



Explanatory Note to Decisions 2017/005/R, 2017/006/R, 2017/007/R, 2017/008/R, 2017/009/R, 2017/010/R, 2017/011/R and 2017/012/R

Update of the acceptable means of compliance and guidance material on air operations

RELATED NPA/CRD 2015-18 — RMT.0516 & RMT.0517

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

These Decisions, amending the acceptable means of compliance (AMC) and guidance material (GM) to the annexes to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Air OPS Regulation'), address a regulatory issue related to the rules on air operations. EASA is issuing these Decisions following the outcome of consultations performed in the context of the activities of RMT.0516 & RMT.0517.

The specific objectives of the Decisions are to:

- (a) perform an editorial update of the air operations rules;
- (b) better identify inspector qualifications;
- (c) provide operators with more flexibility regarding the location of the emergency medical kit (EMK);
- (d) address identified safety issues such as passenger (emergency exit) seating and briefing; and
- (e) address implementation issues related to helicopter sling load operations.

The proposed changes are expected to ensure alignment with ICAO. In addition, through said changes, EASA expects to ensure an efficient and proportionate set of implementing rules (IRs) and AMC/GM on air operations and to resolve any inconsistencies identified following the adoption of the Air OPS Regulation, reflecting thus the state of the art and best practices in the fields concerned. The Decisions also introduce new AMC/GM in response to safety recommendations.

Action area:	Regulatory and oversight considerations		
Affected rules:	AMC/GM to all the annexes to the Air OPS Regulation		
Affected stakeholders:	All operators and NAAs		
Driver:	Safety: Emerging issues	Rulemaking group:	No
Impact assessment:	Light	Rulemaking Procedure:	Standard

● EASA rulemaking process milestones




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1. About these Decisions

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed, in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008¹ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the Rulemaking Procedure², the following ED Decisions:

- 2017/005/R (GM to Definitions);
- 2017/006/R (AMC/GM to Part-ARO);
- 2017/007/R (AMC/GM to Part-ORO);
- 2017/008/R (AMC/GM to Part-CAT);
- 2017/009/R (AMC/GM to Part-SPA);
- 2017/010/R (AMC/GM to Part-NCC);
- 2017/011/R (AMC/GM to Part-NCO); and
- 2017/012/R (AMC/GM to Part-SPO).

This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA [5-year Rulemaking Programme](#) under RMT.0516 & RMT.0517. The scope and timescales of the task were defined in the related Terms of Reference (ToR)³.

The draft text of this Decision has been developed by EASA. All interested parties were consulted through NPA 2015-18⁴, on the ‘Update of the rules on air operations’, which was divided into the following three sub-NPAs (A), (B) and (C):

- sub-NPA (A) ‘Draft Implementing Rule’;
- sub-NPA (B) ‘Draft AMC/GM’; and
- sub-NPA (C) ‘Draft Implementing Rule and Draft AMC/GM on passenger seating and briefing’.

Regarding sub-NPA 2015-18 (B), 275 comments were submitted by 36 commentators, including EU competent aviation authorities, aircraft manufacturers, air operators and several associations. Concerning sub-NPA 2015-18 (C), 75 comments were submitted by 23 commentators, including national aviation authorities, organisations/associations, air operators, and individuals.

EASA reviewed the comments received during the consultation. The comments received and the EASA responses thereto are presented in Comment-Response Documents (CRDs) 2015-18 (B) and (C)⁵. Based on the comments received, EASA has taken the decision to publish these Decisions.

The major milestones of this rulemaking activity are presented on the title page.

¹ Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1) (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1467719701894&uri=CELEX:32008R0216>).

² The Agency is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of the Basic Regulation. Such a process has been adopted by the Agency’s Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 01-2012 of 13 March 2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by the Agency for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (Rulemaking Procedure).

³ <http://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/ToR%20to%20RMT.0516%20AND%20RMT.0517%20-%20Issue%202.pdf>

⁴ In accordance with Article 52 of the Basic Regulation and Articles 5(3) and 6 of the Rulemaking Procedure.

