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The European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment L'Organisation Européenne pour l'Equipement de l'Aviation Civile

# 3 MINIMUM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 4 STANDARD FOR ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAG (EFB) 5 **APPLICATION APPROVAL** 6 7 This document is the exclusive intellectual and commercial property of EUROCAE. It is presently commercialised by EUROCAE. 8 9 This electronic copy is delivered to your company/organisation for internal use exclusively. In no case it may be re-sold, or hired, lent or exchanged outside your company. 10 11 12

# 13 <u>ED-273</u>

14 [December 2019]

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10	MINIMUM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE
20	STANDARD FOR ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAG (EFB)
21	APPLICATION APPROVAL

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PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION OF EASA NPA FOR CS-ETSO AMENDMENT 17 THAT PROPOSES THE NEW ETSO-2C521.

30		FOREWORD
31		
32 33	1.	This document was prepared by EUROCAE Working Group 106 "Electronic Flight Bag (EFB)" and was approved by the Council of EUROCAE on [Day Month Year].
34 35 36 37 38	2.	EUROCAE is an international non-profit making organisation in Europe. Membership is open to manufacturers and users of equipment for aeronautics, trade associations, national civil aviation administrations, and, under certain conditions, non-European organisations. Its work programme is principally directed to the preparation of performance specifications and guidance documents for civil aviation equipment, for adoption and use at European and world-wide levels.
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65 66	enhanced situation awareness for pilots.
67 68 69 70 71	The growth of EFB has helped airlines achieve important operational and safety goals, and has been a strong contributor to the global aviation initiative to leverage innovation for the next century of air travel. At the same time, the increased scope and usage of EFB makes it more difficult and complex for national aviation authorities to efficiently evaluate and approve for the use in operations of EFB applications.
72 73 74 75	This document is a EUROCAE industry standard that provides a modern and systematic means to address the design, development, evaluation and validation of EFB applications and functions, proportionally to the safety risk of their intended use in flight operations.
76 77 78	This standard is applicable to EFB application suppliers. It was initially developed to support the approval of EFB applications by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
79	This standard provides MOPS for the following aspects of EFB application:
80 81 82 83 84 85 85 86 87	<ul> <li>Determination of whether emerging functions are suitable for EFB,</li> <li>Operational Risk Assessment,</li> <li>Human Machine Interface,</li> <li>Development Assurance,</li> <li>Databases,</li> <li>Security,</li> <li>Operational and installation data.</li> </ul>
88 89 90	The standard provides also additional MOPS applicable to specific EFB functions, existing at the time of development of this document.
91 92 93 94	This standard does not replace the requirements and/or conditions applicable to operators to obtain an operational approval or authorisation by their national aviation authorities for the usage of EFB applications. These requirements and/or conditions are provided by the operational regulations and/or policies established by the national aviation authorities.
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# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The rapid development of Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) and their widespread adoption over recent

years has made them a very common and important tool for flight operation. Not only has EFB replaced paper in most cockpits, it has provided many functions that increase flight operational effectiveness and

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# CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

# 191 **1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

192 This document is an industry standard applicable to EFB application suppliers. It provides MOPS for the 193 design, development, evaluation and validation of EFB applications and functions.

194 The MOPS include requirements, recommended practices and guidelines.

195 The MOPS are proportionate to the safety risk of the intended use of the EFB functions in flight 196 operations.

197

An Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) is an electronic information system, comprised of equipment and applications for flight crew, which allows for the storing, updating, displaying and processing of EFB functions to support flight operations or duties.

EFBs were initially introduced in the cockpits to supplement and/or replace conventional paper products traditionally carried in the pilot's flight bag, such as airport and navigation charts, aircraft performance and weight and balance charts or flight operational manuals.

The usage of EFBs also includes functions intended to increase the flight operational effectiveness and

enhance the pilot situation awareness. Examples of those functions include electronic airport and en route moving maps, in-flight weather function...

This continuous trend makes it more difficult for national aviation authorities to evaluate whether these 207 new functions and applications, which are typically hosted on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 208 hardware and operating system, can be safely used in operation. This evaluation proved to be 209 particularly complex for candidate EFB functions similar to functions hosted in the aircraft certified 210 avionics (e.g. presentation of the aircraft position on a moving map) and that generate a safety risk if 211 not properly used by the flight crew. National aviation authorities may not have the resources and the 212 expertise needed for this assessment, which create delays and hurdles for the introduction of these 213 innovative functions in flight operations. 214

- To address this challenge, EUROCAE created the Work Group 106 and invited its members to develop an industry standard specifically applicable to EFB applications. The standard had to be structured and formatted in order to be used as a basis for the approval of EFB application software (and its associated
- 218 installation and operating data) by an authority.

The scope of the work given to the WG-106 was to develop a standard adapted for EFB applications that unambiguously define the perimeter of EFB functions without preventing future innovation in that domain. The standard should also not contradict existing guidance such as that contained in the European regulation or in the ICAO EFB Manual Doc 10020 but could implement objectives to achieve completeness. The WG-106 verified also consistency of its work with other EFB policies such as the FAA AC 120-76.

The WG-106 was composed of EFB application suppliers, aircraft manufacturers, equipment suppliers, operators, regulators, authorities and association representatives. This panel of participants covered a large spectrum of the stakeholders involved in the EFB eco-system and ensured that the standard is

- 228 adapted to the needs.
- 229
- 230 This industry standard address the following general EFB aspects:
- 231

# 232 Determination of whether emerging functions are suitable for EFB:

The standard provides a clear and systematic process for determining whether a given function is authorized on an EFB or not. This process is consistent with the definitions and principles of the EFB regulatory materials and relies on the conclusive completion of an operational risk assessment. This process is simple and streamlined for the EFB functions already authorized by the EFB regulatory materials at the time of writing this standard. This process could be applied onto any kind of emerging functions proposed to be hosted on an EFB.

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# 240 Operational Risk Assessment:

241 The standard provides an operational risk assessment process developed on the model of the "bowtie" 242 method. This process addresses an issue that has been existing since the onset of the EFB regulations. By the current regulatory definition, EFB includes functions with failure effect no greater than minor after 243 244 considerations of the operational/procedural mitigation means (typically pilot procedures and training). 245 Though, it is recognized that some EFB functions, such as the takeoff and landing performance 246 calculations, may have a failure effect greater than minor, for instance in case of a misleading calculation 247 error that is not detected by the flight crew by the operational/procedural mitigations. To resolve this 248 issue, the process uses the concept of residual risk and defines it as the risk associated to hazard which 249 may contribute after application of the operational/procedural mitigation to a severity effect more than minor. The existence of residual risk or not for a given function has been applied throughout the standard 250 251 in order to ensure for the proportionality of the requirements to the criticality of the function. Application 252 hosting function(s) without residual risk have to comply with the minimum set of requirements. Application hosting function(s) with residual risk have to apply additional requirements in order to provide 253 254 assurance that the contributors to the hazard are prevented to an acceptable level.

255

# 256 <u>Human Machine Interfaces:</u>

The standard provides considerations for the design of the Human Machine Interface (HMI) of EFB applications. These considerations have been developed using the HMI provisions of the EFB regulatory materials as well as additional best industry practices. A human factors assessment of the HMI is required when HMI aspects are identified as a contributor to a residual risk. The standard specifies the characteristics of the protocol of a human factor's assessment.

262

# 263 <u>Development Assurance:</u>

The standard provides development assurance considerations for the development of the EFB software 264 application. These development assurance considerations have been defined using existing industry 265 standard and best practices that have been fully reviewed and adapted for use in the context of EFB 266 application software development. These considerations are applicable to the various software 267 development methods (e.g. classic waterfall method, agile method). The applicant has to apply the 268 adequate assurance level proportionate to the risk associated with the use of its EFB application. The 269 270 terminology "Function Qualification Level" (FQL) is used to define the selected level of assurance. Two FQL levels are defined: Low and High. The FQL Low development process objectives are applied for 271 272 all EFB application. The additional FQL High development process objectives are applied when EFB software application errors are identified as contributor to a residual risk by the risk assessment. 273

- 274
- 275 <u>Databases:</u>

The standard provides considerations for addressing databases used by EFB applications and stored on the EFB host platform. In addition to proposing two levels of considerations depending whether the database contributes to a residual risk or not, the standard also provides considerations adapted to whether the database is approved or not with the application. It will be up to the applicant to make this decision to approve database(s) with the application or not.

282 Security:

The standard provides considerations for addressing the security threats. A minimum set of security measures has been developed based on existing best industry practices. This minimum set is applicable to all EFB applications. A comprehensive security assessment process specifically defined for EFB applications is also provided and must be applied in case of residual risk identified for EFB function(s).

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281

288 Operational and installation data:

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The standard defines the operational and installation data to be provided by the EFB application supplier to the operators for the integration of the application into their operations. The objective is to ensure that the EFB application supplier provide the adequate set of data for ensuring the proper installation, administration, use and maintenance of the application by the operators.

293

#### 294 Specific considerations:

The standard provides also additional considerations applicable to specific existing EFB functions. These additional considerations complements the general considerations. The EFB functions specifically addressed in this document are the aircraft performance and weight and balance calculation function, the airport moving maps (AMM) function, the weather function, the functions displaying the aircraft position on maps or charts, the electronic checklist function and the electronic signature function. The other existing EFB functions are considered as not deserving specific considerations i.e. that the general considerations are deemed sufficient.

Additional specific considerations may be needed for new, emerging functions that were not in-service at the time of the development of this standard. If this is the case, these additional specific considerations would be identified and discussed during the development, evaluation or approval of these new, emerging functions.

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# 307 1.2 DOCUMENT STRUCTURE

308 The document structure is as follows:

- Chapter 1 introduces the standard and provides its intended use, the stakeholders, the definitions, acronyms and reference documents.
  - Chapter 2 contains general considerations applicable to all EFB applications.
  - Chapter 3 contains additional specific considerations applicable to specific EFB functions.
  - Chapter 4 defines the relevant operational and installation data to be provided to the operator(s) for integration of the EFB application into their operations.
    - Appendixes provide additional information to facilitate the use of this standard, such as guidance, templates, and examples.

# 318 1.3 USE OF THE STANDARD

This standard is applicable to EFB application suppliers. The standard has been developed to support the approval of EFB applications by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) using the certification procedures and specification as established by EASA.

322 323

# 1.4 WORDING RULES OF THE STANDARD

324 The following convention is used to graduate the different level of requirements defined in the document.

#### 325 1.4.1 Requirements

326 A requirement indicates a mandated criterion; i.e. compliance with the particular procedure or 327 specification is mandatory and no alternative may be applied.

- 328
- 329 The following verbal forms are used to express requirement:
- 330

Intent	Basic Form	Equivalent expression
Requirement	Shall	is to is required to
		it is required that

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	has to… only … is allowed must
Shall not	is not allowed is required to be not is required that be not is not to be must not

#### 332 **1.4.2** Recommendations

A recommendation indicates a means of compliance as the preferred option to comply with a requirement, alternative means of compliance may be applied, provided that the applicant can provide information or data to adequately support and justify the alternative.

336

337 The following verbal forms are used to express recommendation:

338

Intent	Basic Form	Equivalent expression
Recommendation	Should	it is recommended that ought to
	Should not	it is recommended that not ought not to

339

#### 340 **1.4.3** Guidance materials

341 Requirements and recommendations may be completed by additional guidance to help the applicant to

342 comply with a requirement or a recommended means of compliance.

