ORO.AOC.100 Application for an air operator certificate

Regulation (EU) 2015/1329

(a) Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council57 OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p. 3., prior to commencing commercial air transport operations, the operator shall apply for and obtain an air operator certificate (AOC) issued by the competent authority.

(b) The operator shall provide the following information to the competent authority:

(1) the official name and business name, address, and mailing address of the applicant;

(2) a description of the proposed operation, including the type(s), and number of aircraft to be operated;

(3) a description of the management system, including organisational structure;

(4) the name of the accountable manager;

(5) the names of the nominated persons required by ORO.AOC.135(a) together with their qualifications and experience;

(6) a copy of the operations manual required by ORO.MLR.100;

(7) a statement that all the documentation sent to the competent authority have been verified by the applicant and found in compliance with the applicable requirements.

(c) Applicants shall demonstrate to the competent authority that:

(1) they comply with all the requirements of annex IV to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, this Annex (Part-ORO), Annex IV (Part-CAT) and Annex V (Part-SPA) to this Regulation and Annex I (Part 26) to Regulation (EU) 2015/64058 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/640 of 23 April 2015 on additional airworthiness specifications for a given type of operations and amending Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 (OJ L 106, 24.4.2015, p. 18).;

(2) all aircraft operated have a certificate of airworthiness (CofA) in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 or are dry-leased in accordance with ORO.AOC.110(d); and

(3) its organisation and management are suitable and properly matched to the scale and scope of the operation.

APPLICATION TIME FRAMES

The application for the initial issue of an AOC should be submitted at least 90 days before the intended start date of operation. The operations manual may be submitted later, but in any case not later than 60 days before the intended start date of operation.

OPERATOR SECURITY PROGRAMME

In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 300/2008, as part of granting the AOC, the CAT operator should provide the competent authority with the operator’s security programme, including security training. The security programme should be adapted to the type and area of operation, as well as to the aircraft operated.

MEANING OF CERTIFICATE OF AIRWORTHINESS

A certificate of airworthiness means either a certificate of airworthiness issued in accordance with Part-21.B.326 or a restricted certificate of airworthiness issued in accordance with Part-21.B.327.

ORO.AOC.105 Operations specifications and privileges of an AOC holder

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

The privileges of the operator, including those granted in accordance with Annex V (Part-SPA), shall be specified in the operations specifications of the certificate.

ORO.AOC.110 Leasing agreement

Regulation (EU) 2019/1384

Any lease-in

(a) Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008, any lease agreement concerning aircraft used by an operator certified in accordance with this Part shall be subject to prior approval by the competent authority.

(b) The operator certified in accordance with this Part shall not lease-in aircraft included in the list of operators subject to operational restrictions, registered in a State of which all operators under its oversight are subject to an operating ban or from an operator that is subject to an operating ban pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

Wet lease-in

(c) The applicant for the approval of the wet lease-in of an aircraft from a third-country operator shall demonstrate to the competent authority all of the following:

(1) that the third country operator holds a valid AOC issued in accordance with Annex 6 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation;

(2) that the safety standards of the third country operator with regard to continuing airworthiness and air operations are equivalent to the applicable requirements established by Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 and this Regulation;

(3) that the aircraft has a standard CofA issued in accordance with Annex 8 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Dry lease-in

(d) An applicant for the approval of the dry lease-in of an aircraft registered in a third country shall demonstrate to the competent authority that:

(1) an operational need has been identified that cannot be satisfied through leasing an aircraft registered in the EU;

(2) the duration of the dry lease-in does not exceed seven months in any 12 consecutive month period;

(3) compliance with the applicable requirements of Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 is ensured; and

(4) the aircraft is equipped in accordance with the EU regulations for Air Operations.

Dry lease-out

(e) The operator certified in accordance with this Part intending to dry lease-out one of its aircraft shall apply for prior approval by the competent authority. The application shall be accompanied by copies of the intended lease agreement or description of the lease provisions, except financial arrangements, and all other relevant documentation.

Wet lease-out

(f) Prior to the wet lease-out of an aircraft, the operator certified in accordance with this Part shall notify the competent authority.

GENERAL

(a) The operator intending to lease-in an aircraft should provide the competent authority with the following information:

(1) the aircraft type, registration markings and serial number, as soon as available;

(2) the name and address of the registered owner;

(3) a copy of the valid certificate of airworthiness;

(4) a copy of the lease agreement or description of the lease provisions, except financial arrangements; and

(5) duration of the lease.

(b) In case of wet lease-in, a copy of the AOC of the third-country operator and the areas of operation.

(c) The information mentioned above should be accompanied by a statement signed by the lessee that the parties to the lease agreement fully understand their respective responsibilities under the applicable regulations.

WET LEASE-IN AGREEMENT WITH A THIRD-COUNTRY OPERATOR

If the operator is not intending to apply EU safety requirements for air operations and continuing airworthiness when wet leasing-in an aircraft registered in a third country, it should demonstrate to the competent authority that the standards complied with are equivalent to the following requirements:

(a) Annex IV (Part-CAT);

(b) Part-ORO:

(1) ORO.GEN.110 and Section 2 of Subpart GEN;

(2) ORO.MLR, excluding ORO.MLR.105;

(3) ORO.FC;

(4) ORO.CC, excluding ORO.CC.200 and ORO.CC.210(a);

(5) ORO.TC;

(6) ORO.FTL, including related CS-FTL; and

(7) ORO.SEC;

(c) Annex V (Part-SPA), if applicable;

(d) for continuing airworthiness management of the third-country operator, Part-M59 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003 of 20 November 2003 on the continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks (OJ L 315, 28.11.2003, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1149/2011 of 21 October 2011 (OJ L 298, 16.11.2011, p. 1). Subpart-B, Subpart-C and Subpart-G, excluding M.A.707, and M.A.710;

(e) for the maintenance organisation used by the third-country operator during the lease period: Part-14560 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003 of 20 November 2003 on the continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks (OJ L 315, 28.11.2003, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1149/2011 of 21 October 2011 (OJ L 298, 16.11.2011, p. 1).;

(f) retroactive airworthiness requirements in accordance with Part-26; and

(g) the operator should provide the competent authority with a full description of the flight time limitation scheme(s), operating procedures and safety assessment demonstrating compliance with the safety objectives set out in points (b)(1)-(6).