⁵ <http://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/comment-response-documents>



2. In summary — why and what

2.1. Why we need to change the AMC/GM

These Decisions, amending the AMC and GM to the annexes to Air OPS Regulation, address a regulatory issue related to air operations. EASA is issuing these Decisions following the outcome of consultations performed in the context of the activities of RMT.0516 & RMT.0517.

2.2. How do we address safety recommendations

The following table summarises the outcome of the EASA assessment of safety recommendations that were addressed through RMT.0516/0517.

SWED-2011-011	Safety recommendation: The European Aviation Safety Agency is recommended to consider the need for expanded information and checking of understanding emergency evacuation procedures, of passengers who are expected to act in emergency evacuation of aircraft.
	Reference: Final report on the serious incident to aircraft LN-KKD at Arlanda airport, Stockholm County, Sweden, on December 20, 2009, issued by the Swedish Accident Investigation Board on 01 September 2011 (Ref. RL 2011:10e, Case L-22/09).
	Outcome: The proposed new GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.170(a) 'Passenger briefing' addresses this safety recommendation. The new guidance material recommends instructions that the passenger(s) should receive through an 'exit briefing'. It also recommends verification by the cabin crew that the passenger has understood the instructions received.
UNKG-2002-043	Safety recommendation: The CAA and JAA should review the requirements for passenger safety cards to ensure that, for aircraft with overwing exits, the safety card is required to clearly depict the emergency escape route(s) from the cabin, via the wing, to the ground.
	Reference: AAIB Bulletin No: 3/2003 on the incident to Fokker F28 Mark 0100 (Fokker 100), Registration G-UKFI, at Manchester International Airport, on 01 April 2002, issued by the UK AAIB in 2003 (Ref. EW/C2002/4/1).
	Outcome: New GM is developed by EASA addressing the need for a clear depiction for passengers of emergency escape routes from the cabin via the wing to the ground for aircraft with overwing exits (see point (f)(6)(iii) of GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.170 'Passenger briefing — SAFETY BRIEFING MATERIAL').
UNKG-2014-005	Safety recommendation: It is recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency amend AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.170, 'Passenger briefing', to ensure briefings emphasise the importance of leaving hand baggage behind in an evacuation.
	Reference: Report on the accident to Airbus A330-343, G-VSXY, at London Gatwick Airport, on 16 April 2012, issued by the UK AAIB on 12 February 2014 (Ref. Aircraft



	Accident Report 1/2014).
	<p>Outcome: The amendments to AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.170 address the recommendation for passengers to be briefed on the importance of leaving hand luggage behind in case of evacuation (see points (a)(1)(iii) and (c)(1)(iii)).</p> <p>This safety issue is also addressed in the newly developed GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.170 ‘Passenger briefing — SAFETY BRIEFING MATERIAL’ [see point (f)(5)(vi)].</p>
UNKG-2014-006	<p>Safety recommendation: It is recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency develops recommendations on the content of visual aids such as safety briefing cards or safety videos to include information on how passengers, including those with young children, should use the escape devices.</p>
	<p>Reference: Report on the accident to Airbus A330-343, G-VSXY, at London Gatwick Airport, on 16 April 2012, issued by the UK AAIB on 12 February 2014 (Ref. Aircraft Accident Report 1/2014).</p>
	<p>Outcome: The new GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.170 ‘Passenger briefing — SAFETY BRIEFING MATERIAL’ addresses both the safety briefing card and the safety video and provides guidance on the minimum content, as applicable to the aircraft and the type of operation. Inclusion of information on how passengers, including those with young children, should use the escape devices is addressed in point (f)(7)(iv).</p> <p>Furthermore, EASA Safety Information Bulletin SIB 2013-06, published on 17 May 2013, also provides information on evacuation with young aircraft occupants.</p>

2.3. What we want to achieve — objectives

The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. These Decisions will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by updating the AMC/GM to the Air OPS Regulation.

