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

INTERFACES

Member States or, when designated, the single CIS provider should provide and document all information required by the users to identify and implement interfaces to support access to the CIS.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

GEO-ZONE DATA FORMAT

Members States may define a format and data model to support the electronic sharing of information. They may use the JSON format (rfc7159) defined in EUROCAE ED-269. To support interoperability, Members States are encouraged to refer to standards and ensure consistency as regards the naming convention.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

TIMELINESS

Information on static and dynamic airspace restrictions should be made available within 30 and 5 seconds respectively for at least 99 % of the time.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

COMPLEMENTARY AIRSPACE RESTRICTION

Relevant NOTAMs, airspace use plans (AUPs) / updated airspace use plans (UUPs) and navigation warnings are to be considered airspace information and should be made available online as part of the CIS, in accordance with Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

TIMELINESS

Traffic information should be made available with a latency that is lower than that necessary for the proper functioning of the traffic information service, as determined by the U-space airspace risk assessment, for at least 99 % of the time.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

FEEDBACK ON CIS DATA QUALITY

The providers of common information may suggest categories of anomalies that USSPs or, when designated, the single CIS provider, may use to categorise the type of feedback they share. Those categories may be inspired by data quality requirements such as accuracy, timeliness, or completeness, and offer specific tags for user comments or requests.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

INSTRUCTIONS TO CIS USERS

The necessary information to get access and exchange data through the CIS (e.g. service descriptions, interfaces) should be made available to the public, and should encompass:

(a)the point of contact of the CIS administrator and the procedures to access the CIS (e.g. to obtain the required credentials);

(b)the instructions on how to configure the user interfaces/system to properly support the exchange;

(c)the instructions to ensure the security of the exchange.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

INSTRUCTIONS TO USSPs

The single CIS provider should develop and provide USSPs with instructions to:

(a)configure their interfaces and systems to properly support the provision of services;

(b)ensure the security of the exchange.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE CIS STAKEHOLDERS

The single CIS provider may need to make a formal arrangement with CIS providers. To allow for flexibility, the formal form of the arrangement is left to the discretion of the parties involved, but may encompass the following items:

(a)The arrangement may:

(1)make reference to service ownership, accountability, roles and responsibilities;

(2)contain a description of the provision of data, information or services;

(3)match the expected service provision with the actual service support and delivery.

(b)The arrangement may establish:

(1)the subject matter, which may cover:

(i)the U-space airspace serviced (one arrangement may cover several U-space airspace volumes);

(ii)the coordination between stakeholders (may be covered in the same arrangement);

(2)the governance model, which may contain:

(i)points of contact for process coordination and system maintenance contacts;

(ii)a coordination process involving representatives from the stakeholders involved; the arrangement may cover procedures to organise meetings;

(iii)provision on dispute resolution;

(3)the data- and information-sharing attributes and constraints:

(i)the scope of data and information to be shared will depend on whether the Uspace is designed in controlled or uncontrolled airspace, or in airspace where both controlled and uncontrolled manned aircraft may operate simultaneously (i.e. ICAO airspace class E);

(ii)a data- and information-sharing plan may cover the following:

(A)the data and information shared;

(B)compliance with applicable data protection legislation;

(C)data processing;

(D)data quality;

(E)data subjects’ rights;

(F)data retention and deletion;

(G)security and training;

(H)security breaches and reporting procedures;

(I)responsibilities for providing data and services.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE SINGLE CIS PROVIDER AND THE AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE PROVIDER (ATSP)

Similarly to USSPs, specific arrangements may be necessary between the single CIS provider and the relevant ATSP.

The arrangement may be established according to the example presented in GM1 to Article 5(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 and in Annex V to this Regulation to ensure the adequate exchange of relevant operational data and information.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

MONITORING OF THE AVAILABILITY OF CIS PROVIDERS AND REPORTING OF DATA QUALITY ISSUES

The single CIS provider should monitor the availability of services of the providers of common information, as well as the quality of the exchange and data received. The single CIS provider should inform the providers of common information as soon as practically possible about any detected availability or quality issues with regard to the data received.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CIS DEGRADATION

The single CIS provider should inform USSPs without undue delay about CIS degradation.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

PRESERVATION OF DATA INTEGRITY AND QUALITY

The single CIS provider should ensure for the data it collects and distributes that:

(a)it does not alter the information, and preserves the integrity of the information received;

(b)it takes the appropriate measures to maintain the completeness, accuracy, resolution, traceability, timeliness, and logical consistency of the data.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CIS DEGRADATION

It is recommended that the single CIS provider inform USSPs about CIS degradation within 30 seconds.

CHAPTER III — GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UAS OPERATORS AND U-SPACE SERVICE PROVIDERS

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

1.When operating in the U-space airspace, UAS operators shall:

(a)ensure that the UAS to be operated in the U-space airspace comply with the capabilities and performance requirements determined in accordance with Article 3(4)(a);

(b)ensure that during their operations, the necessary U-space services referred to in Article 3(2) and(3) are used, and their requirements complied with;

(c)comply with the applicable operational conditions and airspace constraints referred to in Article 3(4)(c).

2.UAS operators may provide U-space services to themselves. In such case, they shall be considered as U-space service providers for the purposes of this Regulation.

3.Before operating in the U-space airspace, UAS operators shall comply with the requirements of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 including, where relevant, hold an operational authorisation or a certificate issued by the competent authority of the Member State of registration and to comply with the operational limitations set by a Member State in any UAS geographical zone.

4.Before each individual flight, the UAS operator shall submit an UAS flight authorisation request to its U-space service provider, through the UAS flight authorisation service referred to in Article 10, in compliance with Annex IV.

5.When ready to start the flight, the UAS operator shall request the U-space service provider for the activation of the UAS flight authorisation. Upon receiving the confirmation of the activation for the UAS flight authorisation from the U-space service provider, the UAS operator shall be entitled to start its flight.

6.UAS operators shall comply with the UAS flight authorisation, including the authorisation deviation thresholds referred to in Article 10(2)(d), as well as with any changes thereto. The Uspace service provider may introduce changes to the authorisation during any phase of the flight and, in such case, shall inform UAS operators about them.

7.Where UAS operators are not able to comply with the UAS flight authorisation deviation thresholds referred to in Article 10(2)(d), they shall request a new UAS flight authorisation.

8.UAS operators shall provide for contingency measures and procedures. They shall make their contingency measures and procedures available to the U-space service providers.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

OBLIGATIONS WHEN OPERATING IN U-SPACE AIRSPACE

(a)Article 6 covers the obligations for UAS operators when they operate in U-space airspace. Apart from making use of the required U-space services, UAS operators would need to ensure in advance that the UAS intended to be operated comply with the applicable capabilities and performance requirements, as well as with the relevant operational conditions and airspace constraints.

(b)To adequately make use of the U-space services, UAS operators may conclude a contract with an active certified USSP of their choice that provides the required set of U-space services in a given U-space airspace.

(c)UAS operators should submit their UAS flight authorisation request to the USSP and comply with the terms and conditions of the UAS flight authorisation once it is granted by the USSP. Certain conditions need to be met prior to the flight. UAS operators are not allowed to commence a flight until they have sent an activation request of the UAS flight authorisation to the USSP. They should ensure compliance with the terms and conditions associated with the UAS operation in the particular U-space airspace. In case they cannot comply with the UAS flight authorisation, UAS operators should amend their original request.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

UAS operators should select UAS of a type that is appropriate to satisfy the UAS capabilities and performance requirements specified for the U-space airspace.

In accepting the ‘terms and conditions’ of the flight authorisation provided by their USSPs, UAS operators confirm that they have selected the appropriate UAS type that satisfies the required Uspace performance requirements.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

Depending on the UAS capabilities and performance requirements specified for the U-space airspace, not all UAS types are eligible to be operated. Technical support (e.g. providing technical characteristics of their products) provided by UAS manufacturers may be necessary in the evaluation of the UAS capabilities and performance requirements.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

MONITORING OF U-SPACE SERVICES

UAS operators should monitor, through a UAS flight, the availability of U-space services, and the information that may affect safety, such as:

(a)changes in the U-space airspace (e.g. dynamic airspace restriction or reconfiguration);

(b)changes to the flight authorisation (e.g. withdrawal, modification);

(c)traffic information, and especially traffic which may represent a collision hazard;

(d)non-conformance, when provided.

Accordingly, UAS operators should take appropriate action according to operational procedures and planned contingency measures.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

COMPLIANCE OF THE UAS FLIGHT

UAS operators should ensure consistency of the UAS configuration with the accepted flight authorisation, and should conduct the UAS flight to stay within the authorised planned 4D volume for 95 % of the time.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF NON-CONFORMANCE

When relevant, and as per Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, UAS operators should acknowledge receipt of the notification that they are non-conforming by using the means provided by their USSPs.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE SERVICES — UAS OPERATORS’ INTERFACE

When UAS operators intend to develop their own user interface upon the technical means that may be provided by the USSP (e.g. application programming interface (API)), they should ensure that the implementation of the proprietary user interface continues to satisfy the U-space performance requirements to which they contribute.