343

344 The following verbal forms are used to express guidance:

345

Intent		Basic Form	Equivalent expression
Guidance		May	is permitted
	need not Can Cannot	-	it is allowed
		need not	it is not required that
			no is required
		Can	to be able to
			to be in a position to
			it is possible to…
		Cannot	to be unable to
			to not be in a position to
			there is no possibility of
			it is impossible to…

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#### 347 **1.5 STAKEHOLDERS**

- 348 The following stakeholders are referred in the document.
- 349 *Applicant*: The EFB application supplier applying to demonstrate compliance with this standard.
- 350 **Operator**: The organization that will integrate the EFB application in its operations.
- 351 *Flight Crew*: The pilot or any flight crew member that will use the EFB application.
- 352 *Authority*: Any agency verifying the compliance to the standard.
- 353

# 354 **1.6 DEFINITIONS**

- 355 *Airport moving map display*: A software application that displays an airport map on a display device 356 and uses data from a navigation source to depict the aircraft current position on this map while the 357 aircraft is on the ground.
- 358 *Approval of an EFB application*: The application has been recognized compliant by the competent 359 authority to the requirements defined by this standard.
- 360 **Authoritative source**: A State authority or an organization formally recognized by the State authority 361 to originate and/or publish data which meets the data quality requirements (DQRs) as specified by that 362 State;
- 363 *Checklist* includes
- Checklist i.e. a means to ensure that some actions of a procedures have been completed ("read and check") and
- Procedure i.e. a means to ensure a logical progression of actions, decisions, or both in a sequence which is prescribed to achieve a specified objective ("read and do").
- 368 **Coding Standards**: Guidelines and recommendations to establish secure code best practices as well 369 as stylistic preferences and conventions. Coding standards are specific to a programming language.
- 370 *Code Review*: A process by which someone reviews source code authored by someone else to ensure
   371 it conforms to the company's coding standards and all applicable specifications (e.g. functional,
   372 architecture, design). A code review differs from static analysis insofar as it relies on people instead of
- 373 software tools. Because code reviews are intrinsic to collaborative software development methodologies
   374 -- e.g. Extreme Programming (XP) -- additional code reviews can be optional.
- 375 Configuration baseline: A defined and recorded configuration of one or more configuration items, that
   376 thereafter serves as the basis for further development, and that is changed only through change control
   377 procedures.
- 378 **Configuration item**: One or more development data treated as a unit item for the configuration 379 management purposes.
- 380 **Database**: One or more files of data structured to enable data to be extracted from the files and for them 381 to be updated. This primarily refers to data stored electronically and accessed by computer rather than 382 in files of physical records.
- Note: This definition does not include Data Base Managements Systems (DBMS) which are considered
   external services.
- 385 **Data Quality Requirement:** The specification of the characteristics of data (i.e. accuracy, resolution, 386 integrity (or equivalent assurance level), traceability, timeliness, completeness, and format) to ensure 387 that the data is compatible with its intended use.
- 388 **Development data:** All the data used for or produced during the EFB application development process.
- 389 *Development environment*: Encompasses all means used to develop the EFB application (framework, tools, compiler, etc.).
- 391 *Distribution information*: Includes guidelines and steps for the operator to ensure that the EFB 392 application and associated databases are delivered in the EFB host platform.
- 393 *EFB Application:* A software application installed on an EFB host platform that contains at least one
   394 EFB function.

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- 395 *EFB function:* A software function intended to be used by the flight crew to support their flight operations
   396 tasks and duties.
- 397 *EFB host platform:* The hardware equipment in which the computing capabilities and basic software
   398 reside, including the operating system and the input/output software.
- 399 *EFB system:* The hardware equipment (including any battery, connectivity provisions, input/output 400 components) and software (including databases and the operating system) needed to support the 401 intended EFB application(s).
- 402 *Electronic checklist:* An EFB application which displays checklists to the flight crew by means of a display.
- 404 *Electronic flight bag*: An electronic information system, comprised of equipment and applications for
- flight crew, which allows for the storing, updating, displaying and processing of EFB functions to support
   flight operations or duties.
- 407 *Electronic signature:* The electronic means used a primary means for acceptance or for confirmation
   408 of authority.
- 409 *Hardening:* Process of securing a system by reducing its surface vulnerability.
- 410 *Human Factors:* Is the disciple of studying how a system is compatible for a human to use.
- 411 *Human Factor's Assessment:* An evaluation of an application aimed at identifying shortcomings that 412 may lead to human performance issues (such as errors or workload issues).
- 413 Human-machine interface: A component of certain devices that is capable of handling human-
- 414 machine interactions. The interface consists of hardware and software that allow user inputs to be
- interpreted and processed by machines or systems that, in turn, provide the required results to the user.
- Installation Guidelines: includes all information for the operator to ensure that EFB application is
   installed in the EFB host platform.
- 418 *Minor safety effect:* Conditions which would not significantly reduce aircraft safety, and which involve
- 419 crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor safety effect may include, for example, a slight
- reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew workload, such as routine
   flight plan changes, or some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew.
- 422 *Miscellaneous (non-EFB) function*: Functions that are part of the EFB application and that are not directly related to the tasks performed by the flight crew in the aircraft.
- 424 *Mitigations means*: Means that mitigate the severity of the consequences of a hazard.
- 425 Night mode: Night mode (or dark mode) is a software feature that makes the user interface darker. It generally changes light backgrounds to a dark color and changes text from dark to light color. Dark or night mode is not necessarily a simple color inversion of the light mode, but the palette can be adapted
- 428 to retain the significance of some colors such as for example red, amber, blue.
- 429 No safety effect: A condition which would have no effect on safety: For example conditions which would
   430 not affect the operational capability of the airplane or increase crew workload.
- 431 **Operational requirements:** Requirements which define the EFB function and its intended use.
- 432 **Parameter data items:** A set of data that, when in the form of a Parameter Data Item File, influence the
- 433 behavior of the software without modifying the Executable Object Code and that is managed as a 434 separate configuration item.
- 435 *Prevention means:* Means that prevent the occurrence of a hazard or reduce its likelihood to an acceptable level.
- 437 *Refutation:* Acts as an independent set of assurance activities beyond analysis and requirements. As
- 438 an alternative to exhaustive testing, refutation can be used to provide evidence that an unwanted
- 439 behavior has been precluded to an acceptable level of confidence. Refutation is also known as Security440 Evaluation in some contexts.
- 441 *Release:* An official version of an EFB application delivered for operational use.
- 442 *Residual risk:* Risk associated to hazard which may contribute after operational/procedural mitigation
- 443 to a severity effect more than minor.

- 444 Security Measure: Used to mitigate or prevent a threat condition. Security measures may be features,
   445 functions, or procedures, both on-board and off-board. Security measures can be technical, operational,
   446 or process oriented.
- 447 **Software requirement:** Part of the specification of an EFB function. These requirements are the ones 448 used by the software developers to implement the function.
- 449 **Software Security Asset:** The logical and physical resources of the EFB application which contribute 450 to the application operation, including but not limited to functions, software, interfaces, data flows and 451 data.
- 452 **Static Code Analysis:** Tool-driven analysis of source or object code to detect possible security 453 vulnerabilities and to ensure adherence to industry standards and general code quality.
- **Supported Operational Environment:** The EFB Host Platform(s) and software environment where the function may be implemented and the additional resources which may be required for the use of the function. For instance, additional resources for the use of a function may be input devices, external or internal sensors such as: GNSS, interfaces to A/C systems, remote display, keyboard. The supported operational environment corresponds to the minimum configurations for which the performance and integrity of the function is guaranteed by the applicant.
- 460 *Taxi Route:* In the context of an airport moving map function, the term "taxi route" refers to any sequence
- 460 **Fax Route:** In the context of an aliport moving map function, the term tax route refers to any sequence
   461 of taxiway and/or runway fixes (e.g., "turn left at Echo") that are interconnected and depict the desired
   462 taxi path.
- 463 *Third Party Software:* Software that would be used by an application provider as part of their application. Additionally, this would include commercial off the shelf (COTS) items.
- 465 *Threat:* A potential for violation of security, which exists when there is an entity, circumstance, capability,
   466 action, or event that could cause harm.
- 467 *Validation*: The determination that the requirements for a product are correct and complete. [Are we building the right function/data?]
- 469 *Verification:* The evaluation of an implementation of requirements to determine that they have been470 met. [Did we build the function/data right?]
- 471 *Vulnerability:* Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or 472 implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source.
- 473

# 474 **1.7 ACRONYMS**

- 475 AMMD: Airport Moving Map Display
- 476 AMDB: Airport Map Data Base
- 477 **DQR**: Data Quality Requirements
- 478 **EASA**: European union Aviation Safety Agency
- 479 **ECL**: Electronic Checklist
- 480 **EFB**: Electronic Flight Bag
- 481 **FQL**: Function Qualification Level
- 482 GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite System
- 483 HMI: Human Machine Interface
- 484 **SSA**: Software Security Asset
- 485 486

# 1.8 REFERENCES

- 487 *ICAO Doc 10020* EFB Manual
- 488 FAA AC 120-76() Authorization for Use of Electronic Flight Bags
- 489 (EU) No 965/2012 Air operations regulation
- 490 EUROCAE ED-76() Standard for processing aeronautical data

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- 491 **EUROCAE ED-99()** User Requirements for Aerodrome Mapping Information
- 492 **RTCA DO-257()** Minimum Operational Performance Standards for the Depiction of Navigational
- 493 Information on Electronic Maps



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#### **CHAPTER 2 GENERAL MINIMUM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE** 495 STANDARD 496

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499

498 This chapter includes the requirements applicable to all EFB applications and functions.

#### 2.1 **EFB APPLICATIONS AND FUNCTIONS** 500

501 This section addresses the determination of whether a function can be defined as an EFB function. This 502 determination is exclusively process-based. If this determination is not conclusive, the function cannot be hosted on an EFB and should be considered to be hosted on an airworthiness approved platform. 503

504

All functions of the application intended to be approved shall be demonstrated as EFB functions in 505 506 accordance with the process specified in §2.2

507

#### 2.2 **EFB FUNCTIONS ELIGIBILITY** 508

The process presented in this chapter aims at determining whether the functions of the software 509 application may be considered EFB functions. Until functions are demonstrated as such, they are termed 510 "candidate EFB functions." 511

- For a given EFB application, the process is successfully completed when all candidate EFB functions 512 have successfully demonstrated the eligibility criteria. 513
- Only the candidate EFB functions or sub-functions must be demonstrated as compliant with the 514 515 standard.
- 516

#### 517 2.2.1 Functional breakdown

- A functional breakdown of the EFB application shall be performed. 518
- The EFB application should be broken down in functions and sub-functions. 519
- 520

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- The functional breakdown of the EFB application shall clearly list the candidate EFB functions and the 521 522 functions not intended for approval.
- 524 The scope of all functions shall cover the full scope of the EFB application.
- The scope of all sub-functions shall cover the full scope of each function. 525
- An EFB application may host EFB functions (intended for approval) as well other functions or sub-527 528 functions not intended for approval.

Note: Although an applicant may elect not to demonstrate compliance of all the application functions or 530 sub-functions with this standard, the acceptability for use in flight of the functions or sub-functions not 531 intended for approval will be left under operator responsibility and be governed by the applicable 532 533 operational regulation.

- 534
- 535 The identification of the scope of EFB functions and of a function's sub-functions is left at the discretion of the applicant. It is recommended to consider the following: 536
- The level of detail used in defining an EFB function should ensure that the scope of each EFB 537 function is large enough to, from a flight crew perspective, contribute to the same flight 538 operations task or duty. An EFB function should be a logical subset of the application. 539

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• The level of detail used in defining sub-functions should support the Risk Assessment process 541 with sufficient details. Keeping the scope of the sub-functions small enough will improve the 542 confidence that all significant risks can be assessed and then mitigated or prevented at the 543 adequate level.

#### 545 **2.2.2** Intended use

- 546 The intended use of each candidate EFB function shall be defined and include the following information:
- Definition of the type of data and service provided by the function to the flight crew,
- The phases of flight and the types of operations during which the function is intended to be used (as applicable),
- Whether the function provides data needed to perform the flight,
- Whether the function is intended to be used as a primary means, and if not, proposal of a reference source of information,
  - If applicable, definition of whether the function is intended to replace existing means,
  - Whether the function is intended to address an operational regulatory requirement.
- 554 555

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If certain considerations are left at the discretion of the operator, this shall appear in the intended functiondefinition.

- 558
- 559 Primary means refers to information that can be directly used for operating the aircraft or for fulfilment 560 of an operational regulatory requirement, without the need to verify or crosscheck its validity with an 561 independent reference source of information.
- 562 Independent reference sources of information may include approved digital performance data, 563 referenced paper documentation, avionics information certified for use as primary means. A second 564 EFB running an identical application is not considered as a reference source of information.
- 565 Common examples of using EFB applications for primary means include calculating aircraft 566 performance without crosschecking the AFM and access to documents and charts.
- 567
- 568 The intended use of each non-EFB function shall be defined
- 569

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575 576

# 570 2.2.3 EFB functions eligibility

- 571 In order for a candidate EFB function to be considered eligible, the following shall be demonstrated:
- The function is intended to be used by flight crew to support flight operation tasks and duties, and
  - The intended use is authorized, and
  - The risk assessment process was performed.

#### 577 2.2.3.1 Flight crew operation tasks and duties

578 Flight crew operations tasks and duties are assigned by the operators for the purpose of conducting the 579 flight. They may include pre-flight, flight and post-flight tasks and duties.