The specific objectives of these Decisions are to:

- (a) perform an editorial update of the air operations rules;
- (b) better clarify and identify inspector qualifications;
- (c) provide operators with more flexibility regarding the location of the emergency medical kit (EMK);
- (d) address identified safety issues such as passenger (emergency exit) seating and briefing stemming from related safety recommendations; and
- (e) address implementation issues related to helicopter sling load operations.



2.4. How we want to achieve it — overview of the amendments

2.4.1 Amendments to the AMC/GM to Definitions (Annex I)

Weight and mass

Regarding the proposed new GM on ‘weight’ and ‘mass’, the comments from stakeholders have been partially accepted. The proposed text is the mere transposition of the explanatory material present in EU-OPS and JAR-OPS 3 section 2 which was not originally transposed. EASA accepts some of the clarifications proposed in the comments provided and has amended the text in relation to the International System of Units (SI) system. However, it is considered that the reference to ICAO Annex 5 is not wrong because as also quoted in the content, the use of the term ‘weight’, although not recommended, in practice is acceptable when its meaning is clear.

2.4.2 Amendments to the AMC/GM to Part-ARO (Annex II)

Inspector qualifications

In the interest of more precision and clarity regarding inspector qualifications and of a proportional and uniform implementation of the requirements pertaining to inspector qualification, EASA is issuing new AMC/GM on inspector qualifications. Comments received during the consultation period of [A-NPA 2014-12](#), on the European Commission policy initiative on aviation safety and a possible revision of the Basic Regulation, demonstrated the need to clarify the qualification of inspectors when overseeing CAT operators. Today’s authority requirements related to the qualification of OPS inspectors (ARO.GEN.200) only require inspectors to be ‘qualified to perform their allocated tasks and have the necessary knowledge, experience, initial and recurrent training’. The associated AMC does not specify qualification elements for certain tasks.

Following the specific concerns raised on inspector qualifications, a task force, composed of EASA staff and NAA representatives as well as a representative from the FAA, was set up in 2013. The Taskforce developed a detailed matrix identifying the aircraft-specific inspector qualifications needed for each AOC holder certification task. This matrix was circulated to the EASA Management Board (MB) members in July 2013; EASA then committed to transpose it into regulatory material, as no objections were raised to the proposed course of action.

An advance draft text transposing the outcome of the EASA/NAA Task Force’s work into AMC/GM was presented to the OPS/FCL TAG in March 2015, in order to check whether the proposed way forward was supported. Contrary to the initial positive reception, most NAAs found the proposal to be too demanding/too prescriptive. While acknowledging the reasons that led to its development, NAAs requested EASA to develop a more proportionate and flexible approach. Furthermore, several NAAs highlighted the need to agree on a general framework of competencies that OPS inspectors should possess to fulfil the current and future needs (assessment of management systems, performance-based oversight, etc.).

EASA took note of such inputs and committed to develop a revised proposal accordingly. This revised proposal on inspector qualifications was subject to a second pre-NPA consultation during August/September 2015.

Following the comments received, the EASA revised proposal includes a set of specific inspector qualifications, but in parallel ensures a certain degree of flexibility in terms of required technical



background and knowledge, also depending on the type of operations. Amendments to the AMC on inspector qualifications were made to cater for those authorities certifying and overseeing CAT operators with aircraft with a maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of less than 19 seats. The Decision also includes a transition period of 24 months to allow authorities to implement the AMC.

Flight time limitations

The new GM1 ARO.OPS.235(b);(c) was not consulted through NPA 2015-18 (B). Said GM refers competent authorities to the new ICAO Doc 9966 in order to get further guidance on the approval of individual flight time specification schemes. This GM was developed based on the feedback received from stakeholders through questions raised and through standardisation visits and will provide more clarity on the subject matter.

RAMP inspections

Some minor editorial changes were made to the AMC/GM pertaining to ARO.RAMP. With regard to ramp inspectors, the Decision clarifies the requirements for initial appointment, recency and the conditions for re-qualification. GM has been amended following input from standardisation.

2.4.3 Amendments to the AMC/GM to Part-ORO (Annex III)

Changes to nominated person

Many comments did not agree with EASA's clarification that a change of a nominated person does not require prior approval.