WET LEASE-IN

The lessee should maintain a record of occasions when lessors are used, for inspection by the State that issued its AOC.

SHORT-TERM WET LEASE-IN WITH A THIRD-COUNTRY OPERATOR

In anticipation of an operational need the operator may enter into a framework agreement with more than one third-country operator provided that these operators comply with ORO.AOC.110(c). These third-country operators should be placed in a list maintained by the lessee.

WET LEASE-OUT

When notifying the competent authority, the operator intending to wet lease-out an aircraft should provide the competent authority with the following information:

(a) the aircraft type, registration markings and serial number;

(b) the name and address of the lessee;

(c) a copy of the lease agreement or description of the lease provisions, except financial arrangements; and

(d) the duration of the lease agreement.

ORO.AOC.115 Code-share agreements

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a) Without prejudice to applicable EU safety requirements for third country operators and aircraft, an operator certified in accordance with this Part shall enter into a code-share agreement with a third country operator only after:

(1) having verified that the third country operator complies with the applicable ICAO standards; and

(2) having provided the competent authority with documented information enabling such authority to comply with ARO.OPS.105.

(b) When implementing the code-share agreement the operator shall monitor and regularly assess the ongoing compliance of the third country operator with the applicable ICAO standards.

(c) The operator certified in accordance with this Part shall not sell and issue tickets for a flight operated by a third country operator when the third country operator is subject to an operating ban pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 or is failing to maintain compliance with the applicable ICAO standards.

INITIAL VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

(a) In order to verify the third country operator’s compliance with the applicable ICAO standards, in particular ICAO Annexes 1, 2, 6, Part I and III, as applicable, 8 and 18, the EU operator should conduct an audit of the third country operator, including interviews of personnel and inspections carried out at the third country operator’s facilities.

(b) The audit should focus on the operational, management and control systems of the operator.

CODE-SHARE AUDIT PROGRAMME

(a) Operators should establish a code-share audit programme for monitoring continuous compliance of the third country operator with the applicable ICAO standards. Such a code-share audit programme should include:

(1) the audit methodology (audit report + compliance statements);

(2) details of the specific operational areas to audit;

(3) criteria for defining satisfactory audit results;

(4) a system for reporting and correcting findings;

(5) a continuous monitoring system;

(6) auditor qualification and authorisation; and

(7) the frequency of audits.

(b) The third country code-share operator should be audited at periods not exceeding 24 months. The beginning of the first 24-month oversight planning cycle is determined by the date of the first audit and should then determine the start and end dates of the recurrent 24-month planning cycle. The interval between two audits should not exceed 24 months.

(c) The EU operator should ensure a renewal audit of each third country code-share operator prior to the audit expiry date of the previous audit. The audit expiry date for the previous audit becomes the audit effective date for the renewal audit provided the closing meeting for the renewal audit is within 150 days prior to the audit expiry date for the previous audit. If the closing meeting for the renewal audit is more than 150 days prior to the audit expiry date from the previous audit, then the audit effective date for the renewal audit is the day of the closing meeting of the renewal audit. Renewal audits are valid for 24 consecutive months beginning with the audit effective date and ending with the audit expiry date.

(d) A code-share audit could be shared by several operators. In case of a shared audit, the report should be made available for review by all duly identified sharing operators by any means.

(e) After closure of all findings identified during the audit, the EU operator should submit an audit compliance statement to the competent authority demonstrating that the third country operator meets all the applicable safety standards.

THIRD-PARTY PROVIDERS

(a) The initial audit and/or the continuous monitoring may be performed by a third-party provider on behalf of the EU operator in accordance with AMC2 ORO.GEN.205 on contracted activities.

(b) The use of a third-party provider for the initial audit or the monitoring of continuous compliance of the third-country code-share operator does not exempt the EU operator from its responsibility under ORO.AOC.115.

(c) The EU operator should maintain a list of the third country code-share operators monitored by the third-party provider. This list and the full audit report prepared by the third-party provider should be made available to the competent authority upon request.

ORO.AOC.120 Approvals to provide cabin crew training and to issue cabin crew attestations

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a) When intending to provide the training course required in Annex V (Part-CC) to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011, the operator shall apply for and obtain an approval issued by the competent authority. For this purpose, the applicant shall demonstrate compliance with the requirements for the conduct and content of training course established in CC.TRA.215 and CC.TRA.220 of that Annex and shall provide the competent authority with:

(1) the date of intended commencement of activity;

(2) the personal details and qualifications of the instructors as relevant to the training elements to be covered;

(3) the name(s) and address(es) of the training site(s) at which the training is to be conducted;

(4) a description of the facilities, training methods, manuals and representative devices to be used; and

(5) the syllabi and associated programmes for the training course.

(b) If a Member State decides, in accordance with ARA.CC.200 of Annex VI (Part-ARA) to Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011, that operators may be approved to issue cabin crew attestations, the applicant shall, in addition to (a):

(1) demonstrate to the competent authority that:

(i) the organisation has the capability and accountability to perform this task;

(ii) the personnel conducting examinations are appropriately qualified and free from conflict of interest; and

(2) provide the procedures and the specified conditions for:

(i) conducting the examination required by CC.TRA.220;

(ii) issuing cabin crew attestations; and

(iii) supplying the competent authority with all relevant information and documentation related to the attestations it will issue and their holders, for the purpose of record-keeping, oversight and enforcement actions by that authority.

(c) The approvals referred to in (a) and (b) shall be specified in the operations specifications.