- A function not intended to be used by flight crew is not an EFB function. A function from an EFB application may also be accessible to non-pilots and interface or overlap with tasks or duties governed under other regulations than operational regulation (e.g. Maintenance regulations for Technical Logbook).
- 584
- 585 For the purpose of this exercise, the following categories of flight operations tasks and duties can be 586 considered:

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"Aviate" or "Fly" refers to the flight crew's actions to monitor and control the aircraft flight 587 parameters in order to achieve and maintain a desired flight path. 588

- 589 "Navigate" refers to the flight crew's actions to determine where the aircraft is (present position), where it should be, and where the aircraft should go, in accordance with published procedures 590 and with appropriate navigation performance where applicable. 591
- "Communicate" refers to the communication between flight crew members, the flight crew and 592 the Air Traffic Control (ATC) as well as between the flight crew and the cabin crew, the flight 593 crew and the company ground staff. 594
- "Manage systems" refers to the flight crew's actions to monitor and control the aircraft systems. 595
- 596 "Build & maintain situational awareness" refers to the flight crew actions to build and maintain a mental picture of the aircraft and its situation with respect to its environment (e.g. weather, 597 terrain and obstacles, traffic, FIR, Country boundaries, etc.). 598 599
  - "Support Mission" refers to:
    - Flight crew's consultation of reference information (e.g. flight operational manuals,  $\cap$ navigation charts, EOSID, etc.), the computation of "flight-related" information (e.g. aircraft performance, Mass & Balance (M&B), etc.) and any other information supporting the conduct of the flight.
- The actions performed before the flight (e.g. flight planning, dispatch, etc.) or after the 604 0 flight (e.g. post flight report, aeronautical administrative forms, etc.) in relation with the 605 606 flight itself
- "Manage Logistics" refers to the tasks non-related to the conduct of the flight Authorized 607 Intended Uses 608
- 609

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602 603

- 2.2.3.2 610 Intended uses
- 611 The following intended uses are explicitly not authorized for an EFB function:
- 612

Category	Prohibited Intended uses
All	<ul> <li>Any use substituting or duplicating the intended use of instruments or equipment required by airworthiness regulations, airspace requirements, or operational rules.</li> </ul>
	responses for safety of the flight.
Aviate or Fly	All uses.
Navigate	All uses.
Communicate	Communication with ATC.
Manage systems	<ul> <li>Monitoring as a primary means of the real-time status of aircraft critical and essential systems.</li> <li>Control of aircraft critical and essential systems.</li> <li>Consultation of checklists taking inputs from aircraft to reflect the status as primary means of aircraft systems or switch positions</li> </ul>

613

# Table 1 Prohibited intended uses

- 614 615 The following list contains examples of possible intended uses for EFB functions. This list is nonexhaustive and is based on EFB applications in-service at the time of writing this standard. 616
- 617

Category	Intended uses
----------	---------------

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Communicate	Communication with ground services (such as OCC or MCC),	
	Communication with service providers.	
Manage systems	Use of contextual augmentation of information provided by aircraft systems.	
Situational awareness	Improvement of Situational Awareness in flight via representation of ownship position on navigation charts, Anticipation or management of flight events such as diversions (e.g. Nearest airport functions), Consultation of graphical weather information in flight, Video surveillance of Cabin and aircraft exterior.	
Support Mission	<ul> <li>Consultation of aeronautical charts and maps,</li> <li>Computation of aircraft performance and mass and balance,</li> <li>Consultation of documents and manuals,</li> <li>Electronic signature,</li> <li>Consultation of checklists manually selected by the flight crew</li> <li>Consultation of checklists automatically presented to the flight crew based on the aircraft context (flight phases, flight crew alert messages)</li> <li>Aid to Flight Profile Optimization,</li> <li>Management of flight time and duty time limitations,</li> <li>Monitoring of en-route navigation integrity coverage,</li> <li>Flight briefing and following (Electronic Flight Folder),</li> <li>Reporting,</li> <li>Log Book consultation and entries.</li> </ul>	
Manage Logistics	Any non-safety related intended use.	

# Table 2 Possible intended uses

# 619 2.3 OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT

The process presented in this chapter aims at ensuring a systematic and step-by-step qualitative approach to the identification of the hazards introduced by a particular candidate EFB function, the identification of adequate mitigation and prevention means, and their validation.

- 624 It is recommended to perform this process as early as practicable during the development cycle.
- 626 The picture here below gives an overview of the process

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THIS DRAFT MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO CHANGE -PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION OF EASA NPA FOR CS-ETSO AMENDMENT 17 THAT PROPOSES THE NEW ETSO-2C521. 656 If used in the risk assessment, a mitigation means shall be: 657 Recorded, to ensure that it is communicated to the operator, and Validated. 658 659 660 Each mitigation means should be validated with respect to its: Effectiveness: When correctly applied, the mitigation mean will reduce or remove the 661 consequences of the hazard. 662 Practicability: The mitigation mean can be applied by the crew without requiring exceptional 663 664 concentration or skills, and does not create unacceptable workload. Robustness: The mitigation mean will be effective over time for the considered operational 665 assumptions. 666 667 668 Any mitigation validation activity allocated to the operator should be recorded in the operational 669 information (see §4.3) 670 Mitigation means based on procedures and training should be validated with a flight crew involvement. 671 672 The effectiveness and robustness of the mitigation means should be validated from a security point of 673 view when based on assets subject to security threats. 674 For functions with residual risk, this validation is performed through the security risk assessment 675 process. 676 677 678 The objectives of the means of mitigations are: 679 For loss of the sub-function: to reduce the operational impact by providing an alternative means • 680 to access equivalent data, such as paper, communication with operations centre or use a different EFB application/host platform; 681 For display of erroneous output: to increase the likelihood to detect the error and/or minimize 682 • the severity effect of the hazard. 683 684 The severity effect at aircraft level of each hazard, with consideration of all mitigation means, shall be 685 686 evaluated and classified according to the following criteria: 1. Severity effect is Minor at worst, or 687 688 2. Severity effect is greater than Minor, i.e. there is a residual risk. 689 690 The severity effect of the hazards should be assessed in accordance with the intended use and the operational assumptions (e.g. use with paper backup or not, use only during certain phases of flight, 691 692 etc.). 693 Example of scenarios that could lead to residual risks: When the loss of a sub-function cannot be fully mitigated and has the potential for more than a 694 minor safety effect, 695 696 When the display of erroneous data by a sub-function could remain undetected by the flight crew (undetected erroneous data) despite the proposed mitigations and has the potential for 697 more than a minor safety effect. 698 699 700 The contributors to each hazard with residual risk shall be identified and recorded. 701 At least the following contributors should be analysed to determine if they will cause the hazard: 702 Misbehaviour of the host platform, • 703 Misbehaviour of the software due to design errors, • 704 Erroneous database, •

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705 706 707 708 709	<ul> <li>Erroneous crew input,</li> <li>Security threats,</li> <li>Erroneous inputs coming from another system or EFB application,</li> <li>Erroneous configuration or customization settings.</li> </ul>
710 711 712 713	Prevention means shall be identified and recorded for every contributor to hazards with residual risk, unless it can be demonstrated that all hazards stemming from this contributor are already satisfactorily mitigated (e.g. errors can be detected).
714	Acceptable prevention means for misbehaviour of the host platform include:
715 716 717 718	<ul> <li>Operational procedures for cross-checking results from two EFBs (acknowledging that misbehaviour events of the host platform are random in nature), or</li> <li>Other means that ensure detection of the misbehaviour of the host platform, or</li> <li>Development assurance on the host platform itself.</li> </ul>
719 720	An acceptable prevention means for misbehaviour of the software caused by design errors is to reduce its likelihood by using the FQL high development assurance level.
721 722	An acceptable prevention means for erroneous databases is the use of the proper Database processes (see section §2.6).
723 724	An acceptable prevention means for erroneous crew input is the increase of Human Factors assessment scrutiny. (see section §2.4)
725 726 727	Acceptable prevention means for security threats are to be defined carrying a security risk assessment (see section §2.7)
728 729	Other prevention means not listed above shall be validated.
730	In order to validate a prevention means it should be ensured that it is:
731 732 733 734 735 736 737 730	<ul> <li><u>Effective</u>: When correctly applied, the prevention mean will prevent the hazard or reduce its likelihood to an acceptable level.</li> <li><u>Practicable</u> (When the prevention means is under flight crew responsibility) it can be applied without requiring exceptional concentration or skills, and does not create unacceptable workload.</li> <li><u>Robust</u>: The prevention means will be effective over time for the considered operational assumptions.</li> </ul>
739 740 741	Any prevention means validation activity allocated to the operator should be recorded in the operational information (see section §4.3)
742	2.4 HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACES
743 744 745 746 747	This section addresses the design of the Human Machine Interface of EFB applications. This section includes, but is not limited to, data entry methods, colour-coding philosophies and symbology. Considerations are given to the environment (aircraft type, host platform, integration in flight deck), operating system and other applications as specified below.
748 749	Graphic and text displayed on the EFB shall be legible to the flight crew in the intended operation environment.

Considerations should be given to the hardware intended to host the EFB application, the intended viewing distance, the typical range of lighting conditions expected (including extreme illumination conditions such as direct sunlight or night.) and environmental conditions.

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753 The resulting hardware requirements and installation requirements should be the responsibility • 754 of the operator. 755 756 The EFB application shall be designed in such a manner to not distract the flight crew from their duties 757 There should be a means to inhibit both EFB visual and aural messages 758 Flashing text or symbols should be avoided 759 Messages should be prioritized and the message prioritization scheme evaluated and • 760 documented During critical phases of the flight, information necessary to the pilot should be continuously 761 • presented without uncommanded overlays, pop-ups, or pre-emptive messages, except for 762 those indicating the failure or degradation of the current EFB application 763 764 765 Red and amber shall be reserved for safety-related information. 766 These colours should not be used for information (such as text, icons, figures and graphics) that is not safety-related. 767 Red may be used for keep-out zones such as severe weather or taxiway construction. 768 Amber may be used for zones or conditions where caution is required, such as marginal weather 769 or failures that adversely affect performance of the EFB application. 770 771 The EFB application shall notify the flight crew if there is a detected failure in the EFB adversely affecting 772 performances or usability of the EFB application. 773 774 775 The EFB application response time shall be predictable to the user System busy or process indicator should be displayed 776 Immediate feedback to touch indicators should be given to the user 777 The response time of the system to user inputs shall be consistent with an application's intended 778 function. 779 780 When the EFB application is busy it shall display a 'system busy' indicator (e.g. spinner, progress bar) 781 782 783 The application shall inform the user when a user input is mandatory or if a user input is not required. 784 The pilot should be informed of the mandatory entries in order to ensure a good functioning of 785 the system 786 If user-entered data is not in the correct format or type expected by the EFB application, the EFB 787 788 application shall provide feedback to the user regarding which entry is erroneous or what type of data is expected. 789 790 791 If user-entered data is not in the correct format or type expected by the EFB application, the EFB application shall not accept the data. 792 793 794 The software version of the EFB application shall be accessible. A mechanism should allow the flight crew to check the validity of the software application 795 796 797 There shall be a means to check the validity of a database 798 A mechanism should allow the flight crew to check the validity of the data base 799

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800 The EFB application shall clearly distinguish pilot entries, default values and entries imported from other 801 EFB applications and aircraft systems. 802 803 The use of the EFB application shall not result in unacceptable flight crew workload. When the user returns to an EFB application that was running in the background, it should 804 805 appear in the same state as when the user left that EFB application with the exception of 806 differences stemming from the progress of the flight or completion of processing performed in 807 the background. 808 • A search function should be available if the EFB application can display a large amount of textual 809 information (e.g. data, charts, documents) 810 The EFB application should be designed to minimize the number of steps needed to navigate • 811 through information and/or functions. 812 If content is not visible in its entirety in its available display area, such as during "scroll", "zoom" or "pan" 813 operations, the existence of off-screen content shall be clearly indicated in a consistent way, unless the 814 815 presence of that off-screen content is readily obvious. 816 Off screen content should be shown through visual cues implemented in the application design. (e.g. scrollbars) 817 If there is a cursor, it should be visible on the screen at all times while in use 818 The EFB application should always display the names or symbols of the active EFB function. 819 • 820 All software controls shall be properly identified and sized for their intended function. 821 822 Active areas should be sized appropriately for accessibility in the intended position and for use 823 in turbulence Labels or icons may be used. It is recommended to utilize icons that are commonly recognized. 824 825 The EFB Application shall appear distinct from, but not conflict with, the installed avionics displays. 826 Organize information in a manner that is consistent with other displays within flight deck yet 827 should clearly showing a distinction from certified displays, e.g. this can be done using different 828 829 fonts or colours Display of EFB applications on installed displays may require differentiation to enable the 830 flightcrew member to distinguish between the installed avionics display and the supplemental 831 or "secondary" EFB display. 832 833 Text Colours, Symbols shall be compatible with the flight deck environment 834 An EFB application should not disturb the pilot's night vision. 835 The EFB application HMI may be configurable in order to ensure consistency with a specific 836 837 flight deck environment The EFB application may have the ability to be customized by the operator to ensure 838 • commonality with their flight decks or any other operator's policy. 839 840 841 Data entry methods, units of measure, colour-coding philosophies, and symbology shall be consistent throughout the EFB application user interface 842 843 Consistency between applications or airplane systems may be achieved. 844 845 The pilot shall easily understand clearly what units are being used for numerical data 846 Where applicable measurement units should be displayed to ensure accuracy of information 847 Applicable units should be displayed next to each data field. 848

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849 850	The EFB application provider shall perform a human factors' assessment when HMI aspects are identified as potential contributor to the residual risk by the risk assessment		
851	This human factor's assessment should be carried out through a specific evaluation protocol.		
852	This evaluation protocol and results should be validated by a human factor's specialist.		
853	The definition of the evaluation protocol may include:		
854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864	<ul> <li>The detailed objectives of the evaluation</li> <li>The description of the means and the operational environment</li> <li>The involvement of a flight crew panel representative to the foreseen end users</li> <li>The definition of detailed scenario to be executed or ad-hoc use case</li> <li>The way to record the observations and data collection</li> </ul> The evaluation report should record issues and the way to address or mitigate these issues These mitigations for the recorded issues may contain but are not limited to: <ul> <li>Design changes to EFB application as necessary</li> <li>Flight crew Training</li> <li>EFB Administrative recommendations</li> </ul>		
865			
866	2.5 DEVELOPMENT ASSURANCE		
867 868 869 870 871	This section defines development assurance considerations for the development of the EFB application. The applicant has to apply the adequate assurance level proportionate to the risk associated with the use of its EFB application. The terminology "Function Qualification Level" (FQL) will be used to define the selected level of assurance. Two FQL levels are defined: Low and high.		
872			
873	FQL Low objectives shall be applied for any EFB application.		
874 875 876 877	FQL High objectives shall be applied when EFB application errors are identified as contributor to a residual risk by the operational risk assessment (see §2.3)		
878	2.5.1 FQL objectives		
879			
880 881 882	The table below defines for each FQL level the applicable development process objectives as defined in section 2.5.2.		