EASA maintains its proposal and clarifies that the change of a nominated person does not require prior approval. The AMC to Part-ARO already refer to the importance of the initial application for an AOC and the careful review of the qualifications of the organisations' nominated persons. However, a change of a nominated person does not require prior approval. AMC 1 to ORO.GEN.130 specifies that In the case of a planned change of a nominated person, the operator should inform the competent authority before the date of the proposed change.. As the rules were adopted in 2012, a prior approval for the nominated person was not foresee. However the change management process to be agreed between the authority and the operator under ARO.GEN.330(c) and ORO.GEN.130(c), include the possibility to establish a specific change management procedure, which can also include specific conditions related to the changes to nominated persons. EASA understands that point (a) of AMC1 ARO.GEN.330 might be interpreted as requiring prior approval for the nominated person. Therefore, next to the GM1 ORO.GEN.130(b), EASA has also amended AMC1 ARO.GEN.330 to clarify that such changes do not require prior approval.

Flight time limitations

The following new changes are proposed to GM related to flight time limitations and have not been consulted with NPA 2015-18 (B) of RMT.0516/0517:

- GM2 ORO.FTL.105(1) — new GM to the definitions to further explain the concept of acclimatisation;
- GM1 ORO.FTL.120 — new GM on fatigue risk management pointing towards the ICAO Doc 9966 (Manual for the Oversight of Fatigue Management Approaches);



- GM1 ORO.FTL.120(b)(3) — new GM on fatigue risk management (FRM) to explain the scientific method, which may be required as an element of proactive fatigue hazard identification;
- New GM to CS FTL.1.235 (b)(3) on additional rest to compensate for time zone differences to further explain the rest requirements for complex rotations; and

2.4.4 Amendments to the AMC/GM to Part-CAT (Annex IV)

Location of EMK

Following the entry into force of the Air OPS Regulation, EASA received numerous queries from operators and NAAs pointing at the difficulties to comply with CAT.IDE.A.225, specifically with the associated AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.225 which states that the EMK should be kept in a ‘locked compartment’ when carried in the cabin. Some of the queries were seeking an opinion either on designs of lockable compartments for the carriage of the EMK in the cabin or on the possible solutions to comply with the requirement. In the case of a medical emergency on board that requires the use of any supplies from the EMK, the rapid access to the medical kit may be vital to saving the passenger’s or crew’s life. Stowage of life-saving equipment in a locked compartment may not be the only option of secured carriage and may also cause some delays in retrieving the equipment in case of an in-flight medical emergency as padlocks, locks or combination locks may get jammed; keys may be misplaced, missing or difficult to retrieve. The EMK should continue to be carried under secure conditions in the cabin with easy access, while preventing unauthorised access to passengers and to any other persons who are not authorised to handle it. The NPA proposed to remove the recommendation on the carriage of the EMK in a locked compartment, providing thus the operator with flexibility to find other suitable secure locations in the cabin. EASA received six comments, all of them supporting the proposal. One commentator suggested to remove the term ‘secure location’ from the AMC; this has been carefully considered and also discussed with the EASA TAG Expert group on cabin crew and cabin/passenger safety. Following the above, AMC2 CAT.IDE.A.225 is amended, and the new GM1 CAT.IDE.A.225 is introduced to explain that ‘secure location’ refers to a location in the cabin that is not intended to be used by passengers and preferably to which passengers do not have access.

Passenger seating

The regulatory impact assessment to this part of Decision extensively explained the reasons for this rulemaking activity in the Explanatory Note (EN) and in the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). The AMC/GM related to passenger seating addresses safety recommendations (SRs) addressed to EASA. Only one commenter questioned the conclusion of the impact assessment, stating that an inadequate level of safety cannot be proven by safety data. The commenter questioned whether the seat row adjacent to unmanned emergency exits must be occupied. EASA in its response clarified that the proposed AMC/GM addresses safety recommendations following accident and incidents, who support the proposed AMC/GM.

