



Fatigue Management within VAA


Ellie Powell, Flight Safety Manager

Safety & Security Plan, Key Objective 2014-2016


*“Develop a corporate Fatigue Risk Management program to support EASA Flight Time Limitations and provide a risk mitigation process for issues arising from **crew** fatigue”*



EASA Transition – FRM & FTL Project Governance



Background



Supporting data



FAIL

virgin atlantic
Air Safety Report/Observation
(submit an incident)

1. DATE OF OCCURRENCE
2. TIME OF OCCURRENCE
3. FLIGHT NO.
4. REGISTRATION NO.
5. ROUTE
6. TYPE OF FLIGHT
7. CAPTAIN
8. FIRST OFFICER
9. OTHER CREW
10. OTHER INFORMATION & SUGGESTIONS FOR PREVENTION

Please complete and sign box 11 on the reverse



Case Study – Trip Pairing A

- Trip involving two consecutive night flights
- Fatigue Observation Forms received indicating the following causal factors:
 - ✓ The inability to achieve adequate pre-flight rest (afternoon nap) outbound from the UK
 - ✓ The inability to achieve adequate rest (7 hours) whilst down-route
 - ✓ Cumulative tiredness following a previous duty



Case Study – Trip Pairing A cont'd

The following soft rules were introduced following a Fatigue Working Group Review of this trip pairing with all known information:

- ✓ 7 day separation rule
- ✓ 7 day separation rule for two similar pairings
- ✓ Local night off following a late simulator – pilot only
- ✓ Restriction on the no. of trips within a rolling period




Fatigue Working Group

- Identified that without additional data unable to make further recommendations
- Agreed to conduct a Top of Descent Fatigue Survey in order to obtain more data and to benchmark



Top of Descent Fatigue Survey

- Flight Crew: received @ 3500 reports
- Cabin Crew: received @ 6800 reports



Analysis

- Time of report and duration of duty are the most significant factors
- Findings mirrored the existing Maximum FDP theories, though not always the scientific modelling
- Pairings of flights impacted overall perception of tiredness
- Availability of crew rest facilities an important factor



Results


Trip A

- ASR data over past two months indicated a no. of errors where flight crew have cited fatigue as a contributing factor
- 6% of flight crew sickness are associated with Trips A and B.
- Decision made to stop trip pairing A/E & B for pilots.

Require further supporting data for the determination of action necessary for other trip pairings.



Risk Management



Going forward



Lessons Learnt

- Start communication and training early
- Consider the differences between Flight/Cabin Crew
- Develop a robust Fatigue Management approach



Questions?



Thank You