European Aviation Safety Plan 2014-2017

European Aviation Safety Agency

Report

European Aviation Safety Plan
2014-2017

Final
Table of Contents

1 Executive Summary ........................................................................................................3
2 2013 Performance at a glance .........................................................................................4
3 Introduction .....................................................................................................................7
  3.1 Objectives and principles ..........................................................................................7
  3.2 Main risk areas: the Safety Plan Framework .........................................................8
  3.3 Continuous update ...................................................................................................9
  3.4 The European Aviation Safety Programme .............................................................10
  3.5 Content of the Plan ................................................................................................10
  3.6 EASp summits ..........................................................................................................11
  3.7 Governance ...............................................................................................................11
  3.8 Information and Promotion .....................................................................................12
4 Systemic Issues .............................................................................................................13
5 Operational Issues .........................................................................................................21
  5.1 Commercial Air Transport by Aeroplanes .............................................................22
  5.2 Helicopter Operations ............................................................................................30
  5.3 General Aviation ....................................................................................................31
6 Emerging Issues ............................................................................................................33
7 Human Factors and Performance ..................................................................................36
Acronyms and Definitions ...............................................................................................38
Working Groups ................................................................................................................41
1 Executive Summary

The worldwide rate of fatal accidents for scheduled passenger and cargo flights continued to decrease in 2012, providing a steady improvement in aviation safety. According to the EASA Annual Safety Review 2012 the rate of fatal accidents in EASA MS is comparable with and slightly lower than North America.

Even though this is a great achievement, there is no room for complacency: air traffic is expected to almost double by 2030\(^1\) and the fact that the average annual rate of fatal accidents in scheduled passenger operations\(^2\) in the European Union has remained more or less stable for the past years, makes new approaches necessary to complement the existing and successful safety measures in order to drive further safety improvements in aviation.

The commitment to improve safety is the driver of the European Aviation Safety Plan (EASp), our risk portfolio for the European region. The Plan is the documented output of an evidence based, pro-active approach to safety risks and provides the reader with a risk picture of the aviation safety system in Europe. It supports the management of safety at European level by complementing existing safety regulations and investigations.

The Safety Plan encompasses three broad areas: systemic, operational and emerging issues. The risks identified in these areas are mitigated by safety actions that Member States, Eurocontrol, the European Commission, the industry and the Agency take on board. All the partners work together, streamline their activities and add their efforts to drive our accident rate even further down.

An update of the Plan is provided to the EASA Management Board at the end of each year. The present document constitutes the fourth edition of the EASp covering the period between 2014 and 2017. This edition includes an update to the main risk areas of the portfolio by including fire, smoke and fumes as one of the categories where new opportunities to improve safety have been identified.

This fourth edition includes a report on the status of the 88 standing actions identified last year. A progress report with details on individual actions is included in Annex A. This has been developed in coordination with the various action owners. Additionally, a brief summary of the progress made in each of the safety areas has been included in the main body of the document (sections 4 to 7).

The document also proposes 18 new actions for incorporation. These new actions have been reviewed by the European Aviation Safety Advisory Committee (EASAC), States and Industry and are distributed within the existing framework. They take into consideration new safety intelligence acquired and initiatives aimed at mitigating the existing risks.

The following chapter summarises the performance of the Plan in the current year.

---

1 EUROCONTROL CND/STATFOR Doc415 of 17 December 2010 - Long-Term Forecast – Flight Movements 2010 - 2030
2 Fatal accidents per 10 million flights, see EASA Annual Safety Review
2 2013 Performance at a glance

This section focuses on three aspects of the Plan: the type of actions from various perspectives, the Plan performance measured against the original planning established at the beginning of the year and the level of implementation among the various States.

Action types

The third edition of the European Aviation Safety Plan (EASp) contained **88 actions**. Almost half of the actions in the Plan mitigate operational risks, the majority of them being classified as safety promotion actions (55%). These actions include launching promotion campaigns, developing safety videos, training syllabi, leaflets and guidance material, holding specific workshops or financing research projects among others.

The two major owners of EASp actions are the Agency (57% of the actions) and the Member States (18% of the actions). Other EASp stakeholders are Eurocontrol, the Strategic Safety Initiative’s (ESSI) Teams, the European Human Factors Advisory Group (EHFAG), the European Commission (EC), the Safety Management International Collaboration Group (SMICG), the European Authorities Coordination Group on FDM (EAFDM) and the Network of Analysts (NoA). An overview of the EASp composition is provided in the right side diagrams.

EASp performance

When it comes to delivering results, twenty nine (29) actions were due to be completed in 2013. Twenty three (23) have been delivered during the year including three actions delivered ahead of schedule.

Among the actions finalised in 2013 we find:

- The publication of the opinion requiring aerodrome operators (of such aerodrome that will require certification) to
implement and maintain a management system as well as the authorities responsible for their oversight;

- The progress made on paving the way on safety performance measurement: The SMICG has published guidance material for service providers while the NoA has agreed the first SPI definitions with States;
- The collaborative work of the International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE) and Loss of Control Aviation Rulemaking Team (LOCART) in which EASA and Member States have taken part. ICATEE recently delivered a draft Upset Prevention and Recovery Manual to ICAO;
- A workshop on loss of control prevention and recovery training was organised on 28 February and 1 March at the Agency. The workshop invited the major stakeholders who discussed on issues like theoretical training, on aircraft upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT), Flight Simulation Training Devices, realistic stall prevention and training scenarios development and manual flying skills. Actions coming out of the workshop have been identified and a follow-up EASp action is proposed in this edition;
- A tool to assess the impact of technologies on mitigating helicopter safety issues developed by the EHEST;
- A safety conference to exchange views on icing – both on ground and in the air - and identify mitigation opportunities organised by the Agency in October;
- The implementation of a uniform, standardisation process for all fields of aviation as covered by the Basic Regulation and related Implementing Rules is now developed;
- The EHFAG has reviewed the rulemaking programme for 2013 to 2016 and identified tasks that have potential HF considerations.

Overall, 67% of the actions are on schedule according to the initial Plan. Significant efforts have been made to deliver results on-time. A number of actions (23%) are continuous activities that are reported every year till the desired results are achieved. They include many actions under the leadership of States.

Among the 29 actions due in 2013, 20 actions have been completed, while 8 actions have been postponed into next year and one has been moved beyond 2014. Three additional actions have been delivered ahead of time.

The below diagrams summarise the overall performance of the Plan and the results achieved in 2013.
Level of Implementation in the States

The implementation of the EASp is now extended to 45 States: 32 EASA States plus the 13 States outside the EASA system that are members of ECAC. As in previous years, a request was sent out to those States that have nominated a focal point in order to retrieve the status of the various actions under their leadership (15 actions). Thirty one (31) EASA States plus eight (8) non-EASA States have nominated focal points, thus formalising their commitment to the EASp. This represents an increase of 4 focal points from the previous year. Eighteen (18) action reports have been received in 2013, 3 less than in 2012. The commitment of States over the three years of EASp implementation is summarised in the below graph.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focal Points</th>
<th>Action reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variation from previous year</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2013, responses on the status of EASp implementation have been received from Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

Focal points have been received from all EASA States except Cyprus plus Albania, Monaco, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Turkey.
3 Introduction

Europe has started to implement a Safety Management System to become more pro-active in the identification of hazards and with the ultimate goal of further reducing our already good safety record. This system complements the existing system of developing safety regulations, complying with them and investigating accidents and serious incidents when they occur.

One of the key elements of an SMS is managing safety risks, which means identifying hazards, assessing the risks and making decisions on the best course of action to mitigate those risks. Industry organisations and States are also required to do this within the scope of the activities they have to manage.

At the European level this process is carried out in coordination with States and industry because they are part of one aviation system and now documented in a safety plan. That document is the European Aviation Safety Plan, the EASp. The Plan starts by identifying those areas in which coordinated action will make a difference in avoiding accidents and serious incidents, which is the ultimate goal that links all the activities together.

The planning activity is followed up by a reporting activity, in which progress on the actions is evaluated and also documented. This feedback loop ensures that the process to manage risks continuously improves.

3.1 Objectives and principles

The main objective of the Safety Plan is to create a common focus on European aviation safety issues as a continuation of the European work to increase aviation safety and to comply with ICAO standards. The fourth edition continues the approach of compiling the on-going work in Europe, hence improving traceability and reinforcing commitment to the current initiatives. This will contribute to avoiding the duplication and overlapping of safety initiatives and competition for resources.

While some safety issues stay at national level and are addressed within State Safety Programmes (SSP) alone, there are other instances where common issues of pan-European scope require a collective action. The latter actions are the scope of the present publication.

The fourth edition of the European Aviation Safety Plan covers the 4-year period between 2014 and 2017. The objective of this edition is twofold: on one hand it informs stakeholders on the progress made on the actions during 2013; on the other hand it also incorporates new actions to mitigate the already identified safety risks. The initial framework has been slightly updated in this edition as explained in section 3.2.1.

The Safety Plan is built on the principle that the planning for the first year (2014) is a commitment and that the planning for the following years (2015-2017) might be subject to changes depending on changing priorities and availability of resources. Following this principle, the present 4-year Safety Plan commits the stakeholders to the actions planned for finalisation in 2014. These actions are highlighted throughout the document. The actions for the following years (2015-2017) will be reviewed in light of experience. The Agency’s Rulemaking programme is also based on this principle.
3.2 Main risk areas: the Safety Plan Framework

The first edition of the Safety Plan was developed by taking into account Member States safety concerns. In order to support the timely publication of the Plan, a request was sent to the 31 EASA Member States in the first quarter of 2010. They were asked to provide the top 5 safety concerns in their State as well as the process by which they had determined them. A total of 15 responses were received from Member States in May 2010. Additionally, input was aggregated with safety information from Eurocontrol, ECAST and the Agency since these organisations have a pan-European view on safety. The first results were presented to EASAC in June 2010.