The update of AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 is based on a request by the European Commission to address the absence of a specific regulatory reference requiring the seat rows with direct access to emergency exits to be occupied during taxiing, take-off and landing by passengers or crew members. Currently, AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 only specifies that the operator should make provisions so that passengers with seat allocation permitting direct access to emergency exits appear to be able to assist in an



evacuation. In the absence of such specific regulatory reference, the IR and the related AMC and GM may be perceived as general and open to interpretation in this respect.

The newly introduced point (a) of AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 clarifies that at least one seat on each side in a seat row with direct access to emergency exits (not staffed by cabin crew members) should be occupied by passengers during taxiing, take-off and landing. The operator should also pay due attention to mass and balance limitations and the available passenger numbers.

The proposal on occupancy of seats that provide direct access to exits was supported by the majority of the commentators who also suggested to improve the text and to make it more detailed and specific, e.g. to reflect that passenger(s) occupying a seat with direct access to exit should be willing to assist the crew. In cases of low passenger numbers on the flight, the seating by the exit(s) not staffed by cabin crew members may not be possible due to the necessity to observe the mass and balance restrictions and also due to the fact that preference may be given to seating these passengers in the vicinity of the floor level exits which are staffed by cabin crew members. The commentators requested to amend the text to also reflect the low passenger numbers on board. Some commentators were of the opinion that recommending passenger seating by exits not staffed by cabin crew members is unrealistic. Some stakeholders stated that there is no need for seat rows with direct access to exits to be occupied by passengers if these exits are staffed by cabin crew members.

AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 is amended in response to a practice increasingly followed by some EU operators whereby seat(s)/seat rows with direct access to exits (not staffed by cabin crew members) are left empty during taxiing, take-off and landing if no passenger has paid the extra charge imposed by the operator for the occupancy of those seats. Today, the air safety rules establish clear criteria for passengers seated in seats that permit direct access to emergency exits. Those passengers have to appear to be reasonably fit, strong and able to assist the rapid evacuation of the aircraft.

The practice of leaving the emergency exit seat row empty poses the following risks:

- Passengers in the vicinity of the empty emergency exit seat row are not reasonably fit, strong and able to assist in case of an emergency evacuation, e.g. children, special categories of passengers.
- Passengers in the vicinity would have to move from their seat to the emergency exit seat row, thus delaying a possible evacuation. The aisle(s) is (are) likely to be obstructed by passengers trying to make their way out.

Passengers are not aware of the use and operation of the exit in case of an emergency and will be confused as to *who* is to act and *how* to open the exit in case of an emergency. Cabin crew members are likely to be too far away and may not be able to reach the exits or give commands. Passengers might open the exit, even though it should remain closed if the outside conditions require so, i.e. due to smoke, leading to further endangering aircraft occupants (e.g. dense smoke entering the cabin).

The existing EU air operations rules do not contain any clear requirements, AMC or GM on emergency exit briefing, or on safety briefing material and its content. The current EU legislation only requires that passengers receive a demonstration of *the location* of emergency exits. The absence of clarity on the seating of emergency exit seat rows could lead to delayed or incorrect actions by passengers which may ultimately lower the survivability of aircraft occupants.



Passenger emergency exit seating

The newly developed GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.165 provides guidance to operators when considering the appropriate measure with regard to occupancy of seat(s)/seat rows with direct access to exits.

One commentator suggested a clarification that not all the seats in a row with direct access to exit need to be occupied by passengers. Another commentator was of the opinion that the seat immediately adjacent to the exit is not the best choice for the passenger due to the disadvantage of only one armrest on that seat; this is a certification option, as the operator may opt for an armrest mounted on the exit. The proposal on the occupancy of the seat immediately adjacent to the exit was included to accommodate those operators who only consider this seat to be ‘the exit seat’ and ultimately only brief that passenger on the operation and use of the exit. One commentator requested a clarification of the term ‘passenger who appears reasonably fit and strong’ used in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 and another comment discussed developing a definition of ‘able-bodied person’. The Air OPS Regulation does not use the term ‘able-bodied’ persons, but rather refers to ‘passenger who appears reasonably fit and strong’. One commentator suggested that passengers should be informed by the operator on the exit seating suitability already at the time of booking and GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.165 has been amended accordingly.

