ED Decision 2021/008/R
The system is designed to provide a level of continuity that supports its intended operation.
[Issue: CS-ACNS/3]
AMC1 ACNS.E.LAD.610 Continuity
ED Decision 2021/008/R
ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE APPLICABLE TO ALL SOLUTIONS
The loss of a function of the system should be considered a minor failure condition.
[Issue: CS-ACNS/3]
ED Decision 2021/008/R
COMMON GUIDANCE FOR ALL SOLUTIONS
(a) Any of the following may contribute to a loss of a function of the system:
(1) failure of the arming of the system;
(2) loss of capability to detect an accident condition;
(3) loss of capability to transmit either the activation signals or the 121.5-MHz homing signal; or
(4) incomplete information in the activation signals.
(b) The functions of the system are defined in CS ACNS.E.LAD.010.
[Issue: CS-ACNS/3]
ED Decision 2021/008/R
The system is designed to provide a level of integrity that supports its intended operation.
[Issue: CS-ACNS/3]
ED Decision 2021/008/R
ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE APPLICABLE TO ALL SOLUTIONS
(a) The erroneous automatic activation of the system should be considered a major failure condition.
(b) The transmission of activation signals that contain an erroneous aircraft position or erroneous aircraft identification should be considered a minor failure condition.
(c) The transmission of deactivation signals that contain erroneous aircraft identification should be considered a minor failure condition.
[Issue: CS-ACNS/3]
ED Decision 2021/008/R
COMMON GUIDANCE APPLICABLE TO ALL SOLUTIONS
(a) The failure condition of point (a) of AMC1 ACNS.E.LAD.620 for the case of erroneous automatic activation is intended to prevent that a large number of false alerts are caused by erroneous automatic activation of the system and have a significant and worldwide impact on SAR authorities.
(b) A piece of equipment that is part of the system and that contributes to the failure condition of point (a) of AMC1 ACNS.E.LAD.620 could be inactive when the system is not activated, including when the system is armed. This piece of equipment could be, for example, a processor in sleep mode or an ELT. If errors in the design of the software or of the electronic hardware of such piece of equipment do not cause undesirable automatic activation of the system when that piece of equipment is inactive, that software and electronic hardware may be developed in accordance with design assurance level (DAL) D.
[Issue: CS-ACNS/3]
CS ACNS.E.LAD.650 Risk for third parties
ED Decision 2021/008/R
If the system uses deployable equipment:
(a) the effects on persons other than aircraft occupants are considered when assessing a failure condition corresponding to the unintended deployment of such equipment; and
(b) the system provides a specific indication to the flight crew when such equipment is deployed.
[Issue: CS-ACNS/3]
AMC1 ACNS.E.LAD.650 Risk for third parties
ED Decision 2021/008/R
ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE SPECIFIC TO SOLUTIONS BASED ON AN ADFR
Meeting the conditions of AMC2 ACNS.E.LAD.020 satisfies CS ACNS.E.LAD.650 regarding the deployable package of the ADFR.
[Issue: CS-ACNS/3]