The inputs collected were further analysed and classified into three different areas according to the type of issues they highlighted. All of the responses received were placed into one of the following areas:

a) **Operational Issues**, which are closely related to the events that are reported during operation. The relationship between this type of issues and the final outcomes or end states can be supported by data.

b) **Systemic Issues**, which affect the aviation as a whole. These issues play a role in accident and incident causation. They underlie operational issues; thus their improvement has an implicit effect on operational causes.

The above issues can be considered as the reactive elements of the Safety Plan since they address problems that have already happened and for which data is to some extent available. In order to balance the composition of the Plan with a more proactive or forward looking element, a third category of issues named **emerging issues** was also proposed.

c) **Emerging issues**. This area gives some consideration to safety issues derived from operations or regulations that have not been fully deployed and where data is not always available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAFETY PLAN FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYSTEMIC ISSUES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with States to implement and develop SSPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with States to foster the implementation of SMS in the industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety Management enablers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence of personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPERATIONAL ISSUES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT BY AEROPLANES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runway Excursions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-air Collisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled Flight Into Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Control In Flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runway Incursions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EMERGING ISSUES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New products, systems, technologies and operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER TYPES OF OPERATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HUMAN FACTORS AND PERFORMANCE</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally human factors and human performance affect all the safety topics discussed within the above areas and it is important to recognise that addressing human factors will bring safety improvements across all those issues. Due to the fact that they have an effect across all domains and the difficulty of associating them to one of the above broad areas, they will be addressed separately in the Safety Plan.

The proposed approach and list of issues was presented to EASA Management Board in June 2010 and constitutes the Safety Plan Framework.

### 3.2.1 Safety Plan Framework update

In this edition of the EASp, the operational issues affecting commercial air transport by airplanes have been slightly reorganised. Until now the section has been organised in six major accident categories (note that ground collisions include both runway incursions and the safety of ground operations). They represent the various ways in which a CAT aircraft accident can happen.

It has been highlighted that safety of ground operations is not an outcome category as originally intended. However events that occur during ground operations (e.g. inappropriate aircraft loading) can lead to one of the outcome categories already identified (e.g. loss of control) and therefore can be reallocated within the other areas.

Additionally on-board fire was not specifically identified as an outcome category in previous editions. It can be argued that fire on-board has the potential to lead to a loss of control in flight. However it would be also valid to separate this type of accidents into an individual category since the way to address them may benefit from a different approach than in other types of loss of control accidents. The first actions to address on-board fire are proposed in section 5.1.

Consequently it is proposed that in the fourth edition of the EASp the safety of ground operations will not appear in the general framework (which does not mean that they will not be addressed in the EASp), while fire, smoke and fumes will be incorporated as a new outcome category, hence CAT by airplanes will focus on the following six risk areas:

- Runway Excursions
- Mid-air Collisions
- Controlled Flight Into Terrain
- Loss of Control In Flight
- Runway Incursions
- Fire, Smoke and Fumes

### 3.3 Continuous update

In collaboration with all the stakeholders, the Safety Plan is reviewed every year. The review consists of two main activities:

a. Firstly, the status of the standing actions is assessed. An action is considered complete when the proposed deliverable is delivered. When the action could not be closed by the due date or a deviation from the Plan is expected, the causes have been recorded and a modification has been proposed. This allows the progress and
effectiveness of the Safety Plan to be measured. A progress report is included in Annex A.

b. Secondly, the initial list of actions proposed in the previous edition has been updated with the incorporation of new actions after consultation with all stakeholders. These new actions have been placed within the existing framework. They take into consideration new safety initiatives aimed at mitigating the existing risks.

3.4 The European Aviation Safety Programme

On 26 January 2011, the European Commission organised a conference to discuss the future of European Union's Aviation Safety Management towards 2020 and to hear the views and experiences of the various stakeholders in aviation safety. The conference debated the issues surrounding moving from a largely reactive system towards a proactive system based upon proven safety management.

With the results of the debate, the EC developed a Communication\(^3\) to the Council and the European Parliament called “Setting up an Aviation Safety Management System for Europe”. The Communication sets the strategy for aviation safety in Europe for the coming years and supports the aim, set out in the Transport White Paper\(^4\), to raise the EU aviation safety performance to a level that matches or exceeds the best world standard.

According to the Communication this is achieved by adding a pro-active element to the current EU aviation safety system and publishing annual updates to the European Aviation Safety Plan detailing progress made in addressing identified safety risks at EU level. This is the scope of the present publication.

This Communication is accompanied by a Commission Staff Working Paper\(^5\) describing the current aviation safety framework at European level. It was prepared jointly by the Commission and EASA and is called the European Aviation Safety Programme. The work is based on the manual presented to the EASA MB at the end of 2010.


3.5 Content of the Plan

The Safety Plan is divided in four areas, each one addressing the main safety topics presented in the Safety Plan framework.

- Section 4 addresses **Systemic Issues**
- Section 5 addresses **Operational Issues**
- Section 6 addresses **Emerging issues**


\(^4\) COM(2011) 144 - WHITE PAPER - Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system

Section 7 addresses *Human Factors and Performance*, which affect all of the above areas.

Within each of the above sections, the following information is provided:

- A table with the actions delivered during 2013.
- A summary of the key achievements made during 2013 together with the main challenges encountered.
- A summary of the actions under the leadership of the States.

The present document is complemented by several Annexes:

- **Annex A** contains a *status report* on the progress made on the Safety Plan throughout 2013. In this Annex the following information is provided for each action item: a summary of the work done, the leader of the action, an assessment on whether the action is progressing according to the Plan, possible deviations from the Plan should they exist and an identification of the key deliverables.
- **Annex B** focuses on the actions owned by States and summarises the feedback provided throughout the year.
- **Annex C** contains the results of an SSP Phase Implementation survey aimed at highlighting where States are with SSP implementation.

At the end of the document several attachments clarify the acronyms, define the terms used throughout the document and provide a brief description of the different working groups and initiatives at European level dealing with aviation safety.

### 3.6 EASp Summits

Coordination with the States participating in the implementation of the EASp is key to keep the risk management exercise relevant. With this aim the *EASp implementation and review summits* have been created. They are a vehicle to consult on the Plan with the States.

They consist of face to face meetings between the States, the European Commission and the Agency, take the pulse of the implementation and discuss safety risks affecting the system. They also allow States to present their work and learn from each other.

The EASp summits are held twice a year. The first two summits took place on 29th May and 16th November 2012 providing with an opportunity to introduce the approach to new delegates of several States. In 2013 two more summits have been held on 18th June and 7th November. The material discussed and main outcomes can be found [here](#).

### 3.7 Governance

The content of the Safety Plan is developed by EASA under the supervision of EASAC. The Committee created in 2009 brings together safety experts from the Member States, the European Commission, Eurocontrol, the Performance Review Body (PRB), industry and EASA. Their role is to provide advice on how to address the identified safety risks at EU level.

Once it is reviewed and approved by EASAC, the Safety Plan is submitted to the EASA MB for endorsement. After it is endorsed, it becomes a public document that is implemented on a voluntary basis by all the stakeholders.
3.8 Information and Promotion

A dedicated web site (www.easa.europa.eu/sms) has been created to publish the key deliverables and update on the major developments. Inquiries concerning the EASp can be addressed via a dedicated mailbox (easp@easa.europa.eu)

The Agency, in cooperation with all the stakeholders, continues to further disseminate the approach. To this end, a brochure was developed and handed out at various safety events. The brochure briefly explains the key aspects of the EASp and points out where to get the information.
4 Systemic Issues

Systemic issues are system-wide problems that affect aviation as a whole. Their association to a particular safety event or circumstance is not always obvious. In most scenarios, they become evident by triggering factors and play a significant role in the development of safety occurrences. They often relate to deficiencies in organisational processes and procedures.

### Completed actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Finished action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS1.5</td>
<td>Incorporation of SSP in all domains of aviation.</td>
<td>SSPs and enablers have been incorporated in the requirements for aerodrome oversight authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS2.3</td>
<td>Incorporation of SMS in all domains of aviation.</td>
<td>SMS and enablers have been incorporated in the requirements for aerodrome operator organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS3.5</td>
<td>Lack of a methodology to define SPIs.</td>
<td>A comprehensive model for the measurement of safety performance has been developed by the SMICG including guidance for service providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS3.12</td>
<td>FDM programmes priorities do not consider operational issues identified at the European and national levels.</td>
<td>EASA has fostered actions by States to improving the implementation of FDM programmes by their operators and assisted States in initiating the standardisation of FDM events relevant to SSP top safety priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS3.13</td>
<td>Frequency of information to support the management of safety.</td>
<td>EASA publishes a safety dashboard on its website with the intent to provide regular statistics on the state of safety in Europe and worldwide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS3.14</td>
<td>All domains, except ATM, lack indicators and targets on key performance areas in order to achieve and maintain required safety levels.</td>
<td>High-level SPIs for use at European and national level in all domains of aviation safety have been developed by the Network of Analysts (NoA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS5.5</td>
<td>Reduce possible differences in training implementation among States.</td>
<td>A Training Implementation Policy has been developed by the EASA Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS5.7</td>
<td>Increasing pilot reliance on automation.</td>
<td>EASA, through the IGPT, has studied and promoted possibilities for mitigating the risk of increasing pilot's reliance on automation through the proposals derived from the cockpit automation survey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Progress made during 2013

**Working with Authorities and Organisations to implement Safety Management**

Managing safety in a systematic and proactive way will allow authorities and organisations to act on hazards before aviation accidents occur. This is a global move as the adoption of the new ICAO Annex 19 compiling all safety management provisions reflects.
This move is an integral part of the EASp as the EU is in the process of setting up the regulatory framework that will require organisations and authorities to implement a management system that incorporates safety in it. While the management system that organisations have to implement will address the 14 SMS framework elements contained in Annex 19; the management system to be put in place by the authorities will contain specific provisions to support the implementation of SSP without specifically mandating States to have one such programme.