	Development process objective		FQL	
			allo	cation
	Section	Description	High	Low
Development plan	2.5.2.1.1	Minimum considerations	х	Х
	2.5.2.1.2	Additional considerations	х	
Operational	2.5.2.2.1	EFB Function operational requirements definition	х	Х
requirements	2.5.2.2.2	EFB application architecture definition		Х
	2.5.2.2.3	EFB Function Operational Requirements	х	х
		validation		
	2.5.2.2.4	EFB Function compliance with operational	х	х
		requirements		
Software	2.5.2.3.1	EFB Function software requirements definition		
development	2.5.2.3.2	EFB function software requirements validation	х	

	2.5.2.3.3	EFB function compliance with software	Х	
		requirements		
Configuration	2.5.2.4.1	Configuration items are identified.	Х	Х
Management	2.5.2.4.2	Baselines and traceability establishment	Х	
	2.5.2.4.3	Problem reporting, change control, and change	Х	
		review		
	2.5.2.4.4	Archive, retrieval, and release establishment		Х
	2.5.2.4.5	EFB Application development environment control	х	
Application	2.5.2.5.1	EFB Application conformity review is conducted.	х	х
Release	2.5.2.5.2	Impact analysis of known issues	х	х
Quality Assurance	2.5.2.6	Quality assurance	х	х
Process				

# Table 3 FQL objectives

#### 884 2.5.2 Development process objectives

- 885886 The following picture represents main processes of a typical EFB application development.
- 887



#### 903 2.5.2.1.2 Additional considerations

- 904 If necessary, the development plan may address additional considerations, such as those defined below. 905
- 906 2.5.2.1.2.1 Multi-functions EFB applications

907 An EFB application may host several different functions and the EFB application may be configurable by the applicant or the operator to enable or disable some functions. 908

909

910 The appropriate FQL is determined for each function during the risk assessment process.

911

912 Low FQL functions shall not adversely impact high FQL functions,

It is recommended that the entire EFB application should be qualified to the highest FQL. 913

When different FQLs are applied, the applicant should ensure that FQL Low functions do not adversely 914 affect high FQL functions. 915

- Absence of adverse effects from low to high FQL functions may be demonstrated by: 916
  - Software architecture analysis, •
- 918 Data flow analysis,
- Verification. 919
- 920

917

- Usage of third party software 921 2.5.2.1.2.2
- 922 An EFB application may include third party software.
- Any third party software included in the EFB application shall be identified 923
- Third party software should be managed under configuration. 924
- 925 Third party software identification may include the editor, the version and the licenses.

926 The use of third party software should be assessed to identify the activities that need to be performed or re-performed to ensure that the EFB application including this third party software complies with the 927

operational requirements and application requirements. 928

- 929
- 930 2.5.2.1.2.3 Usage of service history

If an applicant seeks approval of an EFB application or a function that is already in service, service 931 932 history may be used to demonstrate compliance with some requirements in this standard.

In case service history is used to comply with some qualification requirements regarding this standard. 933 934 the applicant shall justify it with relevant evidence data.

- The following aspects of an EFB application service history should be evaluated: 935
- Identify the service history data and its relevance to demonstrate compliance with qualification 936 937 requirements. 938
  - Problem reporting is required to support service history. •
- The similarity of the EFB application operational environment in which the service history data 939 • 940 was collected to the one used for establishing the service history credit.
- 941 Relevancy of the operational context of the EFB application for which service history credit is • 942 claimed.
- 943
- 2.5.2.1.2.4 Alternative methods for EFB application gualification 944

945 Applicants may decide to use an alternative method than the one defined in chapter 2.5 for EFB 946 application software qualification

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Alternative methods for EFB application gualification shall be identified and described. 947 948 The applicant should specify and obtain agreement from the subject matter expert on: The impact on the qualification process 949 950 The equivalence with the method being replaced 951 952 2.5.2.2 **Operational Requirements** 953 The first step to develop an EFB application is to define how it will help and support the flight crew to 954 perform his duties; the objective is then to capture the operational requirements. 955 2.5.2.2.1 EFB Function operational requirements definition 956 957 The EFB function operational requirements shall be defined. The EFB function operational requirements should describe, as applicable: 958 959 The operational context and the intended use of the function The supported operational environment 960 The inputs entered by the user or acquired from other sources. 961 Behavior in normal operating conditions 962 Behavior in degraded operating conditions (as required) 963 Possible customization of the function by the applicant or the operator or the user (options, 964 configurations, parameters values, etc.) 965 Requirements stemming from the risk assessment if applicable 966 • Non-functional requirements 967 968 969 2.5.2.2.2 EFB application architecture definition 970 EFB application architecture shall be defined. 971 The definition of the EFB application architecture should include High level architecture description relevant to identify potential degraded conditions that should 972 • 973 be addressed during the risk assessment process The functional links between the different software components 974 **EFB Function FQL Assignment** 975 976 A FQL shall be assigned to each function of an EFB application. 977 The FQL assignment should be an outcome of the risk assessment process. 978 979 2.5.2.2.3 EFB Function Operational Requirements validation 980 The EFB Function Operational Requirements shall be validated. 981 Reviews and analyses should be performed on the EFB Function Operational Requirements to ensure 982 completeness, accuracy, verifiability and consistency. 983 984 985 2.5.2.2.4 EFB Function compliance with its operational requirements 986 The EFB function shall comply with its operational requirements. The verification of the compliance of the EFB function to the Operational Requirements should be 987 addressed: 988 989 Test cases and procedures should be developed and executed to ensure that the function fulfills • the operational requirements 990

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- 991 Test results should be reviewed to ensure that they are correct and that discrepancies between 992 actual and expected results are justified.
- Test cases and procedures may define the acceptable tolerance on expected results. 993
- 995 2.5.2.3 Software development
- 996 It is up to the applicant to choose their development methodology.
- 997 Software development activities described in this section may be done in an iterative way, with functional 998 increments at each iteration.
- 999

994

- 1000 2.5.2.3.1 EFB Function software requirements definition
- 1001 The EFB function software requirements shall be defined.
- 1002 The EFB function software requirements shall include:
  - Functional, non-functional and interface (i.e. interoperability) related requirements,
- 1004 Degraded conditions and responses to these conditions as applicable, 1005
  - Specification of user interface, error messages, and potential constraints for the user, •
- Specification of algorithms and associated boundaries. 1006
- The EFB function software requirements should implement operational requirements. 1007
- The EFB function software requirements should be verifiable and consistent. 1008
- The EFB function software requirements should be developed following the processes described in the 1009 development plan. 1010
- Expected calculation accuracy of algorithm should be defined. 1011
- 1012 Coding rules may be used to insure adequate calculation accuracy.
- EFB function software requirements may be developed in different forms depending on the selected 1013 methodology (e.g. users stories for Agile methodology, shall statement classic requirements, model
- 1014 1015 based requirements, formal methods...).
- Each EFB function software requirement should trace to one or more operational requirements, with the 1016 1017 exception of derived requirements.
- Derived requirements are those for which the rationale is not linked to the operational requirements. 1018
- The existence of derived requirements should be justified, and they should be evaluated to ensure that 1019 they do not negatively impact the expected functionality and outputs defined in the operational 1020 1021 requirements.
- The EFB function software requirements should be defined to a level of detail appropriate to ensure 1022 1023 proper implementation.
- 1024

1025

- EFB function software requirements validation 2.5.2.3.2
- The EFB function software requirements shall be validated before implementation. 1026
- 1027 Reviews and analyses should be performed on the EFB function software requirements at least to ensure completeness with recommendations from chapter 2.5.2.3.1. 1028
- 1029
- 1030 2.5.2.3.3 EFB function compliance with software requirements
- 1031 Test cases and procedures shall be developed and executed to demonstrate that the function fulfills its 1032 software requirements.
- 1033 Each test case should be developed from the software requirements and identifies the set of inputs, the 1034 conditions, the expected results, and the pass/fail criteria.
- 1035 Test procedures should be defined from the test cases.
- 1036

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# DRAFT ED-273 (AS SUBMMITTED TO OPEN CONSULTATION) -

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PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION OF EASA NPA FOR CS-ETSO AMENDMENT 17 THAT PROPOSES THE NEW ETSO-2C521.

- 1037 EFB function software requirements shall be fully covered by tests.
- 1038 Input data including user entries should be exercised in representative ranges including boundaries1039 values.
- 1040 Expected accuracy and boundaries of algorithm calculation should be verified.
- 1041 Robustness tests should be performed to address:
  - The ability of the EFB application to respond to abnormal inputs or conditions.
- 1043 The prevention of invalid output.
- 1044 Test coverage analysis should be performed to demonstrate that all requirements have been tested.
- 1045 Software structural coverage assessment may be used for the test coverage analysis.

1046 Test results shall be reviewed and acceptable discrepancies between actual and expected results shall 1047 be explained.

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1042

# 1049 2.5.2.4 Configuration management

- 1050 The configuration management process includes the activities of configuration identification, change 1051 control, application baseline establishment, and archiving of the EFB application product, including the 1052 related life-cycle data.
- 1053 2.5.2.4.1 <u>Configuration items are identified.</u>
- 1054 Each EFB application configuration item and its successive versions shall be identified unambiguously.
- 1055 The objective is to establish the basis for the control and reference of the application configuration items.
- 1056 Configuration identification should be established for each configuration item and for combinations of
- 1057 configuration items that constitute the EFB application.
- 1058 Configuration management process should be established.
- 1059 Change control process should be established.
- 1060 Revision identification scheme for configuration items should be established.
- 1061 Supported releases should be defined by the applicant and made available to the operators as required.
- Supported releases are those releases for which the applicant may provide support to operators (e.g. assistance, bug fixing...)
- 1064

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- 1065 2.5.2.4.2 Baselines establishment
- 1066 A baseline shall be established for each EFB application release
- 1067 A configuration index shall define for each EFB application release:
  - The release configuration baseline
    - All files required for the EFB application installation and use
    - Each source component used to build the EFB application
- 1071
- 1072 2.5.2.4.3 Problem reporting, change control, and change review
- 1073 Anomalous behavior of the EFB application shall be recorded as a problem report.
- 1074 A method shall be defined for managing problem reports.
- 1075
- 1076 EFB application change control shall provide for recording, evaluation, resolution, and reviewing of 1077 changes throughout the EFB application development.
- 1078 Change review shall ensure problems and changes are assessed and then approved or disapproved.
- Each problem should be documented, along with its initial reported severity, characteristic, and effectsand be managed into configuration.
- 1081 Any changes to any baselined configuration item should be managed.

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PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION OF EASA NPA FOR CS-ETSO AMENDMENT 17 THAT PROPOSES THE NEW ETSO-2C521.

