EASA
European Union Aviation Safety Agency

Conflict Zone Information Bulletin

Airspace of Syria

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Revision description:
16/11/2026 – The CZIB validity was extended until 30 April 2027. No changes were made to the content or recommendations.

Valid until:
30/04/2027
30/04/2027, unless reviewed earlier.

Referenced publication(s):
Aeronautical Publications issued by or on behalf of Syria, by the Aviation Authorities of the neighbouring States and by the State of Operator.

Affected Airspace:
FIR Damascus (OSTT), all altitudes and flight levels.

Affected Countries:
Syria

Applicability:
Applies to operators

Applicability Description:

Air operators:
- subject to the provisions of Commission Regulation (EU) 965/2012, planning to conduct operations in the affected airspace (EASA operators); and
- third Country Operators authorised by EASA, when conducting operations under their TCO authorisation to, from and within the EU (TCO operators).

Description:

This CZIB is issued based on information currently available to EASA, the European Commission and Member States in order to share information which is considered necessary to ensure the safety of flights over zones of interest and indicate areas of high risk.

The airspace over Syria continues to be affected by the wider regional security dynamic, the presence of multiple State and non-State actors, as well as recurrent foreign military operations.

Iranian missile and UAS transits towards Israel and US/Jordanian targets remain recurrent, but largely escalation driven. Their direct impact on civil overflights of Syria is generally assessed as limited due to the trajectories involved. However, interception activity against Iranian ballistic missiles targeting Israel or Jordan may create high risks to civil aviation in particular in south-western Syrian airspace. In addition, interceptions of ballistic missiles targeting Israel may take place at considerable distances from Israeli airspace and may result in falling debris affecting other parts of Syrian airspace.

Israeli military strikes against targets in Syria remain recurrent, although they are generally limited in duration and concentrated in the south-west of the country. At the same time, the overall degradation of Syria’s long-range air-defence network has reduced the risk of misidentification and unintended engagement of civil aircraft. Air-defence systems associated with other State actors are assessed as primarily providing localised protection of specific areas and are not currently considered to have a significant direct impact on civil overflight operations.

At lower altitudes, violent non-State actors retain capabilities, including UAS, rockets and MANPADS, creating additional risks primarily below FL260.

Available data also indicate that kinetic and associated air-defence activity is concentrated predominantly during the hours of darkness.

While improvements have been observed in the dissemination of aeronautical information and the management of conflict-related risks, fragmented control of the airspace and limited coordination mechanisms continue to constrain effective deconfliction and the timely dissemination of relevant information.

Overall, the main risks to civil aviation remain concentrated in the south-western parts of Syria and at lower altitudes across the country. At higher altitudes, the risk to overflights is reduced. Nevertheless, regional escalation in the Middle East may result in missile and UAS activity, associated interceptions and falling debris, temporarily increasing risk exposure, including at higher flight levels.

EASA, together with the Commission and Member States, will continue to closely monitor the situation, with a view to assess whether there is an increase or decrease of the risk for EU aircraft operators due to the evolution of the threat and risk situation.

Recommendation(s):

Air operators should:

1. Not operate at all flight levels and altitudes, west of the line connecting navigation points **ZELAF – BASEM – LOTAX - LATEB**, including airways segments forming this boundary.
2. Not operate below FL 260 in the remainder of the FIR Damascus (OSTT).
3. Exercise caution and take potential risks into account when operating at and above FL260 in the portion of the Damascus FIR (OSTT) not covered by point 1 above.
4. Consider scheduling operations during daylight hours as an additional risk-mitigation measure.
5. Ensure that an up-to-date risk assessment and a high level of contingency planning are in place for operations within the affected airspace, and be prepared for short notice instructions from the State authorities.
6. Closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications concerning the region, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities.