EASA
European Union Aviation Safety Agency

# SDM Webinar
# - Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation -
# (under EASA oversight)

## Guidance to comply with the EASA occurrence reporting requirements

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# Today’s agenda

- Aim of the webinar
- Regulatory basis for reporting
  - why to report? what for? What is reportable? to whom ? (EASA, TCH, SoR CAA…)?
- Good Reporting practices and guidelines for CAMOs.
  - ECCAIRS aviation taxonomy and its key role for data management
  - Good practices for high data quality reports
- Conclusion
  - Q & A : send us your **questions, by 28 Feb.2026**, on report[at]easa.europa.eu
  - Post webinar actions

# The aim of the webinar

Guide CAMO holder (later termed as “CAMO”)

→ Better comply with applicable mandatory reporting requirements

→ Fine-tune their policies and procedures

→ Improve the CAMO’s screening of internally reported events

→ Assess and address the contributors to safety deficiencies detected in the CAMO organisation as a system. (CAMO.A.200 (a)(3),(b), Management system refers.)

# The foundation: 3 forms of risk management

Prevent re-occurrence or mitigate severity of safety events <> Reactive

Proactive

Identify hazard mechanisms and threats beforehand and establish control measures to prevent initial occurrence from happening.

Predictive

Attempt to anticipate future exposure based on past performance data/knowledge



# Occurrence Reporting Regulatory Framework for CAMO

Reg. (EU) 996/2010 Accident and Serious Incident Investigation

Reg. (EU) 2018/1139 EASA Basic Regulation

Reg. (EU) 376/2014 Occurrence reporting

CIR (EU) 2015/1018 List of Reportable Occurrences

**Annex I, § 2 : Technical Occurrences related to the operation of the aircraft. And part of Annex II § 3.**

CDR (EU) 2020/2034 and CIR (EU) 2021/2082 as regards ERCS

| Reg. (EU) 748/2012 | Reg. (EU) 1321/2014 | Reg. (EU) 2017/373 | Reg. (EU) 2023/1769 | Reg. (EU) 965/2012 | Reg. (EU) 1178/2011 | Reg. (EU) 139/2014 | Reg. (EU) 452/2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| •Design Organisation<br>•Production Organisation | •Maintenance Organisation<br>•**Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation** | •Air Navigation Service Providers<br>•DAT Providers | •ATM/ANS equipment | •**Air Operators** | •Pilot Training Organisations | •Aerodromes | •Third Country Operators (TCO) |

**AMC 20 – 8**

# SARPS of ICAO Annex 8, Airworthiness of aircraft

- Chapter 9. Continuing Airworthiness of Aircraft, **para. 9.1.2**. "*Under the control of the respective CAAs of the State of Design, the State of Registry and, when appropriate, the State of the Operator,* ***continuing airworthiness includes the following***: /…/

- (d) the **reporting** of faults, malfunctions and defects and other significant maintenance and operational information **by the operator to the type design organization** in accordance with the requirements of the State of Registry and the State of the Operator;
- (e) the **reporting** of faults, malfunctions and defects and other significant maintenance information **by the maintenance organization to the type design organization** in accordance with the requirements of the State having jurisdiction over the maintenance organization;

- (f) **the analysis** of faults, malfunctions, defects, accidents and other significant maintenance and operational information **by the type design organization, the State of Design and the State of Registry** and the initiation and transmission of information and recommended or mandatory action to be taken in response to that analysis.

# Mandatory reporting flow, an EU-centric Example




* under oversight of EASA

# Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System #1

In short, **two kinds of occurrences MUST** be reported to EASA.

→ The **Operator-centric's SMS-determined** reportable **occurrences** that must be reported to EASA - as Competent Authority - and that are **related to** the "**safety of the organisation operations**".(i.e. cases where an occurrence originates from operations conducted by the CAMO - as a system – (AMC1 CAMO.A.200(a)(3) Management system and Reg. 376/2014 art.13(2-3)(5)(7-8) refers)

→ The **regulatory list-determined** reportable **occurrences** that must be reported by a CAMO, and that are **related to** the "**safety of the product**". (i.e. aircraft, engine, propeller, (E)TSO part) or to the "**safety of aircraft operations**". (AMC20-8, and IR2015/1018 annex I §(2) and annex II §(3) refers.)

# Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System, # 2(1)

**SMS-determined** reportable occurrences that are **related to** the "**safety of the organisation**":

- **Some* - Risk Classification permitting-** can be reported to EASA as "**closed on issue**", **conditionally to** a combined **EASA-approved procedure** and **risk classification**. (e.g. from low risk up to marginally outside the ALoSP…)
- Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP) is determined through application of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), Safety Performance Targets (SPTs), and alert thresholds within Safety Performance Management framework.
- * could be read as **Most** for organisations with higher maturity level.
- "**closed on issue**" implies one and **only one report**, with no need for follow-up reports. (because no corrective action deemed necessary at CAMO level)
- **…**Go to next slide

# Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System, # 2(2)

**SMS-determined** reportable occurrences that are **related to** the "**safety of the organisation**":

- → **Some shall be** reported to EASA as "**Open**", **when** the level of the risk **classification triggers** further **needs for investigation**. (i.e. when outside the ALoSP)
- → **"Open"** report implies existence of a safety deficiency (potential or actual) at CAMO level
- → **"Open"** report implies likely **need for mitigations and/or corrective action(s**) at **CAMO level**
- → **…**Go to next slide

# Mandatory OR System, # 2(3)

**SMS-determined** reportable occurrences that are **related to** the "**safety of the organisation**":

…

→ **"Open"** report implies one or more "follow-up" report(s) until submittal of a final report that shall be reported to EASA as "**Closed**".

→ **Final report** shall contain a final risk assessment, document mitigations and/or corrective actions for EASA TL's review, comments and/or acceptance.

→ Report to **all necessary** "parties" (e.g. DAH, AOC, EASA.) and indicate to EASA all "**parties informed**" at time of reporting.

# Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System # 3

**List-determined reportable occurrences** that are **related to** the "**safety of the product**" or to the "**safety of aircraft operations**":

- **Can** initially **be reported** to EASA as "**closed on issue**", because the CAMO is not responsible for the continued airworthiness of the product 's type design.
- **Can be** reported to EASA as "**closed on issue**", when the reporting CAMO is not the **originator of the operations/maintenance-induced event.**
- "**closed on issue**" implies one and **only one report**, with no need for follow-up reports. (because no corrective/mitigating action at CAMO level)
- **Corrective actions ≠ remedial maintenance action** (restoration of continuing airworthiness, M.A.301(b) refers, by means of defect rectifications)
- CAMO to indicate to EASA all "**parties informed**" at time of reporting.

# Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) System

- CAMO must establish **an internal safety reporting scheme**, as part of its safety management system.
- The scope of the **internal scheme** should extend **beyond the scope** of **occurrences** required **to be reported** to the competent authority
- **Collect and evaluate occurrences** that are required to be reported under para. CAMO.A.160 Occurrence reporting
- **List of reportable** occurrences as per (GM1 CAMO.A.160 Occurrence reporting.)

# Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) System

- When occurrences originate from operational activities conducted by the CAMO, (aka **operations-induced discrepancies**):
  - CAMO **must identify the cause(s) of, and contributing factor(s)** to, the unintended event(s), and address them as part of its safety risk management (SRM) process i.a.w. AMC1 CAMO.A.200 Management system.
- The **CAMO's SRM procedure** must describe the reporting procedure to EASA, the organisation responsible for the design of the aircraft/engine/propeller (aka product) or component, the AOC(s), and other parties as applicable (e.g. ATM/ANS, ADR).
- EASA Part-CAMO approvals - User Guide for Continuing Airworthiness Management Exposition (CAMO-AOC), UG.CAMO.00004-002, dated 5-Nov-2024.