ORO.AOC.125 Non-commercial operations of an AOC holder with aircraft listed on its AOC

Regulation (EU) 2019/1384

(a) The AOC holder may conduct non-commercial operations in accordance with Annex VI (Part-NCC) or Annex VII (Part-NCO) with aircraft listed in the operations specifications of its AOC or in its operations manual, provided that the AOC holder describes such operations in detail in the operations manual, including the following:

(1) an identification of the applicable requirements:

(2) a description of any differences between operating procedures used when conducting CAT operations and non-commercial operations;

(3) means of ensuring that all personnel involved in the operations are fully familiar with the associated procedures;

(b) An AOC holder shall comply with:

(1) Annex VIII (Part-SPO) when conducting maintenance check flights with complex motor-powered aircraft;

(2) Annex VII (Part-NCO) when conducting maintenance check flights with other than complex motor- powered aircraft.

(c) An AOC holder conducting operations referred to in points (a) and (b) shall not be required to submit a declaration in accordance with this Annex.

(d) The AOC holder shall specify the type of flight, as listed in its operations manual, in the flight-related documents (operational flight plan, loadsheet and other equivalent documents).

FLIGHT AND DUTY TIME LIMITATIONS AND REST REQUIREMENTS

When aircrew members are assigned to perform a series of flights that combine several types of operation (CAT, NCC/NCO), the operator should:

(a) comply at any time with the provisions of ORO.FTL.210 ‘Flight times and duty periods’ or, as applicable, the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (EU-OPS, Subpart Q), to ensure compliance with Subpart FTL for any CAT operation; and

(b) include any combination of types of operation in its safety risk management process to ensure that the fatigue risks arising from such operations do not affect the CAT operation.

APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS

An AOC holder should apply either of the options below to its non-commercial operations:

(a) the same operational procedures as those used for its CAT operations. In this case, the AOC holder should state this option in the operations manual and ensure that the procedures comply with Part-CAT. No further descriptions are required; or

(b) different operational procedures from those used for its CAT operations. In this case, the procedures should comply with Part-ORO, except for Subpart-DEC, and Part-NCC for complex motor-powered aircraft or with Part-NCO for other than complex motor-powered aircraft, as appropriate.

DIFFERENT OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR NON-COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS

When developing operating procedures for non-commercial operations that are different from the ones used for its CAT operations, the AOC holder should identify the hazards and assess and mitigate the risks associated with each specific non-commercial operation, as part of the safety risk management process in compliance with ORO.GEN.200.

This process should consider at least the following elements:

(a) Flight profile (including manoeuvres to be performed, any simulated abnormal situations in flight, duties and responsibilities of the crew members);

(b) Continuing airworthiness, as applicable. This includes the case when the aircraft is returned to the AOC holder after having been used by another operator for operations in accordance with ORO.GEN.310;

(c) Levels of functional equipment and systems (MEL, CDL);

(d) Operating procedures, minima, and dispatch criteria;

(e) Operating a flight with a double purpose (e.g. a relocation flight used as a line training flight or a maintenance check flight used as a line training flight);

(f) Specific approvals held by the AOC holder;

(g) Flight and duty time limitations and rest requirements and cumulative fatigue;

(h) Selection, composition, and training of flight crew and cabin crew;

(i) Multi-pilot operation as per Part-CAT vs single-pilot operation when operating according to Part-NCC or Part-NCO;

(j) Flights performed with aircrew that includes aircrew members of another operator, who have not completed a familiarisation training and who may not be familiar with the AOC holder’s operational procedures;

(k) Categories of passengers on board, including when non-commercial operations are performed with no cabin crew.

PLANNING FLIGHTS WITH AN INCREASED LEVEL OF RISK

(a) Significant aspects such as the ones below should be addressed in the risk assessment and risk mitigation process by any operator conducting such flights:

(1) which pilots are involved in their operation;

(2) what is the purpose of the flight; and

(3) how it is to be accomplished — what flight procedures are to be applied.

(b) The AOC holder should prepare the non-commercial operations with an increased level of risk taking into consideration the following elements, as applicable:

(1) pre-flight briefing;

(2) duties and responsibilities of the flight crew members involved, task sharing;

(3) special operating procedures;

(4) manoeuvres to be performed in flight, minimum and maximum speeds and altitudes for all portions of the flight;

(5) operational limitations;

(6) potential risks and contingency plans;

(7) adequate available airspace and coordination with the air traffic control (ATC);

(8) selection of flight crew members; and

(9) additional flight crew training at regular intervals to ensure recency (considering also a flight of a similar risk profile in the simulator, if needed).

EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT OPERATING PROCEDURES APPLIED TO NON-COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS

The provisions of ORO.AOC.125 enable an AOC holder to apply the most appropriate requirements when conducting non-commercial operations, based on the risk assessment and risk mitigation processes.

Below is a non-exhaustive list of elements that an AOC holder may identify and describe as being different in its non-commercial operations from those used for its CAT operation and for which the provisions of Part-ORO and Part-NCC or the provisions of Part-NCO should apply as appropriate:

(a) Qualification, training and experience of aircrew members, including aerodrome and route competence requirements.

(b) Flight crew and cabin crew composition requirements

(1) CAT operations contain more stringent requirements for aircrew members, e.g. multi-pilot vs single-pilot requirements.

(2) The AOC holder should specify the minimum number of flight crew and cabin crew and the applicable aircrew composition.

(c) Fuel requirements

(d) Performance requirements

(e) Serviceable instruments, data and equipment and MEL considerations

(f) Non-ETOPS/ETOPS

ETOPS are applicable to CAT operations only and thus a flight operated according to Part-NCC/Part-NCO may be performed without the ETOPS restrictions.

(g) Non-commercial flights with no cabin crew (see ORO.CC.100(d) and the associated AMC).

ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring – aeroplanes

Regulation (EU) 2015/1329

(a) The operator shall establish and maintain a flight data monitoring programme, which shall be integrated in its management system, for aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass of more than 27 000 kg.

(b) The flight data monitoring programme shall be non-punitive and contain adequate safeguards to protect the source(s) of the data.

FLIGHT DATA MONITORING (FDM) PROGRAMME

(a) The safety manager, as defined under AMC1-ORO.GEN.200(a)(1), should be responsible for the identification and assessment of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process(es) concerned. The latter should be responsible for taking appropriate and practicable safety action within a reasonable period of time that reflects the severity of the issue.

