



Certification Memorandum

Turbine Engines – High Pressure Turbine Shaft Loss of Load and Rotor Integrity

EASA CM No.: CM-PIFS-017 Issue 01 issued 20 November 2020

Regulatory requirement(s): See table in Paragraph 1.2

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Log of issues

Issue	Issue date	Change description
01	20.11.2020	First issue.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose and scope

The purpose of this Certification Memorandum is to provide additional guidance to the Applicant when complying with CS-E 840 (c) and CS-E 850 (a)(3) & (b)(2) for a High Pressure Turbine (HPT) shaft. In particular the criteria defined by CS-E 850 (b)(2)(i) thru (v) are further clarified, and additional guidance is provided to demonstrate that the failure of certain elements of the HPT shaft are predicted to occur at a rate not in excess of Extremely Remote.

1.2. References

It is intended that the following reference materials be used in conjunction with this Certification Memorandum:

Reference	Title	Code	Issue	Date of entry into force
CS-E 25	Instructions for Continued Airworthiness	CS-E	6	24 June 2020
CS-E 510	Safety Analysis	CS-E	6	24 June 2020
CS-E 515	Engine Critical Parts	CS-E	6	24 June 2020
CS-E 520	Strength	CS-E	6	24 June 2020
CS-E 650	Vibration Surveys	CS-E	6	24 June 2020
CS-E 840	Rotor Integrity	CS-E	6	24 June 2020
CS-E 850	Compressor, Fan and Turbine Shafts	CS-E	6	24 June 2020

1.3. Abbreviations

AIA	Aerospace Industries Association	
ALS	Airworthiness Limitation Section	
CM	Certification Memorandum	
ESF	Equivalent Safety Finding	
FMECA	Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis	
НРТ	High Pressure Turbine	
ICA	Instructions for Continued Airworthiness	
TC	Type Certificate	
WG	Working Group	



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1.4. Definitions

Shaft System See applicable item of Table 1 in paragraph 3.1 of this CM

2. Background

2.1. CS-E 840 and CS-E 850 Specifications

When determining the operating conditions applicable for rotor overspeed, <u>CS-E 840</u> Rotor Integrity requires to evaluate the loss of load of the turbine rotor(s):

(c) The highest over-speed which will result from a complete loss of load on a turbine rotor, unless it can be shown to be Extremely Remote under the provisions of CS-E 850, must be included in the over-speeds considered under each of CS-E 840(b)(3)(i), (ii) and (b)(4), irrespective of whether it is the result of a Failure within the Engine or external to the Engine.

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As seen above, CS-E 840 (c) allows to exclude this evaluation when the loss of load can be shown to be Extremely Remote. The relevant provisions of <u>CS-E 850</u> Compressor, Fan and Turbine Shafts are extracted below:

(a) Objectives.

(1) It must be demonstrated that Failures of the shaft systems will not result in Hazardous Engine Effects, except as provided in CS-E 850(a)(3).

•••

- (3) If compliance with the objective of CS-E 850(a)(1) is not achieved for certain elements of a shaft, it must be shown that Failures of these elements are predicted to occur at a rate not in excess of that defined as Extremely Remote.
- (b) Compliance.

...

- (2) Hazardous Shaft Failures. In complying with CS-E 850(a)(3), the Failure rate of certain elements of shaft systems will be accepted as Extremely Remote if: -
 - Paragraphs (i) through (v)

2.2. EASA ESF E-07 on CS-E 840 and CS-E 850

In December 2012, EASA published for public consultation a Proposed Equivalent Safety Finding (ESF) on CS-E 840/850 – Rotor Integrity/Shafts in order to accept, if sufficiently substantiated, exclusion of the whole or part of the High Pressure Turbine (HPT) shaft from failure considerations when determining the terminal high pressure turbine rotor speed in the event of a complete loss of load event. Following the publication of the Comment Response Document (CRD), the ESF was adopted¹.

Note: The CRD did not modify the Proposed ESF, which is considered Final.



