

Structural Safety Substantiation Method for HUMS Usage Credits


Brian Tucker - Bell Helicopter

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Safe Life Fatigue


- Safe life fatigue methodology uses conservative values for strength, loads, usage
- 70 years of history shows this approach is safe
- Usage credit – how do we change usage without affecting safety?



The Problem with Credit

- Some of current safety comes from conservative usage assumption


Analogy: Scenic Overlook



Analogy


- Some of current safety comes from conservative usage assumption:

Scenic Overlook




Structural Reliability

- **Probabilistic reality of fatigue**
 - Strength, load, usage have distributions
- **Result – failure density functions**
- **→ Q: How to determine impact of credit of safety?**




Service Timeline




Proposed Solution – System Reliability Method

- One means to quantify the impact of credit is to look at the fleet as a system
- System reliability methods – already used in non-structural qualification
- Model the aircraft fleet as a serial system:
- Split the fleet into sub-fleets:



As Easier Way to Visualize System Reliability

- **Unreliability and Reliability**



- **Mathematical simplification of fleet reliability**

- For very small unreliability, the unreliability of a system is the sum of the unreliability of its components.



$$p_s(t) = p(t)^n = (1 - Q(t))^n \approx 1 - n \cdot Q(t) \text{ for } Q(t) \ll 1$$

$$\therefore n \cdot Q(t) \approx 1 - p_s(t) = Q_s(t)$$

Simple Example - Baseline

- **Assumptions:**
 - Life limit already established.
 - Failure density functions known:
 - Group A: severe usage
 - Group B: mild (benign) usage
 - Fleet breakdown:
 - Group A – 25 aircraft
 - Group B – 75 aircraft
- **Fleet unreliability:**
 - 7.2×10^{-6}
- **Group A drives the fleet unreliability**


Failure Density Functions



Simple Example – with credit

- Apply usage credit of 1000 hours to all aircraft in Group B
 - Group B – 75 aircraft
- Conclusions:
 - Group A still drives fleet unreliability
 - Fleet unreliability increased by only 1%.
- Easy to evaluate sensitivity to credit amount, fleet breakdown


Failure Density Functions



Reference Problem*

- **Given**
 - Distributions of strength, load
 - Deterministic usage spectra – severe, medium, mild usage
- **Solutions for reliability vs. retirement life match published values**


Bell Solutions from Monte Carlo Simulations with Importance Sampling (1,000 simulations)



- *AHS International – Fatigue and Damage Tolerance Subcommittee – Structural Reliability Round Robin Problem – "Round 1" (2006)*


Simple Example using Reference Problem

- **Life Limit: 1,030 hours**
 - based on “severe” usage – “six nines” reliability
- **Fleet Makeup:**
 - Severe usage (exclusive): 25 aircraft
 - Mild usage (exclusive): 75 aircraft
- **Fleet Unreliability (probability of failure)**
- **Credit Option 1: set mild aircraft reliability to “six nines”**
 - 7,960 hour life = credit of 6,930 hours



Reference Problem – Using New Method

- Iterate using system reliability method to reach 1% increase in fleet unreliability
 - Result: *2,130 hour life = credit of 1,100 hours*
- Unreliability of the mild sub-fleet increases significantly...
- ***But not enough to significantly impact total fleet***




Practically
Equivalent
Reliability

What is the Right Threshold?

- System Safety certification methods use levels of risk (change in unreliability)
- Example: changing from “Catastrophic” Severity (10^{-9}) to “Severe-Major” (10^{-7}):

$$- \Delta Risk = \frac{(New - Current)}{Current} = \frac{(10^{-7} - 10^{-9})}{10^{-9}} (100\%) = 9900\%$$



Since a 1% change is 5 orders of magnitude smaller than smallest recognized step, it is practically equivalent

Managing Total Aircraft Risk

- **Total risk budget split between:**
 - Risk Budget
 - “Risk Reserve”
- **Risk budget includes risk allocations for each component**

Aircraft-Level Δ Risk Threshold	
1.0%	
Allocations:	
Δ Risk Budget: 0.5%	Δ Risk Reserve: 0.5%

Conclusions

- **To safely apply usage credit to life-limited components, we must understand how usage contributes to the current fleet reliability**
- **System reliability methods can be used to quantify this contribution**
- **In cases where a portion of the fleet drives the majority of the risk, it may be possible to apply credit to the remaining aircraft with almost no impact to the fleet reliability**
- **A reasonable risk threshold and a “risk reserve” can ensure that such an approach can be tolerant of changes in usage, other unknowns.**