1082		
1083	2.5.2.4.4	Archive, retrieval, and release establishment
1084 1085	Development retrievable.	data and development environment of supported releases shall be archived and
1086 1087	Development established.	data and development environment retention and retrieval procedures should be
1088 1089	Data retention	time should ensure that recorded data of supported releases are available.
1090	2.5.2.4.5	EFB Application development environment control
1091 1092 1093	The various en Any change of	ivironments used to support the development process shall be defined and controlled. the development environment should be assessed before implementation.
1094	2.5.2.5	Application Release
1095		
1096	2.5.2.5.1	EFB Application conformity review is conducted.
1097 1098	The purpose o development p	If the conformity review is to obtain assurances, for an EFB application release, that the processes and data are complete.
1099	Conformity rev	iew of EFB Application releases shall be conducted.
1100 1101	A conformity i operational use	e.
1102	A conformity re	eview may determine that:
1103	Planne	ed development activities have been completed and records of their completion are
1104	availat	DIE,
1105	<ul> <li>Evider</li> <li>proces</li> </ul>	ses, and is controlled in accordance with the configuration management process,
1107	Evider	nce exists that EFB application Problem Reports have been evaluated and have their
1108	status	recorded,
1109	Develo     Develo	opment plan deviations are recorded and approved,
1111	status.	In Reports deletted from a previous contorning review are re-evaluated to determine their
1112		
1113	2.5.2.5.2	Impact analysis of known issues
1114	Known issues	and potential mitigations shall be recorded, assessed and made available to operators.
1115 1116	Known issues crew and not fi	are problem reports and functional limitations which are relevant for the operator/flight xed for the considered release.
1117 1118 1119 1120	The severity a perspective. It mitigation mea	and the impact of known issues should be analyzed from a functional and operational should be ensured that such issue does not compromise the intended function or any ins used in the risk assessment.
1121	2.5.2.6	Quality Assurance

- Assurance shall be obtained that actual development processes, including those of suppliers, comply with the development plan and the required FQL.
- 1124 The quality process should:

Ensure that the development plan is defined and complies with the required FQL

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1126 1127	<ul> <li>Ensure that the deviations from the defined development plan are identified, tracked and addressed</li> </ul>
1128 1129	<ul> <li>Produce records including evidence of completion of the EFB Application conformity review</li> <li>Provide assurance that any supplier processes and outputs comply with the defined processes</li> </ul>
1130 1131 1132	Those performing the quality process can take an active role in the activities of the EFB application development processes, and have the authority, responsibility, and independence to ensure that the quality process objectives are satisfied.
1133 1134	Credit may be taken from already existing quality assurance processes.
1135	2.6 DATABASES
1136 1137 1138 1139	Data addressed here are databases used by EFB applications that are stored and not acquired in real time from an interfaced system. Considerations for real time data are addressed through the risk assessment, development process and security chapters.
1140 1141 1142	This data includes those supporting the operational use of an EFB application by the operator. They may be produced and managed either by the applicant, either by the operator or a third party organization.
1143	A non-exhaustive list of operational databases used by EFB applications may include:
1144 1145 1146	<ul> <li>Navigation databases</li> <li>Airport map databases</li> <li>Aircraft performances databases</li> </ul>
1147 1148	<ul> <li>Obstacles databases</li> <li>Terrain databases</li> </ul>
1149	Runway & airport databases
1150 1151	<ul> <li>Aircraft Weight and Balance calculation databases</li> <li>Electronic Checklist databases</li> </ul>
1152	Electronic Charts databases
1153	Documentation databases
1154	
1155 1156 1157 1158	This section does not apply to parameters data items that may be used to enable/disable optional functions, or to customize the HMI of an EFB application, etcThey may be produced and managed either by the applicant, or by the operator. The definition of these files is done during the integration phase of the EFB application in the operational environment of the operator. A revision or an update to
1159	the parameter data items is an administration task that may impact the behavior of the EFB application
1160	and thus then may be considered as a change of the EFB application from the operator point of view.
1162	Each database used by EFB functions shall be identified
1163	The following is not applicable to any EFB application database not used by an EFB function
1164	
1165 1166	Depending on the potential contribution to residual risk and if the database is approved with the EFB application or not, one of the following options shall apply
1167	



1189 1190	2.6.3	Option 3 - Database is identified as a contributor to residual risk and is not approved with the EFB application
1191	For ae	ronautical data, the applicant shall define and make available DQR for the data provider
1192 1193	The DO use:	QR should specify the characteristics of data to ensure that the data is compatible with its intended
1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201	• • • •	Accuracy, Resolution, Integrity (or equivalent assurance level), Traceability (ability to determine origin of the data), Timeliness, Completeness, Format.
1202 1203 1204 1205	For dat the doc on the	a other than aeronautical data (e.g. ECL database), the applicant shall define, as necessary in cumentation, specification of the database and/or the methods and mitigation mean (e.g. guidance use of a specific database processing tool to generate or modify the database)
1206 1207 1208	DQR C 76(), in (e.g. fro	compliance for data provider: The applicant may recommend to the data provider the use of ED- particular when the data provider is not the originator of the data and use "authoritative" sources om AIP, OEM, etc.)
1209 1210	Mainta a grour	ining DQR Compliance: Depending on the EFB application architecture, if data is transferred from and repository to the EFB host platform, it should be protected against corruption and alteration
1211 1212	If the a be des	pplicant is the data provider, DQR might not be formalized in a single document and may instead cribed in documented internal processes.
1213		
1214 1215	2.6.4	Option 4 - Database is identified as a contributor to residual risk and is approved with the EFB application
1216 1217	For dat the haz	abase approved with the EFB application, one of the three alternatives shall be used to prevent card identified as a contributor to a Residual risk
1218 1219 1220 1221 1222	•	The database is a low complexity database; meaning that the amount of data is limited, the structure of the database is simple, and the full database content is validated and verified by the applicant, or The database is developed with the function according to the High FQL level, or Applying ED-76() process.
1223 1224	2.7	SECURITY
1225 1226 1227	By natu require	ure an EFB application may be exposed to various security threats. Security is a concern which s attention during the whole software lifecycle:
1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233	• •	At the development level to ensure no vulnerabilities are introduced; part of this topic is already covered by development assurance. During distribution between the applicant and the customer, to ensure that the EFB application behaves as designed. After delivery of the EFB application to monitor any new vulnerabilities.
1234	Addres	sing security concerns are done in two steps:
1235 1236	1. 2.	Apply the Minimum Requirements found in this chapter. Apply the Security Process if residual risk exists.
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12371238 See figure below1239



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1251 It is recommended that the applicant defines its strategy to regularly monitor vulnerabilities in the 1252 development plan and throughout the entire lifecycle of the EFB application.

- 1253
- 1254 The authenticity and integrity of configuration items of the EFB application shall be established.
- 1255

1256 Distribution of EFB application binary files, parameters data items and database files shall ensure both 1257 the integrity of the files and the authentication of the originator.

1258

1259 The use of the EFB application shall not require permanent deactivation of security measures on 1260 supporting assets.

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## 1262 2.7.2 Security Risk Assessment

1264 In the event residual risks have been identified in the safety assessment, a Security Risk Assessment 1265 shall be carried out as per "Figure 1 ORA overall process" to identify potential security vulnerabilities 1266 contributing to residual risks.

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1268 The following section defines the process that should be followed when performing a security risk 1269 assessment on an EFB application or function.

1270 The security assets shall be defined.

1271 The security assets of each EFB function should be defined, including but not limited to functions, 1272 software interfaces, network data flows and Third Party Software.

1273 This is an example of data flows, assets and supporting assets:

- Data Flows:
  - Wired or Wi-Fi connectivity to AID/installed EFB or Onboard Server
- Avionics Data retrieval
  - Writing data out to Avionics
    - Removable Media such as an USB stick
  - Data exchange with ground system or operator
- 1280 o HMI user entries
- 1281 o Data Integrity Check
- 1282 Primary Assets identification: 1283 • EFB application comp
  - EFB application components (including Third Parties Software)
    - Avionics parameters
    - Messages exchange
      - Crew entries
  - Supporting Assets:
    - Portable EFB hosting platform
      - Services provider (AID or installed EFB)
- 1290 o Wi-Fi 1291 o Configu
  - Configuration or Data Base, Load installation
  - Data from other EFB applications
- 1292 1293

1294 Vulnerabilities in the EFB functions and assets shall be identified, evaluated and treated for their 1295 potential contribution on residual risk.

- 1296 The applicant should define an Acceptable Means to prevent vulnerabilities contributing to residual risk,
- 1297 this means being embedded into the function(s) or being a procedure to be applied by the operator.
- 1298 Vulnerabilities may be assessed on the basis of threats listed below (Table 4 Security threats).

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- Hardening may be used to reduce vulnerability of libraries used within the EFB application. Reducing
   available ways of attack typically includes the removal of unnecessary software, unnecessary
   usernames or logins, and the disabling or removal of unnecessary services.
- 1302 A static code analysis scan may be used to prevent potential runtime errors.
- 1303 Vulnerability identification should be initiated during development lifecycle phase.
- 1304 A process should be established to evaluate vulnerabilities affecting the EFB functions (including Third
- 1305 Party Software) on an ongoing basis.
- 1306
- 1307 Catalogue of Threats
- 1308 The table below may be used by the applicant to determine which potential threats could affect assets 1309 used by the EFB functions.
- 1310

Threat	Threat Description	Prevention means
ACCESS	An authorized user may gain unauthorized access to the EFB Application or to information controlled by the EFB Application via an attack for malicious purposes.	Implement Authentication and Credentials management
DEVELOP	Security failures may occur as the result of problems introduced during design, development, and implementation of the EFB Application.	Code review, coding rules, Static code analysis have to be done during the implementation life cycle
FAILURE	EFB Application system could be compromised or affected in the event of a system failure.	Identification of dummy data and restart with a functional context
INSTALL	The EFB Application may be delivered or installed in a manner that undermines security.	Check data at installation
MAINTAIN	The security of the EFB Application may be reduced or defeated due to errors or omissions in the administration and maintenance of the system.	Covered per installation (data load or configuration)
OBSERVE	Security events occur in EFB Application operation but the system, due to flaws in its specification, design, or implementation, may lead a competent user or technician to believe that the EFB Application is still secure.	Code and Design review, coding rules, Static code analysis
OPERATE	Security failures may occur because of improper operation of the EFB Application or systems interfacing with the EFB Application.	Code and Design review, coding rules, Static code analysis
PHYSICAL	Security-critical parts of the EFB Application may be subjected to a physical attack that may compromise security.	Refutation tests refutation activities
JAMMING	An attacker performs jamming on a communication physical medium.	Check on data EFB application input. Could be demonstrate by analysis or tests Refutation tests

FLOOD	An attacker performs flooding on a communication mean.	Check on data EFB application input. Could be demonstrate by analysis or tests Refutation tests
USURP	An attacker usurps the identity of an authorized external entity communicating with the EFB Application.	Implement Authentication and Credentials management
INJECTION-ALTER	An attacker injects or otherwise alters messages on a communication link in order to reduce the integrity of the EFB Application.	Check on data input Refutation tests
REPLAY	An attacker replays messages on a communication link in order to reduce the integrity of the system.	Check on data input
COMPROMISE	An attacker compromises EFB Application loadable components (FLS, DB, Digimaps etc.) in order to reduce the integrity, availability or confidentiality of the system.	Check data at installation
MALWARE	An attacker injects a malware within the EFB that aims at targeting the EFB Application, affecting the integrity, availability or confidentiality of this system.	

Table 4 Security threats

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1315 1316	CHAPTER 3 SPECIFIC MINIMUM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE STANDARD
1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325	<ul> <li>This chapter includes the additional requirements applicable to the following EFB functions:</li> <li>Aircraft performance and weight and balance calculation functions,</li> <li>Functions displaying the own-ship position,</li> <li>Airport moving maps (AMM) function,</li> <li>Weather function,</li> <li>Electronic checklist function,</li> <li>Electronic signature function,</li> </ul>
1326	3.1 AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND WEIGHT & BALANCE FUNCTIONS
1327	These functions include:
1328 1329 1330 1331 1332	<ul> <li>Computation of take-off and landing performance limitations for specific aircrafts, runways and conditions.</li> <li>Computation of weight &amp; balance for specific aircrafts, chosen aircraft and crew/catering configurations and passengers, bags and fuel load.</li> </ul>
1333	3.1.1 Human machine interfaces
1334 1335 1336 1337 1338	Input and output data shall be clearly separated from each other. Inputs designate the set of data that will be entered into the application by the user. Inputs can also be prepopulated data that will be verified by the user as acceptable. Outputs designate the set of data that are the results of the calculations. All output data should be available in numbers except for commonly used terms in the environment, e.g.
1339 1340 1341	TOGA For Take-Off and Landing performance calculation functions, at least the following input data shall remain visible on the screen after performing a calculation when applicable for the aircraft:
1342 1343 1344 1345 1346	<ul> <li>Aircraft mass,</li> <li>Selected runway, runway entry / exit, and runway condition,</li> <li>Wind, Temperature and Pressure Altitude,</li> <li>Status (active/inactive) of MEL, CDL, or non-normal performance penalties,</li> <li>Status (active/inactive) of NOTAM or other runway / obstacle modification.</li> </ul>
1347 1348 1349	All other input data should remain accessible via a single user action (e.g. button press or swipe). For En-Route, non-approved performance calculation functions, and mass & balance functions, flight crew inputs should remain accessible via a single user action after calculation.
1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359	If input data is displayed after calculation, it should be the data actually used by the calculation function. The application should indicate if a set of entries results in an unachievable operation (for instance a negative stopping margin) with a specific message and/or colour scheme. The software application may include the ability for the operator to rearrange the graphical user interface in order to provide consistency with different flight deck configurations. If that is the case, the applicant has to ensure that the application remains compliant with the criteria of this MOPS throughout the envelope of possible interface modifications, or provide clear guidelines to the operator regarding how to ensure this. The user should be able to modify calculations input parameters easily, especially when making last minute changes.
1360	accessible.