In 2011 existing SMS requirements in the domain of ATM/ANS were transposed into EU regulation. It was not however until 2012 when the new integrated approach started to be introduced in the domains of air crew and air operations serving as a model for other domains. The adaptation of the management systems of authorities and organisations has started and will take some time.

Similar requirements in the domain of continuing airworthiness and aerodromes have been proposed. In the former domain NPA 2013-01 has been published covering maintenance organisations and continuing management organisations. In the latter domain, Opinion 01/2013 has been issued foreseeing that aerodrome operators of such aerodromes that will require certification shall implement and maintain a management system. Until the entry into force of the corresponding EU Regulation the national rules which are in place at the level of the different Member States will continue to apply.

As actions SYS 1.3b and SYS2.2b reflect, the approach has been extended and now covers Maintenance Training Organisations (Part-147) and Competent Authorities (Part-66) through the publication of NPA 2013-19.
Similar work has been started on initial airworthiness (SYS1.3a and SYS2.2a). In this case two different types of activities are on-going: on one hand the integrated approach to SMS will be extended to Design and Manufacture Organisations. This work will start by launching several pilot projects to acquire experience. On the other hand, the level of involvement (LOI) of the Agency on product certification will be subject to a risk-based regime. The first NPAs on LOI are being finalised.

Additionally, a second regulatory phase seeking to align the ATM/ANS domain with the integrated management approach adopted in air crew and air operations has already started. Opinions are expected in 2014.

**Safety Management Enablers**

Besides identifying hazards and assessing the associated risks, SMS seeks to close the loop by measuring achievements. In order to do that organisations and States have started to engage in developing safety performance indicators (SPIs). Several EASp activities contribute to pave the way to measure performance.

- The [Safety Management International Collaboration Group](#) (SMICG), has published guidelines to assist service providers in the definition and implementation of a set of safety performance indicators (SYS3.5).

- At European level a performance scheme has been made mandatory in Regulation 691/2010 for ATM. The European Commission is getting ready to contract a study (SYS3.7) to explore the possibility of extending the approach beyond ATM. The study is envisioned in 2015.

- Additionally the Network of Analysts (NoA) has already defined high-level SPIs that can be used at European and national level.

Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) is a powerful tool for monitoring operational safety on a day-to-day-basis, and a natural component of the SMS of an aircraft operator. The EASp includes two actions (SYS3.11 and SYS3.12) intended to promote that FDM programmes priorities include common operational issues identified at the European and national levels. The European Authorities Coordination Group on Flight Data Monitoring ([EAFDM](#)) has already developed guidance for authorities on setting up a national FDM forum with their operators. The group is also working on a list of standardised FDM-based indicators relevant for the prevention of the major risk areas identified in the EASp which is expected to be published this year. Another project of the EAFDM is a guidance document for NAAs on the oversight of FDM programmes. This will be started in 2014.

**Competence of personnel**

Having the right competencies and adapting training methods is recognised as a key area in the EASp, hence a new systemic threat was created last year to tackle such issues like the increasing pilot reliance on automation, the modernisation of training provisions or the differences in training implementation among States.

In response to the issue of increasing pilot’s reliance on automation, EASA has published three SIBs that address manual flight training and operations, stall and stick pusher training and mode awareness and energy state management, thus closing action SYS5.7. The training issues addressed in them are closely related with the EASp activities to address loss of control avoidance and recovery training described in the following section of this report.
Work to develop a training implementation policy to reduce the differences in training implementation among States has concluded (SYS5.5). A training implementation working group was established within the EASA Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT) to work on the issue, that was discussed with NAAs in a Workshop on 27 June 2012. The results of the workshop have been the basis to develop the policy that is now available. The resulting training implementation policy addresses the implementation of rules regarding training, testing and checking.

Two actions (SYS5.1 and SYS5.3) focus on modernising training methods and competence provisions across several domains: flight crew licensing, operations, maintenance and ATM/ANS. New training methods like competence based training (CBT), evidence based training (EBT) and distance learning are being evaluated and training standards will be adapted in the coming years as necessary.

**Coordination with Member States**

In the new ICAO Annex dedicated to safety management, the role played by the State in managing safety at its level has been reinforced, stressing the concept of overall safety performance in all domains, in coordination with service providers.

The near-term objectives of the GASP 2013 focus on the implementation of an effective safety oversight system by 2017 in all States. Using the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) effective implementation (EI) as an indicator of State safety oversight system maturity, the GASP stipulates that States with an EI above 60% should begin SSP implementation if they have not already. This is the case of the majority of the States implementing the EASp.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase I</th>
<th>Phase II</th>
<th>Phase III</th>
<th>Phase IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SSP element 1.2 (i)</strong></td>
<td><strong>SSP element 1.1</strong> National aviation legislative framework.</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 1.4 (ii)</strong> c. Provision to prevent use or disclosure of safety data for purposes other than safety improvement.</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 2.2</strong> Service provider safety performance indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Establish SSP Implementation Team.</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 1.3</strong> Accident and serious incident investigation</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 3.2 (i)</strong> a. Safety data collection &amp; exchange systems. b. Establish high consequence (or Tier 1) State safety performance indicators and target/alert levels.</td>
<td>b. Establish lower consequence safety indicators with target/alert level monitoring as appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Perform SSP Gap Analysis.</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 1.4 (i)</strong> Establish basic enforcement (penalty) legislation.</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 3.2 (ii)</strong> c. Promote safety information exchange with and amongst service providers and other States.</td>
<td>c. Promote safety information exchange with and amongst service providers and other States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Develop SSP Implementation Plan</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 3.1 (i)</strong> State safety oversight and surveillance of its service providers.</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 3.3</strong> Prioritize inspections and audits based on the analysis of safety risk or quality data where applicable.</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 3.1 (iii)</strong> Establish internal review mechanism covering the SSP to assure continuing effectiveness and improvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Establish SSP coordination mechanism.</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 2.1 (i)</strong> SMS education &amp; promotion for service providers.</td>
<td><strong>SSP element 3.2 (i)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Action SYS1.7 encourages States to expedite SSP implementation (due in 2014). Until now 16 SSP documents and 10 Safety Plans have been made available to the Agency as part of the implementation of the EASp. Web links to these documents can be found here.

In 2013, a new survey has been distributed to the States in order to assess where they are with SSP implementation. For that purpose the 4 phase approach suggested in the 3rd edition of the Safety Management Manual was used. The survey was tailored to the EASA safety system and accompanied with guidance text. An overview of the various SSP elements included in each phase is provided in the above table.

The aggregated results show that some elements such as identifying the SSP place holder organisation, performing an SSP Gap analysis, developing an implementation plan, establishing an accident and incident investigation body or performing oversight and surveillance of service providers are already in place in at least 80% of the States that provided a response.

![SSP Implementation Survey Results](image)

On the other hand, SSP elements such as establishing service providers performance indicators, incorporating service providers' SMS and safety performance indicators as part of routine surveillance program, establishing lower consequence safety indicators with target/alert level monitoring, prioritising inspections and audits based on the analysis of safety risk or quality data or providing external training, communication and dissemination of safety information were implemented in less 30% of the States that provided a response.

More details can be found on Annex C – SSP Phase Implementation Survey Results.

Action SYS3.11 encourages States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) programmes. Among the States that provided a response, five of them have organised meetings with aircraft operators that promote FDM in 2013 or 2012. Five more States expressed their intention to organise these types of meetings.
in the future. Discussions on FDM events relevant for preventing the major operational risks identified in the EASp are held in 5 States. More details can be found on Annex B- EASp implementation in the States

New actions

Safety Management Enablers

Lack of experience on FDM-based indicators

After the FDM-based indicators published by EAFDM, an in-depth assessment is needed of their practicalities and of their benefits for the industry and for national aviation authorities. This concept has not been experimented yet, therefore a careful examination of all aspects and possibly small-scale trials are needed at this stage. The EAFDM plans to conduct this assessment.

Desired outcome

Assess the usefulness of FDM-based indicators for addressing national safety priorities.

Proposed actions

EASA should consolidate the results of EASp action SYS3.12, by assessing further, together with Member States, the benefits of FDM-based indicators for addressing national safety priorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS3.16</td>
<td>Lack of experience on FDM-based indicators</td>
<td>EASA should assess further, together with Member States, the benefits of FDM-based indicators for addressing national safety priorities.</td>
<td>EAFDM</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Report with the results of the assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Improving the implementation of FDM programs requires, besides active FDM promotion, an effective oversight of FDM activities. However there is currently little guidance available to national aviation authorities on how to oversee FDM programs in practice. Therefore the sharing of good practice on this topic is considered priority by the EAFDM.