In such case, UAS operators should liaise with their competent authority to ensure that the overall acceptable level of safety (ALS) is not compromised by the complementary development activities. Even if, as per Regulation (EU) 2021/664, UAS operators are not directly subject to certification, they should consider Article 15(1)(a) and (b) of that Regulation and the related AMC and GM for the parts which may affect the safe provision of the required U-space services and information to the operator in charge of controlling or monitoring the UAS.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE SERVICES — GUARANTEE AS REGARDS THE LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE

It is necessary for the UAS operator to be able to demonstrate that the required level of U-space service performance can be achieved for the entire duration of the flight. This may take the form of a service level agreement (SLA) or any formal arrangement made between a service provider and the applicant on the relevant aspects of the U-space services to be provided (including quality, availability, and responsibilities).

ED Decision 2022/022/R

USE OF U-SPACE SERVICES

Except for compensating for unavailability or degradation of U-space services, for the purpose of data consistency and the provision of safe support to operations, it is recommended as best practice that UAS operators keep using the bundle of services of the same USSP throughout an activated UAS flight.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONNECTIVITY

The UAS operator should establish a digital connection to the USSP whenever the provision of U-space services is required to support operations in U-space airspace.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

MONITORING OF U-SPACE SERVICES

While it is assumed that the priority for UAS operators is to ensure the safe conduct of a flight, safety of operations relies on the capability of UAS operators to maintain their situational awareness. The information provided by U-space services is meant to reach an acceptable level of safety within the Uspace airspace, and needs to be adequately integrated throughout the operations.

A loss of link with the USSP is a safety issue per se as it disconnects the UAS operator from the U-space airspace, prevents it from maintaining situational awareness and eventually negatively impacts on the necessary decision-making to safely react to events that may dynamically happen.

The necessary monitoring procedure (e.g. degree, regularity, etc.) may vary depending on the operational constraints, and the roles and responsibilities of UAS operators (e.g. ‘hands-on’, ‘handsoff’), controls mock-up, etc.).

U-space services and information to the operator in charge of controlling or monitoring the UAS.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE SERVICES — UAS OPERATORS’ INTERFACE

The inadequate implementation of the interfaces with, or the improper use of, the U-space services may impair (e.g. by introducing latencies) the overall performance to an extent which may ultimately compromise the safety of operations within the U-space airspace. It is expected that the user interface that could be privately developed by UAS operators guarantee the satisfaction of the performance requirements defined for the U-space airspace (i.e. do not alter the performance) and the provision of U-space service information, down to the human operator in charge of operating the UAS.

Nevertheless, the responsibility of UAS operators is:

(a)limited to the continued satisfaction of the U-space performance requirements to which they contribute, according to the intended system and UAS operators’ user interface implementation;

(b)commensurate with the level of risk that may be introduced locally.

The technical assessment could be conducted and completed through the specified activities in order to comply with Regulation (EU) 2019/947.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

UAS operators should handle the operation of the UAS flight as per the operating instructions established for the U-space airspace and provided by the USSP.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

EMERGENCY SITUATION

UAS operators should use the means at their disposal (e.g. built in the UAS and/or provided by the USSP) to declare an emergency when the UAS flight becomes non-compliant with the applicable Uspace airspace operational conditions or constraints, or facing an event, to an extent which may result in hazards to other operations performed in the U-space airspace.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

The operating instructions originate from the operational conditions and airspace constraints specified for the U-space airspace, and further refined and complemented by the procedures elaborated by the other U-space stakeholders (USSPs, ATS providers, etc.).

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS EMERGENCY STATUS

UAS operators may support the alternative proposed in GM1 to Article 8(2)(f) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 to compensate for the potential lack of automatic transmission of the UAS emergency status.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS OPERATORS — SORA AND AIR RISK CLASS

Even if operations are intended to be performed in U-space airspace, the specific operations risk assessment (SORA) should still be carried out as per Regulation (EU) 2019/947. Regarding the evaluation of the air risk, UAS operators are entitled to take credit for their SORA of the residual air risk class (ARC) determined through the U-space airspace risk assessment as per AMC1 to Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

The Member State that designates the U-space airspace may define additional, more demanding performance requirements than the tactical mitigations performance requirements (TMPR), otherwise the U-space airspace performance requirements are less demanding and UAS operators should consider whichever is the most stringent. The UAS operator should demonstrate to the competent authority with sufficient evidence that it fulfils the U-space performance requirements or the required TMPR as per the SORA application, whichever is the most demanding.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES

UAS operators may operate in restricted UAS geographical zones (as per Article 15(3) of Regulation (EU) 2019/947) provided they have obtained a specific authorisation. In accepting the ‘terms and conditions’ of the flight authorisation provided by their USSP, UAS operators confirm that they have been authorised to perform operations within restricted UAS geographical zones.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION

The UAS operator should activate the UAS flight authorisation before the take-off, and end it as soon as possible after landing.

In case of operations that involve multiple take-offs and landings, the UAS flight authorisation should be activated once before the first take-off, and should be ended only after the last landing.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ACTIVATION OF THE UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION

The UAS operator is expected to start the operation without undue delay after receiving the activation confirmation from the USSP. Time constraints for the specific airspace used may be established by the Member Sate that designates the U-space airspace.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

FLIGHT AUTHORISATION PLANNING AND DEVIATION THRESHOLD

UAS operators should plan the UAS flight to stay within a planned 4D volume. Flying outside the planned 4D volume is to be an exceptional event for less than 5 % of the time. The size of the volume should allow for gusts of wind and other likely sources that could cause deviation.

When UAS operators do not consider it possible to appropriately perform the flight within the authorised, planned 4D volume, including the deviation threshold, for 95 % of the time (e.g. based on degraded environmental conditions, or operational constraints), they should replan their flight accordingly (e.g. extended boundaries) and request a new UAS flight authorisation.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONTINGENCY MEASURES AND PROCEDURES

UAS operators should describe their contingency measures and procedures within the contractual agreement with the USSPs.

In addition, UAS operators should detail for each flight in their flight authorisation requests the planned contingency measures (e.g. alternative routes, emergency landing sites).

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONTINGENCY IN CASE OF DEGRADATION OR A LOSS OF THE USSP SERVICES

To prevent risking safety in case of degradation or a loss of the USSP services during the operations, UAS operators should safely end any active UAS flight as soon as possible, except when they have duly demonstrated to their competent authority that the continuation of the operation will not pose a hazard to the other operations performed in the U-space airspace.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONTINGENCY MEASURES AND PROCEDURES

The contingency measures and procedures may be derived from those specified in point (6)(d) of Appendix 5 to the Annex to Regulation (EU) 2019/947. They may also address the following conditions:

(a)sudden, total or partial unavailability of the U-space airspace,

(b)restriction or revocation of the UAS flight authorisation,

(c)unlawful interference,

(d)engine failure,

(e)loss of signal,

(f)loss of control,

(g)loss of payload,

(h)loss of power,

(i)loss of energy reserves,

(j)adverse weather conditions,

(k)foreign object debris (FOD),

(l)unidentified aircraft entering protected volume around the UAS,

(m)unavailability of landing area.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONTINGENCY IN CASE OF DEGRADATION OR A LOSS OF THE USSP SERVICES

UAS operators may evaluate the degradation or the loss of the USSP services in the context of their operations in the U-space airspace and establish appropriate contingency measures against the resulting hazards.

A hazard assessment should consider:

(a)the impact and severity of the hazards on own operations;

(b)the impact and severity of the hazards on other nearby operations;

(c)the operational environment;

(d)other additional operational mitigation measures, if applicable.

UAS operators should provide USSPs with actions to be taken in the event of a loss or degradation of the U-space services which could result in an overall reduction of safety or pose a risk to nearby Uspace operations, and action would be required to be taken by another UAS operator. These actions may be contained within an operator’s contingency plan. UAS operators should ensure the effective coverage of the contingency measures in case of degradation or loss of USSP services, especially for services used in flight such as:

(e)the inability to receive information on dynamic airspace reconfiguration and/or modifications to the UAS flight authorisation;

(f)a loss of availability of traffic information data;

(g)sharing of contingencies (as applicable).

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

1.U-space services shall be provided by legal persons certified as U-space service providers in accordance with Chapter V.

2.U-space service providers shall be responsible for providing the UAS operators with the U-space services referred to in Article 3(2) and (3) during all phases of operations in that U-space airspace.

3.U-space service providers shall establish arrangements with the air traffic services providers to ensure adequate coordination of activities, as well as the exchange of relevant operational data and information in accordance with Annex V.

4.U-space service providers shall handle air traffic data without discrimination, restriction or interference, irrespective of their sender or receiver, content, application or service, or terminal equipment.

