

# European Safety Promotion Network Rotorcraft (ESPN-R)

## Safety Workshop



**helitech<sup>®</sup>**  
**international**  
HELICOPTER EXPO & CONFERENCE

**16-18 OCT 2018** AMSTERDAM  
RAI

In association with



## SMS Case Study

Presented by:  
**Dr Ilias Panagopoulos**

# Safety Management System (SMS) at a glance

## 10 Critical Slides

ICAO SMS Reference material:

[https://www.unitingaviation.com/publications/safetymanagementimplementation/content/#/?\\_k=lbllsw](https://www.unitingaviation.com/publications/safetymanagementimplementation/content/#/?_k=lbllsw)

## ‘Safety’: Definition

**Safety** is the state in which **risks** associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are **reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.**


(ICAO ANNEX 19, published 14 Nov 2013\*)

*\*If there should be any differences in the definitions, the Annex 19 definitions shall prevail*

## ICAO SMS Framework


SMS Main Components	
1	Safety Policy and Objectives
2	Safety Risk Management
3	Safety Assurance
4	Safety Promotion

# The safety management process: The Big Picture




# Hazard Identification

## Understanding Risk: The Bow Tie Model





# SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT: within the Bow-Tie diagram



# The results of the Integrated Risk Management (IRM) Common Risk Register or Hazard Log Safety Action Group (SAG) level




Control ID	Risk Owner	Occurrence, hazard or concern	Undesirable Event	Worst Credible Outcome	P	S	E	Initial Risk	Risk Validation	Mitigations	Authorization of Operation	Residual Risk	Risk Actionee(s)	Actual (current) risk state	Last update	Comment -Timeline
OPS_001	Safety Manager	Engine Failure	Auto-rotation	Ditching, post crash fire, injuries, fatalities, crash	H	H	M	High	Chief Pilot	Inform Aircrew, pax, Training, SIM, SOP, QRH	Accountable Manager (AM)	Medium	FLT OPS, Mx, CAMO	High	15 Oct 2018	2 events, not in the company but in the world - wide fleet
AW_003								High				Low		Medium		
GND_007								Medium				Low		Medium		
ATM_103								Medium				Low		Low		
HR_022								Medium				Eliminated		Low		
TRN_009								Medium				Low		Low		
OHS_014								Low				Low		Medium		
SEC_001								Low				Low		Low		
CM_018								Low				Eliminated		Eliminated		

**Risks are reduced to an Acceptable Level**




# Control:

## Average and Standard Deviation (STDV)



# Risks are Controlled to an Acceptable Level



# EU/EASA Hard and Soft Law

Applicable to all Member States	Adopted by	Status
<b>Regulations of the European Parliament and the Council</b> <b>Example: EC 1136/2018, 1321/2014, EC 965/2012</b>	<b>The European Parliament and Council</b>	<b>Legally binding</b> <b>SHALL</b>
<b>Implementing Rules (IR)</b> <b>Examples:</b> <b>PART ORO, PART-M, PART-145, PART-147/66</b>	<b>European Commission</b>	<b>Legally binding</b> <b>SHALL</b>
<b>Certification Specifications (CS)</b> <b>Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC)</b> <b>Guidance Materials (GM)</b>	<b>EASA</b>	<b>Not legally binding</b> <b>SHOULD</b>

## Liabilities & Legal Responsibilities

This is the reason why EASA introduced the ‘**Compliance Monitoring (CM) function**’ next to SMS requirements and calls this integration of SMS+CM as ‘**Management System**’

EASA Management System Assessment Tool: [https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/214081\\_EASA\\_MANAGEMENT\\_SYSTEM\\_ASSESSMENT\\_TOOL.pdf](https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/214081_EASA_MANAGEMENT_SYSTEM_ASSESSMENT_TOOL.pdf)

# SMS Case Study 1

## Tailwind Approach to helipad

## ‘Safety’: Definition

**Safety** is the state in which **risks** associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are **reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.**

(ICAO ANNEX 19, published 14 Nov 2013\*)


*\*If there should be any differences in the definitions, the Annex 19 definitions shall prevail*

## ICAO SMS Framework


SMS Main Components	
1	Safety Policy and Objectives
2	Safety Risk Management
3	Safety Assurance
4	Safety Promotion