Desired outcome

Facilitate the oversight of FDM programmes by national authorities.

Proposed actions

EASA should produce, together with Member States, best practice on the oversight of FDM programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS3.17</td>
<td>Lack of guidance on the oversight of FDM activities</td>
<td>EASA should produce, together with Member States, best practice on the oversight of FDM programmes</td>
<td>EAFDM</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Best practice document</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Competence of personnel

The Standardisation Annual Report 2012 (issued in March 2013) highlighted that the availability of adequate staff in NAAs, in terms of qualification and number, is the main reason for some of the difficulties related to the process of granting approvals, licenses or certificates and to the continued surveillance of approved organisations that were encountered in the last campaign. This problem has also been highlighted by some States at the occasion of the EASp summits.

This weakness which has been perceived in most of the domains, but in particular in Air Operations, can have severe safety consequences because authorities risk controls may not be applied properly.

**Desired outcome**

Facilitate the availability of adequate staff at the NAAs, in terms of both qualification and number available.

**Proposed actions**

1. EASA to support Competent Authorities
   a. in defining the right competences needed to properly discharge their safety oversight responsibilities, and
   b. in providing training to their staff
2. Promote the concept of ‘pooling’ available expertise among NAAs in order to make subject matter experts available in a cost effective way, to those States that need resources
3. EASA Standardisation to monitor the availability of staff at the NAAs.

### New Safety Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SYS5.8 | Unavailability of adequate personnel in Competent Authorities | EASA to support Competent Authorities
a. in defining the right competences needed to properly discharge their safety oversight responsibilities, and
b. in providing training to their staff | EASA | Cont. | SP | Description of support activities |
| SYS5.9 | Unavailability of adequate personnel in Competent Authorities | Promote the concept of ‘pooling’ available expertise among NAAs in order to make subject matter experts available in a cost effective way, to those States that need resources | EASA and MS | 2015 | SP | Report on the concept |
| SYS5.10 | Unavailability of adequate personnel in Competent Authorities | EASA Standardisation to monitor the availability of staff at the NAAs | EASA | Annually | O | Standardisation Annual Report |

Reduce possible differences in training implementation among States.

A dedicated working group of the EASA Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT) developed a Training Implementation Policy (SYS5.5) in 2013 aimed at reducing possible differences in training implementation among States.
Desired outcome
Reduce difference in training implementation among States.

Proposed actions
In order to continue to promote the key issues identified in the policy, a thematic workshop, with the involvement of the NAA and the industry is to be organized in 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS5.11</td>
<td>Reduce possible differences in training implementation among States.</td>
<td>A thematic workshop, with the involvement of the NAA and the industry is to be organized to promote the issues and orientations published in the Training Implementation Policy</td>
<td>EASA</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Workshop organised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5 Operational Issues

Operational issues are brought to light by the reporting and analysis of occurrence data. The Safety Plan starts by addressing the main risks that affect commercial air transport operations, especially those carried out by aeroplanes. Additionally, an effort has been made to capture actions that address other types of operation; thus acknowledging the existing initiatives at European level.

Issues affecting commercial air transport operations carried out by airplanes are classified in various areas which correspond with the main accident categories. This does not mean that only causes of actual accidents are dealt with in the EASp, but also hazards with the potential to lead to any of the identified categories. The categories represent the various final outcomes that need to be avoided.

It is also important to recognise that certain issues like unstable approaches, the encounter with hazardous weather conditions or inappropriate actions performed by the crew have an impact on more than one risk area. Human factor issues also affect different areas and are addressed in section 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Finished action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AER1.3</td>
<td>Requirements for RE need to be transposed in certain areas.</td>
<td>European requirements addressing RE for aerodrome operators organisations, aerodrome operations and aerodrome design are now published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER1.4</td>
<td>Requirements for RE need to be transposed in certain areas.</td>
<td>European requirements addressing RE for ATM/ANS provision are now published. They aim to ensure the provision of safe and efficient air traffic services within the single European sky.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER2.5</td>
<td>Requirements for MAC need to be transposed in certain areas</td>
<td>European requirements addressing MAC for ATM/ANS provision are now published. They aim to ensure the provision of safe and efficient air traffic services within the single European sky.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER4.1</td>
<td>Protection From Debris Impacts and Fire.</td>
<td>A new paragraph of CS-25, which would cover the protection of the whole aircraft against the threat of tire/wheel failure has been developed. Identified as a common priority for JAA-FAA-TCCA joint rulemaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER4.8</td>
<td>Response to upset conditions in order to prevent LOC-I.</td>
<td>EASA and Member States supported, encouraged and followed up initiatives such as ICATEE to contribute to developing solutions aimed to reduce LOC-I, revising and promoting upset recovery guidance material, and influencing the adoption of future ICAO SARPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER4.10</td>
<td>Response to unusual attitudes in order to prevent LOC-I.</td>
<td>A Workshop to identify and promote requirements and guidance in Part FCL and Part OPS related to the prevention of LoC accidents was organised in 2013 and has allowed to identify needs for future improvements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER4.15</td>
<td>Icing</td>
<td>A safety conference to exchange views on the safety issue and identify mitigation opportunities has been organised in October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER5.3</td>
<td>Runway incursions.</td>
<td>Implementing rules based on transferred tasks from the JAA and the EUROCONTROL EAPPRI report have been developed and are now going through Comitology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER5.6</td>
<td>Transposition of requirements into EU regulation in the domain of Aerodromes to improve safety of ground operations.</td>
<td>Requirements for aerodrome operator organisations and oversight authorities are now published.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1 Commercial Air Transport by Aeroplanes

Progress made during 2013

To mitigate the risk of runway excursions a European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE) was delivered at the beginning of 2013. The Plan offers a comprehensive view on the issues that lead to runway excursions and proposes actions for authorities, various industry organisations (operators, service providers, aerodromes) and also for the Agency. Two EASp actions (AER 1.9 and AER 1.10) are aimed at following-up the EAPPRE both at Member State and EASA level. The follow-up is coordinated with Eurocontrol implementation mechanisms.

An opinion proposing European requirements to mitigate Runway Excursions has been published in 2013 and targets aerodrome operators organisations, aerodrome operations and aerodrome design whereas the requirements targeting ATM/ANS provision are already adopted (AER1.4)

The loss of control of the aircraft in flight continues to be the category with the major number of fatal accidents in Europe. Among the hazards with the potential to develop into a loss of control addressed in the EASp are: icing, unusual airplane attitudes and erroneous weight and centre of gravity information.

The Agency is now updating its certification specifications with a view to improve safety of large aeroplanes and engines in icing conditions (AER4.2). Icing (both on-ground and in the air) was the subject of the safety conference organised by the Agency in October 2013 (AER4.15). Rulemaking tasks to mitigate the ground contamination of aircraft surfaces are scheduled to start in 2015.

In certain situations, flight crews are faced with unusual airplane attitudes, one of the scenarios that has the potential to develop into a loss of control. Training plays a key role in these situations and hence several actions of the EASp address training:

- European-wide requirements that address training of and recovery from unusual attitudes have been published.
- EASA and Member States have taken part in the International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE) and Loss of Control Aviation Rulemaking Team (LOCART). ICATEE recently delivered a draft Upset Prevention and Recovery Manual to ICAO.
- A workshop on loss of control prevention and recovery training was organised on 28 February and 1 March at the Agency. The workshop invited the major stakeholders who
discussed on issues like theoretical training, on aircraft upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT), Flight Simulation Training Devices, realistic stall prevention and training scenarios development and manual flying skills. Actions coming out of the workshop have been identified and a new EASp action is proposed in the following section.

Another scenario that has led to loss of control accidents is having erroneous weight and/or centre of gravity information. Two actions of the EASp (AER4.11 and AER 4.12) propose mitigation solutions either through regulation (i.e. equipping aircraft with a weight and centre of gravity measuring system) or through research (i.e. EFB applications).

Implementation of mitigation measures proposed in other European Action Plans already available is being followed-up with States in close coordination with Eurocontrol in the areas of runway incursions and airspace infringement risk. More information is available on Annex B.

The second extension rules will incorporate European requirements that will contribute to mitigate the risk of runway excursions, mid-air collisions, runway incursions and will enhance the safety of ground operations.

Eurocontrol is leading the development of guidance material for ground-based safety nets (AER2.2 and AER2.3) like Short Term Conflict Alert, Approach Path Monitoring and Area Proximity Warning.

**Coordination with Member States**

The responses received from Member States to the request on the status of their actions are included in Annex B - EASp implementation in the States. The Annex details to what extent the risk areas proposed in the EASp are also being incorporated in risk portfolios at national level and how coordination should be organised in the future.

The below diagram summarises the responses received from 18 Member States on the operational risks identified in the EASp. In general the majority of States are also incorporating the EASp risk areas in their risk portfolios and provide useful feedback on the actions taken at their level. When the management system of a State does not justify the incorporation of an area this is also highlighted. This has been the case of States where only a specific type of operation was relevant or where the size of the activity was rather small.

The below table highlights the number of States (out of a total of 18) that reported to be implementing actions to address the areas of the EASp.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main EASP area</th>
<th>Number of States working on the issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC-I</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFIT</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the majority of cases Local Runway Safety Teams have been set up at the certified aerodromes. They play a key role in addressing runway safety. On the other hand, the implementation of the EAPPRE (issued at the beginning of 2013) is now starting. A list of hazards with the issues being addressed in each of the States is published in Annex B.