5.U-space service providers shall:

(a)exchange any information that is relevant for the safe provision of U-space services amongst themselves;

(b)adhere to a common secure interoperable open communication protocol and use the latest information made available in accordance with Annex II;

(c)ensure that the information is exchanged in accordance with the data quality, latency and protection requirements set out in Annex III;

(d)ensure the access to and the necessary protection of the information exchanged.

6.U-space service providers shall report the following to the competent authority:

(a)the starting of operations after receiving the certificate referred to in Article 14;

(b)the ceasing and subsequent restart of operations, if applicable.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

(a)A U-space service provider (USSP) is a new entity established by this Regulation. It refers to an organisation that is certified by a competent authority to provide U-space services in the Uspace airspace.

(b)USSPs are responsible for implementing and providing the bundle of U-space services required by the Member State that designates the U-space airspace.

(c)Entities that are not willing to deliver all required U-space services may act as subcontractors to a USSP that provides all required U-space services.

(d)A USSP may subcontract the provision of some or all U-space services to other entities if they remain under its management control. There can also be associations between USSPs or equivalent mechanisms, if it is clear that there is a single certified entity responsible for providing the required bundle of U-space services to UAS operators. When required, the USSP should ensure that the competent authority is given access to any subcontracted organisation and data relevant to support the USSP certification.

(e)USSPs ensure coordination with CIS providers or, when designated, the single CIS provider.

(f)USSPs ensure operational coordination with the relevant ATSPs. Only some specific information is expected to be sent back to the relevant ATC unit.

(g)USSPs support the dissemination and acknowledgment of notification on dynamic airspace reconfiguration, in accordance with Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

(h)USSPs support the competent authority in recording and making operational data available to support the conduct of safe operations in the U-space airspace, as laid out in the AMC and GM to Article 18(f) and (h) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

BUNDLE OF U-SPACE SERVICES

The set of U-space services required to be provided by the USSP to UAS operators isdefined by the Member State for each designated U-space airspace. To facilitate the provision of U-space services to UAS operators, a USSP should provide the U-space services required in the U-space airspace served in a form of bundle, which may encompass:

(a)four services as per Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664;

(b)five or six services when considering the provisions of Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

USSP–UAS OPERATOR INTERFACES

The USSP should provide UAS operators with interfaces, together with the U-space services. The interfaces and functionalities should at least allow UAS operators to:

(a)properly use the U-space services;

(b)be provided with the operational instructions applying to the U-space airspace;

(c)get access to the UAS operator’s operational records;

(d)declare a contingency or an emergency;

(e)acknowledge any non-conformance, when the conformance monitoring service is required, as per Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS OPERATOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

The USSP should ensure that the information that may affect safety is efficiently conveyed to UAS operators, allowing them to take the necessary, appropriate actions to ensure safety in a timely manner.

Accordingly, the USSP should:

(a)identify the information that supports safety, and requires immediate UAS operator awareness;

(b)reduce the risk of missing the information that supports safety by deploying means to ensure that the attention of UAS operators will be appropriately attracted.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

DEGRADATION OF USSP SERVICES

The USSP should inform without undue delay its UAS operators, other USSPs within the same U-space airspace, and ATSPs when necessary, about the degradation of its services (including degradation that results from the unavailability of CIS providers or ATSPs).

The degradation of USSP services should be supported by procedures or contingency measures to be jointly established with UAS operators.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

The USSP should develop and provide UAS operators with instructions on how to conduct operations within the U-space airspace. The operating instructions should encompass:

(a)the transcription of the operational conditions and airspace constraints that originate from the U-space airspace risk assessment;

(b)a user guide documenting how UAS operators should configure and use USSP services;

(c)when the services are provided through an API, the user guide should also contain the technical instructions and requirements to the UAS operators to ensure the continued satisfaction of the performance requirements and overall safety;

(d)recommendations ensuring the security of the exchange;

(e)the normal, contingency, and emergency procedures related to U-space services, to be applied by UAS operators.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONNECTIVITY

Regulation (EU) 2021/664 assumes that the U-space is a connected environment. A connected environment refers to any digital connection that meets the requirements established by the USSP for the provision of the U-space services in question. A connected environment is not restricted to internet-based connectivity, although the vast majority of connections between a USSP and a UAS operator are expected to be internet based.

Therefore:

(a)U-space information is exchanged in a machine-readable format to support the necessary exchange of data among the U-space actors concerned; and

(b)operations in the U-space airspace require the UAS operator to establish a connection to a USSP.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

USSP–UAS OPERATOR INTERFACES

The USSP may have various means to develop and provide UAS interfaces, such as interfaces relying on mobile, web or PC applications, and/or application programming interfaces (API). The solution retained is expected to ensure that the performance requirements are met, and the availability of the services is ensured.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONDITIONS THAT REQUIRE IMMEDIATE AWARENESS

Safety-critical information, which may require the UAS operators’ immediate awareness, may concern the following:

(a)degradation of services;

(b)changes in the configuration of the U-space airspace (e.g. dynamic airspace restriction or reconfiguration);

(c)changes in the flight authorisation;

(d)new emergency in the proximity of the UAS flight;

(e)non-conformance, when relevant for the U-space airspace;

(f)incoming manned traffic which may eventually result in a conflict with the UAS flight trajectory;

(g)infringement of the UAS flight authorisation;

(h)detection of rogue traffic in the proximity or within the volume where the UAS flight is performed.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ALERTING MEANS

Safety relies on the timely reaction of UAS operators to situational changes that may dynamically occur in the U-space airspace throughout the UAS flight. Inappropriate UAS operator reaction due to a lack of sufficient awareness may ultimately compromise safety. Moreover, UAS operations require UAS operators to additionally manage operational information than just strict UAS flight data. In some conditions, especially where high workload is involved, UAS operators may have limited capability to focus their attention on monitoring U-space services in order to detect new relevant information.

Regardless of being served by the USSP through a separate user interface/application or through direct application programming interface (API), UAS operators need to be clearly alerted to new, safety-critical information during all phases of flight (flight preparation, preflight, in flight and postflight).

To effectively attract the attention of UAS operators, the USSP may either implement or provide the supporting means of various techniques such as:

(a)visual annunciations (e.g. flashing red),

(b)aural annunciations (e.g. sounds or voice),

(c)telephony voice messages,

(d)telephony text messages, coupled with haptic sense.

To maximise the effectiveness of the attention-getter, it is recommended that the USSP rely on more than one means for raising awareness on safety-critical information that requires immediate attention.

The implementation of the necessary alerting means should ensure the use of appropriate designs that effectively raise the attention of UAS operators while preventing undue nuisance and distraction that could impair the safe conduct of UAS operations.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

DEGRADATION OF USSP SERVICES

It is recommended as best practice that the USSP disseminate the information on the degradation of its services within 30 seconds.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS OPERATIONAL RECORDS

It is recommended as best practice that USSPs provide UAS operators with a method to access a copy of their data related to the U-space services required by a Member State (e.g. history of the flight authorisations as well as non-normal conditions). Any requested piece or set of data should be electronically exported and provided to the UAS operators in a machine-readable format.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN USSPs AND ATSPs

For U-space airspace established in controlled airspace, the USSP should establish a written agreement with the relevant ATSP covering the coordination of activities, as well as the exchange of relevant operational data and information. The coordination activities between the USSP and the ATSP should cover:

(a)the emergency management plan as per Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, including contingency and emergency conditions involving manned and unmanned aircraft;

(b)the exchange of relevant operational data and information, if not provided through the CIS, as per point ATS.OR.127 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665;

(c)the dynamic airspace reconfiguration procedure, laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, and in accordance with point ATS.TR.237 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665, in identifying the means to:

(1)receive the dynamic airspace reconfiguration requests from the ATC unit;

(2)notify in a timely manner the ATC unit about the presence of UAS special operations within the designated U-space airspace as per AMC2 to point ATS.TR.237(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665;

(3)notify the ATC unit once the airspace reconfiguration has been implemented, as per the conditions addressed in the AMC and GM to Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/664;

(4)alert the ATC unit in case of unavailability of the link with the USSP;

(5)alert the ATC unit in case a relevant non-conformance is identified in the U-space airspace, when the conformance monitoring service is required, and as per Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN USSPs AND ATSPs

Although the exchange of data and information between USSPs and ATSPs is routed via the CIS in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, the coordination of activities (such as emergency procedures) will require the direct interaction and coordination between USSPs and ATSPs. Therefore, the following arrangement topics are not suitable to be delegated to a single CIS provider (when one is designated):

(a)normal, contingency and emergency procedures concerning UAS operations;

(b)nominal, non-normal and emergency procedures concerning manned aircraft operations performed in the U-space airspace;

(c)procedures concerning system or service shortages and degraded level of quality of a service;

(d)procedures, roles and responsibilities for both parties, as required by Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

It is recommended that USSPs use GM1 to Article 5(6) of this Regulation to formalise the arrangement with the relevant ATSP.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ARRANGEMENT AMONG USSPs

For the purpose of ensuring technical interoperability, all USSPs with an interest in the same U-space airspace should adhere to the same arrangement. The arrangement should ensure the compatibility of a USSP system joining the U-space airspace to allow USSPs to add the start/cease of the provision of services in the agreement or remove the start/cease of the provision of services from it.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

MONITORING OF THE AVAILABILITY OF CIS AND ATSPs

The USSP should monitor the availability of, and quality of the exchange with, the provider of common information, or the single CIS provider (if designated), and ATSPs.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

PRESERVATION OF DATA INTEGRITY AND QUALITY

USSPs should ensure for the data they are required to collect and distribute that:

(a)they do not alter the information, and preserve the integrity of the information received;

(b)they take appropriate measures to maintain the completeness, accuracy, resolution, traceability, timeliness, and logical consistency of the data.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

REPORTING OF DATA QUALITY ISSUES

USSPs should inform the providers of common information, the single CIS provider (if designated) and other USSPs that operate in the same U-space airspace as soon as practically possible of any detected availability or quality issues with the data received.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG USSPs

A USSP should exchange and consolidate the following information with other USSPs that share the same U-space airspace:

(a)UAS remote identification, through the network information service, to support the continuous consolidation of traffic information.