(b) An FDM programme should allow an operator to:

(1) identify areas of operational risk and quantify current safety margins;

(2) identify and quantify operational risks by highlighting occurrences of non-standard, unusual or unsafe circumstances;

(3) use the FDM information on the frequency of such occurrences, combined with an estimation of the level of severity, to assess the safety risks and to determine which may become unacceptable if the discovered trend continues;

(4) put in place appropriate procedures for remedial action once an unacceptable risk, either actually present or predicted by trending, has been identified; and

(5) confirm the effectiveness of any remedial action by continued monitoring.

(c) FDM analysis techniques should comprise the following:

(1) Exceedance detection: searching for deviations from aircraft flight manual limits and standard operating procedures. A set of core events should be selected to cover the main areas of interest to the operator and as much as possible, the most significant risks identified by the operator. The event definitions should be continuously reviewed to reflect the operator’s current operating procedures.

(2) All flights measurement: a system defining what is normal practice. This may be accomplished by retaining various snapshots of information from each flight.

(3) Statistics — a series of data collected to support the analysis process: this technique should include the number of flights flown per aircraft and sector details sufficient to generate rate and trend information.

(d) FDM analysis, assessment and process control tools: the effective assessment of information obtained from digital flight data should be dependent on the provision of appropriate information technology tool sets.

(e) Education and publication: sharing safety information should be a fundamental principle of aviation safety in helping to reduce accident rates. The operator should pass on the lessons learnt to all relevant personnel and, where appropriate, industry.

(f) Accident and incident data requirements specified in CAT.GEN.MPA.195 take precedence over the requirements of an FDM programme. In these cases the FDR data should be retained as part of the investigation data and may fall outside the de-identification agreements.

(g) Every crew member should be responsible for reporting events. Significant risk-bearing incidents detected by FDM should therefore normally be the subject of mandatory occurrence reporting by the crew. If this is not the case, then they should submit a retrospective report that should be included under the normal process for reporting and analysing hazards, incidents and accidents.

(h) The data recovery strategy should ensure a sufficiently representative capture of flight information to maintain an overview of operations. Data analysis should be performed sufficiently frequently to enable action to be taken on significant safety issues.

(i) The data retention strategy should aim at providing the greatest safety benefits practicable from the available data. A full dataset should be retained until the action and review processes are complete; thereafter, a reduced dataset relating to closed issues should be maintained for longer-term trend analysis. Programme managers may wish to retain samples of de-identified full-flight data for various safety purposes (detailed analysis, training, benchmarking, etc.).

(j) The data access and security policy should restrict information access to authorised persons. When data access is required for airworthiness and maintenance purposes, a procedure should be in place to prevent disclosure of crew identity.

(k) The procedure to prevent disclosure of crew identity should be written in a document, which should be signed by all parties (airline management, flight crew member representatives nominated either by the union or the flight crew themselves). This procedure should, as a minimum, define:

(1) the aim of the FDM programme;

(2) a data access and security policy that should restrict access to information to specifically authorised persons identified by their position;

(3) the method to obtain de-identified crew feedback on those occasions that require specific flight follow-up for contextual information; where such crew contact is required the authorised person(s) need not necessarily be the programme manager or safety manager, but could be a third party (broker) mutually acceptable to unions or staff and management;

(4) the data retention policy and accountability, including the measures taken to ensure the security of the data;

(5) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner;

(6) the conditions under which the confidentiality may be withdrawn for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern;

(7) the participation of flight crew member representative(s) in the assessment of the data, the action and review process and the consideration of recommendations; and

(8) the policy for publishing the findings resulting from FDM.

(l) Airborne systems and equipment used to obtain FDM data should range from a quick access recorder (QAR) in an aircraft with digital systems, to a crash-protected flight recorder in an older or less sophisticated aircraft. The analysis potential of the reduced data set available in the latter case may reduce the safety benefits obtainable. The operator should ensure that FDM use does not adversely affect the serviceability of equipment required for accident investigation.

IMPLEMENTATION OF AN FDM PROGRAMME

Flight data monitoring is defined in Annex I to this Regulation. It should be noted that the requirement to establish a FDM programme is applicable to all individual aircraft in the scope of ORO.AOC.130, not to a subset selected by the operator.

(a) FDM analysis techniques

(1) Exceedance detection

(i) FDM programmes are used for detecting exceedances, such as deviations from flight manual limits, standard operating procedures (SOPs), or good airmanship. Typically, a set of core events establishes the main areas of interest that are based on a prior assessment of the most significant risks by the operator. In addition, it is advisable to consider the following risks: risk of runway excursion or abnormal runway contact at take-off or landing, risk of loss of control in flight, risk of airborne collision, and risk of collision with terrain.

Examples: low or high lift-off rotation rate, stall warning, ground proximity warning system (GPWS) warning, flap limit speed exceedance, fast approach, high or low on glideslope, heavy landing.

(ii) Trigger logic expressions may be simple exceedances such as redline values. The majority, however, are composites that define a certain flight mode, aircraft configuration or payload-related condition. Analysis software can also assign different sets of rules dependent on airport or geography. For example, noise sensitive airports may use higher than normal glideslopes on approach paths over populated areas. In addition, it might be valuable to define several levels of exceedance severity (such as low, medium and high).

(iii) Exceedance detection provides useful information, which can complement that provided in crew reports.

Examples: reduced flap landing, emergency descent, engine failure, rejected take-off, go-around, airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) or GPWS warning, and system malfunctions.

(iv) The operator may also modify the standard set of core events to account for unique situations they regularly experience, or the SOPs they use.

Example: to avoid nuisance exceedance reports from a non-standard instrument departure.

(v) The operator may also define new events to address specific problem areas.

Example: restrictions on the use of certain flap settings to increase component life.

(2) All-flights measurements

FDM data are retained from all flights, not just the ones producing significant events. A selection of parameters is retained that is sufficient to characterise each flight and allow a comparative analysis of a wide range of operational variability. Emerging trends and tendencies may be identified and monitored before the trigger levels associated with exceedances are reached.