- The layout of any software application calculation outputs shall be consistent with the data entry 1361 interface of the aircraft system in which the calculation outputs are used (e.g. Flight Management 1362 1363 Systems), or this instruction forwarded to the operator customizing the interface.
- Airspeeds shall be provided in a form directly usable in the cockpit unless the unit clearly indicates 1364 otherwise (e.g. KCAS). Any difference in the type of airspeed provided by the EFB application and the 1365 type provided by the AFM or FCOM performance data shall be discussed in the flight crew guides and 1366 1367 training material.
- 1368 If the application offers different calculation modes (e.g. dispatch landing performance and operational landing performance), the active mode shall be unambiguously identifiable by the user. 1369
- 1370 Calculation results and any outdated input fields shall be deleted when inputs are modified.
- Input and Output data shall be deleted when the EFB is shutdown or the EFB application closed. 1371
- The results of calculations and any outdated input fields should be deleted whenever the application 1372
- has been in stand-by or 'background' mode or if data is no longer valid. 1373
- 1374 The deletion time may be configurable by the administrator.
- Applications may use default input values where appropriate and when flight crew workload has not 1375 1376 been negatively affected.
- 1377 For Mass & Balance functions, the interface shall provide a diagram displaying the mass and its 1378 associated centre-of-gravity (CG) position.
- 1379

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#### 1380 Software considerations for Airplane Take-Off and Landing performance 3.1.2 1381 calculation functions

- 1382 Except for:
  - Airplane Take-Off and Landing performance calculation functions reusing computerized AFM software approved as per airworthiness requirements (CS2x.1581 or equivalent), and
  - Airplane Take-Off and Landing performance calculation functions for which sufficient service history exists and whose extent and relevance can be substantiated by the applicant, demonstrating satisfactory operations,
- the functions intended to be used as a sole means of airplane take-off or landing performance 1388 calculations shall be designed so as to ensure that a single software performance calculation error will 1389 not lead to performance results above the mass specified in the AFM for the same ambient conditions. 1390
- For this purpose, one of the following means developed at least to a FQL-Low level could be 1391 implemented: 1392
- 1393
- 1394
- Independent reverse calculation flow with inputs cross-check:

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1403 The functions not intended to be used a sole means of airplane take-off or landing performance 1404 calculations shall have an operational means independent from the application e.g. gross-error check 1405 based on pre-computed tables available on paper or electronically) specified and recorded, in order to 1406 ensure that a software performance calculation error from the application can be detected.

1407

# 14083.1.3Recording of inputs and outputs

1409 The performance and mass & balance functions shall record each computation performed (inputs and 000 outputs).

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# 14123.1.4Databases and calculations

- Where it exists, performance and mass and balance functions should use existing approved data such
  as the Aircraft Flight Manual performance data. The functions should take into account for the applicable
  performance and mass and balance requirements from the Operational Regulations.
- 1416 Performance and mass and balance functions should not extrapolate beyond information contained in 1417 approved data.
- 1418 Performance and mass and balance functions may have the capability to interpolate within the 1419 information contained in approved data but they should not extrapolate beyond it.
- 1420

# 1421 3.2 FUNCTIONS DISPLAYING OWN-SHIP POSITION

- 1422 This chapter specifies considerations for the depiction of own-ship position on an aeronautical maps or 1423 charts. It contains provisions that are generally applicable to all functions that display an own-ship 1424 position. Special provisions related to AMMD and to In-flight Weather are detailed in chapter 3.3 and 1425 3.4 respectively.
- 1426

# 1427 **3.2.1 Limitations**

- 1428 The display of own-ship position as an overlay on EFB functions shall not be intended for use as a 1429 primary source of information to fly or navigate the aircraft.
- Except on VFR flights over routes navigated by reference to visual landmark, the limitations provided with the EFB application should allow display of the own-ship symbol only in aircraft having a certified navigation display (moving map).
- 1433 In the specific case of IFW functions, the limitations provided with the EFB application should restrict 1434 the display of own-ship to aircraft equipped with a weather radar.
- 1435

# 1436 3.2.2 Position Source and Accuracy

- The display of own-ship position should be based on a GNSS or GNSS-based (e.g. GPS/IRS) position
   from certified aircraft equipment or a suitable portable COTS position source.
- 1439 Note: The selection of a position source in compliance with applicable operational regulations and the 1440 provisions in this section and is under operator responsibility.
- 1441 The own-ship symbol should be removed and the flight crew notified if:
- 1442 (1) The total system accuracy exceeds a certain threshold; or
- 1443 (2) No or invalid position data is received for 5 seconds.

#### 1444 Note: The term "total system accuracy" is defined and explained in RTCA DO-257().

- The total system accuracy threshold should be acceptable for the specific implementation of the function and should be selected such that erroneous misleading information is prevented. It may vary by chart type, phase of flight or selectable zoom scales.
- 1448 For functions displaying own-ship position in flight, it may be sufficient to consider position source 1449 accuracy only.
- 1450 Total system accuracy monitoring for the purpose of own-ship symbol removal may be unnecessary if
- the applicant can plausibly demonstrate for their implementation that the total system accuracy generally
- 1452 remains below the threshold because certain prerequisites are fulfilled (like certified aircraft equipment,
- 1453 a sufficiently accurate database or a sufficiently high total system accuracy threshold).
- 1454 The zoom level of the application may be limited to prevent suggesting a level of accuracy that is 1455 unrealistically high, which could lead to users misusing the function as a primary source of information.
- 1455 1456

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## 1457 3.2.3 Charting Data Considerations

1458 World Geodetic System (WGS-84) position reference system or an equivalent earth reference model1459 shall be used for all displayed data.

- 1460 If the map involves raster images that have been stitched together into a larger single map, it should be 1461 demonstrated that the stitching process does not introduce distortion or map errors that would not 1462 correlate properly with a GNSS-based own-ship symbol.
- 1463

# 1464 3.2.4 Human machine interface (HMI) Considerations

- 1465 3.2.4.1 <u>Interface</u>
- 1466 The flight crew shall be able to unambiguously differentiate the EFB function from avionics functions 1467 available in the cockpit, and in particular with the navigation display,
- A sufficiently legible text label 'AIRCRAFT POSITION NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATION' or equivalent should be continuously displayed by the application if the own-ship position depiction is visible in the current display area over a terminal chart (i.e. SID, STAR, or instrument approach) or a depiction of a terminal procedure.
- 1472 The 'not-to-be-used-for-navigation' limitation may be also covered by training.
- 1473

# 14743.2.4.2Display of own-ship symbol

- 1475 The own-ship symbol shall be different from the ones used by certified aircraft systems intended for 1476 primary navigation.
- 1477 The depiction of a circle around the EFB own-ship symbol may be used to differentiate it from the 1478 avionics one.
- The pilot should be able to obtain information about the operational status of the own-ship function (e.g. active, deactivated, and degraded).
- 1481
- 1482 A means to disable the display of the own-ship position shall be provided to the flight crew.
- 1483
- 1484 If direction/track is not available, the own-ship symbol shall not imply directionality.
- 1485 If directional/track data is available, the own-ship symbol should indicate directionality
- 1486 If own-ship directionality information becomes unusable then this condition should be indicated.
- 1487 If the own-ship symbol is directional, the front of the symbol that conveys directionality should 1488 correspond to the aircraft nose location.
- 1489 If the own-ship symbol is non-directional, the aircraft location should correspond to the centre of the 1490 non-directional symbol.
- 1491

# 1492 3.2.4.3 Map orientation

- 1493 The current map orientation shall be clearly, continuously and unambiguously indicated (e.g., Track-up 1494 vs North-up).
- 1495 The display in track-up mode should not create usability or readability issues. In particular, labels should 1496 not be rotated in a manner that affects readability.
- 1497 When the flight crew has selected a display orientation (e.g. Track-up), that display orientation should 1498 be maintained until a pilot action that requires an orientation change occurs.
- 1499 If the North-up display is selected, the orientation of the map itself should be referenced to True North.
- 1500 If direction information is referenced to True North, this should be indicated.
- 1501 True bearings should be labelled with "<sup>o</sup>T" to the right of the bearing value.
- 1502

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# 1503 3.2.4.4 <u>Map scale/range, panning</u>

- 1504 The function shall have the capability of manually changing the map range or scale
- 1505 The function should provide an indication of the map range or scale.
- 1506 The application zoom levels should be appropriate for the function and content being displayed and in 1507 the context of providing supplemental position awareness.
- 1508 If a scale is depicted, it should be indicated permanently.
- 1509 If the function is controlling the map range or scale automatically, the mode (e.g. auto map range) should 1510 be indicated.
- 1511 It is recommended that the range/scale indication be depicted on at least one of the charts/maps (e.g. airport moving map or static airport/ground map).
- 1513 If the function is controlling the map range or scale automatically, then the capability should exist to 1514 activate or deactivate the automatic map range.
- 1515 If a panning and/or range selection function is available, the capability to return to an own-ship-oriented 1516 display should be provided.
- 1517 When using the panning and/or range selection function, an indicator of own-ship current position should
- be provided within the overall displayed image. The indicator should be distinguishable from the ownship symbol.
- 1520 When the display is switched to a previously viewed page then the display should maintain the map 1521 range associated with that previously viewed page.
- 1522
- 1523
- 1524 3.2.4.5 Data displayed
- 1525 All overlayed data shall be presented in the same map orientation and scale as the base map.
- 1526

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1539 1540

1527 The following parameters must not be displayed in a way that allows deduction of the airplane status or 1528 deduction of information that could be used to steer the airplane:

- 1529 (i) Track/heading;
- 1530 (ii) Estimated time of arrival (ETA);
- 1531 (iii) Altitude;
- 1532 (iv) Geographical coordinates of the current location of the aircraft; and
- 1533 (v) Aircraft speed.

15353.3AIRPORT MOVING MAP (AMM) FUNCTION (INCLUDING OWN-SHIP1536POSITION)

- 1537 An airport moving map shall include the following minimum information and control elements:
- 1538 Runways
  - Runway Identifiers
  - Taxiways
- 1541 Ramp Areas
- Indication of map/chart scale (should)
- 1543 Indication of map/chart orientation
- Ability to select map/chart orientation
- Ability to select map range/scale
- Ability to declutter the map/scale
- 1547
- 1548
- 1549 The function should have a consistent prioritization scheme for layering map data.

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To ensure the availability of appropriate information during surface operations, the order of display layer precedence (in case aerodrome features overlap) should be (higher priority layered on top): Own-ship symbol (must be unobstructed)

- Taxi route 1553 b. Runway identifiers 1554 C.
- 1555 d. Runways

а

- 1556 Taxiway identifiers e.
- Taxiways 1557 f.
- 1558

1550 1551

1552

- 1559 The depiction of runways shall be distinctive from all other symbology.
- 1560 With the exception of instances where two or more runways intersect, each runway should be depicted as a contiguous area (i.e., an unbroken rectangle). 1561
- 1562

1564

- Runways and taxiways should be depicted as filled areas, rather than outlined areas. 1563
- A capability should exist to depict runway identifiers on the display when the runway is within the 1565 1566 selected map range/scale.
- 1567 At reduced map ranges, if only a small portion of the runway is visible, developers may choose to only 1568 depict one runway identifier.
- 1569

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1575

- 1570 If runway markings (e.g., runway centerline) are provided they should be depicted in their correct relative 1571 position.
- 1572 Runway identifiers should be distinguishable from the depiction of runway markings.
- If taxiways are depicted then a capability should exist to depict taxiway identifiers on the display. 1574

1576 Additional data on the display (over and above the minimum required data) should be depicted in a consistent way and should not interfere with the usability of the minimum data. 1577

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1581

- The aerodrome designator (e.g., ICAO identifier) or name for the depicted aerodrome should be 1579 indicated on the display. 1580
- Taxi route information shall be distinguishable from all other AMM elements. 1582
- 1583 The way taxi routes are depicted in a preview or edit mode should be distinctive from the depiction of 1584 the active taxi route.
- The depiction of taxi routes should not obscure runway or taxiway identifiers. 1585
- 1587 The function shall have the capability to present map information in at least one of the following orientations: North-up or Track/Heading-up (if direction/track is available). 1588
- 1589

1586

- 1590 All symbols shall be depicted in an upright orientation except for those designed to reflect a particular 1591 orientation.
- 1592 If symbols or fonts cannot be rotated, the map orientation should be limited to North-up - except for 1593 runway identifiers.
- 1594 Symbols used for one purpose on published paper charts should not be used for another purpose on 1595 the electronic function.
- 1596 The spatial relationships between labels and the objects that they reference should be clear, logical, 1597 and, where possible, consistent.