(b)The status of the UAS flight authorisations to ensure the continuous synchronisation of the authorisations within the U-space airspace and adequate deconfliction.

(c)Traffic information, including e-conspicuous manned aircraft, as per point SERA.6005(c) of Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, when duly agreed among the USSPs.

(d)Non-conformance alerts trigged by their UAS operators.

(e)Notification of the degradation of their services.

(f)Contingencies and emergencies of their UAS operators.

(g)Other information as required by the Member State and/or as agreed among the USSPs, which may be necessary to ensure interoperability in the U-space airspace.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG USSPs — INTERFACES

(a)The exchange of information described in point (c) among the USSPs should conform to the requirements of Annex A to EUROCONTROL ‘Specification for SWIM Technical Infrastructure (TI) Yellow Profile’, edition 1.1, published on 5 July 2020.

(b)USSPs should document the services that facilitate the exchange of information referred to in Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, as well as the related services regarding the safe provision of services, and should adhere to EUROCONTROL ‘Specification for SWIM Service Description (SD)’, edition 2.0, published on 15 March 2022.

(c)The documentation of services defined in point (b) should be made available to the public (e.g. service descriptions, interfaces).

(d)Compliance with points (a) and (b) should be directly measured against the requirements listed in the respective documents.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ARRANGEMENT AMONG USSPs AND THE MASTER AGREEMENT

USSPs may use a common contract (the master agreement) that defines the technical indicators associated with the provision of services, acceptable and unacceptable service levels, parameters for data-sharing among USSPs, as well as dispute resolution procedures and actions to be taken in specific circumstances.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

MONITORING OF THE AVAILABILITY OF CIS AND ATSPs

The frequency at which CIS providers and ATSPs are monitored is commensurate with the level of risk the lack of information may induce. Indeed, while the unavailability of communication with the ATSP may represent a short-term threat to safety, the lack of availability of the UAS operator’s registration databases would only represent an issue in case of unresponsiveness to a query.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON E-CONSPICUOUS MANNED TRAFFIC

The receipt of information on e-conspicuous manned traffic, as per point SERA.6005(c) of Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, may rely on ground infrastructure (e.g. antennas) in the U-space airspace privately deployed by the USSPs. In order not to create an unfavourable situation and unfair treatment among the USSPs, the exchange of information on e-conspicuous manned traffic is subject to a specific agreement made among the USSPs.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION — INFORMATION MODEL

(a)U-space services may be provided concurrently by multiple USSPs in the same airspace. This requires the exchange of information and coordination among those USSPs, as well as between USSPs and other entities (such as UAS operators, ATSPs and CIS providers). Such exchange of information is expected to be based on open protocols and formats, using public, IP-based networks as transport layers.

(b)The exchange of information (and its models) should be described in a technology-agnostic way (e.g. in the Unified Modelling Language (UML)). The aim is to document the key aspects of a dedicated information exchange service at conceptual level.

(1)Operational and business context of the service:

(i)service requirements (e.g. information exchange, constraints, validation rules);

(ii)stakeholders that provide/use the service;

(iii)operational activities supported by the service (e.g. flight planning, flight execution, etc.);

(iv)relation of the service to other services.

(2)Service description:

(i)interfaces (e.g. based on request/response or publish/subscribe);

(ii)interface operations (methods to interact with the service, e.g. request a flight authorisation);

(iii)payload definition;

(iv)features (e.g. a flight authorisation object);

(v)properties/attributes (e.g. the identifier within a flight authorisation object);

(vi)data types (e.g. defining the identifier within a flight authorisation record as a list of characters and numbers);

(vii)associations (e.g. the relation of a flight authorisation to a registered UAS);

(viii)dynamic behaviour (and life cycle) description.

(3)Service performance level and validation aspects.

(c)The information exchange services described in point (b) may be realised in different technical implementation levels enabling an architectural approach based on one concept, allowing for multiple potential solutions.

(d)Consequently, different types of data frames might be in use to carry payload. A standard data encoding may be used to provide the service (JSON or ASTERIX on the example of traffic information).

(e)The data encoding should be mapped to the definition of the service payload. Furthermore, the service that provided the information on this data encoding should be mapped in relevant technical details as well, e.g. in the service interfaces and operations. EUROCAE ED-269, which establishes a conceptual definition and its implementation in a standard data encoding, may be used as an example.

(f)Provision of safe services

(1)In addition to the operational information exchanged among the respective USSPs, further information on the respective service’s performance (e.g. degradation of services) may be collected and made available to ensure the provision of safe services. Sufficient monitoring may support technical operations to be performed under controlled conditions. This includes ensuring compliance with the related data quality, latency and data protection requirements set out in Annex III to Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

(2)The provision and exchange of any safety-relevant information should follow processes that are comparable to established standards (e.g. ISO 9001 series). Additional information that originates from these processes should be exchanged as well. This includes but is not limited to:

(i)service availability (planned or unplanned downtime, points of contact for technical and operational matters, etc.);

(ii)service limitations (degraded operations, regional constraints, known issues);

(iii)service integrity (security/safety incidents).

(3)Both operational and service performance information should be protected; technical and operational measures should be taken by the USSPs to ensure the necessary information protection.

(g)Protocol

Any information exchange should be based on a common open communication protocol, such as the transmission control protocol (TCP). As a minimum, the requirements documented in the SWIM Technical Infrastructure (TI) Yellow Profile, edition 1.1, published on 5 July 2020, should be met.

(h)Extension of information exchange services

(1)Information exchange services may be extended by the entities described in point (a).

(2)The extension of information exchange services, by changing their description (as described in point (b)(2)), should not jeopardise their semantic interoperability and standardisation across the Member States.

(3)The extension of the payload definition can be usually managed by:

(i)adding additional properties/attributes to the features;

(i)adding new features.

(4)The extension points for additional properties/attributes could be already foreseen in the payload definition, such as free text or a custom enumeration.

(5)If custom features are added by an extension, the association between the default and the additional features should always be managed in the additional feature.

(6)The description of the extended service should introduce optional elements (interfaces, operations, features, attributes/properties, data types, etc.) only.

For instance, if additional information regarding communication infrastructure is provided by an extended flight authorisation service, a new feature called ‘communication infrastructure service availability’ might be introduced. This new feature might be associated with a flight authorisation feature. The association should be designed without changing the flight authorisation feature, to allow the processing of flight authorisations by services that have no knowledge of the ‘communication infrastructure service availability’.

(7)The approach to the service description is laid down in the SWIM Service Description and the EUROCONTROL Specification for SWIM — Information Definition.

(i)Protection of information

The necessary protection level will vary depending on the type of the information exchanged. As a minimum, the requirements documented in the SWIM Technical Infrastructure (TI) Yellow Profile, edition 1.1, published on 5 July 2020, should be met. Additional protection should be put in place where applicable, especially when considering the relevant data privacy regulations (e.g. GDPR).

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONFIGURATION OF THE PROVISION OF SERVICES

After receiving their certificate, USSPs are entitled to deliver their services in any U-space airspace.

Nevertheless, the result of the U-space airspace risk assessment, and the related performance requirements, operational constraints and digital interfaces may vary between U-space airspace volumes. Therefore, prior to start providing services, the USSP should liaise with the local competent authority to ensure that the provision of services satisfy the performance requirements and constraints established for the U-space airspace where the operations are intended to be conducted.