# The reporting process in a flowchart, condensed


T0
Staff experiences a safety event
Up to T0 + 72 hours = T1
The organisation collects, screens the data, risk-scores the event
Reportable per regulatory Rep. Requirements ? (List + SMS)
NO
YES
Organisation's database
1
Use for continous improvement
Elapsed time
Existence of a safety deficiency at CAMO's level ? Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP)?
Extrinsic cause(s), or
No safety deficiency, or low-risk SD (as agreed and based upon approved procedures)
Intrinsic cause(s)
High-risk SD (at CAMO's level)
Medium-risk SD (at CAMOs' level)
Intrinsic cause(s)
Send ASAP report – as Open – to EASA that contains:
- all common and relevant specific mandatory data fields
- initial risk classification
- narrative expliciting the « safety deficiency »
- preventive, mitigating and/or corrective actions, as found necessary
(nb: based on the elements known at this stage)
Send expeditiously report – as Open – to EASA that contains:
- all common and relevant specific mandatory data fields
- Initial risk classification
and
narrative explaining the « safety deficiency »
- preventive, mitigating and/or corrective actions, as found necessary
(nb: based on the elements known at this stage)
Send report – as Closed on Issue – to Competent Authority (EASA) that contains:
- all common and relevant specific mandatory data fields
- initial risk classification
- narrative and conclusions documenting why submitted as « Closed on Issue· »
Up to T1 + 72 hours
1
2


2
Further investigate the event Until closure
within 11 + 30 Days:
Provide EASA with Follow-up report (Open) containing:
- preliminary safety analysis
- revised risk classification (if needed)
- analysis elements with preventive, mitigating and/or corrective actions, as found necessary and their respective timelines.
Close the investigation
within 11 + 90 Days:
Provide EASA with final and closure report (Closed) containing:
- final safety analysis
- final risk classification
- conclusions of the analysis with preventive, mitigating and/or corrective actions, and Their respective timelines
- measures to implement and monitor effectiveness of the action(s).
Organisation's Database
Without delay investigate the event Until closure
within 11 + 30 Days:
Provide EASA with Follow-up report (Open) containing:
- preliminary safety analysis
- revised risk classification (if needed)
- analysis elements with preventive, mitigating and/or corrective actions, as found necessary and their respective timelines.
Close the investigation
within 11 + 90 Days:
Provide EASA with final and closure report (Closed) containing:
- final safety analysis
- final risk classification
- conclusions of the analysis with preventive, mitigating and/or corrective actions, and Their respective timelines
- measures to implement and monitor effectiveness of the action(s).
Elapsed Time


T0
Staff experiences a safety event
Up to T0 + 72 hours = T1
The organisation collects, screens the data, ris scores eve
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- narrative and conclusions documenting why submitted as « Closed on Issue· »
preventive, mitigating and/or corrective actions, as found necessary
(nb: based on the elements known at this stage)
Elapsed time
Up to T1 + 72 hours
1
2

# What is reportable?

# What is reportable? #1

- The scope of the **internal reporting** (CAMO.A.202 refers) extends **beyond the scope** of **occurrences** required **to be reported** to the competent authority
- Only a fraction is to be reported to the Competent Authority.
- The **Operator-centric's SMS-determined and** the **regulatory list-determined** reportable **occurrences.**
- Read thoroughly the Regulation 2015/1018 - Occurrences in Civil Aviation to Be Mandatorily Reported, to grasp the subtleties of it
- **When** reported as **closed-on-issue, indicate** the reason **why (**e.g. monitored safety issue ref. xyz, and still within acceptable safety indicators/targets.)
- **When** reported as **opened, indicate** the reason **why,** the **mitigations** in place **(preliminary analysis) until** submittal of **closure report (final analysis)** documenting the **corrections** decided **to be implemented** and the **timeline.**

# What is reportable? #2, a few more …

- → CAMO: **AMC 20-20B Continuing structural integrity programme**, para. 3.2.5. Reporting system refers.
- → CAMOs: Appendix 8 to **AMC 20-6B (ETOPS)** – Continuing airworthiness considerations, para. 2 on occurrence reporting.

# Good reporting practices and guidelines for CAMOs

**SUBMITTING FURTHER QUESTIONS**

**Mailbox**: report@easa.europa.eu

**Submission Deadline:** All questions must be submitted no later than **28.02.2026**

# ECCAIRS Aviation taxonomy and its key role for data management

## Foundations of aviation intelligence

1. What's a Taxonomy?
2. Why is a taxonomy important?
3. What we want to achieve?

## Medium maturity: taxonomy maintenance and Data integrity

4. Why must we keep it up-to-date?
5. Defining quality control

## Deep dive: Occurrence categories and Event type classification

6. Occurrence Categories (CICTT)
7. Event type taxonomy

## Practical aspects

8. From Compliance to Excellence: Reporting Observations

# Foundations of aviation intelligence

## What's a taxonomy

- A language with its own dictionary — **Language**
- Structured hierarchy — **Organisation**
- Data Categorisation — **Quality**
- Query logic — **Filter**
- Analytical tool — **Analysis**