Since coordination with States is considered vital, two additional EASp summits have been organised in 2013 (information on the events is available here). More specifically the 4th EASp implementation and review summit (organised on 7 November) focused on discussing the feedback provided by States as part of the implementation of the EASp.

**MAIN EASp AREAS**

- **RI** = Runway Incursions;
- **LOC-I** = Loss of Control in Flight;
- **CFIT** = Controlled Flight Into Terrain;
- **MAC** = Mid-air Collisions;
- **RE** = Runway Excursions;
- **GO** = Safety of Ground Operations,
- **LRST** = Local Runway Safety Teams;

**EUROPEAN ACTION PLANS**

- **EAPPRI** = European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions;
- **EAPPRE** = European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions;
- **EAPAIRR** = European Action Plan for Airspace Infringement Risk Reduction
**New actions**

**Runway Excursions**

Between 1991 and 2010, EASA Member State operators had on average close to 1 fatality per year due to runway excursions at landing. The number of these occurrences has increased in line with the growth in traffic. As aviation traffic is expected to continue to grow worldwide as well as in Europe (albeit at a lower rate), the number of runway excursions can also be expected to increase further.

According to IATA’s 2009 Safety Report, runway excursions represented 25% of all the events that occurred in 2008 and it is notable that the rate of reported accidents and serious incidents involving runway excursions has increased during the last decade. Statistically, around 80% of the occurrences happen during landing and 20% during the take-off phase.

Flying an unstabilised approach, landing too fast, too far down the runway, or conducting an extended flare, delayed or incorrect flight crew action on braking systems, late or no decision to abort landing, are identified as contributing factors to those accidents.

To facilitate the prevention of and recovery from bounced landings, which have led to runway excursion with substantial aircraft damage and injuries to passengers and crews, an SIB (SIB 2013-20) was issued on 19 November 2013.

One of the results of the combined and sustained efforts of authorities and industry organisations to prevent runway excursions is the European Action Plan for Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE) (Edition 1.0 - January 2013). The document provides recommendations on the use of ‘all practicable means available ranging from the design of aircraft, airspace, procedures and technologies, to relevant training for operational staff associated with runway excursion prevention.’

Among the recommendations, the following were issued:

— Ref. 3.5.3 (for aircraft manufacturers):
‘On-board real-time performance monitoring and alerting systems that will assist the flight crew with the land/go-around decision and warn when more deceleration force is needed should be made widely available.’

— Ref. 3.7.11 (for EASA):
‘Develop rulemaking for the approval of on-board real-time crew alerting systems that make energy based assessments of predicted stopping distance versus landing distance available, and mandate the installation of such systems’.

Safety Recommendations have been issued to ‘actively pursue with aircraft and avionics manufacturers the development of technology to reduce or prevent...’
runway excursions and, once it becomes available, require that the technology be installed’ (NTSB recommendation n°A-11-28 to the FAA, 2011).

The subject has been well studied through the past years and aviation stakeholders showed their interest in this topic by cooperating to find solutions that address this safety issue. Today, some systems have been developed, certified and put into service on large aeroplanes to protect against the risk of runway excursion.

On-board means are now capable of performing calculation in real time in order to assess the real time runway overrun risk and aid the flight crews’ awareness and subsequent decision making. Moreover, the enhanced awareness provided by such an on-board means allows developing effective avoidance on-board capability in order to help the flight crew to use all required and available retardation means in a timely manner.

**Desired outcome**

*Reduce the number of runway overrun events during landing*

**Proposed actions**

1. **Mandating existing technology to be installed on large aeroplanes (RMT.0047) –newly designed or newly produced.**
   a. Amending of CS-25 for new designs
   b. Amending of CS-26 for already certificated large aeroplanes

**Follow-up actions**

2. Installing new technology (Large aeroplane’s manufacturers)
3. Train flight crews on the use of the new technologies (Training organisations and air operators)
4. Proactively monitor the number of runway overrun events during landing and the ones that were avoided by the new technology (States)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Safety Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER1.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Loss of control in flight**

Globally approximately 20% of all fatal accidents in Commercial Air Transport (CAT) operation with aeroplanes over the past 10 years can be attributed to loss of control in flight. The approximate global rate is 5.4 accidents per 10,000,000 flight movements or 1 fatal accident per year. Within Europe the rate is 1.6 fatal accidents per 10,000,000 flights or 1 fatal accident every 3 years.
According to a SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR6237) published in April 2013, which reviewed worldwide loss of control accidents between 1981 and 2010, the top 5 primary causes were aerodynamic stalls, spatial disorientation, flight crew handling issues, flight control issues and atmospheric disturbances. Moreover, several safety recommendations have been received in the past years that address loss of control and more specifically improvements in pilot training and checking.

The following table depicts some of the work that has already been done or is on-going to address some of the hazards that contribute to Loss of Control scenarios:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Challenges presented by the increasing reliance on automation</td>
<td>Publication of an EASA Automation Policy (updated on May 2013) – EASp EME4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degradation of manual flying skills</td>
<td>Continued promotion of the Automation Policy - EASp SYS5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate reaction to stall indication or stick pusher events</td>
<td>SIB 2013-02 Stall and Stick Pusher Training was published on 22 Jan 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mismangement of the energy state of the aircraft due to lack of awareness of the automation mode</td>
<td>SIB 2010-33 Flight Deck Automation Policy - Mode Awareness and Energy State Management, published on 18 Nov 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight crew handling of unexpected and unusual situations</td>
<td>RMT .0411 Update requirements for Crew Resource Management (CRM) Training, initiated in November 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Icing conditions</td>
<td>RMT.0058 Large Aeroplane Certification Specifications in Super-cooled Large Drop, Mixed phase, and Ice Crystal Icing Conditions. – EASp AER4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, a safety conference (October 2011) and a dedicated workshop (28 Feb and 1 March 2013) were organised in Cologne with the intention to bring stakeholders together and discuss the main issues and progress made so far. Furthermore this year’s safety conference focused on icing, which is one of the known precursors to loss of control.

At the global level ICAO has already made substantial progress supported by the Loss of Control Avoidance Recovery (LOCART) and International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE) working group initiatives. They have put the focus on preventing and recovering from upset scenarios.
**Desired outcome**

Pilots have the competencies to prevent and/or recover from a loss of control in flight and successfully apply them.

The proposed set of actions intend to close the loop of the implementation of the mitigation measure with affected stakeholders as follows:

**Proposed actions**

1. Develop regulations which ensure that initial and recurrent pilot training and checking is adequate to provide a pilot with the knowledge, skills and attitude to be competent in preventing and, if necessary, recovering from a loss of control in flight situation (EASA)

**Follow-up actions**

2. Transfer new competencies introduced in the regulation to pilots (Training organisations + States)
3. Check that new competencies have been acquired (EASA Standardization and States)
4. Proactively monitor situations with the potential to lead to loss of control events in which pilot training was a contributor. (States)

The proposed mitigation measures include an integrated approach addressing initial and recurrent training with increased focus on prevention by specific upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) covering theoretical, FSTD training and possibly on-aeroplane training. It is also proposed to address instructor qualifications in this context. The Terms of Reference of the rulemaking task are available [here](#).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AER4.16</td>
<td>Flight crew are not adequately trained to respond to loss of control.</td>
<td>Develop regulations which ensure that initial and recurrent pilot training and checking is adequate to provide a pilot with the knowledge, skills and attitude to be competent in preventing and, if necessary, recovering from a loss of control in flight situation.</td>
<td>EASA</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Opinion/Decision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fire, smoke and fumes**

On-board fire, smoke and fumes is proposed to be added as a new category of accidents in the 4th edition of the EASp and will form an integral part of subsequent EASp editions. Uncontrolled fire on board an aircraft, especially when it is in flight, represents one of the most severe hazards in aviation. Post-crash fire is not addressed in this section.
In-flight fire can ultimately lead to loss of control, either as a result of structural or control system failure, or again as a result of crew incapacitation. Fire on the ground can take hold rapidly and lead to significant casualties if evacuation and emergency response is not swift enough.

Smoke or fumes, whether they are associated with fire or not, can lead to passenger and crew incapacitation and will certainly raise concern and invite a response. Even when they do not give rise to a safety impact, they can give rise to concerns and need to be addressed.

A statistical analysis of commercial jet aircraft accident data shows that in-flight fire was responsible for the fourth highest number of on-board fatalities and was the seventh most frequent cause of accidents in 2005 (Boeing, 2005). Since 2005 there have been two B747 freighter fires that resulted in the loss of the aircraft and flight crews, but no fatal fires aboard passenger airplanes. Consequently, the ranking of in-flight fires has decreased since 2005 due to the reduction in passenger fatalities. Had the freighter fires occurred in passenger aircraft causing fatalities the rankings would certainly have been different.

In addition, data from recent years indicate the probability of passengers experiencing an in-flight smoke event is greater than one in 10,000. In the United States alone, more than one airplane a day is diverted due to smoke (Shaw, 1999).

In addition, there have been three major cargo fire accidents in the past 10 years and a number of serious incidents. All aircraft were carrying large quantities of lithium batteries. Since the early 1990s, there have been dozens of incidents of batteries igniting in flight or during cargo handling. What exactly triggered many of the fires is however not well understood. This issue is being closely monitored.