Examples of parameters monitored: take-off weight, flap setting, temperature, rotation and lift-off speeds versus scheduled speeds, maximum pitch rate and attitude during rotation, and gear retraction speeds, heights and times.

Examples of comparative analyses: pitch rates from high versus low take-off weights, good versus bad weather approaches, and touchdowns on short versus long runways.

(3) Statistics

Series of data are collected to support the analysis process: these usually include the numbers of flights flown per aircraft and sector details sufficient to generate rate and trend information.

(4) Investigation of incidents flight data

Recorded flight data provide valuable information for follow-up to incidents and other technical reports. They are useful in adding to the impressions and information recalled by the flight crew. They also provide an accurate indication of system status and performance, which may help in determining cause and effect relationships.

Examples of incidents where recorded data could be useful:

             high cockpit workload conditions as corroborated by such indicators as late descent, late localizer and/or glideslope interception, late landing configuration;

             unstabilised and rushed approaches, glide path excursions, etc.;

             exceedances of prescribed operating limitations (such as flap limit speeds, engine overtemperatures); and

             wake vortex encounters, turbulence encounters or other vertical accelerations.

It should be noted that recorded flight data have limitations, e.g. not all the information displayed to the flight crew is recorded, the source of recorded data may be different from the source used by a flight instrument, the sampling rate or the recording resolution of a parameter may be insufficient to capture accurate information.

(5) Continuing airworthiness

Data of all-flight measurements and exceedance detections can be utilised to assist the continuing airworthiness function. For example, engine-monitoring programmes look at measures of engine performance to determine operating efficiency and predict impending failures.

Examples of continuing airworthiness uses: engine thrust level and airframe drag measurements, avionics and other system performance monitoring, flying control performance, and brake and landing gear usage.

(b) FDM equipment

(1) General

FDM programmes generally involve systems that capture flight data, transform the data into an appropriate format for analysis, and generate reports and visualisation to assist in assessing the data. Typically, the following equipment capabilities are needed for effective FDM programmes:

(i) an on-board device to capture and record data on a wide range of in-flight parameters;

(ii) a means to transfer the data recorded on board the aircraft to a ground-based processing station;

(iii) a ground-based computer system to analyse the data, identify deviations from expected performance, generate reports to assist in interpreting the read-outs, etc.; and

(iv) optional software for a flight animation capability to integrate all data, presenting them as a simulation of in-flight conditions, thereby facilitating visualisation of actual events.

(2) Airborne equipment

(i) The flight parameters and recording capacity required for flight data recorders (FDR) to support accident investigations may be insufficient to support an effective FDM programme. Other technical solutions are available, including the following:

(A) Quick access recorders (QARs). QARs are installed in the aircraft and record flight data onto a low-cost removable medium.

(B) Some systems automatically download the recorded information via secure wireless systems when the aircraft is in the vicinity of the gate. There are also systems that enable the recorded data to be analysed on board while the aircraft is airborne.

(ii) Fleet composition, route structure and cost considerations will determine the most cost-effective method of removing the data from the aircraft.

(3) Ground replay and analysis equipment

(i) Data are downloaded from the aircraft recording device into a ground-based processing station, where the data are held securely to protect this sensitive information.

(ii) FDM programmes generate large amounts of data requiring specialised analysis software.

(iii) The analysis software checks the downloaded flight data for abnormalities.

(iv) The analysis software may include: annotated data trace displays, engineering unit listings, visualisation for the most significant incidents, access to interpretative material, links to other safety information and statistical presentations.

(c) FDM in practice

(1) FDM process

Typically, operators follow a closed-loop process in applying an FDM programme, for example:

(i) Establish a baseline: initially, operators establish a baseline of operational parameters against which changes can be detected and measured.

Examples: rate of unstable approaches or hard landings.

(ii) Highlight unusual or unsafe circumstances: the user determines when non-standard, unusual or basically unsafe circumstances occur; by comparing them to the baseline margins of safety, the changes can be quantified.

Example: increases in unstable approaches (or other unsafe events) at particular locations.

(iii) Identify unsafe trends: based on the frequency and severity of occurrence, trends are identified. Combined with an estimation of the level of severity, the risks are assessed to determine which may become unacceptable if the trend continues.

Example: a new procedure has resulted in high rates of descent that are nearly triggering GPWS warnings.

(iv) Mitigate risks: once an unacceptable risk has been identified, appropriate risk mitigation actions are decided on and implemented.

Example: having found high rates of descent, the SOPs are changed to improve aircraft control for optimum/maximum rates of descent.

(v) Monitor effectiveness: once a remedial action has been put in place, its effectiveness is monitored, confirming that it has reduced the identified risk and that the risk has not been transferred elsewhere.

Example: confirm that other safety measures at the aerodrome with high rates of descent do not change for the worse after changes in approach procedures.

(2) Analysis and follow-up

(i) FDM data are typically compiled every month or at shorter intervals. The data are then reviewed to identify specific exceedances and emerging undesirable trends and to disseminate the information to flight crews.

(ii) If deficiencies in pilot handling technique are evident, the information is usually de-identified in order to protect the identity of the flight crew. The information on specific exceedances is passed to a person (safety manager, agreed flight crew representative, honest broker) assigned by the operator for confidential discussion with the pilot. The person assigned by the operator provides the necessary contact with the pilot in order to clarify the circumstances, obtain feedback and give advice and recommendations for appropriate action. Such appropriate action could include re-training for the pilot (carried out in a constructive and non-punitive way), revisions to manuals, changes to ATC and airport operating procedures.

(iii) Follow-up monitoring enables the effectiveness of any corrective actions to be assessed. Flight crew feedback is essential for the identification and resolution of safety problems and could be collected through interviews, for example by asking the following:

(A) Are the desired results being achieved soon enough?

(B) Have the problems really been corrected, or just relocated to another part of the system?

(C) Have new problems been introduced?