# Foundations of aviation intelligence

## Why a taxonomy is important

- Data sharing
- Trend analysis
- Identification of risks
- Effective resource allocation
- Support Data-driven decision making

# Foundations of aviation intelligence

## What we want to achieve?

- A categorised source of knowledge
- Protect people and assets
- Preventing reoccurrence
- Measurable Safety performance (SPIs)
- Closing the safety loop

# Medium maturity: taxonomy maintenance and Data integrity

## Why must we keep it up-to-date?

- Evolution of Technology
- Refining Definitions – reducing misunderstanding
- Correcting mistakes
- Granularity
- Global alignment

# Medium maturity: taxonomy maintenance and Data integrity

## Defining quality control

- Foundation of Data trust
- Verification of compliance with rules and definitions
- Identification of Systematic gaps
- Identification of issue with rules and description
- Historical accuracy

# Deep dive: Occurrence and Event type classification

## Occurrence Categories (CICTT)

- Establishment of the CICTT in 1999
- Conceptualisation and first release (2002)
- Purpose - High level classification
- Standardisation and comparability
- Multiple categories per occurrence

# Occurrence Categories (CICTT)

## System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-powerplant) (SCF-NP)

- Definition: Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or component other than the powerplant.
  - Includes:
    - Rotorcraft main rotor and tail rotor system, drive system and flight control failures or malfunction
    - Errors or failures in software and database systems
    - Non-powerplant parts or pieces separating from an aircraft
    - All failures/malfunctions, including those related to or caused by maintenance issues
    - Ground-based transmission, aircraft-based communication, or datalink systems related to Unmanned aircraft (UAS)
    - Failures of ground-based launch or recovery system equipment

Note: If failure makes the aircraft uncontrollable: Code (**SCF-NP**) only. Alternatively, code as well (**LOC-I**) or (**LOC-G**) as appropriate.

# Occurrence Categories (CICTT)

## System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant) (SCF-PP)

- Definition: Failure or malfunction of an aircraft system or component related to the powerplant.
  - Includes:
    - Failure related to propellers, propeller system and engine gearbox, reversers, and powerplant controls.
    - Parts or pieces separating from a powerplant.
    - All failures/malfunctions, including those related or caused by maintenance

Note: If failure makes the aircraft uncontrollable: Code (**SCF-PP**) only. Alternatively, code as well LOC-I or LO-G as appropriate

  - Excludes:
    - Fuel-related powerplant problems such as fuel exhaustion, fuel starvation/mismanagement, fuel contamination, wrong fuel, carburetor and induction icing are coded as (**FUEL**)
    - Rotorcraft main rotor and tail rotor system, drive system and flight control failures or malfunctions are coded ad (**SCF-NP**)

# Occurrence Categories (CICTT)

## Other (OTHR)

- Definition: Any occurrence not covered under another category

Note: Don’t use other in combination other Occurrence categories.

# Occurrence Categories (CICTT)

## Unknown or Undetermined (UNK)

- Definition: Insufficient information exists to categorize the occurrence.
  - Includes:
    - Includes cases in which the aircraft is missing
    - Not enough information available to classify the occurrence.

Note: Not to use in combination with other categories

# Deep dive: Occurrence and Event type classification

## Event type taxonomy

- Developed initially in 1976
- Massive level of details (Over 3000 values)
- Transform narrative text into a list of Event types
- Standardise story telling (Why → What → how)
- Knowledge-dependent Granularity

# Deep dive: Occurrence and Event type classification

## Event type taxonomy: hierarchical structure

- Any other events
- Consequential events
- Equipment
- Operational
- Organisational
- Personnel
- Unknown

# Deep dive: Occurrence and Event type classification

## Event type taxonomy: Maintenance related events

- Operational
  - Aircraft Maintenance
    - Acceptance and Storage of Tools/Components
    - Component workshop Events
    - Fault Isolation/Troubleshooting
    - FOD Control During Maintenance
    - Installation/Removal/Repair/Test
    - Maintenance Inspections/Controls/Servicing
    - Maintenance Planning and Implementation
    - Maintenance Use of Tools and Equipment