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1600

- 1599 The function shall have the capability for de-cluttering (e.g. manual or automatic) during operational use.
- 1601 Movement of map information should be smooth throughout the range of aircraft manoeuvres.
- 1602

1603 The system may provide the option to automatically remove the own-ship position when the aircraft is 1604 in flight or exceeds a certain ground speed.

1605

1606 The function should provide a means to compensate for installation dependent GNSS antenna offset 1607 (i.e., along-track aircraft reference point bias associated with GNSS antenna position relative to the nose 1608 of the aircraft). (see chapter 3.2.2)

- 1609 If the GNSS antenna offset cannot be compensated: operations with own-ship switched on may be 1610 limited to operations where the position source is in or near the flight deck.
- 1611

1614

- 1612 The application shall provide an indication when the database is no longer valid
- 1613 The application should require a pilot action acknowledging an expired database.
- 1615 Database corruption shall be detected and annunciated to the flight crew clearly and in a timely manner
- 1616

1619

1617 The AMM database accuracy and resolution should meet medium category data quality as defined in EUROCAE ED-99()/RTCA DO-272().

- 1620 3.4 WEATHER FUNCTION
- 16213.4.1General Considerations

An in-flight weather (IFW) application is an EFB function or application enabling the flight crew to access meteorological information. It is designed to increase situational awareness and to support the flight crew when making strategic decisions.

1625

1628

- 1626 IFW data shall not be intended to support tactical decisions and/or as a substitute for certified aircraft 1627 systems (e.g. weather radar).
- 1629 The use of IFW applications should be non-safety-critical and not necessary for the performance of the 1630 flight.
- 1631
- Any current information from the meteorological documentation required to be carried on board or from aircraft primary systems should always prevail over the information from an IFW application.
- 1635 An IFW function or application may be used to access both information required to be on board (e.g. 1636 World Area Forecast Centre (WAFC) data) and supplemental weather information.
- 1637

1634

1638 The displayed meteorological information may be forecasted and/or observed, and may be updated on 1639 the ground and/or in flight. It should be based on data from certified meteorological service providers or 1640 other reliable sources evaluated by the operator.

- 1641
- 1642 The meteorological information provided to the flight crew should be, as far as possible, consistent with 1643 the information available to users of ground-based aviation meteorological information (e.g. operations

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1644 control centre (OCC) staff, flight dispatchers, etc.) in order to establish common situational awareness 1645 and to facilitate collaborative decision-making.

#### 1647 **3.4.2 Display Considerations**

1648 Meteorological information should be presented to the flight crew in a format that is appropriate to the 1649 content of the information.

- 1650 Coloured graphical depiction is encouraged whenever practicable.
- 1651

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1652 The IFW display should enable the flight crew to:

- (1) Distinguish between observed and forecasted weather data;
  - (2) Identify the currency or age and validity time of the weather data;
- (3) Access the interpretation of the weather data (e.g. the legend);
- (4) Obtain positive and clear indications of any missing information or data and determine areas of uncertainty when making decisions to avoid hazardous weather; and
  - (5) Be aware of the status of the data link that enables the necessary IFW data exchanges, as applicable.

#### 1659 1660

1661 Meteorological information in IFW applications may be displayed, for example, as an overlay over 1662 navigation charts, over geographical maps, or it may be a stand-alone weather depiction (e.g. radar 1663 plots, satellite images, etc.).

- 1664 If meteorological information is overlaid on navigation charts, special consideration should be given to 1665 HMI issues in order to avoid adverse effects on the basic chart functions.
- 1666

1667 The meteorological information may require reformatting to accommodate for example the display size 1668 or the depiction technology. However, any reformatting of the meteorological information should 1669 preserve both the geo-location and intensity of the meteorological conditions regardless of projection, 1670 scaling, or any other types of processing.

1671

#### 1672 3.4.3 Procedures and training

- 1673 The operator shall establish procedures for the use of an Inflight Weather (IFW) application.
- 1674

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# 1675 This training should address:

(1) Limitations of the use of an IFW application:

- a. Acceptable use (strategic planning only);
- b. Information required to be on board; and
- c. Latency of observed weather information and the hazards associated with utilisation of old information;

#### (2) Information on the display of weather data:

- a. Type of displayed information (forecasted, observed);
- b. Symbology (symbols, colours); and
- c. Interpretation of meteorological information;
- 1685 (3) Identification of failures and malfunctions (e.g. incomplete uplinks, data-link failures, missing info);
  - (4) Human factors issues:
    - a. Avoiding fixation; and
    - b. Managing workload.
- 1689 1690

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## 1691**3.5ELECTRONIC CHECKLIST FUNCTION**

This section is applicable to electronic checklist (ECL) function. The initial part of this section will address the specific considerations for the risk assessment, for the Human Machine Interface (HMI) design and the various human factors aspects such as browsing in the application, connectivity of the application and accessibility to the ECL application from other applications. Finally, there will be a discussion on the presentation of checklist within an aircraft context.

# 1697 **3.5.1 Scope**

1698 This specific requirement provides the considerations applicable to the intended uses of electronic 1699 checklists as primary and sole means either when checklists are either manually selected by the flight 1700 crew or presented to the flight crew based on the aircraft context (flight phases, flight crew alert 1701 messages).

## 1702 3.5.2 Risk assessment

1703 The risk assessment shall evaluate the risks of the loss of the ECL function based on the intended uses 1704 as primary and only means and in the corresponding environmental conditions.

1705 The ECL hardware may be compatible with the required temperature conditions required for fire and 1706 smoke checklists

1707

1709

- 1708 The risk assessment shall evaluate the risks of undetected erroneous data
- 1710 The ECL hardware may be compatible with the required acceleration conditions (g loads) required for 1711 emergency landing or evacuation checklists
- 17121713 The risk assessment shall evaluate the risks of accessibility to the response time of the checklists
- 1714

# 1715 3.5.3 ECL HMI design and human factors considerations

1716 These HMI considerations are broken-down in two aspects: access to the ECL application and the 1717 browsing within the ECL application. The response time required to access the application depends on 1718 each specific checklist.

1719 For example, some non-normal and emergency checklists are time critical and require quicker access 1720 in comparison to other checklists such as normal checklists.

1721 3.5.3.1 <u>Checklist</u>

- 1722 This section applies to the browsing within the ECL application.
- 1723 3.5.3.1.1 <u>Accessibility</u>
- 1724 The response time of the checklist within the ECL application shall be compatible with its time criticality 1725 aspects.
- 1726

1727 Within the ECL application, shortcuts to time critical checklists should be available.

- 1728 Time criticality criteria may be defined by the type certificate holder or if not available then the evaluation 1729 will be done by the applicant.
- 1730
- 1731 It is recommended to organise the checklists in a specific order to improve the access time for the user.
- For example, Checklists may be organized by separating checklist and procedures, by flight phase or by criticality where the most critical items may appear first.
- 1734

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- 1736 The title of the checklist should be displayed and distinguished at all times when in use. 1737 The end of each checklist should be clearly indicated. 1738 1739 The field of view of each checklist should be limited to the viewing window of the hardware used by the flight crew to display the checklist. 1740 1741 1742 Having information displayed outside the flight crew immediate field of view may result in the loss of information when executing a checklist 1743 1744 3.5.3.1.3 ECL with interactivity 1745 ECL with interactivity refers to the possibility offered by an ECL HMI to reflect the actions of the flight 1746 crew. It offers a better situational awareness of the progress inside the checklist as well as an improved 1747 display of the checklist. Examples of actions include the recording of the completion of checklist or 1748 checklist items, the display of conditional branching of a checklist, the restart of checklist, etc. 1749 The ECL HMI shall reflect the actions and the progress of the flight crew in the checklists execution 1750 1751 1752 ECL shall provide a checklist overview displaying which checklists are completed and which are not. 1753 ECL should display the completion status of action items within a checklist. ECL should provide means to restart a checklist with a verification step to confirm the restart. 1754 ECL should provide means to check or uncheck an action item in a checklist. 1755 1756 ECL should provide means to prevent the flight crew from missing the applicable conditional branching(s) within a checklist. 1757 1758 1759 3.5.3.2 Access to the ECL application The access to ECL application depends upon the operational supporting environment. The operational 1760 supporting environment described in general section also applies to ECL applications and specific 1761 considerations are addressed through this section. 1762 1763 1764 The ECL application shall be easily usable and quickly accessible to the flight crew in accordance with the intended use 1765 1766 1767 Shortcut to directly access an ECL application, supporting the time critical checklists, should be available 1768 1769 The toggling between EFB applications on the same hardware may have an impact on the accessibility to the ECL application 1770 1771 1772 3.5.3.3 Supporting environment 1773 The support hardware shall minimize the effort of the flight crew to interact between ECL and cockpit equipment. 1774
- 1775 The hardware may be disconnected in order to achieve this capability.
- 1776
- 1777 3.5.3.4 ECL presented to the flight crew based on the aircraft context

1778 The intended use of those ECL is the capability to display automatically the normal check-list based on 1779 the flight phase and/or the abnormal/emergency checklists based on the data or events provided by the 1780 aircraft

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**Display** 

1735

3.5.3.1.2

1781 1782 The normal checklists shall be displayed at the right moment in the sequence of the flight 1783 1784 The non-normal/emergency checklists shall be displayed according to the alert messages 1785 3.6 **ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE FUNCTION** 1786 1787 This section provides considerations applicable to an electronic signature when used in EFB 1788 applications as sole and primary means. 1789 1790 3.6.1 Uniqueness The electronic signature shall identify a specific individual and shall be unique to this individual 1791 1792 A valid electronic signature shall be under the sole control of the signatory. 1793 1794 It shall be difficult for another individual to duplicate or alter one's electronic signature 1795 1796 1797 Electronic signature requiring the signatory to use a unique user name and password (or PIN code) with limited validity to access the system and affix the signature should be considered as appropriate. 1798 1799 Advanced electronic signatures, gualified certificates and secured signature-creation devices are 1800 1801 typically not required for this requirement. 1802 1803 Association 3.6.2 1804 The electronic signature shall be attached to or associated with the electronic record being signed. 1805 The electronic signature should identify the scope of the information being affirmed with by the signature 1806 1807 and it should be clear to the signatory and to the subsequent readers of the record, record entry, or 1808 document. 1809 It should be clear to the signatory exactly what it is that they are signing. In an electronic environment, 1810 the signer should have an opportunity to review the record before signing it, and to clearly understand 1811 1812 the parameters of the record they are signing. It is also critical that the signing process be established 1813 in a manner to ensure that the signatory's electronic signature is applied only to what they can review. 1814 The electronic signature applied by the signer should be linked to the record being signed. Satisfying 1815 1816 this requirement requires storing the data constituting the electronic signature and doing so in a way that permanently associates it with the electronic record that was signed. 1817 1818 1819 Significance 3.6.3 1820 The electronic signature shall show a deliberate and recognisable action for an individual to sign the electronic record to indicate a person's approval or affirmation of the information contained in the 1821 1822 electronic record. 1823 The signatory should be prompted before their signature is affixed. The electronic signature block should 1824

1825 contain a word or statement of intent that definitively conveys the signatory's intent to affix his or her 1826 signature.

