EASA Automation Policy
Bridging Design and Training Principles

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1. Introduction

The EASA Automation Policy adopts an innovative approach consisting of mapping crew-automation interaction issues, design and certification and training principles, and respective regulatory provisions to identify top challenges and paths for improvement. It was developed by the EASA Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT) set-up by Agency to follow-up the EASA International Conference on Pilot Training of Nov 2009.

Modern aircraft are increasingly reliant on automation for safe and efficient operations, whether commercially operated or not. Automation has brought significant advantages for flight safety and operations and is required for certain types of operations and for precision navigation. Automation can however be challenging for instance to senior pilots who may be less comfortable with automation while the new generation of pilots may lack basic flying skills when the automation disconnects or fails or when there is a need to revert to a lower automation level, including hand flying the aircraft.

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1 Contact: Dr Michel A. Masson, PhD (michel.masson@easa.europa.eu), Safety Action Coordinator, Safety Analysis Department, Executive Directorate, EASA.
2 The Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT) bridges design, certification, training, and operations aspects in an EASA internal forum focusing on training. The IGPT is composed of experts from all operational Directorates and adopts a total system approach in training based on the three pillars Rulemaking, Oversight and Safety Promotion. The IGPT addresses all types of training and checking for all types of personnel and operations. Regarding pilot training, this includes flight and type rating training, including both ab initio and recurrent elements, all categories of aircraft, all types of operations, and pilots with different backgrounds (e.g. those trained on highly automated glass cockpits aircraft and those pilots trained on older generation conventional aircraft).
3 See http://www.easa.europa.eu/events/.
Development and promotion of an EASA Automation Policy are actions of the European Aviation Safety plan (EASp), Editions 2011-2014 and 2012-2015, Section Next Generation of Aviation Professionals (NGAP). The EASA Automation Policy was first presented in the EASA Conference “Staying in Control – Loss of Control (LoC) Prevention and Recovery” of 4-5 Oct 2011 in Cologne, Germany, and subsequently is other international events.

2. Automation Advantages

The following non-exhaustive list summarises the main advantages of automation:

- Progress in flight safety:
  - Overall safety improvement from aircraft generation to generation, usually with poor introduction rate that improves over time.
  - Former generation aircraft are ageing and are operated by smaller companies, in less safety mature regions (e.g. Africa).
  - New generation aircraft fly in better operational environments, with better trained pilots, better ATM, navigation systems, weather services, etc.
  - Envelope protection provides additional safeguards.
  - Certification regulation has evolved: CSs and AMCs 25.1302 and 25.1329.
  - Next revolution with SESAR and NextGen (with concepts such as data link, self-separation, Sense and Avoid, SWIM, Performance Based Navigation, 4D trajectories, etc.) introduce new design and training challenges.
- Technical reliability: computer technology is more reliable than mechanical technology. It is light and cheap and can be used to increase redundancy.
- Advances in engine control technology and improved vertical and lateral navigation accuracy.
- Allows control of unstable aircraft or attitudes (e.g. centre of gravity moved backwards) and is used to improve aerodynamic performance and lower fuel consumption.
- Increases passenger comfort.
- Family concept based on similarity of cockpit design and flight dynamics facilitates type transition.
- Improved flight path control, reduced weather minima, allows decommissioning of land-based navigation aids.
- EFIS and map displays enhance navigation awareness.
- Systems monitoring displays coupled with diagnostic assistance systems (ECAM/EICAS) have enhanced pilots’ and maintenance staff’s understanding of aircraft system states.
- Automation relieves pilots from repetitive or not rewarding actions and from actions that humans are less suited to Automation globally reduces workload, free attentional resources and reinforces the gratifying parts of pilots’ job such as decision making.

Automation however presents a certain number of challenges.

3. Automation Challenges, Assessment and Mitigation

The approach taken to develop this Automation Policy consists of the following steps:

1. Identify and group crew-automation interaction challenges
2. Bridge design and training principles
3. Prioritise issues
4. Assess risk mitigations in regulatory provisions

Updated on a yearly basis, the EASp is published at [http://www.easa.europa.eu/sms/](http://www.easa.europa.eu/sms/).