# Deep dive: Occurrence and Event type classification

## Event type taxonomy: Human Factor related event

- **Personnel**
  - **Experience and Knowledge Events**
    - Knowledge Events
    - Qualifications and Experience Events
    - Training of Personnel Events
  - **Personnel Task Performance Events**
    - Personnel Actions
    - Personnel Communication Events
    - Personnel Decision Making
    - Personnel Memory Related Events
    - Personnel Non Conformance Events
    - Personnel Use of Equipment Events
    - Personnel Use of Information Events
    - Task Management Events
  - **Physiological Events**
    - Personnel Alertness and Fatigue Events
    - Personnel Impairment and Incapacitation Events
  - **Situational Awareness and Sensory Events**
    - Personnel Attention and Vigilance Events
    - Personnel Mental and Emotional States
    - Personnel Perception Events

# Deep dive: Occurrence and Event type classification

## Event type taxonomy: A practical example

- Occurrence text:
  - Flight crew experienced Cabin Altitude Warning at FL370. The flight crew donned oxygen masks and initiated emergency descent. During the descent flight crew suffered change in ear pressure. Mayday was declared. Flight crew uneventfully landed on EPKT. Flight crew uninjured, aircraft with no damage

| Nr. | Event type | Event phase |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Equipment - 2100 Air Conditioning & Pressurization System - 2130 - Pressurisation Control System Events - **2131 Cabin Decompression** | Powered Fixed-wing aircraft - En-route – Cruise |
| 2 | Operational - Aircraft Flight Operations - Warning System Triggered - **Other Warning System Operation** | Powered Fixed-wing aircraft - En-route – Cruise |
| 3 | Operational - Aircraft Flight Operations - Cabin Safety - **Release/Use of Oxygen Masks (Flight Crew)** | Powered Fixed-wing aircraft - En-route - Emergency descent en-route |
| 4 | Consequential Events - Flight Operations Outcome Events - Emergency Situations - **Emergency Descent** | Powered Fixed-wing aircraft - En-route - Emergency descent en-route |
| 5 | Consequential Events - Flight Operations Outcome Events - Emergency Situations - **Mayday Call** | Powered Fixed-wing aircraft - En-route - Emergency descent en-route |

# Practical aspects

## From compliance to excellence: Reporting observations

1. Occurrence text well structured and comprehensive
2. High accuracy and completion rates for all mandatory data fields
3. Part/Serial number provided but not encoded in dedicated attributes
4. Ensure the accurate and complete encoding of occurrence categories and event types
5. Sometime relevant document are mentioned in the text…. but not provided

*Good data quality shortens processing time, clarifies what happened, turns information into actionable intelligence, and ensures that resources are focused where they are truly needed.*

# After the webinar

→ The webinar will be posted on the EASA internet

→ Answers to all questions will also be posted within 15 working days

→ Also available on YouTube

**SUBMITTING FURTHER QUESTIONS**

**Mailbox**: report@easa.europa.eu

**Submission Deadline:** All questions must be submitted no later than **28.02.2026**

EASA
European Union Aviation Safety Agency

# Thank you for your attention

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# Resources, 1 of 2

- EASA Regulations Library: Regulations | EASA
- EASA Easy Access Rules Library and EAR for Continuing Airworthiness (Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014)
- EAR for Information Security (Regulations (EU) 2023/203 and 2022/1645)
- EASA resources for Part-CAMO.
- EAR for Acceptable Means of Compliance for Airworthiness of Products, Parts and Appliances (AMC-20)
- ICAO Safety Management Manual Doc 9859, 4th edition

# Resources, 2 of 2

- ICAO paper, Safety Risk Management (SRM) Methodologies, Aviation Risk Management Solutions (ARMS) and Event Risk Classification (ERC) Version 1.0 – January 2024
- EASA Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP), Implementation Guidance within the European Union Framework, issue 01 dated 31-May-2021.
- Helios Airways Boeing 737-300, Flight HCY522 accident on 14 Aug. 2005, Technical and Common Theme related lessons.