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1827			
1828 1829	Acceptable deliberate actions for creating an electronic signature may include, but are not limited to, the following:		
1830	<ul> <li>Using</li> </ul>	a digital signature;	
1831	<ul> <li>Enter</li> </ul>	ing a user name and password;	
1832	<ul> <li>Swipi</li> </ul>	ng a badge; and/or	
1833	<ul> <li>Using</li> </ul>	an electronic stylus.	
1834			
1835	Examples of s	statements that do this may include, but are not limited to:	
1836	<ul> <li>"Sign</li> </ul>	ed by,"	
1837	<ul> <li>"Certi</li> </ul>	fied by,"	
1838	<ul> <li>"Instruction"</li> </ul>	uctor's signature/certification,"	
1839	<ul> <li>"Signation</li> </ul>	ature,"	
1840	<ul> <li>"Auth</li> </ul>	orized by,"	
1841	<ul> <li>"Sign</li> </ul>	atory,"	
1842	<ul> <li>"Auth</li> </ul>	entication,"	
1843	<ul> <li>"Ackn</li> </ul>	lowledged by,"	
1844	<ul> <li>"Ackn</li> </ul>	iowledgement," and/or	
1845	<ul> <li>"Affirr</li> </ul>	ned by."	
1846			
1847	The EFB appl	lication may notify the signatory that the signature has been affixed.	
1848			
1849	3.6.4	Non-repudiation	
1850	The electronic	signature shall prevent a signatory from denying (repudiating) that they affixed a signature	
1851	to a specific r	ecord, record entry, or document	
1852			
1052	An alastropia	aignoture should allow to ansure the outbanticity of the signoture and that the signor connect	
1000	dony baying c	signature should allow to ensure the aumenticity of the signature and that the signer cannot	
1004	ueny naving a	inved the signature to a specific record, document, or body of data.	
1855			
1856	The more diff	icult it is to duplicate a signature, the likelier it is that the signature was created by the	
1857	signatory		
1858			
1859	3.6.5	Traceability	
1860	An electronic	signature shall provide positive traceability to the individual who signed a record, record	
1861	entry, or any	pther document.	
1862			
1863	The user sha	It be able to identify and retrieve the documents to which his or her electronic signature	
1864	has been ann	lied	
1965	nuo boon upp		
1000	<b>T</b> I		
1866	I ne electroni	c signature should have authentication capabilities that can identify a signature as	
1007	to use a moth	y to a particular signatory. An individual using an electronic signature should be required	
1869	function		
1000	function.		
1870			
1871	3.6.5.1	Specific considerations for mass and balance records	
1872 1873	For electronic considered:	; signature affixed to mass and balance records, the following requirements should be	
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1875The individual's name and professional capacity should be printed-out on the relevant record(s) in such1876a way that it is evident, to anyone having a need for that information, who has signed the document

1877

1879

- 1878 The system should log information to indicate when and where the record has been signed.
- 1880 The requirements for record keeping remain unchanged by the requirements related to electronic 1881 signature
- 1882

#### 1883 **3.6.6 Security**

A valid electronic signature shall be a permanent part of the record or document to which it was affixed.
 The information to which the electronic signature is attached shall be unalterable without a new signature to validate the alteration.

- 1887
- 1888 There should be a means to preserve the integrity of the signed record.
- 1889

An electronic signature process should be secure and should prevent unauthorized access to the system that affixes the signature to the intended documents or records. The process should ensure that only the intended signatory can affix his or her signature and should prevent unauthorized individuals from certifying required documents. The process should prevent modifications to information/data or additional entries to records or documents without requiring a new signature.

1895

An electronic signature process should include a means to correct records or documents that were electronically signed in error, as well as those documents where a signature is properly affixed but the information or data is in error. An electronic signature should be invalidated any time a superseding entry is made to correct the record or document. The information or signature being corrected should be voided but remain in place. The new information and/or signature should be easily identifiable.

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1901	CHAPTER 4 OPERATIONAL AND INSTALLATION DATA			
1902				
1903 1904 1905 1906	This chapter defines the operational and installation data to be provided to the operators for integration of the EFB application into their operations. The objective is to ensure for the proper installation, administration, use and maintenance of the application by the operators.			
1907	4.1 EFB APPLICATION DESCRIPTION AND CHARACTERISTICS.			
1908 1909 1910	Applicants shall provide a description and characteristics of the EFB application including those established as means of compliance with the standard.			
1911 1912	This description and characteristics may include an overall view of the EFB application and the functions. These will support the airline in defining its own risk assessment. This is based on:			
1913 1914 1915	<ul> <li>The information used in determining the application's eligibility to be hosted on an EFB (§2.2)</li> <li>The information used to conduct the risk assessment (§2.3)</li> </ul>			
1916 1917	Applicants should provide an overall description of the EFB application including the version number.			
1918 1919	Applicants should provide the functional breakdown of the EFB application and the identification of non-EFB functions.			
1920				
1921	Applicants should provide the intended use of each EFB function and sub-function.			
1922	Applicants should provide a description of the supported operational operations			
1923	Applicants should provide a description of the supported operational environment.			
1925 1926	Applicants should provide all operational assumptions that support the risk assessment.			
1927 1928 1929	Applicants should provide the relevant information from the risk assessment that allows the operator to conduct its risk assessment. It should contain the following information for each EFB function and sub-function.			
1930 1931 1932 1933	<ul> <li>Hazards identified during the Risk Assessment process.</li> <li>Mitigation means including responsibilities allocated to the operator.</li> <li>Prevention means including responsibilities allocated to the operator.</li> </ul>			
1934 1935	It is responsibility of the operator to complete, apply and validate mitigation and prevention means.			
1936	4.2 EFB APPLICATION ADMINISTRATION			
1937				
1938 1939 1940	Applicants shall provide administration instructions and limitations including instructions and limitations established as means of compliance with the standard.			
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945	The administration instructions and limitations are based on the development assurance set by the applicant (§2.5). It also includes the information necessary for the administrator to manage the EFB application on all the users platforms, i.e. the identification of the database used (§2.6), the security preventions (§2.7) and the configuration of the EFB application software.			

1946 Applicants should provide the minimum performance specifications required of any network connection 1947 for usage of the EFB application. 1948 1949 The network connections include, but are not limited to: 1950 Air/Ground Aircraft communication EFB Cellular or WiFi connectivity 1951 1952 On-board networks 1953 Applicants should provide all distribution information relevant to the operator. 1954 1955 1956 If applicable, applicants should provide installation guidelines. 1957 Applicants should provide a description of the known issues and suggested solutions to address them. 1958 Applicants should provide the identification of the database used by the EFB application. This includes 1959 the identification of the databases that may be modified and administrated by the operator (i.e. 1960 1961 configuration files). If the database is not approved with the EFB application, it should include the characteristics of the data. 1962 1963 1964 When applicable, applicants should provide a description of the application configuration options including configuration management guidelines. 1965 1966 1967 Applicants shall provide security preventions expected to be followed by the operator on an ongoing 1968 basis. 1969 1970 The provided security preventions may include: Security prevention means not implemented at function level, expected in the integrated 1971 environment of use of the EFB application 1972 Security procedures to maintain the protection of the function 1973 1974 **EFB APPLICATION OPERATIONAL INFORMATION** 1975 4.3 1976 Applicants shall provide operational information, instructions, limitations and any other means necessary to ensure that the EFB application is adequately and safely used by the flight crew. Any operational 1977 information, instructions, limitations or any other data established as means of compliance with the 1978 standard shall be included. 1979 1980 Operational information is provided to ensure the use of the EFB application in accordance with the 1981 intended use and the outcome of the risk assessment defined by the applicant. 1982 1983 1984 Applicants should provide a user manual or other equivalent means describing the usage of the EFB application. 1985 1986 1987 Applicants may propose equivalent means to user manual such as: application instructions, in-app help 1988 etc. 1989 1990 Intuitive user interfaces for basic functionalities may not require user manual descriptions. 1991

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Applicants should provide the operator with sufficient information to define flight crew procedures for the
 basic and safe use of the EFB application. Any flight crew procedures used as mitigation means for the
 Risk Assessment should be identified.

1996 Flight crew procedures may cover application usage in normal and degraded conditions (e.g. degraded 1997 functionalities, loss of the EFB application in one platform, etc.)

#### 1998

1995

Applicants should provide operators sufficient information to ensure appropriate flight crew training.Flight crew training items used as mitigation means for the Risk Assessment should be identified.

2001

2003

2002 Applicants may provide training items for initial and recurrent training/checking.

Applicants may provide reference to recommended training means such as e-learning, on-site training, etc.

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2008

#### 2009

# **APPENDIX 1**

# EXAMPLES OF HOW TO APPLY THE SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT TO AN EFB APPLICATION

THREAT	VULNERABILITY		
Name		Proposed mitigations	
OBSERVE.LOG- OVERKILL OBSERVE.LOG- PROTECT	application sends too much logging data	<ul> <li>Specify and Implement a security log policy to be able to detect any cyber security incident on the application over EFB application.</li> <li>Apply a good design practice on the application system in order to         <ul> <li>Ensure the maintainability and the evolution of the application logging system (define and use a dedicated homogeneous application logging function to be used by all the application system components).</li> <li>use as much as possible the logging capabilities of the EFB platform OS (this will centralize the application logs with all the EFB logs, the log processing and management will rely on the OS responsibility, the aircraft operator or maintenance personnel will be able to tune the log policy directly from the EFB system)</li> <li>make event log messages as clear / as simple as possible</li> <li>rationalize event log messages frequency (e.g., manage a counter of identical event logs after a 1st occurrence is logged, group log messages with counter information,)</li> <li>Define a severity level for each of the application log messages and map this severity with the severity scale associated with the EFB OS log system.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Apply a good design practice on the application system in order to . use as much as possible the logging capabilities of the EFB platform OS (this will centralize the application logs with all the EFB logs, the log processing and management will rely on the OS responsibility, the aircraft operator or maintenance personnel will be able to tune the log policy directly from the EFB system</li> </ul>	
		users access rights allocated on the application log files (MAC policy). With such protection mean, an attacker would have to acquire application or user access rights before to be	

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THREAT	VULNERABILITY		
Name		Proposed mitigations	
		able to delete or directly alter the content of the application log files.	
		EFB system available data encryption and authentication mechanisms can also be used to protect the application, application resources files and logs against unauthorized access. (e.g., recommend to activate the EFB cyphering, ask that the EFB user authenticates itself on the EFB before to be able to use the application).	
OBSERVE.UNABLE	Lack of security event policy implementation	<ul> <li>Specify and Implement a security log policy to be able to detect any cyber security incident or corruption to the application.</li> <li>Apply a good design practice on the application system in order to         <ul> <li>Ensure the maintainability and the evolution of the application logging system (define and use a dedicated homogeneous application logging function to be used by all the application system components).</li> <li>use as much as possible the logging capabilities of the EFB platform OS (this will centralize the application logs with all the EFB logs, the log processing and management will rely on the OS responsibility, the aircraft operator or maintenance personnel will be able to tune the log policy directly from the EFB system</li> <li>rationalize event log messages as clear / as simple as possible</li> <li>rationalize event log messages frequency (e.g., manage a counter of identical event logs after a 1st occurrence is logged, group log messages with counter information,)</li> <li>Define a severity level for each of the application log messages and map this severity with the severity scale associated with the EFB OS log system.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
USURP	Weak of authentication in application dataflow exchanges	<ul> <li>Activate cyphering OS mechanism on the EFB + user login protection before unlock the access to the application binary and data. Or recommend the end user to</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>To implement a mechanism which increases the security (confidentiality, integrity and authenticity) of the dataflow exchanged between the involved legitimate application and application</li> <li>We could imagine establishing a secured communication tunnel (using TLS1.2 for instance) between each application and application which are involved in the application for EFB system before any application dataflow is exchanged.</li> </ul>	

THREAT	VULNERABILITY			
Name		Proposed mitigations		
INJECTION	No trusted path on application air- ground communication link	<ul> <li>Assess the absence of implementation vulnerabilities of the application for EFB software by following the security coding rules, perform code review to validate that there is no vulnerability, use tooling to detect eventual defects and patch the found vulnerabilities.</li> <li>Perform regularly a COTS vulnerability assessment and provide patches or workaround procedures when relevant.</li> </ul>		



Name	Company or Organisation



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2016	6 IMPROVEMENT SUGGESTION FORM		
2017	Name:	Company:	
2018	Address:		
2019	City:	State, Province:	
2020	Postal Code, Country:	Date:	
2021	Phone:	Fax:	
2022	Email:		2
2023 2024 2025	Document : ED- / DO-	Sec:Pa	ge:Line:
2023 2026 2027 2028	<ol> <li>Documentation error (Format, p</li> <li>Content error</li> <li>Enhancement or refinement</li> </ol>	unctuation, spelling)	
2029	Rationale (Describe the error or justification	tion for enhancement):	
2030			
2031			
2032 2033	Proposed change (Attach marked-up te	kt or proposed rewrite):	
2034			
2035			
2036			
2037			
2038	Please provide any general comments for	or improvement of this document:	
2039			
2040			
2041			
2042	Return completed form to:		
2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050	EUROCAE Attention: Secretariat General 9 – 23 rue Paul Lafargue 93200 Saint-Denis France Email: <u>eurocae@eurocae.net</u>		

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