Passenger briefing

Regarding the impact assessment only one commenter questioned the need to include in AMC the need to brief the passenger sitting in the seat row of an unmanned emergency exit, since this operator already has such a procedure in place. EASA in its response clarified the current EU operational rules do not contain any requirements, AMC or guidance material on exit briefing or on safety briefing material and its content. The current Air OPS framework only foresees that passengers receive a demonstration of the location of emergency exits.

The update of AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.170 is based on two factors:

- three independent occurrences, two incidents, and one accident which urged the investigative bodies to address four safety recommendations to EASA, and
- alignment with ICAO Annex 6 and ICAO Doc 10002.

Some commentators requested clarification on briefing or reminders to passengers on ‘smoking regulations, if applicable’. The inclusion of ‘smoking regulations, if applicable’ has been transposed from EU-OPS. Although the ‘no smoking in public places’ policy is rather common today and the majority of operators have adopted such policy, it is not harmonised across the EU, neither it is globally. There may be operators (e.g. business, private, VIP jets) conducting commercial air transport operations permitting smoking on board. Thus the AMC as such cannot be deleted. However, the comments have been taken into account and a new point, specifically on smoking regulations, has been added. The new text provides the operator with the flexibility to decide, on the frequency of such briefing or reminders to passengers.

Passenger briefing – EMERGENCY EXIT BRIEFING

The newly developed GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.170(a) is based on safety recommendation SWED-2011-011 addressed to EASA. This GM recommends the basic instructions the passenger(s) should receive during an exit briefing.



Some commentators suggested revising the provision that passengers and crew should communicate in the *same* language. Although the inclusion of ‘same’ was to highlight the *mutual understanding*, it became clear through the comments that the use of ‘same’ may be misunderstood. EASA has deleted the reference to a mutual understanding.

Some commentators discussed the fact that passengers seated by exits not staffed by cabin crew members should also be ready, i.e. willing, to assist the crew. The commentator proposed the aspect of willingness for inclusion in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.165 and the EASA TAG Expert group on cabin crew and cabin/passenger safety concluded that during the ‘exit briefing’ cabin crew members should check the passenger’s willingness to assist’ and that the passenger has understood the instructions.

Passenger briefing – SAFETY BRIEFING MATERIAL

The newly developed GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.170 ‘Passenger briefing — SAFETY BRIEFING MATERIAL’ contains guidance for operators and national aviation authorities on safety briefing cards and on safety videos, as applicable to the aircraft and the type of operation. It was developed based on safety recommendation UNKG-2002-043 addressed to EASA.

The majority of the commentators fully supported the proposed content, suggested a few amendments or had no comments on it, and some commentators believed it was too prescriptive. When drafting the proposal, EASA had reviewed numerous safety briefing cards and safety videos and summarised their content in this GM2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) contains detailed provisions on passenger safety briefing and safety briefing material in AC121-24(C), and the Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) mandates the content of safety cards on the level of IR.

The originally proposed GM2 recommended that the use of subtitles in a language different from that of the soundtrack should be avoided due to distraction when trying to watch and read at the same time. Some commentators opposed such guidance material, as they apply such system in their specific type of operation and others believed that since it was a common practice in television and cinematographic broadcasting, there is no issue with the same practice during safety briefings. The use of subtitles in safety videos is beneficial, not only for passengers with hearing impairments, who are however unlikely to be disturbed by a different language in the form of a soundtrack. Safety video relays important safety information related to that aircraft/flight which may be vital to the passenger on that particular flight. Hearing one language whilst simultaneously reading and trying to process the vital information in another language may prove to be counterproductive. Indeed, it is a common practice to subtitle movies; however, the purpose of an entertainment broadcasting is different from that of an aviation safety briefing. The operator should ensure when providing safety information that may become vital to passengers on that particular flight, that there are no factors that may lead to a mix-up or non-understanding (caused by disturbances such as simultaneous processing of two different languages at a time) of the safety aspects.