Several safety recommendations have been addressed to FAA and EASA regarding redesign of transport checklist pertaining to fire, smoke and fumes, review of the cargo fire certification requirements, smoke removal requirements, flight crew training for in-flight fire, standardisation of the battery packaging regulation, research on fire suppression systems.

The Agency is involved in various certification and rulemaking activities regarding the mentioned topic as well as in the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel, where updates on the ICAO “Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air”, doc. 9284, are proposed.

Early this year the Flight Operation Groups have published an update of the RAeS’s specialist document “Smoke, Fire and Fumes in Transport Aircraft”. The paper serves as a reference document on current risk and proposed mitigations for smoke and fire events on commercial transport aeroplanes. The previous version was published in February 2007 and in the 2013 update edition a new section on lithium batteries, composite materials and predictive technologies has
been added together with new recommendations to reflect the current risks. The recommendations to reduce the severity and effects of in-flight fires focus on:

- Equipment design and airworthiness;
- Protective equipment;
- Maintenance;
- Pilot procedures;
- Flight and cabin crew training.

**Desired outcome**

*Evaluate the latest knowledge with a view to identify new opportunities to mitigate the risk posed by on-board fires.*

**Proposed actions**

EASA will evaluate the latest information available with a view to identify new opportunities to mitigate the risk of on-board fires. In parallel **NAAs should check that regulations related to smoke and fire are being complied with and will include fire as a new area in their risk portfolios.**

At industry level, **ECAST will promote best practice developed by IATA and other industry organisations** to outline mitigations to the risks associated with the carriage of Lithium batteries in passenger and crew baggage and the transport of Lithium batteries as cargo on passenger and cargo aircraft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AER6.1</td>
<td>Uncontrolled fire, smoke or fumes on-board aircraft</td>
<td>EASA to evaluate new opportunities to mitigate the risk of on-board fires</td>
<td>EASA</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>R, SP, O</td>
<td>Report on recommendations addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER6.2</td>
<td>Uncontrolled fire, smoke or fumes on-board aircraft</td>
<td>Safety issue shall be addressed by the MS on their SSPs. This will include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>SSP Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AER6.3</td>
<td>Inadequate transport of lithium batteries on-board aircraft</td>
<td>Develop industry best practice to outline mitigations to the risks associated with the carriage of Lithium batteries</td>
<td>ECAST</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Best Practice Manual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5.2 Helicopter Operations**

**Progress made during 2013**

The European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST) continuously cooperates with the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) to develop risk awareness, safety promotion and training material. The [EHEST website](http://ehest.easa.europa.eu/) contains videos addressing major helicopter specific issues like loss of control in degraded visual environment (DVE), operations in the vicinity of electric infrastructure as well as leaflets with safety considerations for helicopter pilots.
In 2013 the EHEST has finalised the layout of the Technology matrix tool. The tool allows to assess the impact of technologies on mitigating helicopter safety issues (HE1.4). Around 150 technologies in 11 categories have been identified for their capability to mitigate safety issues. In late September about 60 of these had been rated, of which 14 were highly promising and 33 were moderately promising. More technologies will be rated up to the year’s end. The status of the work progress was presented at the Avionics Europe event in Munich on 21st February 2013 and at the Safety Workshop during the Helitech Helicopter Expo in London on 24th September 2013.

**Coordination with Member States**

Action HE1.3 encourages NAAs in partnership with industry representatives, to organise Helicopter Safety events annually or every two years and to promote the EHEST materials. Among the States that provided a response 9 States have organised helicopter safety events. In the majority of cases EHEST material was promoted and distributed. Dedicated helicopters working groups/teams exist in at least 3 States in some cases also addressing general aviation issues.

**New actions**

While the commercial air transport section of the EASp is organized in six areas within which issues and actions are identified, the helicopter section is lacking a similar structure.

**Desired outcome**

*Establish priorities to focus action to mitigate safety issues affecting helicopter operations in future editions of the EASp*

**Proposed actions**

*Make a proposal to arrange the helicopter section of the EASp and seek an agreement with the Helicopter community*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HE1.5</td>
<td>Helicopter priority areas not identified in the EASp</td>
<td>EASA to make a proposal to arrange the helicopter section of the EASp and seek an agreement with the Helicopter community</td>
<td>EASA and EHEST</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Working Paper with proposal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5.3 General Aviation**

**Progress made during 2013**

EGAST develops and shares good practices and safety promotion material for the GA pilots and community in Europe. The latest material includes leaflets on issues like bird strikes and piston engine icing or a video on the human factor aspects related to landing gears. They can be found on the [EGAST website](#).

Based on data received from Member States, the Agency has already identified in 2013 the main accident categories affecting general aviation aircraft below 2250 kg in Europe (GA1.6).
The categories have been published in a dedicated section of the Annual Safety Review and will be used to start discussions with the GA community on where to focus further work on General Aviation within the EASp.

**Coordination with Member States**

Action GA1.5 encourages that national authorities play the leading role in establishing and promoting local implementation priorities and actions to prevent the risk of airspace infringement involving General Aviation. Various States reported airspace infringements involving GA in the past 5 years. 10 States have confirmed that airspace infringement involving GA is a safety concern. The EAPAIRR is being used in 5 States to identify mitigation measures. In one State a national action plan derived from the EAPAIRR has been developed and introduced in the Safety Plan. State level SPIs exist in many States to monitor the situation. More information can be found in Annex B - EASp implementation in the States 2013.

**New actions**

While the commercial air transport section of the EASp is organized in six areas within which issues and actions are identified, the general aviation section is lacking a similar structure.

**Desired outcome**

*Establish priorities to focus action to mitigate safety issues affecting general aviation operations in future editions of the EASp*

**Proposed actions**

*Make a proposal to arrange the general aviation section of the EASp and seek an agreement with the General Aviation community*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GA1.7</td>
<td>General aviation priority areas not identified in the EASp</td>
<td>EASA to make a proposal to arrange the general aviation section of the EASp and seek an agreement with the General Aviation community</td>
<td>EASA and EGAST</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Working Paper with proposal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 Emerging Issues

This section anticipates issues that are emerging or where hazards exist for the immediate or near future. Giving consideration to safety issues derived from operations or regulations that have not been fully deployed incorporates a forward looking element in the Safety Plan, thus complementing the approach illustrated in previous chapters. Developing a possible picture of the future with some of the trends that are more relevant to aviation is one of the actions captured in this section.

The nature of the issues identified in this chapter is twofold: on one hand, it addresses safety aspects of changes and trends that impact aviation; on the other hand, it copes with the introduction of new products, systems, technologies and operations for which safety regulations may need to be updated.

Actions will not only deal with uncertainties at early stages of development but also with gathering data that are lacking from operations. Gaps in safety data can be mitigated by specific research actions either to produce simulation experiments (at different scales) or by gathering operational experts input on safety issues and prioritising them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Finished action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EME3.1</td>
<td>Well balanced standardisation programme.</td>
<td>A well balanced standardisation programme based on three pillars, regulatory compliance verification, pro-active standardisation and a regulatory feedback mechanism is now established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME3.2</td>
<td>One uniform standardisation methodology for all fields of aviation.</td>
<td>One uniform standardisation process for all fields of aviation as covered by the Basic Regulation and related Implementing Rules is now developed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Progress made during 2013

This area is the forward looking element of the EASp. By looking ahead future risks can be anticipated and acted upon.

Action EME1.2 seeks to develop a possible picture of the future by establishing a foresight cell. Such cell could be used at strategic level to evaluate how risks develop with time and identify the kind of expertise needed to be prepared to face the changes. It would bring a more robust basis for this section of the EASp. An agreement has been reached with the consortium developing the ASCOS project to perform an initial test case using the FAST areas of change to develop a picture of the future. The first results are expected in 2014.

Several actions (EME1.3, EME1.4, EME1.5 and EME1.6) encompass pre-regulatory activities leading to the regulation of certain products like Remote Powered Aircraft Systems (RPAS), high-performance aircraft or sub-orbital planes and operations like powered lift pilot licensing operations.

Actions EME2.1 seeks to evaluate the effect of changes in weather hazards in aviation. A survey of all EASA Certification Specification (CS) and related Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) will be conducted in 2014. It will collect requirements...
addressing external hazards such as wind, gust, ice, hail, snow, lightning etc. as well as the certification level if mentioned. This will build out status quo knowledge and allow to identify areas which need further research or rulemaking action to adapt the CS to potential change on external hazard (weather ) threats or close gaps in the certification specifications.

A well balanced standardisation programme and a uniform standardisation methodology for all fields of aviation are now fully in place, thus closing actions EME3.1 and EME3.2. The safety improvements put in place so far should be consolidated and further developed.

Developing new competencies to implement safety management on the regulatory side has been identified as one of the emerging issues of the EASp. The SMICG has delivered guidance on the competencies required for inspectors to evaluate SMS effectiveness when they oversee organisations. The issue will be further progressed by the EASAC in 2014.

**New actions**

**Regulatory and oversight considerations**

Compliance with Airworthiness Directives (ADs) and other mandatory requirements are critical to ensuring the continued airworthiness of operational aircraft. The level of responsiveness of operators is ensured by actions already implemented by EASA like:

- Simplification and clarification of AD requirements through the use of standardised or commonly recognised wording, and
- Closer matching of ADs to the design approval holder service information (e.g. service bulletins) through the publication of guidance material (ref. *EASA Certification Memorandum CM–21.A–J-001 Issue 01 "Service Bulletins (SBs) related to Airworthiness Directives (ADs)"*),

Experience from regulatory oversight has however shown variable achievement in this regard. In fact, some European aircraft manufacturers are concerned by the level of responsiveness of operators (especially outside Europe) with regards to the implementation of mandatory requirements and the feedback provided to them.