When the USSP services are inadequate to fulfil the local conditions to an extent which may not ensure the safe provision of services, the USSP should undertake the extension of its certificate to demonstrate its capability to satisfy the complementary U-space airspace requirements and constraints.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL RECORDS

As soon as the operations start and until they are ceased, the USSPs should support the safety of the operations and the competent authority in charge of the U-space airspace, in recording and making available operational data and events that may be encountered. The type of this data and its retention should be agreed with the competent authority, but should be compatible with the dynamic reassessment of the definition of the U-space airspace.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

U-SPACE AIRSPACE — ONBOARDING PROCESS

Before reporting the start of operations to the competent authority, and in order to provide services in newly designated U-space airspace, USSPs may have to:

(a)coordinate with the competent authority in charge of the U-space airspace where the operations are intended to be conducted;

(b)coordinate and conclude agreements with the CIS providers (or, when designated, the single CIS provider) in that U-space airspace on data sharing;

(c)coordinate and conclude agreements with other USSPs in that U-space airspace on data sharing;

(d)coordinate and conclude agreements with ATSPs in that U-space airspace;

(e)configure and/or adjust the provision of services:

(1)to adhere to the common protocol that supports the exchange of information (e.g. among USSPs) in the U-space airspace;

(2)to satisfy the performance requirements and constraints of the U-space airspace.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONFIGURATION OF THE PROVISION OF SERVICES

The main items that may vary between U-space airspace volumes are:

(a)the required set of U-space services, which could encompass the provisions of Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664;

(b)the U-space services’ performance requirements and constraints, as per Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664;

(c)the common protocol(s) that support the exchange of information with the CIS provider and among the USSPs as per Articles 5(4)(a) and 7(5)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 and its Annex II.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

REPORT TO THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY — TEMPLATE FORM

USSPs may consider using the template form below for the purpose of reporting to the competent authority the start and ceasing of the operations.

Letter to the competent authority

U-space service provider report to the competent authority in accordance with Article 7(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664

ED Decision 2022/022/R

SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL RECORDS

The operational records are meant to provide data to support the implementation of Article 18(h) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, and the dynamic reassessment of the definition of the U-space airspace as defined in the AMC and GM to Articles 3(1) and 18(f) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664. The operational data and events that may be of interest to a competent authority are the following:

(a)dynamic airspace reconfiguration or restrictions;

(b)failure to implement dynamic airspace restriction or reconfiguration;

(c)volume of (e-conspicuous) manned aircraft crossing the U-space airspace;

(d)air proximity situation among UAS, and between UAS and manned aircraft;

(e)emergency declared by UAS operators;

(f)deviation (non-conformance) with the flight authorisation;

(g)over-conformance, when the deviation threshold may be too wide and airspace capacity wasted;

(h)detection of rogue UAS, or UAS used for malicious or unlawful purposes.

The information may be provided in terms of:

(i)volume/number of occurrences; and

(j)date, time, and location expressed in WGS 84 coordinate.

It is recommended that the USSP keep the records for a period of 5 years.

CHAPTER IV — U-SPACE SERVICES

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

1.A network identification service shall allow the continuous processing of the remote identification of the UAS throughout the duration of the flight and shall provide the remote identification of the UAS to the authorised users referred to in paragraph 4 in an aggregated manner.

2.The network identification service shall allow for the authorised users to receive messages with the following content:

(a)the UAS operator registration number;

(b)the unique serial number of the unmanned aircraft or, if the unmanned aircraft is privately built, the unique serial number of the add-on;

(c)the geographical position of the UAS, its altitude above mean sea level and its height above the surface or take-off point;

(d)the route course measured clockwise from true north and the ground speed of the UAS;

(e)the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not available, the take-off point;

(f)the emergency status of the UAS;

(g)the time at which the messages were generated.

3.The information provided by the network identification services shall be updated at a frequency that the competent authority has determined.

4.The authorised users shall be:

(a)the general public as regards information that is deemed public in accordance with applicable Union and national rules;

(b)other U-space service providers in order to ensure the safety of operations in the U-space airspace;

(c)the air traffic services providers concerned;

(d)when designated, the single common information service provider;

(e)the relevant competent authorities.

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GENERAL

(a)The network identification service provides the registration number of a UAS operator, the serial number of an unmanned aircraft, and live flight data of the UAS. It enables the sharing of information with any of the authorised users listed in Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664. Authorised users will be made aware of the geographical position, route course and emergency status, flight level, and type of the UAS, among other data elements. Based on the information provided by the UAS operators, USSPs share and consolidate UAS flight data among themselves and can, therefore, support traffic information when needed.

(b)The network identification service complements the original intent of the direct and network remote identification systems referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/945. Whereas the remote identification established in Regulation (EU) 2019/945 supports the authorities in aspects related to security and privacy, the network identification service also supports operational needs and the traceability of unmanned aircraft during flight. The responsibility for the provision of the remote identification service lies with different entities. Regulation (EU) 2019/945 lays down the requirements for the design and manufacture of unmanned aircraft systems whereas Regulation (EU) 2021/664 defines the services provided by USSPs.

(c)Detailed and accurate information about the latency necessary for the proper functioning of the traffic information service may be assessed and defined during the U-space airspace risk assessment.

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PROVISION OF AGGREGATED UAS REMOTE IDENTIFICATION

USSPs should provide the UAS network remote identification in the geographic proximity of UAS operations that are supported by the provision of their services.

USSPs should exchange network remote identification data with all the service providers that share the same U-space airspace. The resulting aggregated data should cover all available network remote identification data in the U-space airspace concerned.

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CONTINUOUS PROCESSING

USSPs should demonstrate a response time for distributing data received from the UAS, or from other service providers, which is smaller than the latency necessary for the proper functioning of the traffic information service, for at least 99 % of the time.

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DURATION OF THE FLIGHT

The network identification service should:

(a)be available throughout the duration of the flight, starting as soon as the flight authorisation is activated;

(b)not be required when the operator ceases the flight, independently of the time limit approved in the flight authorisation.

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DATA EXCHANGE INTERFACE

USSPs should use the interface defined in Annex 4 to ASTM F3411-22A ‘Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking’.

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GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY

Member States may support the definition of ‘geographic proximity’ by setting a value as part of the performance requirements established for each U-space airspace. Alternatively, the value provided in ASTM F3411-22A which specifies a rectangular area with a diagonal no greater than 7 km as a maximum display area may be used. Establishing a value for a geographic proximity smaller than the size of the U-space airspace limits the sharing of unnecessary data among the USSPs and thus supports the technical and economic efficiency of the network.

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TESTING INFRASTRUCTURE

To support the satisfaction of the U-space performance requirements as per Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, a possible testing environment is presented in Annex A2 to ASTM F341122A ‘Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking’.

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ACCESS

USSPs should provide the authorised users defined in Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 with access to aggregated network remote identification data using the communication protocol defined in Annex 4 to ASTM F3411-22A ‘Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking’.

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ALTITUDE ABOVE MEAN SEA LEVEL

USSPs should convert the heights above the WGS 84 ellipsoid exchanged with the ASTM F-3411-22A standard to height above mean sea level (MSL) before providing it to the UAS operators.

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ALTITUDE ABOVE MEAN SEA LEVEL

Due to the fact that the altitude above mean sea level (AMSL) calculated from the measured value of the barometric sensor and the QNH, cannot be compared to the calculated value of the altitude AMSL using the GNSS systems, it is recommended to exchange the altitude values in relation to the WGS 84 ellipsoid between U-space systems.

Wherever the flight altitude above sea level is required to be determined with the use of GNSS systems, it is recommended to use the EGM2008 or at least the EGM96 geoid models as the definition of mean sea level, as agreed with the competent authority.

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UAS EMERGENCY STATUS

Certain UAS capabilities may not be available as from 26 January 2023, the date on which Regulation (EU) 2021/664 will become applicable. Regarding the identification of the UAS emergency status as per Article 8(2)(f) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, and to compensate for the potential lack of automatic transmission of the information, it is considered an acceptable alternative for UAS operators to:

(a)continuously monitor the UAS behaviour, and when implemented, the built-in safety parameters or emergency status;

(b)manually trigger the UAS emergency status toward the USSP.

The proposed alternative is considered acceptable until 1 year after the date of entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, i.e. 26 January 2024.

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UPDATE FREQUENCY

Competent authorities may use the value defined in ASTM F3411-22A ‘Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking’ as aggregated monthly target for update frequency (no more than 3 seconds for 95 % of the time, and in 1 second for 99 % of the time).

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ACCESS

USSPs may provide a visual interface to the authorised users to access data in accordance with items 5.5.5.6 to 5.5.5.8 of ASTM F3411-22A ‘Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking’.

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

1.A geo-awareness service consisting of the following geo-awareness information shall be provided to UAS operators:

(a)information on the applicable operational conditions and airspace constraints within the U-space airspace;

(b)UAS geographical zones, relevant to the U-space airspace;

(c)temporary restrictions applicable to airspace use within the U-space airspace.

2.U-space service providers shall dispatch the geo-awareness information in a timely manner to allow contingencies and emergencies to be addressed by UAS operators, and shall include its time of update together with a version number or a valid time, or both.