Based on the comments received, EASA has amended the GM on safety briefing material.

2.4.5 Amendments to the AMC/GM to Part-SPA (Annex V)

RVSM operational approval

Insertion of the new AMC3 SPA.RVSM.105 ‘RVSM operational approval’ on CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS to ensure that AMC to SPA.RVSM contain specific continuing airworthiness



references for the application/approval of RVSM operations, and to transpose Chapter 10 of JAA's TGL6 to the European Air OPS rules.

2.4.6 Amendments to the AMC/GM to Part-NCC (Annex VI)

Instruments and equipment

Insertion of the new GM1 NCC.IDE.A.100(b) to clarify which instruments and equipment do not need to be approved in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements.

2.4.7 Amendments to the AMC/GM to Part-NCO (Annex VII)

Other persons on board

This Decision implements a recommendation from the GA Road Map to ensure that an accompanying pilot can be considered as part of the crew.

2.4.8 Amendments to the AMC/GM to Part-SPO (Annex VIII)

Helicopter sling load operations (HESLO)

EASA was informed by NAAs in April and May 2016 that a number of provisions under AMC1 SPO.SPEC.HESLO needed to be amended.

In particular:

- The requirements for the HESLO instructor were deemed so restrictive that a shortage of HESLO 4 and 5 instructors was foreseen. In addition, the lack of grandfather rights would not allow all the current instructors to keep instructing HESLO.
- The introduction of a heavy-lift category was deemed irrelevant to HESLO 1, 2, and 3 operations. With the experience requirements for HESLO 4 and 5 being very similar, it was also deemed irrelevant to introduce a heavy lift category within HESLO 4.
- Draft versions of the AMC and guidance material included a GM on practical training. This GM was later omitted. As a result, guidance for the practical training of HESLO pilots was missing, when HESLO is an activity that requires practical training.
- Pilot experience was a prerequisite to entering training, which was not helping with building up pilot experience under supervision.
- The existing AMC/GM failed to address the variations in the complexity of HESLO operations within a HESLO type, depending on the kind of operations and the environment. More specifically, mountain operations were not properly covered.
- For task specialists, crew resource management (CRM) training or briefings had not been considered because it was not foreseen that task specialists would do work similar to that of a technical crew member.

A focused consultation with industry and authorities stakeholders took place between 12 May 2016 and 12 August 2016.

- Conditions for the nomination of a HESLO instructor are made less restrictive.
- HESLO 5 category is deleted. This makes the requirements for the lifting of loads above 1 500 kg less restrictive, except for construction work (HESLO 4).



- Pilot minimum practical training for HESLO 1, 2, 3, and 4 is defined, which is more prescriptive than the previous AMC, but the minimal training is less restrictive than the GM published in the CRD.
- For HESLO 1 and 2, experience prior to starting training is reduced in order to offer the option to build up experience under supervision, resulting in less restrictive regulations for non-specialised HESLO activities.
- Required experience for HESLO when changing helicopter types is simplified and made less restrictive
- Regarding the variations in complexity within a particular HESLO type:
 - Specialised HESLO activities that were possible to operate under HESLO 1 and 2 are transferred to HESLO 3.
 - Mountain experience prior to HESLO operations in mountain areas is introduced instead of additional experience as PIC for HELSO training in mountain areas.
 - Operators are to define training programmes, making regulations more restrictive.
 - The conditions to perform unsupervised HESLO operations are made more restrictive by the introduction of a proficiency test.
- Regarding task specialists, the training requirements are more restrictive with the introduction of CRM training or briefings.

Human external cargo (HEC)

A review of SPEC.HEC requirement was made together with SPEC.HESLO. One of the main goals was to keep HEC and HESLO consistent, while the following problems were identified and had to be addressed:

- HEC levels were defined but used only for the nomination of the HEC instructor.
- Altitude limits were introduced in the definition of HEC levels although altitude is not relevant to the complexity of the task.
- The definition of HEC levels was such that flying a HEC cycle with a short line at low altitude may add to a pilot's experience in all HEC levels, which was not intended.
- Either HESLO 1 or 2 was needed as a prerequisite in order to perform HEC operations, when the aim was to require HESLO 1 for HEC 1 and HESLO 2 for HEC 2.
- As in HESLO, the lack of grandfather rights would not allow all the current instructors to keep instructing HEC.