ESF CS-E 840-850 Dec2012




CRD ESF CS-E 840-850

Proposed ESF: https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/certification-docs-esf-ESF-on-CS-E-840-%26-850.pdf CRD: https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/certification-docs-esf-CRD-to-ESF-on-CS-E-840-850.pdf

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¹ ESF on CS-E 840/850 – Rotor Integrity/Shafts, published in December 2012. For record purposes, this ESF is considered to be Issue 1 of EASA ESF E-07.





Since EASA published this ESF, other authorities took similar approaches for accepting such exclusions of HPT shaft elements from the failure considerations described above. However some specific or additional provisions were introduced by these authorities within their regulatory framework, which in some cases were not fully harmonised with the EASA ESF.

2.3. The Propulsion Industry/Authority Working Group (AIA Advisory Group)

In the past years applicants have improved their understanding of the behaviour of turbine engines following shaft failure, notably using modern simulation tools validated through engine testing and/or actual events.

A propulsion industry/authority working group has reviewed the provisions contained in both CS-E and CFR Part 33 on this topic, considered the various publications described above, and recommended improvements to clarify and harmonise the way compliance should be shown with the applicable certification specifications.

On 13 May 2019, the working group issued a report entitled "Guidance on exclusion of a High Pressure Turbine (HPT) shaft element, section, or system from failure consideration in determining the terminal High Pressure Turbine rotor speed in the event of a complete loss of load event". This report is included in Annex 1 of this CM.

3. EASA Certification Policy

3.1. Guidance on exclusion of a High Pressure Turbine (HPT) shaft element from failure consideration in determining the terminal High Pressure Turbine rotor speed in the event of a complete loss of load

In view of the above, EASA considers that the guidance material released by the industry/authority working group, as included in Annex 1 of this CM, is appropriate.

This guidance should be used by applicants when showing compliance with CS-E 840 (c), CS-E 850 (a)(3) & (b)(2), or when proposing an Equivalent Safety Finding such as ESF E-07 (referred in paragraph 2.2 of this CM) for an HPT shaft, in complement to AMC E 840 and AMC E 850, when excluding HPT shaft element from failure consideration in determining the terminal HPT rotor speed in the event of a complete loss of load event.

Table 1 lists the items that should be assessed for the excluded shaft elements, the corresponding paragraph and page number of the AIA WG report in Annex 1 of this CM, and additional comments or clarifications where necessary.

Note: Only the content of paragraphs of the AIA WG report listed in Table 1 are to be considered as additional guidance to AMC E 840 and AMC E 850.








Table 1 Items to be assessed when excluding HPT shaft element from failure consideration in determining the terminal HPT rotor speed in the event of a complete loss of load event

Item / Paragraph of the Report in Annex 1 of this CM	AIA WG Report Page #	Comments				
Definition of a Shaft System (*)	3 & Appx 5	Provides definition of a shaft system and examples for different rotor architectures				
Classification as Critical Parts in accordance with CS-E 515	6 (sub- item 1.)	Equivalent to CS-E 850 (b)(2)(i)				
Material and design features well understood, analysis validated	6 (sub- item 2.)	Equivalent to CS-E 850 (b)(2)(ii)				
Assessment of shaft environment	6 (sub- item 3.)	Equivalent to CS-E 850 (b)(2)(iii)				
Potential Mechanisms for Loss of Load in	a Torque	Carrying Section of a Shaft System				
Assessments as part of the Engineering F	Assessments as part of the Engineering Plan					
Fatigue and Damage Tolerance	7-9	Complementary guidance to CS-E 515 and AMC E 515 for lifing process and life debit for the excluded shaft elements				
Additional Guidance on Fatigue and Damage Tolerance Assessments	9-11	Assessment of loadpath components and crack propagation analysis to select or exempt locations from enhanced fatigue and damage tolerance assessment				
Low Pressure or High Pressure spool imbalance	11-12	Complementary guidance to CS-E 650 for the excluded shaft elements				
Rub/contact with adjacent components	12-13	Considerations of shaft areas subject to contact or rubs with adjacent parts				
Shaft overload conditions – Torsional, Axial, and Bending	13	Complementary guidance to CS-E 520 for imbalance and ultimate loads				
Bearing failures	13-14	Considerations of mechanisms, rates and consequences of bearing failures				
Over-temperature (Overheating)	14	Considerations of failure scenarios leading to over- temperature of the shaft				
Internal oil leaks and fires	14-15	Assessment of risks of internal fires from combustible fluids in the shaft FMECA (ref. CS-E 510)				
Failure of Combustion Systems	15	Assessment of combustion system failure in the shaft FMECA (ref. CS-E 510)				
Oscillatory loading from fuel flow instability or other aero-mechanical and vibratory resonant interactions	16	Consideration of vibratory resonances of shaft systems due to resonances with fuel system control natural frequencies or instabilities (ref. CS-E 650)				
Loss of spline lubrication	16	Assessment of loss of lubrication of spline or other mechanical torque coupling feature in the shaft FMECA (ref. CS-E 510)				

