



EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY
AGENCE EUROPÉENNE DE LA SÉCURITÉ AÉRIENNE
EUROPÄISCHE AGENTUR FÜR FLUGSICHERHEIT

| 10TH ANNIVERSARY |

AD Applicability

Paul VAN EENIGE
EASA Safety Information Officer
26 June 2013

Your safety is our mission.
easa.europa.eu



Applicability of an AD

► Questions the AD reader could ask:

- 1) To which aircraft (model, s/n, configuration, etc.) does the AD apply?
- 2) Is action required on my aircraft?
- 3) Which aircraft (if any) are excluded from the Applicability?
- 4) What if an AD applies to STC-modified aircraft only?
- 5) What if an AD applies to 'equipment'?



To which aircraft does the AD apply?

- Quick-reference field (RH side of EASA AD template) is **not** the same as the Applicability.
- Applicability section specifies Product Model designation(s), as specified in the relevant TCDS.
- Specific (groups of) serial numbers are listed (or included by reference to an SB), or the AD applies to 'all' serial numbers.



To which a/c does an EASA AD not apply?

- AD only applies to products, parts and appliances, certificated (validated) before AD issue date.
- The term 'all models' should be used only for out-of-production type designs – no possible future model(s).



Is action required on my aircraft?

- A TC holder's SB may list a specific group of aircraft Models and/or s/n, while the AD explicitly applies to "all Models, all serial numbers" – why this difference?
- Determine whether an aircraft is **actually** 'affected', i.e. if corrective action is necessary.
- If not 'affected' (no corrective action necessary), why does the AD apply?
- How to 'comply' with this AD?



Aircraft excluded from the Applicability?

- Aircraft modification (configuration) technically non-reversible in-service.
- Improved design component is dissimilar to
 - not physically interchangeable with – the 'affected' (to-be-removed) component.
- Listing P/N (or not) in Applicability.



AD applies to STC-modified a/c only?

- AD identifies products and a certain STC – design change approval holder.
- Only a/c STC-modified **before** AD effective date should be 'affected' – post-AD STC modification actions must take the AD (requirements) into account – STC approval holder updates design specification(s).
- AD posted on EASA website linked to multiple approval holders – STC, and those of modified product(s).



AD applies to 'equipment'?

- An EASA 'equipment' AD is issued only when the affected component has its own approval (TSO, ETSO, JTSO, or previous National equivalent).
- The AD identifies aircraft that are **known** to have the affected equipment installed – in most cases adding 'but not limited to'.
- In all other cases: AD action at 'product' (TC and/or STC-modified) level.



EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY
AGENCE EUROPÉENNE DE LA SÉCURITÉ AÉRIENNE
EUROPÄISCHE AGENTUR FÜR FLUGSICHERHEIT

| 10TH ANNIVERSARY |

AD Applicability

Any questions?

- Thank for you attention -

Your safety is our mission.
easa.europa.eu

AD Applicability – QR-field

[Back](#)



Date: 11 January 2013

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 66 of that Regulation.

This AD is issued in accordance with EC 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article 14(4) exemption].

Design Approval Holder's Name :

AGUSTAWESTLAND S.p.A.

Type/Model designation(s) :

A109 and A119 helicopters

TCDS Number: EASA.R.005

Foreign AD: Not applicable

Supersedure: None



AD Applicability

[Back](#)

Supersedure: None	
ATA 53	Fuselage – Belly Fairing / Rivets Installation – Inspection / Modification
Manufacturer(s):	Airbus
Applicability:	Airbus A380-841, A380-842, and A380-861 aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers 0003, 0005 to 0008 inclusive, 0010 to 0017 inclusive, 0019 to 0023 inclusive, 0025 to 0027 inclusive, 0029, 0033, 0034, 0040 and 0045.
Reason:	<p>During a production quality review, interference and incorrect edge margin distances were found between fasteners on Central Belly Fairing Frame (FR) 56 joint to Stringer (STGR) 1. Subsequent investigation identified aeroplanes which might be potentially affected by deviation of rivet installation distance from acceptable design values.</p> <p>This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to the in-flight loss of some Belly Fairing panels, possibly resulting in injury to persons on the ground.</p> <p>To address this potentially unsafe condition, Airbus issued Service Bulletin (SB)</p>



