

APUS i-2

Flight conditions and PtF for innovative products

World-class Engineering. Superior Economics.
Clean Aviation.

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
APUS – Location

The headquarter of **APUS** is located 30 km east of Berlin. The offices and workshops are directly connected to the runway and taxiway of the highly developed airport EDAY.



APUS Zero Emission

Lilienthalstraße 2
15344 Strausberg
GERMANY



Facts – APUS Zero Emission

Founded
Experience (Key Staff):
Approvals/Certificates:

2014
20 Years+ (each)
EASA 21J / 21G / ISO 9100

Staff:
Infrastructure:

70+
350 sqm Offices
1.300 sqm Work-Shop
1.500 sqm Test-Area

Overview of Key Points


- **APUS i-2 Overview**
- **Hydrogen Components**
- **Hydrogen Safety**
- **Challenges and Outlook**



APUS i-2 Overview



APUS i-2 Overview



- MTOM 2,200 kg
- LoA 8.86 m
- Wing span 13.20 m
- Wing area 18.73 m²
- MTOP (shaft) 2 x 135 kW
- MCP (shaft) 2 x 95 kW

APUS i-2 PtF approach – Hydrogen System Components

- All hydrogen components are COTS or as close to existing COTS as possible.
- Example: 6 identical type IV vessels in wing
 - designed as standard type IV tanks for 350 bar NWP
 - Key requirements selected in acc. to established standards for type IV vessels (UNECE 134).
 - Reduced scope of testing comp. to full UNECE 134
 - PoC application with restricted conditions & service life!
 - But 100% tracing of quality recordings from supplier manufacturing!
- The originally envisaged wing with structurally integrated tanks had to be skipped to achieve PoC 1st flight within an acceptable time and cost frame



APUS i-2 PtF approach – Hydrogen Safety

- compared with kerosene, hydrogen has the disadvantages of a much wider flammability range and 1/15th the ignition energy
- advantage of a much higher Lower Flammability Limit (LFL 4.1% cf. 0.7%)
 - Exploiting the higher hydrogen LFL (cf. kerosene) is a key point to consider
- low ignition energy leads to the notion, that flammable H₂ atmospheres tend to spontaneously combust and that H₂ leaks lead to immediate ignition
- a distinctive ignition mechanism is always involved.
 - When all ignition mechanisms can be avoided, a hydrogen fire does not occur even in flammable atmospheres or in the case of (large) leaks..

APUS i-2 PtF approach – Hydrogen Safety

- The hydrogen storage and supply system and the fuel cell system (FCS) are rather complex systems, spread over several aircraft zones, that use a novel technology with a significant potential fire hazard associated.
 - → Mitigation by passive and active ventilation, monitoring of H₂ concentration and control of ignition sources → FTA, ZSA
 - Testing is performed to understand hydrogen permeation and leaks
 - To understand how the hydrogen fuel systems “leaks”
 - and how hydrogen compartments ventilate,
 - from the first rig testing of system elements, through complete system testing and to experimental flight tests.

APUS i-2 PtF approach

- Mutually agreed TC application (instead of Annex I), though only proof-of-concept (PoC) test flights targeted.
 - Good learning experience for later certification activities
 - Possibility to be part of EASA rule-making
- CS-23 performance-based objectives allow manufacturers flexibility to meet the intent of the rules through innovative technologies
 - Also requires deep understanding of innovative technologies on both sides!
- Difficulties in understanding expectations and requirements on both sides.
 - e.g. scope and level of detail of reports
 - Lack of guidance material
- PoC activities within TC project introduce additional hurdles
 - TC application triggers DO scope extension at a very early stage of the PoC!

APUS i-2 outlook on type certification

- Type Certification (TC) is a complex and resource-intensive process even for conventional projects
- Novel technologies lead to ambiguities in how CS-23 applies, leading to lengthy discussions with regulators.
- Requirements due to complex system design often significantly above comparable CS 23 level.



- More **risk-based assessment** envisioned
 - especially in the technology development/prototype phase
 - proportionate to the A/C category

Thank you!