(iv) All events are usually archived in a database. The database is used to sort, validate and display the data in easy-to-understand management reports. Over time, this archived data can provide a picture of emerging trends and hazards that would otherwise go unnoticed.

(v) Lessons learnt from the FDM programme may warrant inclusion in the operator’s safety promotion programmes. Safety promotion media may include newsletters, flight safety magazines, highlighting examples in training and simulator exercises, periodic reports to industry and the competent authority. Care is required, however, to ensure that any information acquired through FDM is de-identified before using it in any training or promotional initiative.

(vi) All successes and failures are recorded, comparing planned programme objectives with expected results. This provides a basis for review of the FDM programme and the foundation for future programme development.

(d) Preconditions for an effective FDM programme

(1) Protection of FDM data

The integrity of FDM programmes rests upon protection of the FDM data. Any disclosure for purposes other than safety management can compromise the voluntary provision of safety data, thereby compromising flight safety.

(2) Essential trust

The trust established between management and flight crew is the foundation for a successful FDM programme. This trust can be facilitated by:

(i) early participation of the flight crew representatives in the design, implementation and operation of the FDM programme;

(ii) a formal agreement between management and flight crew, identifying the procedures for the use and protection of data; and

(iii) data security, optimised by:

(A) adhering to the agreement;

(B) the operator strictly limiting data access to selected individuals;

(C) maintaining tight control to ensure that identifying data is kept securely; and

(D) ensuring that operational problems are promptly addressed by management.

(3) Requisite safety culture

Indicators of an effective safety culture typically include:

(i) top management’s demonstrated commitment to promoting a proactive safety culture;

(ii) a non-punitive operator policy that covers the FDM programme;

(iii) FDM programme management by dedicated staff under the authority of the safety manager, with a high degree of specialisation and logistical support;

(iv) involvement of persons with appropriate expertise when identifying and assessing the risks (for example, pilots experienced on the aircraft type being analysed);

(v) monitoring fleet trends aggregated from numerous operations, not focusing only on specific events;

(vi) a well-structured system to protect the confidentiality of the data; and

(vii) an efficient communication system for disseminating hazard information (and subsequent risk assessments) internally and to other organisations to permit timely safety action.

(e) Implementing an FDM programme

(1) General considerations

(i) Typically, the following steps are necessary to implement an FDM programme:

(A) implementation of a formal agreement between management and flight crew;

(B) establishment and verification of operational and security procedures;

(C) installation of equipment;

(D) selection and training of dedicated and experienced staff to operate the programme; and

(E) commencement of data analysis and validation.

(ii) An operator with no FDM experience may need a year to achieve an operational FDM programme. Another year may be necessary before any safety and cost benefits appear. Improvements in the analysis software, or the use of outside specialist service providers, may shorten these time frames.

(2) Aims and objectives of an FDM programme

(i) As with any project there is a need to define the direction and objectives of the work. A phased approach is recommended so that the foundations are in place for possible subsequent expansion into other areas. Using a building block approach will allow expansion, diversification and evolution through experience.

Example: with a modular system, begin by looking at basic safety-related issues only. Add engine health monitoring, etc. in the second phase. Ensure compatibility with other systems.

(ii) A staged set of objectives starting from the first week’s replay and moving through early production reports into regular routine analysis will contribute to a sense of achievement as milestones are met.

Examples of short-term, medium-term and long-term goals:

(A) Short-term goals:

             establish data download procedures, test replay software and identify aircraft defects;

             validate and investigate exceedance data; and

             establish a user-acceptable routine report format to highlight individual exceedances and facilitate the acquisition of relevant statistics.

(B) Medium-term goals:

             produce an annual report — include key performance indicators;

             add other modules to the analysis (e.g. continuing airworthiness); and

             plan for the next fleet to be added to programme.

(C) Long-term goals:

             network FDM information across all of the operator’s safety information systems;

             ensure FDM provision for any proposed alternative training and qualification programme (ATQP); and

             use utilisation and condition monitoring to reduce spares holdings.

(iii) Initially, focusing on a few known areas of interest will help prove the system’s effectiveness. In contrast to an undisciplined ‘scatter-gun’ approach, a focused approach is more likely to gain early success.

Examples: rushed approaches, or rough runways at particular aerodromes. Analysis of such known problem areas may generate useful information for the analysis of other areas.

(3) The FDM team

(i) Experience has shown that the ‘team’ necessary to run an FDM programme could vary in size from one person for a small fleet, to a dedicated section for large fleets. The descriptions below identify various functions to be fulfilled, not all of which need a dedicated position.

(A) Team leader: it is essential that the team leader earns the trust and full support of both management and flight crew. The team leader acts independently of others in line management to make recommendations that will be seen by all to have a high level of integrity and impartiality. The individual requires good analytical, presentation and management skills.

(B) Flight operations interpreter: this person is usually a current pilot (or perhaps a recently retired senior captain or instructor), who knows the operator’s route network and aircraft. This team member’s in-depth knowledge of SOPs, aircraft handling characteristics, aerodromes and routes is used to place the FDM data in a credible context.

(C) Technical interpreter: this person interprets FDM data with respect to the technical aspects of the aircraft operation and is familiar with the power plant, structures and systems departments’ requirements for information and any other engineering monitoring programmes in use by the operator.

(D) Gate-keeper: this person provides the link between the fleet or training managers and flight crew involved in events highlighted by FDM. The position requires good people skills and a positive attitude towards safety education. The person is typically a representative of the flight crew association or an ‘honest broker’ and is the only person permitted to connect the identifying data with the event. It is essential that this person earns the trust of both management and flight crew.

(E) Engineering technical support: this person is usually an avionics specialist, involved in the supervision of mandatory serviceability requirements for FDR systems. This team member is knowledgeable about FDM and the associated systems needed to run the programme.

(F) Replay operative and administrator: this person is responsible for the day-to-day running of the system, producing reports and analysis.

(ii) All FDM team members need appropriate training or experience for their respective area of data analysis. Each team member is allocated a realistic amount of time to regularly spend on FDM tasks.