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Assessments as part of the Manufacturing Plan				
Improper assembly of the shaft system or damage to the shaft from the assembly process	16	Complementary guidances to the Manufacturing Plan of the shaft for the excluded elements (ref. CS-E 515 and AMC E 515)		
Manufacturing tolerances	16-17	E 313 and Aivic E 313)		
Assessments as part of the Service Management Plan				
In service and environmental assessments	17	Complementary guidance to the Service Management Plan of the shaft for the excluded elements (ref. CS-E 515 and AMC E 515)		
Identification and declaration of assumptions and installation requirements	6 (sub- item 4.)	CS-E 850 (b)(2)(iv) addresses declaration of assumptions in accordance with CS-E 30. In addition, declaration of excluded shaft elements and terminal speeds should be considered for inclusion in the instructions for installing and operating the engine in accordance with CS-E 20(d).		
Assessment of experience	6 (sub- item 5.)	Equivalent to CS-E 850 (b)(2)(v)		

^(*) The Definition of a Shaft System is applicable to HP shaft for the purpose of this CM, and is not intended to change the general shaft definition in AMC E 850.

3.2. Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

Any life limitation or maintenance action established following the assessment performed in paragraph 3.1 of this CM should be reviewed and, where applicable, recorded in the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) in accordance with CS-E 25.

3.3. Who this Certification Memorandum affects

This Certification Memorandum affects applicants for new turbine engine Type Certification (TC) when showing compliance with CS-E 840 (c) and CS-E 850 (a)(3) and (b)(2), as well as significant major changes to TCs (per point 21.A.101 of Part-21) of turbine engines where the affected areas include HPT shaft elements sought for exclusion from loss of load considerations.

4. Remarks

- Suggestions for amendment(s) to this EASA Certification Memorandum should be referred to the Certification Policy and Planning Department, Certification Directorate, EASA. E-mail <u>CM@easa.europa.eu</u>.
- 2. For any question concerning the technical content of this EASA Certification Memorandum, please contact:

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
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Annex 1 to CM-PIFS-017 Issue 01

Guidance on exclusion of a High Pressure Turbine shaft element, section, or system from failure consideration in determining the terminal High Pressure Turbine rotor speed in the event of a complete loss of load event

AIA CARS Committee (*)
Propulsion Subcommittee
Advisory Working Group
Loss of Load and Overspeed (14 CFR §33.27)

Issued on 13 May 2019



(*) Aerospace Industries Association – Civil Aviation Regulatory and Safety Committee

(**) In reference to the "Confidential" note on cover page of the document included in this Annex, EASA received on 22 July 2020 the clearance from AIA CARS to include the report in an EASA public CM.

(***) Note for Appendices of the AIA report:

- Appendix 4 "Data Collection Summary" is not deemed necessary to be included for the purpose of this CM
- Appendix 5 "Shaft Definition" is provided herein. It is applicable to HP shaft for the purpose of this CM, and is not intended to change the general shaft definition in AMC E 850.