Adapted from Briefings 2000, Dédale and IFSA, Eds. R. Amalberti, M. Masson, A. Merritt and J. Pariès, Chapter 9 Cockpit Automation.
5. Identify paths for improvement

**Step 1 – Identify crew-automation interaction challenges**

Crew-automation interaction challenges were identified from expert opinions and from existing sources, including:

- Flight Deck Automation Issues website, Accident Evidence and Incident Evidence (up to 1997) [www.flightdeckautomation.com](http://www.flightdeckautomation.com).

Several references provide analysis and recommendations based on the results of accident or incident investigations, surveys, review of literature, or manufacturer philosophies and policies.

More than 100 flight crew-automation interaction issues were identified and then and grouped into the 17 themes (not prioritised) listed below:

1. Authority and control
2. Monitoring and intent recognition
3. Managing the automation versus flying the aircraft
4. Simplicity of operation
5. Aircraft types, variants, and (lack of) standardisation
6. Special equipment
7. Transformation of pilots’ role
8. Flight crew co-ordination and communication
9. Situation Awareness, mode awareness, failure detection and management
10. Complacency, over-reliance on automation, decision making
11. Workload management
12. Error Management
13. Information processing, integration and formatting
14. Diagnostic and troubleshooting
15. Alarm management
16. Programming and related issues (for example of the FMS)
17. Database related issues

**Step 2 - Bridge Design and Training Principles**

For each issue, the following questions were asked:

- How could this issue be (further) mitigated by design?
- How could it be (further) mitigated by training?
This combined approach allowed identifying Design Principles and Training Principles suitable for improving flight crew-automation interaction.

Guidelines on the use of automation developed by the manufacturers\(^6\) provide principles formulated in the form of competences that pilots must have to best use automation, for instance “Select the appropriate automation level for the task and situation at hand”. To make the link with training, competences are to be considered as training objectives: “Pilots must be able to select the appropriate level of automation”. This competence then needs to be practiced and consolidated operationally.

The corresponding design objective would be “Allow / advise on selection of automation level(s) appropriate for the task and situation at hand”. See the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design and Certification objective</th>
<th>Training objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The System should:</td>
<td>The Flight Crew should:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow selection of / advise on automation level(s) appropriate for the task and situation at hand.</td>
<td>Select an appropriate automation level for the task and situation at hand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide information on selected automation level.</td>
<td>Check/monitor selected automation level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The approach also includes bridging principles classically addressed by different communities and enshrined in different types of regulations: Certification Specifications (CS) on the design side and Flight Crew licensing (FCL) and Operations (OPS) regulations for the training aspects.

The interrelation between Design and Training is illustrated by the basic Performance Model\(^7\) shown below:


\(^6\) For instance Flight Operations Briefing Notes “Standard Operating Procedures Optimum Use of Automation” by Airbus.

\(^7\) M. Masson, 2011, 2012. See the References section.
fatigue, etc., attitudes, interest and involvement in the task also play a role. The model illustrates that good (simple, intuitive, user-friendly) design requires less competences and/or procedural guidance (instructions) to be operated, and conversely that poor design requires more guidance and/or competences from the user. The model also shows that pointing the finger at only one element of the system in case of performance breakdown is reductive and that overall system performance can by enhanced by improving any of these three basic components, individually or in combination.

**Step 3 – Risk Assessment**

Every flight crew-automation issue was risk assessed.

Risk Assessment was based on expert judgement and made use of the following simple risk classification matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Evolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk assessment thus combined importance of the issue and foreseen evolution.

**Example:** Inadvertent selection of mode or data input error (either mistake or typing error) can result in loss of mode awareness and/or unanticipated mode reversion. May lead to by Loss of Control (LoC) and Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents. Risk level: yellow = 2 (Importance 2, Evolution 2).

Accident and incident information was used as background for the risk allocation exercise. The following sources have been considered:

- Flight Deck Automation Issues website, Accident Evidence and Incident Evidence (up to 1997) [www.flightdeckautomation.com](http://www.flightdeckautomation.com).