EXAMPLES OF FDM EVENTS

The following table provides examples of FDM events that may be further developed using operator and aeroplane specific limits. The table is considered illustrative and not exhaustive. Other examples may be found in the documents published by the European Operators Flight Data Monitoring (EOFDM) forum.

Event Group

Description

Rejected take-off

High speed rejected take-off

Take-off pitch

Pitch rate low or high on take-off

Pitch attitude high during take-off

Unstick speeds

Unstick speed high

Unstick speed low

Height loss in climb-out

Initial climb height loss 20 ft above ground level (AGL) to 400 ft above aerodrome level (AAL)

Initial climb height loss 400 ft to 1 500 ft AAL

Slow climb-out

Excessive time to 1 000 ft AAL after take-off

Climb-out speeds

Climb-out speed high below 400 ft AAL

Climb-out speed high 400 ft AAL to 1 000 ft AAL

Climb-out speed low 35 ft AGL to 400 ft AAL

Climb-out speed low 400 ft AAL to 1 500 ft AAL

High rate of descent

High rate of descent below 2 000 ft AGL

Missed approach

Missed approach below 1 000 ft AAL

Missed approach above 1 000 ft AAL

Low approach

Low on approach

Glideslope

Deviation under glideslope

Deviation above glideslope (below 600 ft AGL)

Approach power

Low power on approach

Approach speeds

Approach speed high within 90 seconds of touchdown

Approach speed high below 500 ft AAL

Approach speed high below 50 ft AGL

Approach speed low within 2 minutes of touchdown

Landing flap

Late land flap (not in position below 500 ft AAL)

Reduced flap landing

Flap load relief system operation

Landing pitch

Pitch attitude high on landing

Pitch attitude low on landing

Bank angles

Excessive bank below 100 ft AGL

Excessive bank 100 ft AGL to 500 ft AAL

Excessive bank above 500 ft AGL

Excessive bank near ground (below 20 ft AGL)

Normal acceleration

High normal acceleration on ground

High normal acceleration in flight flaps up (+/- increment)

High normal acceleration in flight flaps down(+/- increment)

High normal acceleration at landing

Abnormal configuration

Take-off configuration warning

Early configuration change after take-off (flap)

Speed brake with flap

Speed brake on approach below 800 ft AAL

Speed brake not armed below 800 ft AAL

Ground proximity warning

Ground proximity warning system (GPWS) operation - hard warning

GPWS operation — soft warning

GPWS operation — windshear warning

GPWS operation — false warning

Airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS II) warning

ACAS operation — Resolution Advisory

Margin to stall/buffet

Stick shake

False stick shake

Reduced lift margin except near ground

Reduced lift margin at take-off

Low buffet margin (above 20 000 ft)

Aircraft flight manual limitations

Maximum operating speed limit (VMO)exceedance

Maximum operating speed limit (MMO)exceedance

Flap placard speed exceedance

Gear down speed exceedance

Gear selection up/down speed exceedance

Flap/slat altitude exceedance

Maximum operating altitude exceedance

GUIDANCE AND INDUSTRY GOOD PRACTICE

(a) Additional guidance material for the establishment of flight data monitoring may be found in:

(1) International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 10000 ‘Manual on Flight Data Analysis Programmes (FDAP)’; and

(2) UK Civil Aviation Authority CAP 739 (Flight Data Monitoring), second edition dated June 2013.

(b) Examples of industry good practice for the establishment of flight data monitoring may be found in the documents published by the European Operators Flight Data Monitoring (EOFDM) forum.

ORO.AOC.135 Personnel requirements

Regulation (EU) 2019/1384

(a) In accordance with point ORO.GEN.210(b), the operator shall nominate persons responsible for the management and supervision of the following areas:

(1) flight operations;

(2) crew member training;

(3) ground operations;

(4) continuing airworthiness or for the continuing airworthiness management contract in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, as the case may be.

(b) Adequacy and competency of personnel

(1) The operator shall employ sufficient personnel for the planned ground and flight operations.

(2) All personnel assigned to, or directly involved in, ground and flight operations shall:

(i) be properly trained;

(ii) demonstrate their capabilities in the performance of their assigned duties; and

(iii) be aware of their responsibilities and the relationship of their duties to the operation as a whole.

(c) Supervision of personnel

(1) The operator shall appoint a sufficient number of personnel supervisors, taking into account the structure of the operator’s organisation and the number of personnel employed.

(2) The duties and responsibilities of these supervisors shall be defined, and any other necessary arrangements shall be made to ensure that they can discharge their supervisory responsibilities.

(3) The supervision of crew members and personnel involved in the operation shall be exercised by individuals with adequate experience and the skills to ensure the attainment of the standards specified in the operations manual.

NOMINATED PERSONS

(a) The person may hold more than one of the nominated posts if such an arrangement is considered suitable and properly matched to the scale and scope of the operation.

(b) A description of the functions and the responsibilities of the nominated persons, including their names, should be contained in the operations manual.

(c) The holder of an AOC should make arrangements to ensure continuity of supervision in the absence of nominated persons.

(d) The person nominated by the holder of an AOC should not be nominated by another holder of an AOC, unless agreed with the competent authorities concerned.

(e) Persons nominated should be contracted to work sufficient hours to fulfil the management functions associated with the scale and scope of the operation.

COMBINATION OF NOMINATED PERSONS RESPONSIBILITIES

(a) The acceptability of a single person holding several posts, possibly in combination with being the accountable manager, should depend upon the nature and scale of the operation. The two main areas of concern should be competence and an individual’s capacity to meet his/her responsibilities.

(b) As regards competence in different areas of responsibility, there should not be any difference from the requirements applicable to persons holding only one post.

(c) The capacity of an individual to meet his/her responsibilities should primarily be dependent upon the scale of the operation. However, the complexity of the organisation or of the operation may prevent, or limit, combinations of posts which may be acceptable in other circumstances.

(d) In most circumstances, the responsibilities of a nominated person should rest with a single individual. However, in the area of ground operations, it may be acceptable for responsibilities to be split, provided that the responsibilities of each individual concerned are clearly defined.

