

Comment				Comment summary	Suggested resolution	From the commenter point	EASA	
NR	Name of the organisation commenting	Section, table, figure	Page			of view a modification of the published text is*: -Not requested; -Recommended; -Requested	comment disposition	
1	The Boeing Company	Special Condition	2 of 2	Overall special condition has primary focus associated with CS 25.855(a) and CS 25.857; however, special condition does not address restraint of subject storage containers as mentioned in Identification of Issue, second paragraph, first sentence.	<ul> <li>Special condition should cover these additional aspects:</li> <li>Cargo items should be stowed only in a location that is capable of restraining it per CFR 25.561 and other applicable structural requirements. Cargo placed in enclosed stowage areas should not be of such size that they prevent latched doors from being closed securely. The number/type of restraint devices and their attachment points should be capable of restraining the cargo in accordance with applicable certification specifications. The restraint system used must prevent load shift under all conditions of flight;</li> <li>Cargo stowage location should be such that, in the event of an emergency evacuation, it will not hinder egress;</li> <li>Cargo should not be placed where it can impede access to emergency equipment;</li> <li>Checks should be made before take-off, before landing, whenever the fasten seat belts signs are illuminated, and under orders of pilot in command to ensure that cargo is properly stowed. The cargo cannot impede evacuation from the aircraft or cause injury by falling (or other movement) as may be appropriate to the phase of flight.</li> </ul>	Recommended	Noted	The special condition containers. EASA agre suggested resolution such items are outsid consequence, no cha
2	The Boeing Company	Special Condition	2 of 2	Cabin preparation related to fire safety.	<ul> <li>Special condition should cover these additional aspects:</li> <li>Any heat generating systems (IFE, In-seat power, galley systems, etc.) in the cabin areas that the containers are located shall be disabled or deactivated;</li> <li>Automatic supplemental oxygen systems in the cabin areas in which cargo is transported will have to be removed from the PSU channels without leaving any opening or be deactivated.</li> </ul>	Recommended	Partially Accepted	EASA agrees that the field are relevant to t already addressed by must contain fires like special condition 1, so and landing. In order applicant has to addr may have on critical s oxygen systems and a introduced to the spe
3	AIRBUS	Para 1) b.	Page 2/2	The possibility for the carriage of dry ice needs to be clarified in the special conditions. Recent Cargo in Cabin projects in all aircraft programs aimed at among others transporting medical supplies especially vaccines against Covid 19. An exemption on Dangerous Goods as mentioned could be granted for the carriage of dry ice in the Cabin.	"prohibit the carriage of dangerous goods, batteries (including batteries contained in, or packed with, equipment), flammable fluid, mailwith the exception of dry ice used to cool e.g. vaccines (under conditions agreed with the EASA); inside the Storage Containers" or alternatively, Airbus would recommend clarifying the carriage of dry ice in a Means of Compliance Section of the Special Condition SC-D25.855-01.	Recommended	Not Accepted	The special condition containers. The trans by special condition 1 conditions and relate introduced to the spe



EASA response

ns address fire protection aspects of the design of the storage rees that the items suggested by the Commenter in the n field are relevant to the installation under discussion. However, de the scope of the special conditions proposed by EASA. As a ange will be introduced to the special conditions.

e items suggested by the Commenter in the suggested resolution the installation under discussion. However, such items are y special condition 3, which requires that the storage containers kely to occur based on the operating limitations specified in so that a cargo fire event will not prevent continued safe flight r to demonstrate compliance with special conditions 3, the ress the effects that a fire developing inside a storage container systems installed in proximity of that container, including any any electrical systems. As a consequence, no change will be recial conditions.

ns address fire protection aspects of the design of the storage sportation of dry ice inside the storage containers is not allowed 1 and would require the development of dedicated special ed means of compliance. As a consequence, no change will be ecial conditions.



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	4	AIRBUS	Para 3)	Page 2/2	The additional guidance should provide clarification on standards or conditions that would be acceptable to EASA to meet the objectives set in 3).	A means of compliance section in the Special Condition SC- D25.855-01 that clarifies how to demonstrate 3) would be useful.	Recommended	Partially Accepted	EASA has developed a However, the means c consultation.
	5	AIRBUS	Para 1)	Page 2/2	Additional limitations may be needed (like the conditions under which dry ice may be carried, ventilation settings in case of fire - if not already covered by the existing abnormal procedures,etc).	To add new Paragraph 1) f. as follows. f) additional limitation arising from the particular design / type of operation.	Recommended	Partially Accepted	EASA agrees that the or resolution field is releved condition 3 requires the based on the operatin event will not prevent compliance with specion operating limitations a continued safe flight a a consequence, no character
	6	Dassault Aviation	Special Condition		The "fare paying passenger" consideration should not be considered in the Part21 design scope but should be part of operational discussions.		Choose an item.	Not Accepted	According to CS 25.85. or passengers must m storage containers add the cargo compartmen Considering the specif has determined that ti Storage Containers can Operating limitations i of the fires likely to oc level of safety achieve considered by EASA su when the Storage Con in the test methodolog In fact, fire containme which is consistent wit representative of all co Storage containers ba that with Amendment definition from 25.855 limitations that are as of control of a cargo fi EASA has also conside equipped with Class E is incompatible with ti Considering that for th contain the fire is base storage containers do through the discharge determined that trans level of safety achieve



EASA response

a means of compliance with the proposed special conditions. of compliance developed by EASA are not subject to public

change suggested by the Commenter in the suggested want to the installation under discussion. However, special hat the storage containers must contain fires likely to occur ng limitations specified in special condition 1, so that a cargo fire t continued safe flight and landing. In order to demonstrate ial conditions 3, the applicant has to determine if additional and emergency procedures need to be introduced to ensure and landing in case a fire develops inside a storage container. As ange will be introduced to the special conditions.

5(a) each cargo or baggage compartment not occupied by crew leet one of the class requirements of CS 25.857. However, the dressed by the proposed special conditions do not meet any of nt classes definitions specified in CS 25.857.

ficities of the design of the proposed Storage Containers, EASA he approach to be used to control fires likely to occur inside the n only be based on fire containment through oxygen starvation in the AFM are required in order to reduce the level of severity ccur inside the Storage Containers. It must be noted that the ed through the proposed fire containment approach is not ufficiently high to allow fare-paying passengers in the cabin, ntainers are loaded. This is mainly due to the limitations intrinsion gy based on which fire containment capability is demonstrated. ent is demonstrated with a specific definition of the fire load, th the limitations specified in the AFM, but cannot be combinations of cargo items that may be transported in the sed on the above-mentioned AFM limitations. It must be noted t 3 of CS-25 EASA has deleted the Class D cargo compartment 5 and 25.857, following accidents that have clearly shown the sociated to the use of fire containment approach as sole means ire.

ered the requirements applicable to freighter aeroplanes cargo compartments, in for which the transportation of cargo ransportation of passengers (ref. CS 25.857(e)).

he proposed Storage Containers installation the only means to ed on passive fire containment, and that the design of the bes not allow access to their content to perform fire-fighting e of the content of a handheld fire extinguisher, EASA has sportation of fare-paying passengers is not compatible with the ed with the proposed design.