The resulting text introduces the following changes:

- The deletion of altitude limits in HEC levels for simplicity
- The deletion of HEC 3 for simplicity
- The introduction of HESLO 2 competency as a prerequisite for HEC 2, making HEC 2 slightly more restrictive
- The introduction of a HEC proficiency assessment, making HEC operations more restrictive
- The introduction of CRM training and briefings for HEC task specialists, into the training of task specialists.



- The deletion of the requirement for the HEC instructor to hold an FI rating, making the nomination of HEC instructors less restrictive.

Further convergence of HEC and HHO training and experience was thought not to be possible within the framework of this rulemaking task because a full consultation would be required. As a result, it was not introduced.

2.5. What are the benefits and drawbacks

An update of the AMC/GM ensures that the regulatory framework for air operations is state of the art and that feedback obtained from stakeholders on implementation difficulties is assessed and the AMC/GM amended accordingly.

On inspector qualifications, the AMC/GM ensures that inspectors overseeing commercial air operations are appropriately qualified for specific tasks that require certain skills and knowledge.

2.6. How do we monitor and evaluate the rules

The Rulemaking Task on the update of the Air OPS Regulation and the related AMC/GM is a result of the EASA's monitoring and evaluation activity. In air operations, EASA continuously monitors the implementation of the rules and AMC/GM via input received through standardisation inspections, feedback from stakeholders and via the EASA advisory bodies, as well as questions received from stakeholders. This process will also be applied in the future.



3. References

3.1. Related regulations

Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1).

3.2. Affected AMC and GM

- (a) [Decision 2012/015/R](#) of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012 on acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council — ‘Guidance material to Annex I — Definitions’
- (b) [Decision 2014/025/R](#) of the Executive Director of the Agency of 28 July 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ARO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2014/014/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-ARO — Issue 3’
- (c) [Decision 2014/017/R](#) of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2’
- (d) [Decision 2014/015/R](#) of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to Part-CAT of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 October 2012 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2’
- (e) [Decision 2012/019/R](#) of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24th October 2012 on acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council — ‘Acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to Part-SPA’
- (f) [Decision 2013/021/R](#) of the Executive Director of the Agency of 23 August 2013 on adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for Non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (Part-NCC)
- (g) [Decision 2014/016/R](#) of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-NCO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2013/022/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 23 August 2013 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-NCO — Issue 2’
- (h) [Decision 2014/018/R](#) of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-SPO of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 — ‘AMC and GM to Part-SPO’



3.3. Reference documents

- (a) SWED-2011-011: Final report on the serious incident to aircraft LN-KKD at Arlanda airport, Stockholm County, Sweden, on December 20, 2009, issued by the Swedish Accident Investigation Board on 01 September 2011 (Ref. RL 2011:10e, Case L-22/09).
- (b) UNKG-2002-043: AAIB Bulletin No: 3/2003 on the incident to Fokker F28 Mark 0100 (Fokker 100), Registration G-UKFI, at Manchester International Airport, on 01 April 2002, issued by the UK AAIB in 2003 (Ref. EW/C2002/4/1).
- (c) UNKG-2014-005: Report on the accident to Airbus A330-343, G-VSXY, at London Gatwick Airport, on 16 April 2012, issued by the UK AAIB on 12 February 2014 (Ref. Aircraft Accident Report 1/2014).
- (d) UNKG-2014-006: Report on the accident to Airbus A330-343, G-VSXY, at London Gatwick Airport, on 16 April 2012, issued by the UK AAIB on 12 February 2014 (Ref. Aircraft Accident Report 1/2014).



4. Appendices

- (a) Appendix 1 — CRD 2015-18 (B)
- (b) Appendix 2 — CRD 2015-18 (C)

