



EVTOL PROPULSION SYSTEM SAFETY

EASA Rotorcraft & VTOL Symposium
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DISTRIBUTED ELECTRIC PROPULSION



SAFETY

**PREPARED
FOR THE
FUTURE**

**PAYLOAD
FLEXIBILITY**

SPEED

Opportunities and Challenges of Electric Propulsion

Opportunities:

- Reduced complexity of components
- Wide number of options for system architecture and arrangement
- Elimination of (some) critical parts
- Propulsion system dissimilarity
- Integrated health monitoring
- Ease of maintenance
- Reduced pilot workload

Challenges:

- Increased system complexity
- Propulsion system closely coupled to flight controls
- Weight and cost of redundant systems and components
- Complexity of systems analysis and certification
- Heavy reliance on electronics systems and software

Trade opportunities and challenges to optimize for mission

Handling Propulsor Failure Modes


Potential Propulsor Failure Modes:

- **Rotor Stoppage** → Major Hazard if propulsion is redundant
- **Structural Failure** → **Catastrophic, independent of redundancy**
 - Release of uncontained high energy debris
 - Cascading failure to other rotors
 - Imbalance & vibration
- **Loss of Rotor Speed Control** → **Catastrophic, independent of redundancy**
 - Severe Rotor Overspeed
 - Severe Rotor Speed Oscillation


**DESIGN MUST ADDRESS ANY CATASTROPHIC FAILURE MODES
REDUNDANCY ALONE INADEQUATE → CRITICAL PARTS REQUIRED**

Sizing Case Study on Propulsion Architecture

Case 1:
Redundant, Non-Critical Rotors,
Single Motor per Rotor




Case 2:
Critical Rotors,
Dual-Redundant Motors per Rotor




 Non-Critical Parts  Critical Parts

Sizing for Redundancy: Nominal Hover



C.G. Centered, Static Hover, System Nominal

$$T_1 = T_2 = T_3 = T_4 = T_5 = T_6 = T_n$$



C.G. Offset, Systems Nominal


T_n (Nominal Thrust, $6T_n = \text{Gross Weight}$)

Assume 20% Thrust margin for C.G.

$$T_2 = 1.2 T_n$$

$$T_1 = T_3 = T_4 = T_6 = T_n$$

$$T_5 = .8 T_n$$



C.G. Offset, Rotor 2 Failure

$$T_2 = T_5 = 0$$

$$T_1 = T_4 = 1.7 T_n$$


$$T_3 = T_6 = 1.3 T_n$$

$$P_i \approx T_i^{1.5}$$

$$P_1 = P_4 = 2.2 P_n$$

FAILURE OF SINGLE (HEX) ROTOR REQUIRES 2.2X HOVER POWER RATING!

Critical Rotor, Dual Motor, Offset C.G.



C.G. Offset, Single Motor Failure

$$T_2 = .7 T_n$$

$$T_1 = T_4 = 1.2 T_n$$







$$T_3 = T_6 = 1.2 T_n$$

$$T_5 = .5 T_n$$

$$P_1 = P_4 = 1.3 P_n$$

HEX ROTOR, DUAL MOTOR, SINGLE FAILURE: 1.3X HOVER POWER RATING

Critical vs Non-Critical Rotors


Issues Addressed by Design	Case 1: Redundant Non-Critical Rotors, Single Motor per Rotor	Case 2: Critical Rotors, Dual-Redundant Motors per Rotor
Rotor Stoppage	 Redundancy	 Critical Rotor
Rotor Structural Failure		 Critical Rotor
Loss of Speed Control		 Critical Rotor
Power Rating	2.2x Hover	1.3x Hover

Critical Rotor Design is Lighter and Addresses Safety Requirements

VTOL Aircraft With Critical Rotors & Redundant Propulsion

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THANK YOU