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GENERAL

(a)Article 9 contains the requirements for USSPs when providing the geo-awareness service to UAS operators, and should not be confused with the geo-awareness function required by Regulation (EU) 2019/945 for certain UAS classes. In the latter case, geo-awareness is defined as a UAS function that detects a potential breach of the applicable airspace limitations and alerts the remote pilots so that they can take effective and immediate action to prevent that breach from occurring. In the framework of the U-space Regulation, geo-awareness is a USSP service that provides UAS operators with the information about the latest airspace constraints and defined UAS geographical zone information made available as part of the CIS.

(b)This service aims to support UAS operators in fulfilling their obligations, as it provides the necessary information on applicable operational conditions and airspace constraints with the level of accuracy and other performance requirements for which it has been certified.

(c)The geo-awareness service is used by the UAS flight authorisation service as a source of data to inform UAS operators of relevant operational constraints and changes both prior to and during the flight.

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INFORMATION

USSPs should ensure the timeliness and availability of the geo-awareness information provided to UAS operators.

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TIMELINESS

USSPs should process and make geo-awareness data available to UAS operators based on the data’s update cycle and criticality level, but no later than its applicability dates and times.

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TIMELENESS

The table below illustrates the scenarios and values USSPs may consider for the implementation of the geo-awareness service:

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TIME FORMAT AND VERSION NUMBER

USSPs may use the time format and version number provided in Chapter VIII ‘UAS geographical zone data model’ of and in Appendix 2 to EUROCAE ED-269 ‘MINIMUM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR GEOFENCING’ standard in the version published in June 2020.

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

1.The U-space service providers shall provide UAS operators with the UAS flight authorisation for each individual flight, setting the terms and conditions of that flight, through a UAS flight authorisation service.

2.Where U-space service providers receive from the UAS operator an UAS flight authorisation request, they shall:

(a)check if the UAS flight authorisation request is complete and correct and submitted in accordance with Annex IV;

(b)accept the UAS flight authorisation request if the flight under the UAS flight authorisation is free of intersection in space and time with any other notified UAS flight authorisations within the same U-space airspace in accordance with the priority rules set out in paragraph 8;

(c)notify the UAS operator about the acceptance or rejection of the UAS flight authorisation request;

(d)when notifying the UAS operator about the acceptance of the UAS flight authorisation request, indicate the allowed UAS flight authorisation deviation thresholds.

3.When issuing a UAS flight authorisation, the U-space service providers shall use, where applicable, weather information provided by the weather information service as referred to in Article 12.

4.Where U-space service providers are unable to grant an UAS flight authorisation in accordance with the UAS operator’s request, U-space service providers may propose an alternative UAS flight authorisation to the UAS operator.

5.Upon receiving the request for an UAS flight authorisation activation referred to in Article 6(5), the U-space service providers shall confirm the activation of the UAS flight authorisation without unjustified delay.

6.U-space service providers shall establish proper arrangements to resolve conflicting UAS flight authorisation requests received from UAS operators by different U-space services providers.

7.U-space service providers shall check the request for UAS flight authorisations against U-space airspace restrictions and temporary airspace limitations.

8.When processing UAS flight authorisation requests, the U-space service providers shall give priority to UAS conducting special operations as referred to in Article 4 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012.

9.When two UAS flight authorisations requests have the same priority, they shall be processed on a first come first served basis.

10.U-space service providers shall continuously check existing flight authorisations against new dynamic airspace restrictions and limitations, and information about manned aircraft traffic shared by relevant air traffic service units, in particular regarding manned aircraft known or believed to be in a state of emergency, including being subjected to unlawful interference, and update or withdraw authorisations as may be necessitated by the circumstances.

11.U-space service providers shall issue a unique authorisation number for each UAS flight authorisation. This number shall enable the identification of the authorised flight, the UAS operator and the U-space service provider issuing the UAS flight authorisation.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

GENERAL

(a)The UAS flight authorisation service provides authorisations to UAS operators for each individual flight based on other notified flight requests that may conflict with other unmanned operations within the same U-space airspace. It is a strategic deconfliction tool. The UAS flight authorisation service is provided to a UAS operator under the condition that it has submitted the UAS flight authorisation request before the flight. The content of this request is detailed in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

(b)The UAS flight authorisation service should be able to handle flight authorisation requests by UAS operators for single flights and for a number of repetitive flights that are conducted consecutively on the same route.

(c)This service covers the flight authorisation provided according to Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2019/947; however, it does not cover operational authorisations granted by the competent authority as defined in Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2019/947. The service informs operators of overlaps with any airspace restrictions provided by the geo-awareness service (Article 9). UAS flight authorisations in 4D volume may be used by the conformance monitoring service.

(d)This service is also a way for UAS operators to announce their intent to start their operations by activating their UAS flight authorisation. The activation of a flight initiates the provision of tactical services (like traffic information, network and remote identification or conformance monitoring) when required. The subsequent ending of the flight stops the provision of these services.

(e)This service is mandatory in U-space airspace designated in any airspace (controlled or not) and applies to UAS operators. This service enforces the prioritisation rules. When there is more than one USSP providing U-space services in a U-space airspace, all USSPs should exchange the UAS flight authorisation requests among themselves as well as state the changes to those requests — i.e. ‘Accepted’, ‘Activated’, ‘Withdrawn’, ‘Ended’.

(f)The information required to process a flight authorisation is provided by the UAS operators (flight authorisation request), other USSPs (other accepted flight authorisations, traffic information), and the CIS (e.g. temporary restrictions, manned traffic information). The single CIS provider has no coordination role and no other responsibilities than to ensure the provision of a subset of information that supports the flight authorisation process.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

FLIGHT AUTHORISATION RECORDS

USSPs should keep records of:

(a)all UAS flight authorisations, including:

(1)the data submitted by the UAS operator;

(2)the time of receipt of the requests;

(3)when accepted, the unique authorisation number, and the associated terms and conditions;

(b)UAS flight authorisation requests that are rejected, including the reason for rejection.

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TERMS AND CONDITIONS

The USSP should include in the terms and conditions of a flight authorisation:

(a)a reminder clause about the applicable conditions and airspace constraints;

(b)the technical requirements, such as the necessary UAS performance requirements;

(c)when relevant, a list of any permissions that are required for a flight to enter restricted airspace (e.g. limited-access geographical zones);

(d)instructions detailing how to handle the flight authorisation and activation requests and constraints, such as the time frame for flight activation or deactivation.

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RETENTION OF RECORDS

It is recommended that the USSP keep the records for a period of 5 years.

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UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION PROCESS

(a)The UAS flight authorisation service is a conflict resolution mechanism and authorises flights that are free of intersection with other flight authorisations.

(b)The UAS flight authorisation request describes the flight trajectory as a series of one or more 4D volumes expressed in height (base, ceiling), longitudinal and lateral limits, and duration (entry and exit times). Each dimension includes the uncertainties of the flight, e.g. earliest possible entry, latest possible exit.

(c)The detection of conflict is performed considering the planned 4D trajectories of the flights with the deviation thresholds added.

(d)The flight authorisation service ensures that the trajectory does not conflict with a no-fly zone and warns if the flight enters a restricted area.

(e)The UAS flight authorisation service describes a 4D trajectory typically in terms of height, length, width, and duration, and ensures that the trajectory does not conflict with a no-fly zone.

(f)The performance required is primarily driven by considering separation assurance and collision avoidance.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CHECK OF THE UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION REQUEST — COMPLETE, CORRECT, FREE OF INTERSECTION

The USSP should verify that the UAS flight authorisation is complete, correct, and free of intersection, and only accept the UAS flight authorisation request when all the following conditions are satisfied:

(a)When specified by the Member State (as per AMC2 to Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664), the flight authorisation request is made within the allowed time frame.

(b)The maximum capacity and density of UAS flights in the U-space airspace (AMC1 to Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664) is not yet reached.

(c)The UAS registration number provided by the UAS operator can be retrieved and validated from the operator’s information provided by the Member States as per Article 3(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

(d)When available, the UAS registration number can be retrieved and validated from the information provided by the Member States.

(e)The UAS flight is compatible with the U-space airspace restrictions and temporary airspace limitations.

(f)The UAS flight does not intersect with a prohibited (no-fly) geographical zone.

(g)The 4D trajectory of the UAS flight, with the deviation threshold (as specified for U-space airspace as per AMC2 to Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664) added, is free of any intersection with a previously authorised request.

The contingency/emergency measures detailed in the flight authorisation request are free of any intersection with a previously authorised request.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS FLIGHT — ACCEPTANCE OF FLIGHT PLANNED IN RESTRICTED AREA

A UAS flight planned outside the boundaries of the U-space airspace or planned to enter a geographical zone with restricted access may be a UAS operator error. When a UAS flight is planned outside the boundaries of the U-space airspace or in a restricted access geographical zone, the USSP may accept the flight authorisation but should provide beforehand a clear notification to the UAS operator, and should list in the terms and conditions the related airspace restrictions, specific entry permissions and requirements.

Once the UAS operator confirms it has been granted the relevant permissions to perform its flight, the USSP should accept the flight authorisation request.

