

## **Airspace of the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon)**

**CZIB number:**

2025-02 R2

**Status:**

Withdrawn

**Issue date:**

13/06/2025

**Revision date:**

Mon, 30/06/2025 - 12:00

**Revision description:**

The validity of the CZIB has been extended until 7 July 2025. The description has been updated, and the recommendation regarding Lebanese airspace has been amended to include an exception for operations to Beirut International Airport under specific conditions.

**Valid until:**

07/07/2025

07/07/2025, unless reviewed earlier.

**Referenced publication(s):**

Aeronautical Publications issued by the affected countries, and by the State of Operator.

**Affected Airspace:**

All altitudes/flight levels in the airspace of: Iran (Tehran FIR – OIIX), Iraq (Baghdad FIR – ORBB), Israel (Tel Aviv FIR – LLLL), Jordan (Amman FIR – OJAC), and Lebanon (Beirut FIR – OLBB).

**Affected Countries:**

Iran  
Iraq  
Israel  
Jordan  
Lebanon

**Applicability:**

Applies to operators

**Applicability Description:**

Air operators:

- subject to the provisions of Commission Regulation (EU) 965/2012, planning to conduct operations in the affected airspace.
- third Country Operators authorised by EASA, when conducting operations under their TCO authorisation to, from and within the EU.

**Description:**

This CZIB is issued based on information currently available to EASA, Member States and the European Commission in order to share information which is considered necessary to ensure the safety of flights over zones of interest and indicate areas of high risk.

From 13 June 2025 onwards, Israel conducted a military strike targeting sites within Iranian territory. In response, Iran launched retaliatory attacks.

The resulting conflict posed high risk not only to the airspace of Iran and Israel but also to that of neighbouring States affected by the hostilities and associated military activities, including interceptions.

On 23 June 2025, Iran launched ballistic missiles at U.S. military bases in Qatar in retaliation for the U.S. military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities carried out the day before. On 24 June 2025, a ceasefire was agreed upon, pausing hostilities between Iran and Israel.

In terms of airspace management during the conflict, most of the States concerned have taken measures to address airspace risks by implementing temporary airspace closures and restrictions. However, a rapid resumption of hostilities could pose challenges to the timely and

effective implementation of such measures.

Although the recent conflict created regional spillover risks, the Lebanese airspace, including Beirut International Airport, has not been directly affected. However, persistent risks stemming from tensions between Israel and Hezbollah remain relevant for Lebanon's airspace.

Given the fragile nature of the ceasefire, there remain high risks for the affected airspaces of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon, except for operations starting from the sea to Beirut International Airport and departures ending over the sea.

As a consequence of the above, there are also additional spillover medium level risks in the adjacent airspace of 100NM surrounding western and southern Israeli borders in eastern part of the FIR Cairo (mainly over Sinai) and the northern part of the FIR Jeddah.

EASA, the Commission and Member States, will continue to closely monitor the situation, with a view to assess whether there is an increase or decrease of the risk for EU aircraft operators due to the evolution of the threat and risk situation.

**Recommendation(s):**

Air operators should:

1. Not operate within the affected airspace of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan at all flight levels.
2. Not operate within the airspace of Lebanon at all flight levels, except for operations to Beirut International Airport (BEY / OLBA) under following conditions:
  - approach starting from the sea / departure ending over the sea,
  - under continuous risk monitoring and an up-to-date risk assessment.
3. Take potential risks into account in risk assessment and routing decisions in the portions of the airspace within 100 NM from the Israeli western and southern borders in FIR Cairo and FIR Jeddah.
4. Closely monitor airspace developments in the region and follow all available aeronautical publications concerning the region, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones, alongside available guidance or direction from their national authorities.

The present CZIB supersedes the following CZIBs and Information Notes:

- CZIB on the airspace of Lebanon (2024-01 R4);
- CZIB on the airspace of Iraq (CZIB-2017-04R17);
- Information Note on threat and risk situation in the airspace of Iran;
- Information Note on threat and risk situation in the airspace of Israel (FIR Tel Aviv - LLLL) and neighbouring airspaces.