**Step 4 - Assess Risk Mitigations provided by Regulatory Provisions**

Regulatory provisions were reviewed, which includes the following references (not an exhaustive list):

- FCL: JAR-FCL 1.235, FCL 725.A et al., JAR-FCL 1.261 et al, Learning Objectives, EASA Rulemaking task FCL.002, etc.
- OPS: OPS 1.210, OPS 1.945, OPS 1.965, Appendix 1 to OPS 1.1045 B 2& B 3, OPS 1.978 (SOP), Appendix 1 to OPS 1.965, etc.
Step 5 – Identify and Rank Paths for Improvement
The final step consisted of identifying and ranking paths for improvement.

4. Intermediate Conclusions

The first conclusion of this assessment process is that the European aviation system is globally well protected against flight crew-automation issues, providing all regulatory provisions and best practices are well and uniformly implemented. Furthermore, certain regulatory developments planned in the Ops, FCL and CS domains will provide additional mitigations.

The second conclusion is that a series of flight crew-automation interaction issues deserve further attention.

To prioritise these issues and also possible actions, a Cockpit Automation survey was conducted by the EASA IGPT in 2012.

5. EASA Cockpit Automation Survey

Published on the EASA website from 30 April to 23 July 2012, this survey was aimed at consolidating the Automation Policy by evaluating the degree of agreement with the identified automation issues and suggested paths for improvement. Results will help orienting future EASA work on the subject.

The survey questionnaire is provided in the Appendix. It features the following Sections:

1. Introduction
2. Respondent Identification
3. Automation Advantages
4. Automation Issues
5. Paths for Improvement – Suggested Actions

5.1 Respondents Profile

151 respondents participated in the survey.

Distribution by Geographical Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region / Non-Region</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe / EASA States</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America (USA)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe / non-EASA States</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia / other than CIS and China</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America / non-USA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>151</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Developed by the EASA Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT)

Distribution by Type of Respondent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Respondent</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilots &amp; Training Community</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities &amp; AIBs</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers &amp; OEMs (Personal)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers &amp; OEMs (Official)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; Academia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC/ATM/ATS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>151</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So the majority of respondents came from the pilot and training communities.
5.2 Flight Crew-Automation Interaction Issues, Ranked

Prioritisation was based on the following criteria:

- Overall support from all respondents (rated on a 5 point ordinal scale),
- Support from the pilots and training community,
- Support from the manufacturers.

The top flight crew-automation interaction issues are those that were highly supported in overall and by both communities. They are presented in the Group 1 below.

**Group 1 – Most Agreed and Consensual Flight Crew-Automation Issues**

- Basic manual and cognitive flying skills tend to decline because of lack of practice and feel for the aircraft can deteriorate.

- Unexpected automation behaviour: engagement or disengagement of automatisms in an inappropriate context or un-commanded transition (for instance mode reversion) may lead to adverse consequences.

- Pilots interacting with automation can be distracted from flying the aircraft. Selection of modes, annunciation of modes, flight director commands may be given more importance than value of pitch, power, roll and yaw and so distract the flight/crew pilots from flying the aircraft.

- Flight crews may spend too much time trying to understand the origin, conditions, or causes of an alarm or of multiple alarms, which may distract them from other priority tasks and from flying the aircraft.

- Diagnostic systems are limited with regard to dealing with multiple failures, with unexpected problems and with situations requiring deviations from Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

- Unanticipated situations requiring to manually override automation are difficult to understand and manage, create a surprise or startle effect, and can induce peaks of workload and of stress.

- For highly automated aircraft, problems may occur when transitioning to degraded modes (e.g. multiple failures requiring manual or less automated flight).

- Data entry errors (either mistakes or typing errors) made when using Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) in addition to avionics systems may have critical consequences. Errors may be more difficult to prevent and to detect as there is no system check of the consistency of the computed or entered values and technology gives a certain sense of confidence (if the data entered in the machine are accepted, they should be OK).

**Group 2 – Other Flight Crew – Automation Interaction Issues**

- In critical situations following disconnection or failure of the automation, although the action that the flight crew must take to regain control is known, the alarm system only indicates the condition met but not the action to take.