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REASON FOR REJECTION OF A UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION

A USSP that rejects a UAS flight authorisation request should indicate the reason(s) for the rejection to the UAS operator concerned.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION NOT ACCEPTED

(a)The reasons for which the USSP is unable to grant the authorisation should be detailed and clear enough to allow the UAS operator to properly understand the issue and adjust its flight authorisation request accordingly.

(b)As only warnings will be given regarding airspace access, the UAS operator remains responsible for acquiring any necessary access permission.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

DEVIATION THRESHOLDS

Due to the numerous parameters outside the area of responsibility of the USSPs which are required to establish safe and sensible deviation thresholds (e.g. acceptable level of safety (ALS), density of operations, necessary safety margins, etc.), the deviation thresholds are defined by the Member States during the risk assessment and specified as performance requirements as per the AMC and GM to Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

WEATHER INFORMATION

The Member State may specify weather maxima or minima for important meteorological parameters as part of the U-space airspace operational conditions and constraints. When weather maxima or minima exist, the weather information service is required for the U-space airspace and the USSP should check the adequacy of the weather forecast with the specified weather maxima or minima when processing UAS flight authorisation and activation requests.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

WEATHER INFORMATION

The USSP cross-checks the weather maxima and minima with the ‘mode of operation’ (point 2 of Annex IV) of the flight authorisation request, such as:

(a)visibility requirements for VLOS or BVLOS with aerial observers;

(b)wind and temperature for all operations.

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UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION NOT ACCEPTED

USSPs may support the planning of an acceptable alternative in suggesting the start time or change of path.

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ACTIVATION OF THE UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION

The USSP should make a final check of the flight authorisation and should confirm the UAS flight authorisation activation without delay when the following conditions are satisfied:

(a)The UAS operator has accepted the terms and conditions associated to the flight authorisation.

(b)The UAS flight authorisation is activated within the allowed time frame, when specified.

(c)The U-space airspace is not subject to dynamic airspace reconfiguration, and the UAS flight remains compatible with the U-space airspace restrictions and temporary airspace limitations.

(d)The planned UAS flight is compatible with the current weather maxima or minima, when relevant.

(e)The UAS flight authorisation does not intersect with another UAS flight authorisation that has a higher priority (e.g. UAS conducting special operations).

(f)In the proximity of the UAS flight, there are no:

(1)manned aircraft in a state of emergency;

(2)cooperative but non-conforming drones, or non-cooperative drones (when their detection is possible);

(3)e-conspicuous manned aircraft intersecting the planned UAS trajectory.

When the UAS flight authorisation cannot be activated, the USSP should indicate the reason(s) to the UAS operator and may propose an alternative.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ACTIVATION REQUEST

(a)It is acknowledged that depending on the implementation of the flight authorisation service and the situation in the U-space airspace, the flight authorisation may have been withdrawn. Nevertheless, a final consolidation and check of the accepted flight authorisation against the Uspace airspace constraints, conditions, and environment is expected to be performed to ensure the safety of operations.

(b)The activation request is expected close to the start of the flight mentioned in the UAS flight authorisation.

(c)The activation of the flight authorisation triggers the provision of the network identification and traffic information services and, when applicable, the conformance monitoring service. The activation request should enable the provision of these services.

(d)When the USSP receives the activation request, it rechecks the flight authorisation request. If the flight authorisation request has been withdrawn because it has been found to be in conflict with a higher-priority flight authorisation request or a manned aircraft known or believed to be in a state of emergency, then the USSP should respond negatively to the activation request.

(e)If no activation request is received for a flight, the USSP should withdraw the flight authorisation after the time indicated in the flight authorisation request as the latest possible start time of the flight plus any deviation threshold with units of time. The USSP may warn the UAS operator before doing this.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ACTIVATION OF THE UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION

The minimum and maximum time (size of time window) before take-off at which the activation of the flight authorisation may have been identified by the Member Sate for specific U-space airspace. The USSP may further constrain the minimum and maximum time (size of time window) before take-off at which the activation is requested, due to practical considerations (e.g. efficient acceptance of flight authorisations among the UAS operators).

Those constraints are to be provided to the UAS operators in the terms and conditions of the UAS flight authorisation request.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UNJUSTIFIED DELAY

A possible interpretation of the expression ‘without unjustified delay’ is provided in ASTM F3548-21 ‘Standard Specification for UAS Service Supplier (USS) Interoperability’, which requires that the activation of flight authorisations be confirmed within 5 seconds for 95 % of the time.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION EXCHANGE AND CONFLICTING REQUESTS

To prevent conflicting UAS flights, the USSP should:

(a)make the necessary arrangements with other USSPs to allow for the rapid, reliable, robust and unequivocal identification of conflicts between any UAS flight authorisation requests;

(b)ensure constant synchronisation of the flight authorisations within the U-space they share, in exchanging the UAS flight authorisation requests among themselves as well as stating changes to those requests — ‘Accepted’, ‘Activated’, ‘Withdrawn’, ‘Ended’.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ARRANGEMENTS IN CASE OF CONFLICTING UAS FLIGHT AUTHORISATION REQUESTS

(a)To ensure the interoperability of USSPs that provide flight authorisation services and resolve potential conflicts, USSPs may follow ASTM F3548-21 ‘Standard Specification for UAS Service Supplier (USS) Interoperability’.

(b)When duly demonstrated to the competent authority that the following mechanism can be safely implemented, if during operations any USSP fails entirely and cannot support strategic coordination, the arrangement among the USSPs may establish service levels and allow other USSPs to plan over accepted flights managed by the USSP that has failed. In that regard, the terms and conditions associated with the flight should incorporate provisions to deal with that specific case.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

The USSP should:

(a)when authorising a flight request, use the set of current airspace restriction data coming from the CIS (and the associated geo-awareness service);

(b)check whether there are any entry permission or technical requirements due to any airspace restrictions relevant to the flight, taking into account the flight’s 4D trajectory including any deviation thresholds;

(c)list the airspace restrictions as well as the specific entry permission and technical requirements in the terms and conditions provided with the flight authorisation request, if a flight authorisation requires specific entry permission or should meet specific technical requirements due to any airspace restrictions relevant to the flight and the USSP cannot determine from the information in the flight authorisation request whether these requirements are met.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

(a)When the acceptance of the flight authorisation only depends on the information contained in the flight authorisation request (Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2021/664), or when an appropriate automatic means to request and obtain permission to enter restricted airspace is implemented for the U-space airspace, the USSP may automatically confirm the technical compliance and approve the flight authorisation request. Conversely, the same process could automatically determine technical non-compliance or the absence of entry permission, hence the USSP could automatically reject the flight authorisation request.

(b)For cases other than that referred to in point (a), there are currently no means in the flight authorisation request (Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2021/664) for the UAS operator to indicate that it has already obtained permission to enter any restricted airspace or that the aircraft is appropriately equipped. In these cases, the flight authorisation service should inform the UAS operator whether permission is required or whether there are specific requirements to be satisfied (e.g. technical equipment) by including the requirements in the terms and conditions of the flight authorisation request.

(c)In the case described in point (b), the UAS operator is responsible for obtaining the appropriate permission to enter any restricted airspace and/or for using an aircraft that meets any applicable technical requirements. By activating a flight authorisation, the UAS operator commits to meeting the terms and conditions of that flight authorisation request.

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS

For the purposes of this AMC, the term ‘normal’ is used for a UAS flight which does not conduct special operations.

(a)When an authorisation request for a UAS flight which conducts special operations conflicts with a previously authorised normal UAS flight, the USSP should update or withdraw the authorisation of the normal flight, as may be necessary by the circumstances, in order to authorise the flight which conducts special operations.

(b)The USSP should inform the UAS operator concerned about any change to the flight authorisation, as per Article 6(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

USSPs identify flight authorisation requests intended for special operations by the information given under ‘type of flight’ (special operations) of the UAS flight authorisation request (see point 3 of Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2021/664).

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ORDER OF PROCESSING

(a)USSPs should reject any UAS flight authorisation request that conflicts with an earlier authorisation request of the same priority or higher, in accordance with Article 10(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664.

(b)As far as practically possible (through the ‘proper arrangements’ that meet the requirement of Article 10(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664), USSPs should process UAS flight authorisations that have the same priority in the order of time at which the operational intent is submitted.

(c)As part of the recording required by AMC1 to Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, USSPs should record the time of receipt of the UAS flight authorisation requests.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

PRIORITY

(a)A new flight authorisation request cannot override a previously approved flight authorisation of the same priority. To reduce the number of cases where two conflicting flight authorisation requests arrive before the approval of either of them has finished, the time required to approve a flight authorisation request by means of ‘proper arrangements’ as per Article 10(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664 should be as short as practically possible. When two or more conflicting flight authorisation requests are received so close in time that their processing has not finished when the other(s) is (are) received, then there should be no systematic advantage to a given USSP or a given UAS operator.

The result should be one of the following:

(1)the first flight authorisation request received by any USSP is approved;

(2)neither/none flight authorisation request is approved;

(3)any flight authorisation request at random is approved.

