

# IAM'24 – Regulators' CIPs

Introduction of the subjects

Date: 13/05/2024

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# CASA CIPs

CIP CASA 2024-01



# 1. Formalizing the use of acronyms and abbreviations (CIP CASA 2024-01)

→ CIP applicability: MSG-3 Vol.1 and Vol.2

→ Issue

→ Whilst Volumes 1 and 2 of the MSG-3 contain a 'Glossary' (see 'Appendix A' of each volume), there is no formal explanation / definition of any of the acronyms that have been used in the MSG-3 document.

→ Recommendation

→ A 'List of Abbreviations' is incorporated into each volume under 'Appendix B', immediately after the existing Glossary in 'Appendix A'.

→ The proposed list is based on those abbreviations that appear at least once within Revision 2022.1 of MSG-3 Volume 1 and Volume 2.

# EASA CIPs

CIP EASA 2023-04\_R1

CIP EASA 2023-08\_R1

CIP EASA 2024-01

CIP EASA 2024-02

CIP EASA 2024-04

CIP EASA 2024-05



# Results following IMRBPB Annual Meeting 2023

## → EASA CIPs discussed

- **CIP EASA 2023-04** *'Clarifications on the policy of consolidation of "off-wing", overhaul and restoration tasks'*
  - Impact on: MSG-3
  - **CIP original version returned to submitter for rework.**
  
- **CIP EASA 2023-08** *'Removal of not MSG-3 related Steps from the L/HIRF Protection Analysis Methodology and Logic Diagram'*
  - Impact on: MSG-3
  - **CIP original version returned to submitter for rework with Industry L/HIRF WG.**

# New Proposed EASA CIPs 2024

1. Escalation of tasks with multiple usage parameters
2. System analysis and relation with inhibited functions
3. Clarification of "internal" and "external"
4. Consideration of static discharging function at MSI selection level

# 1. Escalation of tasks with multiple usage parameters (CIP EASA 2024-01)

→ CIP applicability: IMPS

→ Issue

→ Escalation / Optimisation Exercises in line with IP44 are performed regularly

- › IP 44 only mentions intervals for escalation/optimization, but does not discuss usage parameters.
- › Different OEM have developed differing policies how to handle dual/multiple usage parameters leading to unharmonized approaches.
- › Some resulted in questionable results

→ Recommendation

→ It should be clear, that escalation can not be based on policy and fixed factors.

→ IP44 requires statistically relevant in-service data for escalation.

→ Escalation should be done separately for each utilization parameter

- › This actually optimizes initial assumptions to tasks that meet real in-service usage

## 2. System analysis and relation with inhibited functions (CIP EASA 2024-02)

→ CIP applicability: MSG-3 Vol.1 and Vol.2

→ Issue

→ When answering MSG-3 analysis Systems' Question 3

<b>QUESTION 3:</b>	<b>DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY?</b>
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manufacturers often claim the pilot to be able to prevent a safety impact of the failure.

→ Such an approach is contradicting typical human behavior

- › most of the warnings do activate because the pilot failed to detect the development of the situation
- › inhibit functions are installed to prevent the pilot from doing something wrong

→ Recommendation

→ To have the information about warning/inhibit functions clearly included in analysis, to allow correct consideration when flight crew reaction is claimed in the Level 1, and to understand during which phase of flight, under which circumstances or in case of which functional failure the warning/inhibit function will be active.

### 3. Clarification of "internal" and "external" (CIP EASA 2024-04)

→ CIP applicability: IMPS

→ Issue

→ In the recent years there has been a lot of discussion about "internal" and "external" items in the MSG-3 analysis and "internal" and "external" tasks in the MRBR.

→ MSG-3 uses the terms only in combination (e.g. 2.4.1-1b "*externally and internally*") but gives no information to distinguish between them.

→ Recommendation

→ To provide a clear statement that requires the Policy and Procedures Handbook (PPH) to have a clear definition of "internal" and "external" for the areas of MSG-3 analysis that may require a clear segregation (i.e. Structures, Zonal, L/HIRF).

## 4. Consideration of static discharging function at MSI selection level (CIP EASA 2024-05)

→ CIP applicability: MSG-3 Vol.1

→ Issue

→ Currently approved MRBRs shows lack of harmonized approach to the require maintenance of the static dischargers for fixed-wing aircraft models.

- › stand-alone GVI in the systems section
- › GVI transferred to the zonal program, FNC.
- › “no task selected”
- › No MSI selected

→ Due to the common nature (and function) of those components, this implies lack of harmonized approach to the MSG-3 analysis of static dischargers in general.

→ Recommendation

→ To provide some additional details in the MSG-3 documents in order to prevent this lack of harmonization, when not justified by peculiarity of the aircraft design.

# Thank you!

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