

Airspace of the Middle East and Persian Gulf

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Status:

Active

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Revision description:

01/07/2026 - The validity of the CZIB was extended until 8 July 2026, with no changes to its content or recommendations.

Valid until:

08/07/2026

08/07/2026, unless reviewed earlier.

Referenced publication(s):

Aeronautical Publications issued by the affected countries, and by the State of Operator.

Affected Airspace:

Unless otherwise specified, all altitudes/flight levels in the airspace of: Bahrain (Bahrain FIR – OBBB), Iran (Tehran FIR – OIIX), Iraq (Baghdad FIR – ORBB), Israel (Tel Aviv FIR – LLLL), Jordan (Amman FIR – OJAC), Kuwait (Kuwait FIR – OKAC), Lebanon (Beirut FIR – OLBB), Oman (Muscat FIR – OOMM), Qatar (Doha FIR – OTDF), United Arab Emirates (Emirates FIR – OMAE) and Saudi Arabia (FIR Jeddah - OEJD).

Affected Countries:

Bahrain
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Oman
Qatar
United Arab Emirates
Saudi Arabia

Applicability:

Applies to operators

Applicability Description:

Air operators:

- subject to the provisions of Commission Regulation (EU) 965/2012, planning to conduct operations in the affected airspace (EASA operators); and
- third Country Operators authorised by EASA, when conducting operations under their TCO authorisation to, from and within the EU (TCO operators).

Description:

This CZIB is issued based on information currently available to EASA, the European Commission and Member States in order to share information which is considered necessary to ensure the safety of flights over zones of interest and indicate areas of high risk.

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel conducted military strikes targeting sites within Iranian territory. In response, Iran carried out retaliatory attacks. The resulting military conflict created high risks not only to the airspace of Iran but also to that of neighbouring States hosting U.S. military bases or otherwise affected by the hostilities and associated military activities, including interceptions.

A temporary ceasefire between the United States and Iran, initially announced on 8 April 2026, remained in effect until 17 June 2026, when the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding formally extending it for a further 60 days. As a result, the situation has moved from an active intense conflict with a high number of kinetic events to a state of heightened

tension, with limited, sporadic and confined kinetic events. Short term violations of the US-Iran ceasefire therefore remain possible, in particular in and around the Strait of Hormuz and neighbouring airspace. While risks to aircraft operating in this airspace can be reduced through proactive airspace management and contingency measures, such mitigations are less effective in addressing risks to aviation infrastructure on the ground. Operators should therefore consider the potential vulnerability of airports and other critical aviation facilities when conducting risk assessments for their operations in the region.

Given the ongoing high level of tensions and the potential for further military action, Iran maintains a high level of alert for its air force and air defence units nationwide, which creates an increased likelihood of misidentification within the FIR Tehran (OIIX).

In addition, the airspace over Iraq (ORBB/FIR Baghdad) continues to be affected by recurrent Iranian strikes and the ongoing operations of violent non-state actors (VNSAs), in particular Iranian-backed militant groups (IBMGs).

Furthermore, despite a fragile ceasefire currently in place between Israel and Hezbollah, there remains a potential for military activity affecting the airspace of Lebanon. Coupled with the limited actions in terms of air space risk management of the State concerned, there continues to be high risk to civil aircraft at all altitudes and flight levels within the airspace of Lebanon.

While the overall level of risk has decreased in the region, the sustainability of the ceasefire remains uncertain in the longer term, with a possibility of rapid escalation. Therefore, close monitoring and up-to-date risk assessments remain essential to ensure safety of flights. Should the existing truce break down, the airspaces covered by this Bulletin are likely to be exposed to imminent threats.

In terms of airspace management during the conflict, most of the States concerned have taken measures to address airspace risks by implementing temporary airspace closures and restrictions, thereby contributing to the mitigation of risks to civil aviation.

EASA, together with the Commission and Member States, will continue to closely monitor the situation, with a view to assess whether there is an increase or decrease of the risk for EU aircraft operators due to the evolution of the threat and risk situation.

Recommendation(s):

Air operators should:

1. Not operate within the affected airspace of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon at all flight levels and altitudes.
2. Exercise caution and take potential risks into account when operating within the airspace of Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, UAE and Saudi Arabia.
3. Ensure that an up-to-date risk assessment and a high level of contingency planning are in place for operations within the airspace specified in point 2 above, and be prepared for short notice instructions from the State authorities.
4. Closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications concerning the region, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities.

Air operators are reminded that the following CZIBs remain in effect with recommendations not to operate at all flight levels and altitudes:

- CZIB on airspace of Syria (CZIB-2017-03R19)
- CZIB on airspace of Yemen – Sana'a Flight Information Region (CZIB-2017-07R19)