**Desired outcome**

*This action aims to improve the level of responsiveness of operators to the implementation of mandatory requirements in order to ensure continued airworthiness.*

**Proposed actions**

1. **Provide advice to stakeholders** (e.g. design approval holders, operators, maintenance organisations) on best practice for the management of compliance with mandatory requirements to correct unsafe conditions.
2. **Conduct continued airworthiness industry seminars and meetings to promote the applicable rules and standards.**
3. **Monitor achievement through oversight** (EASA Standardisation and Industry feedback)

4. **National Authorities to encourage compliance with ADs during meetings with industry** (e.g. design approval holders, operators, maintenance organisations) on a regular basis and monitor level of responsiveness.

### New Safety Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EME3.5</td>
<td>Poor level of responsiveness to ADs</td>
<td>Provide advice to stakeholders on best practice for the management of mandatory requirements</td>
<td>EASA</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Publish acceptable means of compliance, guidance material or information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME3.6</td>
<td>Poor level of responsiveness to ADs</td>
<td>Conduct Continued Airworthiness Industry seminars and meetings to promote the applicable rules and standards</td>
<td>EASA</td>
<td>continuous</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Promote bilateral meetings with industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME3.7</td>
<td>Poor level of responsiveness to ADs</td>
<td>Monitor achievement through oversight</td>
<td>EASA + Industry</td>
<td>continuous</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Oversight report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME3.8</td>
<td>Poor level of responsiveness to ADs</td>
<td>National Authorities to encourage compliance with ADs during meetings with industry on a regular basis and monitor level of responsiveness.</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>continuous</td>
<td>SP, O</td>
<td>Report on activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EASA is changing its methodology to oversee Member States and transitioning to a new approach in which risk information will be better used to feed the oversight programme, hence paying more attention to those areas in which greater risks have been identified. The EASp is the risk portfolio for the region and can potentially support the identification of risk concerns.

**Desired outcome**

*Use European-wide risk information contained in the EASp to support oversight of Member States.*

**Proposed actions**

*EASA will study possibilities to use the risk picture provided by the EASp to support the transition to a more risk-based oversight approach.*

### New Safety Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Deliverable (Measure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EME3.9</td>
<td>EASp safety concerns not considered during programming of oversight of Member States</td>
<td>EASA will study possibilities to use the risk picture provided by the EASp to support the transition to a more risk-based oversight approach.</td>
<td>EASA</td>
<td>continuous</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Process to feed the Oversight Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7 Human Factors and Performance

A projected increase in passenger numbers over the next decade, the move towards a Single European Sky and next generation aircraft technology, together with constantly shifting political, economic and regulatory frameworks demand that the role of the human in achieving the highest possible standards of safety within the aviation industry is seen as essential.

The entire aviation system, through people, processes and performance, relies predominantly on individuals and teams for safety, efficiency and effectiveness. In practice, people are required to communicate, apply judgments and make decisions and in doing so are constantly exposed to the risk of error. Therefore, human factors and performance of individuals and organisations affect all aspects of aviation and should not be addressed in isolation.

### Completed actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Finished action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HFP1.2</td>
<td>Action plan development.</td>
<td>An action plan on human factors based on the strategy and evaluation of the results of the questionnaire of December 2009 has been developed. It is updated annually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFP1.4</td>
<td>Consideration of HF in rulemaking activities.</td>
<td>The Agency has taken into account HF in rulemaking tasks that have human factors considerations. EHFAG has reviewed the rulemaking programme for 2013 to 2016 and identified tasks that have potential HF considerations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Progress made during 2013

The entire aviation system, through people, processes and performance, relies predominantly on individuals and teams for safety, efficiency and effectiveness. Human factors and human performance are an integral part of the EASp.

In 2012 the European Human Factors Advisory Group (EHFAG) finalised a Human Factors Strategy with the intent of endorsing human factors principles across civil aviation activities. The EHFAG has started to transform some of the principles into concrete actions and developed an action plan (HFP1.2) that will be reviewed and updated annually.

In addition, during 2013 the rulemaking programme 2013-2016 has been reviewed in order to identify where rulemaking tasks may need to consider human factor issues (HFP1.4). The 2014-2017 iteration of the rulemaking programme will also be reviewed.

The identification of gaps to address design related pilot error and make recommendation to update AMC for CS 25.130 - Installed Systems for use by flight crews has started while work continues to develop human factor competences for the various functions of regulators, starting with maintenance inspectors (HFP1.6)
Eurocontrol’s Safety Team provides support to ANSPs in the deployment of ATM human factors activities (HFP1.3). To that end a work programme has been approved that covers the following strands of work:

- Weak Signals;
- Human Factors in safe ATM Design;
- Human Factors intelligence for all safety actors and all layers of management;
- Human Performance safety culture improvements;
- Safety Human Performance Dissemination and Toolkits;
- Fatigue management;
- Human Factors in Investigation;
- Degraded Modes;
- Critical Incident Stress Management;
- Safety and Team Work Factors.

Among the actions that the Eurocontrol Safety Team has finished we find: the safety culture discussion cards, a paper on safety intelligence, development of an advanced course in human factors for safety actors, review of the occurrence investigator course and a white paper introducing a new safety concept.
# Acronyms and Definitions

## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AER</td>
<td>Aeroplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANS</td>
<td>Air Navigation Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSP</td>
<td>Air Navigation Service Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Authority Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AST</td>
<td>Annual Summary Template</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>Air Traffic Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAST</td>
<td>Commercial Aviation Safety Team (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Commercial Air Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Competence Based Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFIT</td>
<td>Controlled Flight Into Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Continuous Monitoring Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>Commercial Pilot License</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVE</td>
<td>Degraded Visual Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAA</td>
<td>European Aviation Safety Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASp</td>
<td>European Aviation Safety Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASP</td>
<td>European Aviation Safety Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBT</td>
<td>Evidence Based Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAC</td>
<td>European Civil Aviation Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAST</td>
<td>European Commercial Aviation Safety Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECR</td>
<td>European Central Repository</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFB</td>
<td>Electronic Flight Bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGAST</td>
<td>European General Aviation Safety Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHEST</td>
<td>European Helicopter Safety Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHFAG</td>
<td>European Human Factors Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP+</td>
<td>European Safety Programme for ATM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSI</td>
<td>European Strategic Safety Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVS</td>
<td>Enhanced Vision System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCL</td>
<td>Flight Crew Licensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDM</td>
<td>Flight Data Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSTD</td>
<td>Flight Simulator Training Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>General Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRSS</td>
<td>Global Runway Safety Symposium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFP</td>
<td>Human Factors and Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IATA</td>
<td>International Air Transport Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICATEE</td>
<td>International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGPT</td>
<td>Internal Group on Personnel Training of EASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>Instrumental Meteorological Conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Instrument Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOI</td>
<td>Level Of Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mid-air Collision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAA</td>
<td>National Aviation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>Non-Commercial operations with Complex motor-powered aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commercial operations with Other-than-complex motor-powered aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NextGen</td>
<td>Next Generation Air Transportation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGAP</td>
<td>Next Generation of Aviation Professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NoA</td>
<td>Network of Analysts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Supervisory Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Organisation Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>Operational Suitability Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPL</td>
<td>Private Pilot License</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRB</td>
<td>Performance Review Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC-I</td>
<td>Loss of Control In Flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Rulemaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAT</td>
<td>Risk Analysis Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Runway Excursions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPAS</td>
<td>Remotely Piloted Air System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRS</td>
<td>Regional Runway Safety Symposium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>Single European Sky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESAR</td>
<td>Single European Sky ATM Research Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>Super-cooled Large Droplets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMICG</td>
<td>Safety Management International Collaboration Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Safety Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Safety Assurance and Promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPI</td>
<td>Safety Performance Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>State Safety Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAWS</td>
<td>Terrain Awareness Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLJ</td>
<td>Very Light Jets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPR</td>
<td>Upset Prevention and Recovery Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URT</td>
<td>Upset Recovery Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Definitions

Aerial Work
Aerial Work is an aircraft operation in which an aircraft is used for specialised services such as agriculture, construction, photography, surveying, observation and patrol, search and rescue or aerial advertisement.

Aeronautical Information Publication
An Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) is a publication issued by or with the authority of a State and containing aeronautical information of a lasting character essential to air navigation.

Airborne safety nets
Airborne Safety nets provide alerts and resolution advisories directly to the pilots. Warning times are generally short, up to 40 seconds. Pilots are expected to immediately take appropriate avoiding action.

Airspace infringement
Airspace infringement occurs when an aircraft penetrates an area into which special clearance is required without having such clearance.

Commercial Air Transport
Commercial air transport operations involve the transportation of passengers, cargo and mail for remuneration or hire.

Controlled Flight Into Terrain
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) occurs when an airworthy aircraft under the complete control of the pilot is inadvertently flown into terrain, water, or an obstacle. The pilots are generally unaware of the danger until it is too late.

European Aviation Safety Programme
European regional approach to the ICAO requirements of State Safety Programmes. It contains an integrated set of regulations and activities to improve safety within EASA Member States. It is published as a Commission Staff Working Paper\(^6\) developed jointly by the European Commission and the Agency. The latest version is available at www.easa.europa.eu/sms.

General Aviation
General Aviation means all civil aviation operations other than commercial air transport or an aerial work operation.

Ground-based safety nets
Ground-based safety nets are an integral part of the ATM system. Using primarily ATS surveillance data, they provide warning times of up to two minutes. Upon receiving an alert, air traffic controllers are expected to immediately assess the situation and take appropriate action.

Ice crystal icing conditions
Ice crystal icing condition exists when all of the liquid water particles in the cloud have frozen into ice particles and may be encountered in high concentrations at higher altitudes in the area of convective weather systems.

Non-precision approach
A non-precision approach is an instrument approach and landing which utilises lateral guidance but does not utilise vertical guidance. (ICAO Annex 6) For pilots of older aircraft, in which use of automated systems to assist in flying the approach is limited, a high degree of piloting skill is required to fly such approaches accurately and the frequent practice which many pilots need to achieve this can be difficult to come by if precision approaches are the normal method used.

Mid-air collision
A Mid-Air Collision (MAC) is an accident where two aircraft come into contact with each other while both are in flight.

Mixed phase icing conditions
Mixed phase icing conditions occur when supercooled liquid water droplets and ice particles coexist in a cloud, often around the outskirts of a deep convective cloud formation.

Loss of separation
Loss of separation between aircraft occurs whenever specified separation minima are breached. Minimum separation standards for airspace are specified by ATS authorities, based on ICAO standards.

Level bust
A level bust occurs when an aircraft fails to fly at the level to which it has been cleared, regardless of whether actual loss of separation from other aircraft or the ground results. Level busts are also known as Altitude Deviations.

Local Runway Safety Team
Local Runway Safety Teams (LRSTs) are aerodrome centric, multi-organisational groups of experts providing practical suggestions to resolve runway incursion causal factors. More than 100 LRSTs have been established at European airports, as a consequence of which, the safety of runway operations has increased although incidents continue to be reported.

Loss of Control In Flight
Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved.

Occurrences
Operational interruptions, defects faults, or other irregular circumstances that have or might have influenced flight safety and that have not resulted in an accident or serious incident.

Runway Excursion
According to the definition provided by ICAO, a runway excursion is a veer off or overrun off the runway surface. Runway excursion events can happen on takeoff or landing.

Runway Incursion
A runway Incursion is defined as "any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft". (ICAO Doc 4444 - PANS-ATM)

Safety Management System
A Safety Management System (SMS) is a systematic approach to manage safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures (ICAO). ICAO through various Annexes to the Chicago Convention has incorporated requirements for service providers in various domains of aviation to have an SMS.

Space weather
Space Weather is the travel of solar and galactic radiation and their interaction with the Earth magnetosphere and ionosphere. It is a cyclic phenomenon.

State Safety Programme
According to the ICAO definition it is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety. ICAO requires contracting States to implement SSPs.
Working Groups

EAFDM
EASA and NAAs have formed a group of experts called the European Authorities Coordination Group on FDM (EAFDM). It is a voluntary and independent safety initiative with the following objectives:

a. contribute to improving the implementation of FDM programmes and to making FDM programmes more safety effective,
b. contribute to EASA objective of a high and uniform level of safety in Europe,
c. contribute to a better overview of air transport operational safety in Europe for EASA and NAAs.

Among the topics covered by EAFDM are:
- Development of national FDM forums,
- Oversight of FDM programs by NAAs,
- FDM-based indicators.

Web Link

EASAC
The European Aviation Safety Advisory Committee (EASAC) was established by the Executive Director of the Agency in October of 2009. The main objective of the Committee is to advise on a European Aviation Safety Strategy and propose a European Aviation Safety Programme and Plan. The first Plan is the present document, endorsed by the Committee.

The EASAC is chaired by the Executive Director of the Agency and composed of safety experts’ ad persona from Member States, the European Commission, Eurocontrol, the PRB, Industry and EASA. The Committee reports regularly to the EASA Management Board.

Web Link

EARPG
The European Aviation Research Partnership Group (EARPG) prepares proposals and suggests priorities for research topics to be funded by relevant sources available. Identification of research needs is based on: certification experts’ experience, evidence of accumulation of safety related concerns resulting from safety analysis of incident and accident databases, Safety Recommendations stemming from incident and accident investigations and proposals by the European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI) and its safety teams ECAST, EGAST, EHEST.

The research results are expected to lead to recommendations and improvements of safety or environmental protection through changes to requirements, compliance and guidance material.

The EARPG membership consists of the Agency’s research focal points, EASA Member States with an interest in research, the European Commission and Eurocontrol. It shares information with authorities from Non-EASA Member States, particularly the FAA and Transport Canada, on on-going research and where appropriate, co-ordinates future research activities. The group interfaces with Industry and Research Institutions on a regular basis through workshops.

Web Link

ECAST
The European Commercial Aviation Safety Team (ECAST) is a component of European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI). ECAST addresses large fixed wing aircraft operations, and aims to further enhance commercial aviation safety in Europe, and for European citizen worldwide. It was launched in October 2006.

ECAST is a partnership between EASA, other European regulators and the aviation industry. ESSI is based on the principle that industry can complement regulatory action by voluntary committing to cost effective safety enhancements. ECAST cooperates with CAST and with other major safety initiatives worldwide, in particular under the Cooperative Development of Operational Safety and Continuing Airworthiness Programme (COSCAP).

Web Link

EGAST
European General Aviation Safety Team (EGAST) is a component of European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI). General Aviation (GA) is a high priority for EASA. EGAST creates a forum for sharing best practices, improving data sources, and promoting safety.

EGAST’s mission is to promote and initiate for all sectors of General Aviation best practices and awareness in order to improve safety, thereby reducing the accident rates. The team may make non binding recommendations. EGAST will help EASA and the industry focus their resources
on combined safety promotion efforts to reach the goal of reducing accidents.

**EHEST**

Launched on November 2006, the **European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST)** brings together manufacturers, operators, research organisations, regulators, accident investigators and a few military operators from across Europe. EHEST is the helicopter branch of the ESSI, and also the European component of the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST).

EHEST is committed to the goal of reducing the helicopter accident rate by 80 percent by 2016 worldwide, with emphasis on improving European safety.

**EHFAG**

The **European Human Factors Advisory Group (EHFAG)** is an existing body of human factors expertise drawn from national Aviation Authorities (including the FAA), industry, professional associations and research organisations. This group continues to provide human factors advice and support to EASA and to deliver actions in support of the European Human Factors Strategy.

**ESSI**

The **European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI)** is an aviation safety partnership between EASA, other regulators and the industry. ESSI’s objective is to further enhance safety for citizens in Europe and worldwide through safety analysis, implementation of cost effective action plans, and coordination with other safety initiatives worldwide. ESSI was launched in June 2006 by EASA as a ten year programme and has three pillars: ECAST, EHEST and EGAST.

**IGPT**

The Agency’s **Internal Group on Personnel Training (IGPT)** has been set-up by the Agency to follow-up the EASA International Conference on Pilot Training of 29 Nov 2009. Its first meeting took place on 27 Jan 2010. Building on proven internal expertise and competences, the IGPT bridges Design, Certification, Training, and Operations by creating a forum to address training within the Agency and deliver the official Agency’s position on the subject. The IGPT is composed of experts from all operational Directorates and adopts a total system approach in training based on the three pillars Rulemaking, Oversight and Safety Promotion. The IGPT addresses all types of training and checking for all types of personnel and operations. Regarding pilot training, this includes flight and type rating training, including both ab initio and recurrent elements, all categories of aircraft, all types of operations, and pilots with different backgrounds (e.g. those trained on highly automated glass cockpits aircraft and those pilots trained on older generation conventional aircraft).

**NoA**

The European Aviation Safety Agency has recently established a **Network of Analysts (NoA)** to provide a formal process to analyse safety data at a European level. The membership of the NoA is drawn from the National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) and Investigation Authorities of all EASA Member States.

The NoA focuses on:

- understanding what barriers exist to the provision of the best possible safety data and developing ways to improve safety data across Europe;
- agreeing the classification of aircraft accidents in EASA MS;
- carrying out analysis of safety data to support the European Aviation Safety Plan (EASp) and State Safety Plans, as well as identifying emerging issues for possible inclusion in the future;
- sharing experiences, good practice and developing safety analysis projects across Europe to enable the European aviation community to exploit the ECCAIRS European Central Repository for the benefit of all and
- providing analysis support to existing EASA groups such as the European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI) and the European Human Factors Advisory Group (EHFAG).
PRB
On 29 July 2010, the EC adopted a Decision designating Eurocontrol acting through its Performance Review Commission (PRC) supported by the Performance Review Unit (PRU) as the **Performance Review Body (PRB)** until 30 June 2015. The Eurocontrol Organisation accepted to be designated as PRB on 15 September 2010.

Web Link

SM ICG
The **SMS International Collaboration Group (ICG)** created in Feb 2009 is a collaboration activity between aviation authorities in order to promote a common understanding of SMS principles and requirements in different countries, share lessons learned and encourage progress and harmonisation. The ICG consists of a core group and a participant group. The core group is comprised of authorities with resources and expertise for product development. It includes members from the FAA, EASA (supported by FOCA of Switzerland, the DGAC of France, AESA Spain, the CAA of the Netherlands and UK CAA), TCCA, CASA of Australia, JCAB of Japan, CAA of New Zealand and ANAC of Brazil. The participant group tests and reviews the core group’s work products and resources.

Web Link