AD Applicability - TCDS

[Back](#)

Airbus A380

Type Certificate Holder:
Airbus

1 Rond-point Maurice Bellonte
31707 BLAGNAC
FRANCE

Airworthiness Category: Large Aeroplanes

For Models: A380-841/-842
A380-861



AD Applicability - SB

[Back](#)

Foreign AD: Not applicable	
Supersedure: None	
ATA 53	Fuselage – Centre Fuselage – Modification
Manufacturer(s):	Fokker Aircraft B.V.
Applicability:	F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aeroplanes, serial numbers as listed in Fokker Services Service Bulletin (SB) SBF100-53-112 dated 31 January 2013.
Reason:	From service experience, it was concluded that the fuselage frames, which act as back-up structure for the hook latch fitting brackets of the large cargo doors, are sensitive to fatigue cracking. To ensure the continued structural integrity with respect to fatigue, a repetitive inspection was included in the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness under tasks 533026-00-03 and 533026-01-03.











AD Applicability - STC

[Back](#)

Design Change Approval Holder's Name : ICARIUS AEROTECHNICS		Modification(s): PT6A-34 engine installation
Approval Number: DGAC France Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) n°IM23-SF-0127		
Foreign AD: Not applicable		
Supersedure: None		
ATA 71	Powerplant – Air inlet Screen – Inspection / Replacement	
Manufacturer:	Pilatus Aircraft Ltd (for the STC-modified aeroplanes)	
Applicability:	PC-6 B2/H2 and B2/H4 aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if modified in accordance with DGAC France STC IM23-SF-0127.	
Reason:	The instructions provided by Icarus Aerotechnics to install a PT6A-34 engine on a PC6 aeroplane specify that the engine is to be modified into a similar	

AD Applicability – STC (2)

[Back](#)

Number	Issued by	Issue date ▼	Subject	Approval Holder / Type Designation
<u>2013-0057</u>		2013-03-11	Powerplant – Air inlet Screen – Inspection / Replacement	 ICARIUS AEROTECHNICS ✈ STC IM23-SF-0127  PILATUS AIRCRAFT LTD ✈ PC-6
<u>2013-0020R1</u>		2013-02-26	Equipment & Furnishings – Safety Belts / Torso Restraint Systems – Inspection / Replacement	 AMSAFE ✈ Safety Belts ✈ Torso Restraint Systems  ANJOU AERONAUTIQUE ✈ Safety Belts ✈ Torso Restraint Systems  DAVIS AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS ✈ Safety Belts ✈ Torso Restraint Systems  DACTIC SCIENTIFIC COMPANY



AD Applicability - Equipment

[Back](#)

correction dated 24 May 2011.	
ATA 35	Oxygen – Oxygen Mask Regulator Inflatable Harness – Identification / Replacement
Manufacturer(s):	Intertechnique (part of Zodiac Aerospace), EROS
Applicability:	<p>Flight Crew Oxygen Masks Regulators, all Part Number (P/N) MA10, MC10, MC20, MF10, MF20, MLC20, MLD20, MRA005, MRA022 and MRA023 series.</p> <p>The affected Flight Crew Oxygen Masks Regulators are known to be installed on, but not limited to, aeroplanes manufactured by Airbus, ATR, BAE Systems (formerly British Aerospace), Boeing, Bombardier (formerly Canadair, De Havilland Canada), Cessna, Dassault, EADS CASA, EMBRAER, Gulfstream, Hawker Beechcraft (formerly Raytheon, Beech), Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), McDonnell Douglas, Piaggio, Pilatus, Piper and SOCATA.</p>
Reason:	<p>A malfunction of a quick donning mask was reported to Intertechnique, who initiated an investigation in order to detect the root cause and the failure mode. Despite the fact that the analysis did not lead to any final conclusion, discrete suspected silicon batches have been identified which have shown an unusually high premature rupture rate</p>