- It is difficult to understand the situation and to gain/regain control when automation reaches the limit of its operation domain and disconnects or in case of automation failure.
- When automation fails or disconnects, the tasks allocated to the pilots / flight crews may fall beyond their capabilities, individually and or as a team.

- Flight crew are not sufficiently informed of automation failures or malfunctions or of their effects.

5.3 Improvement Paths, Ranked

Paths for improvement were identified by the IGPT and submitted in the survey for prioritisation. Prioritisation was based on the same criteria:

- Overall support from all respondents (rated on a 4 point ordinal scale),
- Support from the pilots and training community,
- Support from the manufacturers.

Group 1 – Most Agreed and Consensual Improvement Paths

- Improve basic airmanship and manual flying skills of pilots.
- Improve recurrent training and testing practices with regard to automation management
- Improve the Multi Crew Cooperation (MCC) concept and training (instruction and testing) practices to better address automation management. Note: EASA has already planned to improve Crew Resource Management (CRM) guidance - Rule Making Task RMT.0411 (OPS.094).
- Improve the Competence Based Training (CBT) and Evidence Based Training (EBT) approaches to better address automation management.
- Develop automation policies specific to aircraft types and variants to account for differences regarding automation and flight path management.
- Improve the Multi-crew Pilot Licence (MPL) programme to better address automation management.

Group 2 – Other Improvement Paths

- Manufacturers to publish automation philosophies and policies, generic and specific to aircraft types and variants, for communication to the training (instructors and trainees) and operations communities.
- Improve air operator Automation Policies / provide guidance for the improvement of air operator Automation Policies.
- Consider introducing requirements regarding flight deck software customisation (e.g. electronic checklists and procedures, Flight Warning Systems) and enhancing the approval of safety critical functions of Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) or introducing this approval in the frame of aircraft certification.
- Transfer the certification assumptions regarding flight crew competences required to safely fly the aircraft to the training and operations communities through appropriate means such as the Operational Suitability Data (OSD).
automation management, and the assumptions made regarding the flight crew capabilities required to take appropriate action.
- Extend the applicability of CS and AMC 25.1302 and CS and AMC 25.1322 to Part 23 (Normal, Utility, Aerobatic and Commuter Aeroplanes), Part 29 (Large Rotorcraft) and Part 27 (Small Rotorcraft).

6. Actions

The survey results are considered by EASA together with the results and recommendations from reference initiatives and projects addressing the prevention on Loss of Control in Flight (LoC-I) accidents such as LOCART, ICATEE and SUPRA.

Adopting a total system approach, actions can target rulemaking, safety promotion or standardisation.

Various actions and deliverables are presented below.

6.1 Rulemaking

The following EASA Rule Making Tasks (RMT) addressing the prevention of Loss of Control In flight (LoC-I) accidents are directly or indirectly relevant to the Automation Policy. They are published in the EASA Rule Making Programme (RMP) 2013-2016:

RMT.0581 and RMT.0582 - Loss of Control Avoidance and Recovery Training

Taking into account the deliverables of the ICAO LOCART WG and ICATEE WG, these rulemaking task review the following aspects for initial, type and recurrent training:

- Manual aircraft handling of approach to stall and stall recovery (including at high altitude)
- Training of aircraft configuration laws
- Recurrent training on flight mechanics, and
- Training scenarios including the effect of surprise.

An EASA Workshop on Loss of Control has taken place in on 28 Feb -1 Mar 2013 to review the results of LOCART, ICATEE, SUPRA and the EASA automation survey and policy and gather expert opinions in view of these rule making tasks.

RMT.0411 - CRM Training

Review of AMC/GM on CRM training for FC, CC and TC. Addressing safety recommendations SPAN-2011-026, SPAN-2011-027, FRAN-2012-042, FRAN-2012-043,

9 LOCART stands for Loss of Control Avoidance and Recovery Training. On a proposal by the Royal Aeronautical Society and given the increasing number of safety initiatives addressing Loss of Control in flight (LOC-I), ICAO has activated a dedicated collaborative effort. LOCART incorporates an FAA ARC (Aviation Rulemaking Committee) and is composed from representatives from ICAO, the FAA, EASA, TCCA, manufacturers and several organisations such as Flight Safety and IATA.

10 Safety promotion includes actions other than rulemaking, such as the publication of Safety Information Bulletins (SIB) and of safety brochures or leaflets, presentations in conferences, diffusion of best practices through authority and industry channels and through safety partnerships such as ECAST and CAST, associations such as the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), encyclopaedic systems such as SKYbrary and Wikipedia, etc.
FRAN-2012-44 and FRAN-2012-021 and recommending to study the effectiveness of current CRM training requirements and to standardize the experience requirements.

RMT.0191 - Requirements for Relief Pilots (RMT.0191)
Review of the AMC/GM for cruise relief co-pilots as regards experience, training, checking and CRM. Also addresses the Safety Recommendation (SR) FRAN-2011-010.

RMT.0416 - Sterile Flight Deck Procedures
Development of Operations Implementing Rules from transferred JAA tasks, including coordination with Aerodrome rulemaking.

RMT.0058 - Large Aeroplane Certification Specifications in Super-cooled Large Drop, Mixed phase, and Ice Crystal Icing Conditions
Review National Transportation Safety Board recommendations A-96-54, A-96-56, and A-96-58, and advances in ice protection state-of-the-art. In light of this review, define an icing environment that includes supercooled large droplets (SLD), and devise requirements to assess the ability of aircraft to safely operate either for the period of time to exit or to operate without restriction in SLD aloft, in SLD at or near the surface, and in mixed-phase conditions if such conditions are determined to be more hazardous than the liquid phase icing environment containing supercooled water droplets. Consider the effects of icing requirement changes on 14 CFR Part 25 and revise the regulations if necessary. In addition, consider the need for a regulation that requires installation of a means to discriminate between conditions within and outside the certification envelope.

6.2 Safety Promotion

6.2.1 Safety Information Bulletins
The following three SIBs published between 2010 and 2013 address the subjects of automation management, flight path management, and maintenance and development of manual flying skills. They are published in the Safety Information Bulletins Section of the EASA Airworthiness Directives website:

This SIB encourages manual flying during recurrent simulator training and also, when appropriate, during flight operations. A similar recommendation has been issued through other publications such as the FAA SAFO 13002 of 4 Jan 2013.

The overall aim is to reach an appropriate balance between the use of automation and the need to maintain pilot manual flying skills, needed in case of automation failure or disconnection, or when an aircraft is dispatched with an inoperative auto-flight system.

Operational principles should be developed by operators and included in their Automation Policy. The operator should identify appropriate opportunities for pilots to practice their manual flying skills, taking into account factors such as (not an exhaustive list):

- Phase of flight;
- Workload conditions;

Complete information on the safety recommendations addressed to EASA is provided in the Annual Safety Recommendations Reviews published here.
- Altitude/Flight Level (non-RVSM);
- Meteorological conditions;
- Traffic density;
- ATC and ATM procedures;
- Pilot and crew experience;
- Operator operational experience.

Compared to the US SAFO, the EASA SIB introduces risk control measures by encouraging to use of SMS and FDM to monitor the potential impact on the number, magnitude and pattern of deviations from consolidated average flight precision, to effectively balance the benefits and the drawbacks of manual flying and adjust policies accordingly. Also, operators implementing ATQP should tailor their training programmes based on available data.

**SIB 2013-02 Stall and Stick Pusher Training**, published on 22 Jan 2013

This SIB is based on the FAA Advisory Circular 120-109 developed on the basis of the report by the FAA 208 ARC on Stall and Stick Pusher Training, and the FAA Aeroplane Upset Recovery Training Aid (AURTA).

It promotes a mixed approach associating simulator and aircraft training and provides a series of example training demonstrations and scenarios for approach to stall and stall recovery training.

The approach emphasises *reduction of the angle of attack* as the most important response when confronted with any stall event, prior to reduction of altitude loss.

The SIB also includes a standard stall recovery template developed by aeroplane manufacturers (Airbus, ATR, Boeing, Bombardier and Embraer), which provides commonality among various aeroplanes and could be used by current and future aeroplane manufacturers to develop aeroplane-specific stall recovery procedures.