NOMINATED PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE CONTRACT WITH A CAMO PURSUANT TO POINT M.A.201(ea)

If the operator concludes a contract with a CAMO pursuant to point M.A.201(ea) of Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, the person nominated by the operator in accordance with point ORO.AOC.135(a)(4) is responsible for the management and supervision of the continuing airworthiness management contract that is required by Appendix I to Part-M. This person should not be employed by the contracted CAMO to avoid conflict of interest. In addition, this person should have the following:

(a) practical experience and expertise in the application of aviation safety standards and safe operating practices;

(b) comprehensive knowledge of:

(i) the relevant parts of operational requirements and procedures;

(ii) the air operator certificate (AOC) holder’s operations specifications;

(iii) the relevant parts of the AOC holder’s operations manual; and

(iv) the relevant parts of the continuing airworthiness management exposition (CAME) of the contracted CAMO;

(c) knowledge of:

(i) human factors (HF) principles; and

(ii) safety management system (SMS) based on the EU management system requirements (including compliance monitoring) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 19;

(d) 5 years of relevant work experience, of which at least 2 years in an appropriate position in the aeronautical industry;

(e) a relevant engineering or technical degree, or an aircraft maintenance technician qualification with additional education that is acceptable to the competent authority; this condition may be replaced by 3 years of experience in addition to those specified in point (d); those 3 years should include an appropriate combination of experience in tasks related to aircraft maintenance and/or continuing airworthiness management and/or surveillance of such tasks;

(f) thorough knowledge of:

(i) the continuing airworthiness management contract;

(ii) the organisation’s management systems’ interfaces; and

(iii) the way of achieving harmonisation of those management systems;

(g) knowledge of a relevant sample of the type(s) of aircraft operated by the organisation, which is gained through a formalised training course; such a course should be at least at a level equivalent to Part-66 (Annex III to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014), Appendix III, Level 1 ‘General Familiarisation’ and may be provided by a Part-147 (Annex IV to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014) organisation, by the manufacturer, by the CAMO, or by any other organisation that is accepted by the competent authority; ‘relevant sample’ means that the related course should cover typical aircraft and aircraft systems that are operated by the organisation; and

(h) knowledge of Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014.

NOMINATED PERSONS

The smallest organisation that can be considered is the one-man organisation where all of the nominated posts are filled by the accountable manager, and audits are conducted by an independent person.

COMPETENCE OF NOMINATED PERSONS

(a) Nominated persons in accordance with ORO.AOC.135 should be expected to possess the experience and meet the qualification provisions of (b) to (f) respectively. Exceptionally, in particular cases, where the nominated person does not meet these provisions in full, the nominee should have comparable experience and also the ability to perform effectively the functions associated with the post and with the scale of the operation.

(b) Nominated persons for flight operations, crew training and ground operations should have:

(1) practical experience and expertise in the application of aviation safety standards and safe operating practices;

(2) comprehensive knowledge of:

(i) the applicable EU safety regulations and any associated requirements and procedures;

(ii) the AOC holder's operations specifications; and

(iii) the need for, and content of, the relevant parts of the AOC holder's operations manual;

(3) familiarity with management systems preferably in the area of aviation;

(4) appropriate management experience, preferably in a comparable organisation; and

(5) 5 years of relevant work experience of which at least 2 years should be from the aeronautical industry in an appropriate position.

(c) Flight operations. The nominated person should hold or have held a valid flight crew licence and the associated ratings appropriate to a type of operation conducted under the AOC. In case the nominated person’s licence and ratings are not current, his/her deputy should hold a valid flight crew licence and the associated ratings.

(d) Crew training. The nominated person or his/her deputy should be a current type rating instructor on a type/class operated under the AOC. The nominated person should have a thorough knowledge of the AOC holder’s crew training concept for flight, cabin and when relevant other crew.

(e) Ground operations. The nominated person should have a thorough knowledge of the AOC holder’s ground operations concept.

(f) Continuing airworthiness. The nominated person for continuing airworthiness or for the continuing airworthiness management contract, as the case may be, should have the relevant knowledge, background and experience in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014. If a continuing airworthiness management organisation (CAMO) is contracted by the operator pursuant to point M.A.201(ea) of Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, please refer to AMC1 ORO.AOC.135(a)(4).

NOMINATED PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE CONTRACT WITH A CAMO PURSUANT TO POINT M.A.201(ea)

If the operator concludes a contract with a CAMO pursuant to point M.A.201(ea) of Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, the person nominated by the operator in accordance with point ORO.AOC.135(a)(4) is responsible for ensuring that both the operator and CAMO fulfil their obligations as specified in the contract (which is established in accordance with Appendix I to Part-M). In the particular context of a single air carrier business grouping, that person is expected to apply critical thinking, to be impartial, and not complacent about the fact that the CAMO belongs to that business grouping.

ORO.AOC.140 Facility requirements

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

In accordance with ORO.GEN.215, the operator shall:

(a) make use of appropriate ground handling facilities to ensure the safe handling of its flights;

(b) arrange operational support facilities at the main operating base, appropriate for the area and type of operation; and

(c) ensure that the available working space at each operating base is sufficient for personnel whose actions may affect the safety of flight operations. Consideration shall be given to the needs of ground crew, personnel concerned with operational control, the storage and display of essential records and flight planning by crews.

VFR DAY OPERATIONS WITH AEROPLANES WITH A MOPSC OF LESS THAN 7 AND HELICOPTERS WITH A MOPSC OF LESS THAN 5 TAKING OFF AND LANDING AT THE SAME AERODROME OR OPERATING SITE

Taking into account the size of the operator and the type of operations, appropriate facilities may consist in arrangements for:

(a) suitable office accommodation for the nominated person(s), as requested by ORO.AOC.135, and

(b) adequate working space for the flight preparation to be performed by the flight crew.

ORO.AOC.150 Documentation requirements

Regulation (EU) No 965/2012

(a) The operator shall make arrangements for the production of manuals and any other documentation required and associated amendments.

(b) The operator shall be capable of distributing operational instructions and other information without delay.