# The safety management process: The Big Picture



# BOW-TIE Risk Management methodology



Root Causes:  
Power lines in the vicinity  
Wind 11-16 gust from 120°

# The results of the Integrated Risk Management (IRM) Common Risk Register or Hazard Log Safety Action Group (SAG) level




Control ID	Risk Owner	Occurrence, hazard or concern	Undesirable Event	Worst Credible Outcome	P	S	E	Initial Risk	Risk Validation	Mitigations	Authorization of Operation	Residual Risk	Risk Actionee(s)	Actual (current) risk state	Last update	Comment -Timeline
OPS_001	Safety Manager	Engine Failure	Auto-rotation	Ditching, post crash fire, injuries, fatalities, crash	H	H	M	High	Chief Pilot	Inform Aircrew, pax, Training, SIM, SOP, QRH	Accountable Manager (AM)	Medium	FLT OPS, Mx, CAMO	High	15 Oct 2018	2 events, Not in the company but in the world - wide fleet
OPS_002	Chief Pilot	Tailwind App	Tail Rotor loss, pitch/roll oscillations, Vortex Ring State (VRS)	Go Around, Hard landing, Crash	H	H	M	High	Director of OPS	Inform Aircrew, Reduce engine power, CRM, Training F/S	Accountable Manager (AM)	Low	Chief Pilot, Head of Training	Medium	11 Oct 2018	

**Risks are reduced to an Acceptable Level**

# Risks are Controlled to an Acceptable Level

## Tailwind App Occurrences



# Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

What if the Air Operator will be involved in an AS-350 serious incident or accident as a result of a tail-wind approach?

How the Air Operator should respond in a situation like this in an effort to  
‘Minimize the Damage’  
(i.e. to the People, Assets, Reputation, Finance)?

# SMS Case Study 2

## Failure of Tail Rotor Blade



## ‘Safety’: Definition

**Safety** is the state in which **risks** associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are **reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.**


(ICAO ANNEX 19, published 14 Nov 2013\*)

*\*If there should be any differences in the definitions, the Annex 19 definitions shall prevail*


## ICAO SMS Framework

SMS Main Components	
1	Safety Policy and Objectives
2	Safety Risk Management
3	Safety Assurance
4	Safety Promotion

# The safety management process: The Big Picture



# BOW-TIE Risk Management methodology



$$\text{TOTAL RISK} = P \times S \times E$$

**Root Causes:**  
Design issues  
Defects  
Production discrepancies  
Torsion box thickness reduction

# The results of the Integrated Risk Management (IRM) Common Risk Register or Hazard Log Safety Action Group (SAG) level



Control ID	Risk Owner	Occurrence, hazard or concern	Undesirable Event	Worst Credible Outcome	P	S	E	Initial Risk	Risk Validation	Mitigations	Authorization of Operation	Residual Risk	Risk Actionee(s)	Actual (current) risk state	Last update	Comment -Timeline
OPS_001	Safety Manager	Engine Failure	Auto-rotation	Ditching, post crash fire, injuries, fatalities, crash	H	H	M	High	Chief Pilot	Inform Aircrew, pax, Training, SIM, SOP, QRH	Accountable Manager (AM)	Medium	FLT OPS, Mx, CAMO	High	15 Oct 2018	2 events, Not in the company but in the world - wide fleet
OPS_002	Chief Pilot	Tailwind App	Tail Rotor loss, pitch/roll oscillations, Vortex Ring State (VRS)	Go Around, Hard landing, Crash	H	H	M	High	Director of OPS	Inform Aircrew, Reduce engine power, CRM, Training F/S	Accountable Manager (AM)	Low	Chief Pilot, Head of Training, Safety Manager	Medium	11 Oct 2018	
AW_007	CAMO Manager	Tail Rotor Blade failure, or loud bang and airframe vibrations	Tail Rotor detachment Fire No Authority on pedal controls	Controlled Ditching, Hard Landing, Crash	M	H	L	Medium	CAMO Manager	Inform Aircrew, Reinforce inspections, Consult manufacturer CRM, Training F/S	Director of OPS	Low	CAM Chief Pilot, Head of Training, Safety Manager	Medium	16 Oct 2018	Re-occurrence


**Risks are reduced to an Acceptable Level**

# Risks are Controlled to an Acceptable Level

## Rotor Blade failure, or loud bang and airframe vibrations Occurrences

ALERT  
Levels

TGT →





# Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

What if the Air Operator will experience a serious incident or accident as a result of AW-139 tail rotor blade failure?

How the Air Operator should respond in a situation like this in an effort to  
‘Minimize the Damage’  
(i.e. to the People, Assets, Reputation, Finance)?

# European Safety Promotion Network Rotorcraft (ESPN-R)

## Safety Workshop



**helitech<sup>®</sup>**  
**international**  
HELICOPTER EXPO & CONFERENCE

**16-18 OCT 2018** AMSTERDAM  
RAI

In association with



## SMS Case Study

Presented by:  
**Dr Ilias Panagopoulos**

**Thank you!**