EASA promotes the use of that template, and has planned further actions, including rulemaking tasks related to stall prevention and recovery training (see Section 6.1 above).


The SIB is based on Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) Safety Enhancement 30 Revision 5 and on COSCAP-NA CNA 020 Issue 1. The CAST SE 30 contains a sample operator Automation Policy based on a set of best industry practices that could be used when preparing an operator Automation Policy.

This SIB reminds operators of the importance of air crews continuing to be aware of the automation mode under which the aircraft is operating and to recommend implementation of an Automation Policy.

Recommendations are provided to air operators to develop, and/or improve their Automation Policy and to ensure that each topic is regularly reinforced in operating procedures and training programs.

**6.2.2 Continued Promotion of the Operational suitability Data (OSD) Concept**

The EASA Opinion No 07/2011 Operational Suitability Data was published on 13 Dec 2011.

Executive Summary - This Opinion proposes changes to several implementing rules to introduce the concept of Operational Suitability Data (OSD). The OSD concept has been introduced in the Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 as part of the first extension package.
The new rules will ensure that certain data, necessary for safe operation, is available to, and used by the operators. This data is considered specific to an aircraft type and must therefore be produced by the designer of that type. It consists of:

- minimum syllabus of pilot type rating training;
- the aircraft reference data to support the qualification of simulators;
- the minimum syllabus of maintenance certifying staff type rating training;
- type specific data for cabin crew training; and
- the master minimum equipment list (MMEL).

The OSD proposed by the designer will be approved by the EASA along with the airworthiness certification. Once approved, the OSD must be used by operators and training organisations when establishing their customised training courses and MEL.

The OSD is expected to contribute to closing the gap between airworthiness and operations.

The IGPT suggests that some assumptions or findings made during the certification exercise should be documented and become training objectives, using a mechanism like, or similar to, the Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE).

Work is on-going with the Design and Certification sub-team of the European Human Factors Advisory Group (EHFAQ) to apply on example cases the OSD approach: identify and document the assumptions made on flight crew competences and behaviors needed to safely fly an aircraft in view of their transfer from design and certification to training and operations.

6.2.3 ICAO ANC 2012 Working Paper 34

The EASA Automation Policy also served as a basis for the Working Paper AN-Conf/12-WP/34 "Development of an Aviation Automation Policy" presented at the ICAO 12th Air Navigation Conference (ANC) by the Presidency of the European Union on behalf of the European Union and its Member States; by the other Member States of the European Civil Aviation Conference; and by the Member States of EUROCONTROL.

6.3 Standardisation

The Automation Policy is also promoted through the EASA Standardisation and Oversight activities, especially by the Air Operations Standardisation Section.

Safety promotion standardisation actions are taken, mainly through standardisation meetings and workshops, to invite the National Aviation Authorities to consider the EASA Automation Policy in their oversight activities, in particular regarding the training and checking programmes of the operators.

Beside, the Air Operations Standardisation Section leads for the IGPT the development of a Training Implementation Policy (EASp Action EME4.5) aimed at reducing differences in training implementation in Europe. This implies improving oversight at Member States and EASA levels, in particular regarding flight crew licensing and training related aspects of operations. Appropriate training implementation measures are needed so that training is enhanced and does not result in lowering training and safety standards. The resulting Training Implementation Policy will focus on the implementation of rules addressing training and provide recommendations for improving the implementation of the rules or the rules themselves.
7. Way Forward

Further actions may require coordination with the ICAO, NAAs, the FAA, EUROCONTROL and the industry: manufacturers, operators and Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs). Coordination may also involve the EHFAG, the European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI) composed of the European Commercial Aviation Safety Team (ECAST), the European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) and the European General Aviation Safety Team (EGAST), the ICAO Regional Aviation Safety Group (RASG) EUR, and the US based Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST).

Appendix - EASA Cockpit Automation Survey Questionnaire and Results


References

Airbus. Flight Operations Briefing Notes “Standard Operating Procedures - Optimum Use of Automation”. Also published as OGFHA BN Automated Cockpit Guidelines” by FSF.

12 For instance informal cooperation was initiated in 2012 with UK NATS, which was also developing an Automation Policy.