(b)It is not possible to change an already authorised flight so that it conflicts with another authorised flight of the same priority or higher. Any change causing a conflict will be rejected, and the original, unchanged flight authorisation should remain valid.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONTINUOUS CHECK OF FLIGHT AUTHORISATIONS IN RELATION TO THE PRESENCE OF MANNED AIRCRAFT

In airspace where the operation of manned aircraft not subject to air traffic control by the ANSP takes place, the USSP should consider the presence of electronically conspicuous manned aircraft and should:

(a)update or withdraw the flight authorisations, as may be necessary, if the manned aircraft is or is believed to be in a state of emergency;

(b)suggest to UAS operators the update of the flight authorisation when the manned aircraft trajectory intersects with the planned UAS 4D trajectory to enhance continued separation.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

CONTINUOUS CHECK

(a)The checks should be performed from the moment the flight is authorised until the flight is no longer active (i.e. when the UAS operator signals the flight is no longer active).

(b)‘Continuous’ checking is likely to be implemented as periodic checking. For an active UAS flight, the check should deliver relevant information as soon as practically possible, hence the checking should be performed at intervals similar to the time between the updates of the network information service for a given flight. For a not-yet-active flight, the checking interval may be longer and at the time limit according to the time horizon published by the Member States for the validity and availability of geo-awareness data.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UPDATE OR WITHDRAWAL OF A FLIGHT AUTHORISATION

(a)USSPs may provide an updated, active UAS flight authorisation at the request of the UAS operator at any time provided that by doing so no new conflicts are produced. For example, a USSP may update a UAS flight authorisation at any point in space to assist in avoiding manoeuvres (e.g. holding or hovering) without the flight being considered non-conforming.

(b)When a USSP becomes aware that an existing flight authorisation is impacted by a new dynamic airspace restriction/limitation or that an existing flight authorisation is considered to be at risk from manned aircraft traffic due to information shared by the relevant air traffic service units, or information incoming from a (non-cooperative) drone detection system, then the USSP should either alert the UAS operator and provide it with an updated UAS flight authorisation to resolve the conflict or withdraw the existing UAS flight authorisation. The USSP should request the UAS operator to acknowledge any change in the UAS flight authorisation.

(c)Ending an active flight is a UAS operator action, and it is not expected to be automatically performed by the USSP. Ending an active flight terminates the provision of ‘tactical’ services, such as network identification, traffic information, and conformance monitoring services. The USSP should warn a UAS operator if it has not ended the flight and the time limit of the flight authorisation has passed.

(d)The USSP may withdraw a flight authorisation prior to flight activation.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UNIQUE AUTHORISATION NUMBER

(a)When authorising a flight, the USSP should issue a flight authorisation number that is unique throughout the duration that the authorisation is expected to be referred to, including after flight. This period should be at least 2 years, and preferably more than 10 years.

(b)Each USSP should ensure that the probability of issuing an authorisation number that is the same with that issued by another USSP within the geographic scope of the U-space implementation is lower than once in 2 years and preferably lower than once in 10 years.

(c)USSPs should agree on, and ensure through dedicated arrangements, the robustness of the mechanism ensuring the uniqueness of flight authorisation numbers.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

UNIQUE AUTHORISATION NUMBER

(a)The purpose of a unique authorisation number is to support the identification of a UAS operation during all its phases, including postflight. It provides an identifier for each UAS flight which is, as far as possible, unique across the U-space implementation and unique in a given time period, for at least 2 years and preferably for more than 10 years. 

(b)The UAS operator should refer to the flight by its unique authorisation number in any subsequent communication with the USSP regarding that flight. It might include activation, ending, update, or cancellation. The USSP too should refer to the flight by its unique authorisation number in any communication with the UAS operator, for example in case of authorisation withdrawal.

(c)A Variant 1 Version 4 or Version 5 universally unique identifier (UUID) is considered a sufficiently unique flight authorisation number. In case Version 5 is used, the USSP should have a unique identifier and that identifier should be made known to the competent authority as part of the certification process of the USSP.

(d)Updates to a UAS flight authorisation should not result in a change to the unique authorisation number.

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/664

1.A traffic information service provided to the UAS operator shall contain information on any other conspicuous air traffic, that may be in proximity to the position or intended route of the UAS flight.

2.The traffic information service shall include information about manned aircraft and UAS traffic shared by other U-space service providers and relevant air traffic service units.

3.The traffic information service shall provide information about other known air traffic and shall:

(a)include the position, time of report as well as speed, heading or direction and emergency status of aircraft, when known;

(b)be updated at a frequency that the competent authority has determined.

4.Upon receiving the traffic information services from the U-space service provider, UAS operators shall take the relevant action to avoid any collision hazard.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

GENERAL

(a)The traffic information service provides information to UAS operators about other air traffic that is or may be present in close proximity to the position of their UAS and supports situational awareness.

(b)The traffic information service supports UAS operators in avoiding collisions with manned and unmanned traffic.

(c)The traffic information service supports concurrent access to U-space airspace for a large number of UAS by providing UAS operators with useful information for the safe and efficient conduct of their flights.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

RESPONSIBILITY WITH REGARD TO THE PREVENTION OF MID-AIR COLLISION

(a)UAS operators are ultimately responsible for the safety of their flights, for meeting the U-space airspace operational constraints, and for ensuring separation or spacing from other manned and unmanned traffic.

(b)This responsibility cannot be transferred to USSPs nor to ANSPs. Neither is authorised to give instructions such as ‘climb’, ‘hold’, etc., to UAS operators; neither is charged with the responsibility to provide conflict resolution advisories, and neither is charged with the responsibility to separate unmanned aircraft from other traffic, other than the USSPs that provide flight authorisation services and ATC units that implement dynamic airspace reconfiguration.

(c)U-space services support the effective decision-making of UAS operators by providing as soon as possible the relevant traffic information to the relevant UAS operators while protecting the integrity and confidentiality of the data originating from manned or unmanned aircraft.

(d)Traffic information is not common information, and the exchange of traffic information does not involve the single CIS provider — except when ATSPs provide the relevant traffic information regarding manned aircraft in U-space airspace established in controlled airspace, as laid down in point ATS.OR.127 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

IDENTIFICATION IN REAL TIME

USSPs should:

(a)identify any known traffic in close proximity to the position or intended route of any active UAS flight under their responsibility, and provide in real time that information to the UAS operator; and

(b)report such traffic to the UAS operator in a timely manner.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

OTHER CONSPICUOUS AIR TRAFFIC

From the point of view of a UAS operator, and in specific U-space airspace, other conspicuous air traffic comprises all flights under the control of other UAS operators that share the same U-space airspace and conspicuous manned traffic in the U-space airspace and in its vicinity.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

PROXIMITY

Member States may support the definition of ‘proximity’ by specifying the associated ‘surveillance volume’ through the establishment of the relevant values (range, height) as part of the performance requirements established for each U-space airspace.

Regarding UAS traffic, a rectangular area with a diagonal of 7 km, may be used according to the value provided in ASTM F3411-22A. For manned traffic, it is recommended to use 3 times this value (i.e. 21 km).

ED Decision 2022/022/R

ELABORATION OF TRAFFIC INFORMATION

Traffic information is composite data that USSPs should elaborate from several sources:

(a)in controlled airspace, from the traffic information provided by the ATSP as per point ATS.OR.127 of Regulation (EU) 2017/373 amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/665, through the CIS or, when relevant, from the single CIS provider;

(b)from electronically conspicuous manned traffic, as specified in point SERA.6005(c) of Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, in airspace where manned aircraft operations are not subject to ATC;

(c)from complementary traffic information about uncontrolled manned aircraft;

(d)from the network identification service, providing the UAS remote identification, including the information from other USSPs;

(e)from other authoritative sources.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

RECEIPT OF TRAFFIC INFORMATION FROM UNCONTROLLED MANNED AIRCRAFT

USSPs that provide traffic information service in U-space airspace where the operation of manned aircraft not subject to ATC takes place should ensure they can acquire the e-conspicuous manned aircraft information through the means specified in AMC1 to point SERA.6005(c) of Regulation (EU) No 923/2012. The information may be acquired from external sources (e.g. other USSPs) or by privately owned means of receipt.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

USSP COMMON PROTOCOL — UNIQUENESS OF TRAFFIC INFORMATION

USSPs should adhere to a common protocol to ensure the uniqueness of traffic information and that it is delivered to each UAS operator exactly once.

ED Decision 2022/022/R

COMPLEMENTARY RECEIPT OF TRAFFIC INFORMATION FROM UNCONTROLLED MANNED AIRCRAFT

As per the result of the airspace risk assessment referred to in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/664, the need for deployment of additional ground infrastructure, in accordance with AMC1 to point SERA.6005(c) of Regulation (EU) No 923/2012, necessary for the continuous receipt of information from manned aircraft that make themselves electronically conspicuous, may be exceptionally alleviated.